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Abstract 
This thesis is basically in line with a common standpoint according 
to which Adam Smith's methodology deserves to be given the main 
priority in order to understand best his system of moral philosophy or 
'social science' in a modern sense. In this connection Smith's 'meta-
physics' is treated as an extremely important element to which our 
attention has to be drawn when we are concerned with his system of 
social science. This point of view differs primarily from an interpre-
tative framework which seems to be still influential; a perspective 
from which a linkage between metaphysics and science is ignored. 
Instead, this work is based on the argument that metaphysics which may 
be defined as confirmable yet irrefutable (thus extra-scientific) 
doctrines is at work in the background of scientific activities in 
such a way that the former proposes an outline of scientific research 
in terms of providing a general outlook whereby a coherent type of 
data may be sorted out, arranged and organized. The 'predominant' aim 
of this work on the basis of the view just mentioned is to seek a 
linkage between Smith's study of natural theology, which is 
responsible for providing an influential metaphysical doctrine, and 
other disciplines such as ethics and economics in his scheme of moral 
philosophy. 
I begin by identifying Smith's three metaphysical doctrines, the 
doctrine of mechanistic determinism, organismic philosophy, and the 
belief in a benevolent God (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 is designed to 
identify Smith's metatheoretical principles which, in conjunction with 
his metaphysics which is rooted in his theological outlook, serve to 
regulate or shape his 'theoretical' analysis of man and SOCiety. The 
three metatheoretical principles identified are the law of the 
heterogeneity, the belief in harmony, and the faith in progress. 
While Chapters 2 and 3 belong to a methodological discussion in a 
broad sense in the present work, they are not concerned with a 
methodological problem which is usually handled in relation to Smith's 
method of inqUiry. Chapter 4 is thus addressed to the treatment of 
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Smith's views on the nature of scientific knowledge, on the rules of 
procedures related to theoretical construction, and on how scientific 
results thus formulated are accepted and justified. In this chapter 
it is observed that Smith's view of science is in line with a realist 
posi tion within a broadly empiricist philosophical tradition. These 
three chapters can be seen as those which illuminate 'principles' that 
are important in understanding Smith's 'analytic' treatment of the 
individual and society. On the basis of this knowledge the subsequent 
chapters (Chapters 5 to 7) are intended to demonstrate and justify 
those 'principles' which are noted in the earlier part. Chapter 5 is 
therefore devoted to the clarification of the characteristics of 
Smith's ethical theory by reference to his metaphysical and 
metatheoretical principles. Smith's moral theory shows that it rules 
out the possibilities of conflict in moral discourse; he suggests the 
progress of moral values, just as he envisages the progress of legal 
codes and of wealth through time; both his theory of conSCience, and 
his equation of a science of morals with normative ethics (and also 
the problem of meta-ethics) are inextricably bound up with his 
organismiC philosophy. Chapter 6 deals with the application of the 
same 'principles' to parts of Smith's theoretical analYSis in the 
Weal th of Nations. It is observed that Smith's view of long-term 
economic evolution is in line with a type of an exchange economy which 
shows a steady growth, which is attributed to the point that Smith is 
bound to the concept of progress as a metatheoretical prinCiple. An 
examination of his theory of value and distribution reveals that at 
the analytic level he is not interested in aspects of conflict and 
exploitation in economic transactions; and despite a certain 
similarity of the observation about the negative effects of the 
division of labour, the difference of treatment in the formal analysis 
between Smith and Marx is due to the difference of the world view 
which is provided by their respective metaphysics. Chapter 7 is 
concerned with the bearing of Smith's religious conviction and its 
associated principles on his political attitude in economic affairs. 
This discussion is offered in connection with the proposition noted in 
the earlier part that metaphysics may have political suggestiveness 
(as well as methodo-logical suggestiveness). 
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Abbreviations and References on Works of Adam Smith 
I have employed throughout this thesis the Glasgow Edition of the 
Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, which was published as a 
series of volumes from 1976 onwards. The usages of the Glasgow Edition 
are used for abbreviations and references in the notes of each 
chapter. The abbreviations of Smith's written and reported works are 
li st ed below. 
Corr. 
EPS 
Ancient Logics 
Ancient Physics 
Astronomy 
External Senses 
Imitative Arts 
Stewart 
LJ (A) 
LJ (B) 
LRBL 
TMS 
WN 
Correspondence of Adam Smith 
Essays on Philosophical Subjects. included among 
which are: 
'The History of the Ancient Logics and Metaphysics' 
'The History of the Ancient Physics' 
'The History of Astronomy' 
'Of the External Senses' 
'Of the Nature of that Imitation which take place 
in what are called the Imitative Arts' 
Dugald Stewart, 'Account of the Life and Writings 
of Adam Smith' 
Lectures on Jurisprudenc~ Report of 1762-3 
Lectures on Jurisprudenc~ Report dated 1766 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
An Inquiry tnt 0 the Nat ure and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations. which is referred to as The 
Wealth of Nations 
In the Glasgow Edition, WN was edited by R. H. Campbell, A. S. 
Skinner, and W. B. Todd (1976) ; TMS, by D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie 
(1976); Corr. , by E. C. M.ossner and I. S. Ross <1977}; LJ (A) and LJ (B), 
by R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein (1978); EPS, by W. P. D. 
Wightman (1980) ; and LRBL, by J. C. Bryce (1983), The Glasgow Edition 
was published by Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Today, Adam Smith is principally renowned for his remarkable 
contribution to the subject of economics. The author of the Wealth of 
Nations opened up a new epoch in the history of economic thought in an 
endeavour to connect together diverse economic phenomena by virtue of 
a few principles, and to offer a systematic economic analysis, which 
his predecessors failed to achieve. But Smith was more than a great 
economist. Smith had a wide range of interests. Before Smith became 
a professor at the University of Glasgow, he gave a course of lectures 
whose subjects were of a literary nature. At an early stage of his 
career Smith was also interested in natural science and mathematics, 
and his essays on philosophical subjects were the products of his 
youthful concerns. However, above all, Smith's greatest concern in 
his lifetime was in the subject of moral philosophy, as the 
publication of his major two books, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and 
the Wealth of Nation~ suggests. It is thus not surprising that since 
the so-called 'Adam Smith renaissance' around the bicentennial 
celebration of the publication of the Wealth of Nations, a large 
number of scholars have talked about Smith's contribution to the 
social sciences in a modern sense. 1 ) The present st udy is likewise 
proposed as an attempt to understand Smith's system of social science. 
To begin with, we shall need to know the subjects of Smith's moral 
philosophy lectures, and the content of each subject wi thin moral 
philosophy. As is known from the report of John Millar, the lectures 
on moral philosophy were divided into four subjects embracing natural 
theology, ethics, jurisprudence, and economics. The outline of the 
contents of each subject which was described by Millar is as follows: 
His course of lectures on this subject was divided into four 
parts. The first contained Natural Theology; in which he 
considered the proofs of the being and attributes of God, and 
those principles of the human mind upon which religion is 
founded. The second comprehended Ethics, strictly so called, and 
consisted chiefly of the doctrines which he afterwards published 
in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. In the third part, he treated 
at more length of that branch of morality which relates to 
justice, and which, being susceptible of precise and accurate 
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rules, is for that reason capable of a full and part icular 
explanat ion. In the last part of his lectures, he examined 
those political regulations which are founded, not upon the 
principle of justice, but that of expediency, and which are 
calculated to increase the riches, the power, and the prosperity 
of a State .... What he delivered on these subjects contained the 
substance of the work he afterwards published under the title of 
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. z > 
The first part of moral philosophy lectures was Natural Theology. But 
Smith's lecture notes were perhaps burnt on his demand before death, 
and no writing on the subject has up to now survived, although some 
evidence remaining in other writings provides us with an idea of his 
theological views. Ethics constituted the second part, and as the 
above report of Millar tells us, its content was comprised in the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, where Smith's general theory of morality 
appears. The third part was Jurisprudence, which was thought to be 
'that branch of morality which relates to justice'. Smith failed to 
publish a book on this subject, but it was one of the works which he 
projected up to his last days. 3) . Two sets of students' notes survive. 
The final course of moral philosophy lectures was encompassed by 
Political Economy, whose contents later became in substance Smith's 
notable classic, the Wealth of Nations. The lectures on Political 
Economy, though it composed a distinct part of his moral philosophy, 
in Smith's plan, actually found its place in the framework of natural 
jurisprudence, which was considered by him as 'a theory of the general 
principles which ought to run through and be the foundation of the 
laws of nations'.4) Looked at from this point of view we can observe 
that in ,the lectures on moral philosophy Smith started with natural 
theology, worked on to ethics, and then proceeded to jurisprudence and 
political economy. 
Given this summary of the subjects of Smith's moral philosophy, a 
meaningful question arises as to vJhat would be the relationships 
between those different subjects within moral philosophy. Obviously, 
a great difficulty in dealing with this problem lies in the fact that 
Smith did not succeed in completing his planned project, and published 
just the two major books in his lifetime. Nevertheless, it seems that 
there have been many successful studies on this matter. 
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The discussions about the relation of the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments to the Wealth of Nations were, in the past, one of the most 
interesting debates among Smithian commentators. A number of 
nineteenth century interpreters found that there was a fundamental 
incompatibility between the two books; the so-called the 'Adam Smith 
Problem' . For example, it was claimed by H. T. Buckle that • In the 
Moral Sentiments, he ascribes our actions to sympathy; in his Wealth 
of Nation~ he ascribes them to selfishness. A short view of these two 
works will prove the existence of this fundamental difference'. S) 
That is, such a contention implies that Smith put forward an 
altruistic theory in the former work, while he came to propose an 
egoistic theory in the latter, which was seen to arise from a later 
change in his concern. But this argument which suggested an 
inconsistency between Smith's ethical and economic works in respect of 
the sources of human motivation and virtue has been refuted since the 
late nineteenth century, 6) so that these days few are likely to 
believe the 'Adam Smith Problem' in the original sense to hold true. 
Now it is'a commonplace that the former book contains Smith's complete 
account of moral psychology including the treatment of self-interest, 
whilst the latter book is built up on the assumption of a narrower 
human motivation of self-love, together with the basic premiss that 
the minimum state of justice is satisfied. 
On the other hand, many recent studies, which were made possible by 
the discovery of the two sets of students' notes on jurisprudence, 
contributed to the work of establishing Smith's planned intentions. 
Those studies focussed attention on a project of seeking the links 
between Smith's main books, in terms of the recovery of his 
jurisprudence or politics. For example, D.Winch made an endeavour to 
establish Smith's politics in the context of his ethics and economics, 
providing a wide-ranging historical reading about several political 
problems of his day. More importantly, K.Haakonssen demonstrated both 
that Smith's moral theory provided the basis for his framework of 
natural jurisprudence, thus pointing out the ethical and philosophical 
foundations of the latter, and that his political and economic 
arguments were the products of the application of the theory of law 
and government to particular historical situations.?) It is 
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noteworthy that these studies supplied the 'eventual' answer to the 
question which first brought about the 'Adam Smith Problem'. 
It seems, accordingly, that at present we can assume a systematic 
unity in the light of the relations between the different studies of 
man in society which Smith taught in the cO..lrse of moral philosophy, 
namely, ethics, jurisprudence or politics, and economics. But another 
question remains to be raised when our interest is to look at the 
relationship between the subjects within his moral philosophy. That 
is, what is the relation between natural theology, and the studies of 
man in society (mainly ethics and economics)? 
have tried to give an answer to this question. 
A number of aut hors 
On the basis of their 
answers those who have engaged in this matter may be divided into two 
main groups, 
each group). 
inclined to 
(if we ignore slight differences of opinion even within 
Firstly, many among the earlier commentators were 
hold that Smith's theological view was intimately 
connected with his ethical and economic doctrines, suggesting that the 
latter was 'logically' deduced from the former. On this type of 
interpretation, Smith's theoretical products in the study of society 
were based on a deduction from his belief in a natural order in the 
universe. Secondly, there is another position on this matter, which 
rightly criticizes the first line of interpretation on the ground that 
Smith's science of society is based on causal analysis only. In this 
view, Smith's religious conviction is in no sense essential to, and 
has no place in, his science of society. Whereas it is admitted that 
Smith's theological outlook is part of his whole system, it is denied 
that he relies on it for the naturalistic analysis of society. 9) 
Smith's principal concern is with an accurate description of social 
facts and a causal explanation of them, following the logic of 
science. There is no room for a linkage between his theological 
belief and science, 
commentators found. 
at least in the way that the former group of 
Smith's theology is, at the very most, an 
appendage to his study of nature and society. I t is even conceded 
that Smith's famous term, 'the invisible hand', contains a theological 
meaning. Yet the 'invisible hand' is claimed to play no role at all 
in direct relation to his scientific inquiry. This is the conclusion 
which is usually common to the second line of interpreters. 
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The second position on the relationship between Smith's natur-al 
theology and the science of man represents recent conventional wisdom 
in the sense that today a number of interpreters seem to accept it. 
Accordingly, it may be said that the subject in which Smith's 
religious conviction manifested itself now remains, in a sense, 
perfectly isolated from his • scientific' studies of society. In this 
vein it is very interesting to observe initially the remark of Jacob 
Viner. 
Modern professors of economics and of ethics operate in 
disciplines which have been secularized to the point where the 
religious elements and implications which once were an integral 
part of them have been painstakingly eliminated. It is in the 
nature of historians of thought, however, to manifest a 
propensity to find that their heroes had the same views as they 
themselves expound, for in the intellectual world this is the 
greatest honor they can confer upon their heroes. If perchance 
Adam Smith is a hero to the~ they follow one or the other of the 
two available methods of dealing with the religious ingredients 
of Smith's thought. They either put on mental blinders which hide 
from their sight these aberrations of Smith's thought, or they 
treat them as merely traditional and in Smith's day fashionable 
ornaments to what is essentially naturalistic and rational 
analysis ... For these writers the teleological aspects of Smith's 
thought have only nuisance value. S ) 
Viner's message is clear: the practitioners have a psychological 
propensity to ignore, from today's convention and perspective, 
religious factors which were basic to certain classical writings, say, 
Smith's work. This may well be true, but it can be noticed that there 
has been the same tendency among many contemporary historians of 
thought, as well as among the practitioners. Hence, in my view, the 
tendency to isolate entirely Smith's scientific performance from the 
religious ingredients is not that which can be ascribed simply to a 
I psychological propensity'; one similar to the inclination by which 
'to see it [a classical work) as leading in a straight line to the 
discipline's present vantage', as Kuhn once stated in The Structure of 
Sci ent i fi c Revol ut i on. While I am ready to admit that in the case of 
Smith such a psychological propensity which Viner notes has actually 
worked, yet I think that a more fundamental source of the recent 
popular opinion above mentioned appears to rest partly on the view of 
science which one believes to be genuine. 
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A popular view of science in modern times has told us the 
following. 10) Science starts with experience. Science as knowledge 
is derived in some 
Inductive reasoning 
rigorous way from observation 
from the facts acquired by 
and experiment. 
observation and 
experiment leads to the formulation of scientific theories, and the 
results of scientific theories are verified by appeal to observation 
and experimentation. At the same time it is stressed that personal 
value judgment or preference and speculation do, and should, find no 
place in science. The movement of logical positivism in this century 
has brought this view of science up to an extreme form of empiricis~ 
All that cannot be derived from observation and experiment are 
conceived to have the status of non-science. In this view of science, 
metaphysical statements are seen to be neither true nor false, but 
meaningless. This view of science became a standard view in the past 
<before 1960s) and still has not a little influence today. What is of 
particular importance for our purpose is that metaphysics has no place 
in science according to this view. It is unscientific and has nothing 
to do with science proper. 
In this connection it will be interesting to note the distinction 
between 'vision' and 'economic (or scientific) analysis' which was 
made by Joseph Schumpeter, one of the great historians of economic 
thought. According to hi~ vision is 'ideological almost by 
definition [since] it embodies the picture of things as we see 
them'. It is also equivalent to 'the way in which we wish to see 
them'. This vision, in Schumpeter's view, is related to 'a preanalytic 
cognitive act', and 'enters on the very ground floor'. On the other 
hand, economic (or scientific) analysis comes after that preanalytic 
cognitive act based on vision, and consists of the purely analytic 
effort of applying the technique of analysis to selected material, 
following the rules of procedure. This stage of analytic effort is 
said to be 'almost as much exempt from ideological influence as vision 
is subject to it'. It seems clear that Schumpeter follows the logic 
of logical positivis~ Schumpeter separates 'economic (or scientific) 
analysis' proper from vision, by which he appears to mean the factors 
such as the world view, ideology, value judgments, and personal hopes 
and aspirations; he argues that there is no interrelationship between 
scienti fic analysis and vision. The one is rational and objective, 
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while the other is irrational and subjective. The logical face of 
science marked by the rules of procedure and the technique of analysis 
serves to correct errors brought about by vision, and scientific 
knowledge grows in this process. 11) Finally, in this way, if we 
consider the popular view of science in the past, and, as I believe, 
suppose its probable connection with many Smithian commentators of the 
second group before noted, it is hardly surprising that they offered a 
low opinion concerning the place of natural theology in Smith's scheme 
of moral philosophy. 
However, the decline of logical positivism came as a result of a 
large number of criticisms against it. There is one thing of special 
interest in this connection: the vital role which metaphysical 
doctrines play in conjunction with scientific inquiry and analysis. 
The theme already formulated by some historians of science, has been 
reinstated and clarified by some Popperian philosophers of science. 
Metaphysical doctrines are statements about the intrinsic nature of 
things in the universe. And they can be considered as the world view 
of a theorist only in such a sense. 12) Metaphysical doctrines inform 
us about the hidden existence of something in the universe of which we 
may have only confirming evidence. They are inconclusively 
confirmable, yet unverifiable and unfalsifiable. Accordingly, there 
is no way of checking them by means of experiment and observation. 
This is the reason that they become meaningless statements by the 
standards of a logical positivist. Nonetheless, they are 
methodologically suggestive since they function in a way that exerts a 
regulative influence on the construction of scientific theories. They 
tell us ways of seeing and examining the world, so that they come to 
limit or rule out a certain range of theoretical possibilities. 
Finally, they have moral or political suggestiveness. 13) These days 
it seems commonplace among contemporary philosophers of science that 
metaphysics is influential in scientific activity. 
Looked at in this way it will be obvious that the part that 
metaphysics plays in relation to scientific inquiry and analysis 
should not be left out of consideration, in the way that many 
positivist interpreters of Smith's work have done. This provides a 
good reason for the reconsideration of the role and place of the 
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'first' subject of Smith's moral philosophy, natural theology. in 
conjunction with his studies of man in society. The main purpose of 
the present work is to make more apparent an intimate linkage between 
Smi th' s nat ural theology and his • theoret ical' system of ethics and 
economics, by reference to the theme just described about the 
relationship between metaphysics and science. It is my belief that if 
we fail to draw proper attention to the relationship between Smith's 
religious conviction (metaphysics) and his 'analytical' studies of 
ethics and economics (science), we might stay content with a less 
correct state of exegesis with respect to his work. 
In my view, there is a great misunderstanding which has occurred 
owing to the failure of the existing commentaries to shed light on the 
precise relationship between Smith's theological outlook and science 
of SOCiety. The point is, as a matter of fact, very important in that 
it has found its final end in the conclusion of the 'duality' of 
Smith's philosophic and historical vision. Viner's famous paper 
brought to the attention of commentators the broad existence of the 
flaws in the natural order in the Wealth of Nation~ or a large number 
of cases where the 'invisible hand' does not work in the book. 14) On 
account of this Viner found a discrepancy between Smith's major two 
books: while Smith's system of ethics was developed on the basis of a 
harmonious order in nature, his system of economics departed partially 
from the presupposition. This is a divergence between the two books 
which is • impossible of reconciliation even by such heroic means as 
one writer has adopted of appeal to the existence in Smith's thought 
of a Kantian dualism'. 15) In this vein Viner says: 'His philosophical 
speculations about a harmonious order in nature undoubtedly made it 
easier for him to reach a laissez faire policy. though I believe that 
the significance of the natural order in Smith's economic doctrines 
has been grossly exaggerated'. 16) 
In a similar context, some reference should be made to A.Macfie's 
contention. Macfie initially agrees with Viner's aforementioned 
opinion about the Weal th of Nations. But Macfie, unlike Viner, 
correctly notes both that Smith does not deduce logically his moral 
theory from his theological faith, and that the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments likewise reveals the dark side of social life. The 
- 8 -
I NT ROD UCTI ON 
'irreconcilable conflict' between the happy and the dark sides of 
human life is, Macfie claims, much sharper within the earlier book 
than between the two books. Macfie concludes: 
There is in fact conflict within both books. In the MOral 
Sentiments the optimistic theism (deduced from faith) is in 
conflict with the inductive sympathy-spectator argument, and with 
the firm grasp of the seamier side of human nature and life. In 
the Wealth of Nations, theism naturally hardly appears at the 
level of economic discourse. But the opposition between the ideal 
picture of free and equal competition backed by fair play and 
justice, and the harsh facts of business is just a reflection of 
the Moral Sentiments opposition. In a system-building, synthetic 
thinker like Smith, such oppositions are to be expected. Smith 
after all is stat ing a form of faith which was general in his 
school ... 17) 
In brief, the bright and the dark sides of human life had been present 
from the outset within Smith's major two books; and given that Smith 
recognized the dark side of life from the outset in both writings, 
there is no reason to think that his ethical and economic doctrines 
were grounded on his religious faith 'in a benevolent Deity. 
Eventually, Smith's religious view, Macfie asserts, is no more than a 
mere expression of a convention which was dominant in his day, and to 
such an extent should be seen to have no connection with his study of 
society. 
After all, we are returning to the recent popular view about the 
relation of Smith's natural theology to his science of society. But 
what here is of great significance is that as a result of these 
studies commentators have come to see the two Smiths, or the 
'coexistence' of the two contrasting features within both books, 
namely, the 'beatific' and the 'seamy' aspects of Smith's argument, 
both of which are claimed to be independent of Smith's theological 
outlook. This kind of perception seems to have opened several doors 
for the study of Smith's work. In this connection there are two 
things to note. One of them is about Smith's method of inquiry. It 
has been claimed that Smith makes 'parallel' use of two distinctive 
methods, abstract and empirical, or ideal and real. 19) Another result 
concerns the duality of Smith's philosophic vision. 19) However, I 
think that if we come to understand properly the role that Smith's 
- 9 -
I NTROD UC TI ON 
theological view as metaphysics plays in his science of society, we 
are able to reach a different yet more coherent result. 
The aim of the present study is to examine the relation between 
natural theology and other disciplines like ethics and economics in 
Smith's scheme of moral philosophy. And in the course of discussion 
attention will therefore be drawn to many present interpretations 
which are related to the argument of the 'two Smiths', or the duality 
of Smith's vision. I suggest that such commentaries are misleading 
owing to the failure to make out the exact relation between Smith's 
religious faith and his 'analytic' treatment of the individual and 
society. For this stated purpose, in Chapter 2, I shall begin with 
introducing the achievements in the contemporary philosophy of 
science, which are designed to establish that metaphysics is in fact 
influential in scientific inquiry 
methodologically, but morally or 
in the way which is 
poli tically suggest i ve. 
not merely 
I shall 
proceed to draw attention to Smith's three metaphysical doctrines 
which correspond, I think, with what we mean by metaphysics as defined 
above; the doctrine of mechanistic determinis~ organismic philosophy, 
and the belief in a benevolent Deity. The account of the role of the 
doctrine of mechanistic determinism will be very limited, and no more 
discussion in particular conjunction with the doctrine will be offered 
in subsequent chapters, for it is a doctrine too familiar to us, and 
its implications are usually well-known. But we shall have some 
occasions to examine the methodological implications of normative 
organicism, since its role in Smith's work has generally been 
overlooked. Of course, our major attention will be given to the part 
which Smith's religious faith in a benevolent God plays in relation to 
his 'formal' or 'theoretical' analysis of morality and economics. For 
the sake of this we shall try to identify Smith's metatheoretical 
principles which are inextricably associated with his theological view 
concerning God's benevolence. By 'metatheoretical' principles I means 
those which, in conjunction with a metaphysical doctrine, 'concretely' 
perform an organizing or gUiding role in scientific inquiry by way of 
proposing or ruling out a certain range of theoretical possibilities. 
It is also worth noting that a metatheoretical principle, as I propose 
it, has the similar characteristic as metaphysics. That is,such a 
principle has confirming evidence, yet is not subject to an empirical 
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test in terms of observat ions. Chapter 3 will be devoted to this 
task, and it will be seen that I identify three principles in the 
metatheoretical dimension, namely, the law of the heterogeneity of 
purposes, the belief in harmony (or the principle of ruling out 
conflict), and the faith in progress. In my vie~ the identification 
of these three elements in the metatheoretical dimension is of the 
highest importance for our purpose, because they serve as the 
organizing principles in theory construction, and as a result help us 
to confirm the linkage of Smith's metaphysics derived from his study 
on natural theology to scientific investigation. Meanwhile, while the 
discussion about Smith's metaphysical and metatheoretical principles 
may be considered as a broadly methodological issue in relation to the 
present study, it is evident that such discussion does not give us 
information about his views on the nature of scientific knowledge, on 
the rules of procedure relating to theory construction, and on how to 
justify formulated theories. This issue will be treated in Chapter 4, 
where Smith's conception of science is deemed to stand in the realist 
tradition of science. In the. subsequent chapters (Chapters 5 to 7) we 
shall address ourselves to a project of demonstrating and justifying 
the themes which were proposed in the previous chapters. In summary, 
the following can be said. The present thesis falls into two parts, 
though I do not try to make an explicitly visible division in terms of 
a title. Chapters 2 to 4 which are intended as Part I will be 
addressed to the elucidation of what may be regarded as 'principles', 
and Chapters 5 to 7 which can be seen as Part II are concerned with 
their application to parts of Smith's analysis in his major work 
within the scheme of moral philosophy, the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
and the Wealth of Nations. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that whereas my treatment of 'principles' aims to be exhaustive, I do 
not attempt to cover the whole range of Smith's thought. Hence, I do 
not try to handle the aspects of Smith's thought in association with 
the doctrine of mechanistic determinism, and the principle of the 
heterogeneity of purposes. The implications and role of such ideas 
are ordinarily well-known, or have properly been treated by others. 
On the same ground I will not aim to examine Smith's historical work 
in detail, in conjunction with the metatheoretical principle of 
progress. 
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Finally, a few remarks need to be made with regard to the intended 
scope of the present study. Firstly, this study is not intended to 
evaluate the adequacy of Smith's arguments. This does not imply that 
Smith's arguments are perfectly complete and correct, looked at from 
today's perspective and knowledge. Instead, I believe that a 
sympathetic approach to his system should initially be made before any 
evaluation is made about it. Here I am trying to follow Bertrand 
Russell's advice that 'in studying a philosopher, the right attitude 
is neither reverence nor contempt, but first a kind of hypothetical 
sympathy, until it is possible to know what it feels like to believe 
in his theories'. 20) Seen in this connection it is likely to be 
important that Smith has to be understood and considered in the 
context of his times. It is well-known that Smith lived at a time 
when the terms, philosophy and science, were used synonymously. 21) 
This does not simply imply, as one usually thinks, that philosophy and 
science were considered to be the disciplines which sought the nearly 
same type of activity. Yet it also means that at least up to Smith's 
time, philosophical speculations which today we usually talk about, in 
scope, as such and such were 'consciously' closely linked to 
scientific activities. 22) Is the fact that a scientist takes 
seriously the importance of the idea of a benevolent God's government 
of the universe in scientific inquiry incompatible with the fact that 
at the same time he stresses the importance of scientific inquiry 
independent of theology and philosophy? Certainly, it is not. I think 
that Smith, like Newton, conceived the one to be compatible with the 
other without contradiction and circularity. A modern commentator 
made a similar pOint, and yet went on to point out that Smith's 
thinking in that way 'is, in the end, circular'.23) A more 
sympathetic approach, I suppose, may help to understand Smith's 
original intentions without ascribing such a defect to him. In my 
view, Smith does not find his arguments to be circular, because he 
would think that his theological or philosophical speculation, as it 
is drawn from, 
presupposition 
and confirmed by, observation of facts, becomes a 
(or a metaphysical idea I shall later note) of 
scientific investigation which is no longer dependent on the latter. 
This is an approach which I am going to adopt in the present study. 
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Secondly, it is highly significant to keep in mind that the 
dominant concern of the present study lies in an account with respect 
to the relation of an influential metaphysical idea to 'scientific' 
systems of ethics and economics. In other words, my main aim is to 
show the intimate relationship between Smith's theological view and 
his • formal' or • theoretical' analysis of morals and an economy. It 
will be quite strange if we talk about the oneness or the duality of a 
writer's world view or vision on the basis of his description of the 
reality at the practical level rather than from the conclusions of his 
theoretical systea This implies, on the other hand, a requirement of 
the evident distinction between Smith's theoretical doctrines and 
other statements, or Smith the theorist and Smith the observer. It is 
well-known, for example, that the Wealth of Nations is not like the 
textbooks of the present-day positive economics. Empirical or 
historical statements, and policy recommendations as well as 
theoretical analysis all are parts of the book. I shall have, from 
time to time, some occasions to collect the facts which Smith honestly 
recognizes in conjunction with the negative aspects of social life, 
but it will be done just with a view to revealing that Smith is so 
well-balanced about the diverse spectra of reality, and not a naive, 
speculative thinker who is liable to overlook them. Donald Winch's 
Adam Smith's Politic~ for example, offers a discussion in connection 
with Smith's description of the dark features of human life such as 
the enormous conflict arising from sectional interests and faction, 
and the deleterious effects of the division of labour, etc.. Yet I 
will not go into a detailed treatment of Smith's description 
concerning the negative aspects of human activities, although I do not 
believe it to be undeserving of attention,24.) since I am primarily 
interested in the elucidation of the relation between natural theology 
and the 'science' of man in society. In brief, in order to show the 
influence of Smith's study about natural theology on his system of 
'social science', my focus will be on the 'theoretical' dimension to 
his work, whilst I do not intend to overlook both the importance of 
Smith's discussion on the practical dimension, and the merit of other 
studies which have been concerned with its aspects. This is 
inevitable, both for my stated narrower purpose, and because it will 
usually be agreed that an author's philosophic vision has to be found 
in his 'theoretical' work. 
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Finally, it is to be noted that the present study aims to give more 
clarification to Smith's ideas. Hence, no attempt will be made to 
handle the problems of how far Smith's ideas depended on his 
predecessors, and have had some influence on his successors. But there 
are places where Mandeville and Marx are treated in some detail. The 
places are intended to note the differences of a perception of reality 
which a different set of world view or vision brings. 
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and 224. 
24) The fact that Smith was not blind to the dark feature of human 
affairs reflects that Smith was so complex and rich a thinker. This 
is not simply that he was so well-balanced a scholar in relation to 
the numerous aspects of reality; but that though he did not treat that 
negative side as an object of theoretical analysis, he attempted, in 
the face of those facts, to find many, whether voluntary or non-
voluntary, socialization mechanism which channels the negative 
respects of human activities into social benefit. We shall have an 
occasion to observe it later. 
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2.1. Introduction 
In ancient and medieval times, philosophy and science were part of 
a single system of thought and were not distinguished from each 
other. This was true at least up to Smith's day, although in the 
seventeenth century the chain between philosophy and science was 
gradually becoming broken. As is well-known, Smith made almost 
interchangeable use of these terms 'philosophy' and 'science'. But, 
since the nineteenth century philosophy and science have been 
completely separated from one another, and nowadays tend to be 
regarded as distinct types of discipline. Each has different aims and 
methods. Generally speaking, science is believed to be concerned with 
providing definite technical knowledge like descriptive laws or 
principles from which we can derive observational facts and which can 
be tested by experiment and observation. Philosophy is seen as a 
study which is designed to promote an understanding of the universe, 
like science, appealing to human reason, yet dealing with speculations 
on matters concerning which it is implausible to reach precise 
knowledge, since it can not be tested in terms of observational facts. 
Once the rift between philosophy and science occurred in this way, it 
was common that the scient ists were averse to the philosophical 
speculations which seemed to them often to lack definite method and 
expression, and to treat insoluble problems, whereas the philosophers 
lost interest in specific sciences which narrowed more and more in 
scope. Moreover, it seems that the rise of logical positivism in the 
early decades of this century has widened the breach between 
philosophy and science. For logical positivism, which is an extreme 
form of empiricism which claims that a body of knowledge can be 
identified, and has a meaning as science to the extent that it can be 
verified by appeal to facts acquired by virtue of experiment or 
observation, demanded a strict distinction between them and liberation 
from the philosophical speculat ions which can not be empirically 
checked. 
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However, it is unfortunate that in modern times philosophy and 
science tend, among most people, to be considered as two entirely 
different fields of knowledge. For science and philosophy are in fact 
'two ends of one chain'. 1) Science is a first-order discipline which 
seeks from statements about experience specific laws. Philosophy is a 
second-order discipline which supplies the 'intelligible principles' 
that help us to understand why various types of phenomena occur in a 
particular way. For example, suppose that we observe the motions of 
celestial bodies such as the motion of planets around the sun, and can 
show why such physical phenomena follow and that they are derived from 
Newtonian laws of motion. Yet, it remains obscure why these facts 
occur and why these laws account for them, unless there is a 
philosophical speculation or an intelligible principle, which is far 
from our immediate experience, to the effect that the universe is 
composed of atoms with their associated central forces. Because of 
this thing science and philosophy are said to constitute both ends of 
a single chain from observed facts to intelligible prinCiples. The 
most creative scientists, as distinct from most ordinary practitioners 
and teachers of science, were fully aware of this link between 
philosophy and science. Hence, Albert Einstein, one of the most 
creative physicists, stated the matter in this light: 
I can say with certainty that the ablest students whom I met as a 
teacher were deeply interested in the theory of knowledge. I 
mean by "ablest students" those who excelled not only in skill 
but in independence of judgment. They liked to start discussions 
about the axioms and methods of science and proved by their 
obstinacy in the defense of their opinions that this issue was 
one important to them. 2) 
Looked at in this way it is evident that an intimate link between 
science and philosophy, though we distinguish those two fields, is 
inevi table. Fortunately it seems that recently there is a growing 
concern in the philosophy of science among scientists, and on the 
other hand, philosophers have also been increasingly prepared to stUdy 
science and its history.3) The decline of logical positivism in the 
last three decades, I believe, is closely bound up with this kind of 
collaboration between scientists and philosophers, which has brought 
about the rapid advancement of the philosophy of science in recent 
decades. 
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Given this, there seems to be enough ground on which on the basis 
of the current performances of the philosophy of science we examine 
the present comment on Smith. Asis well-known,. Smith's work has been 
hailed as a scientific system since his day. Governor Pownall of 
Massachuset ts, one of Smith's contemporary crit ics, considered the 
Wealth of Nations as 'INSTITUTE OF THE PRINCIPIA of those laws of 
motion'.4) Dugald Stewart, Smith's first biographer, wrote that 'it 
may be doubted, with respect to Mr. Smith's Inquiry. if there exists 
any book beyond the circle of the mathematical and physical sciences, 
which is at once so agreeable in its arrangement to the rules of a 
sound logiC, and so accessible to the examination of ordinary 
readers'.6) This kind of appreciations of his later book continues up 
to now. G) Similarly, Smith's earlier work on ethics, the Theory of 
Moral Sentiment~ has been judged as a scientific treatise as well. 7) 
While it should be accepted that such scientific characteristic of his 
work is important in its own right, yet I believe that we do not have 
to exclude an enterprise which connects his philosophical background 
with his scientific activities, on the ground above noted, i.e., that 
philosophy and science are both ends of the 'same' chain, direct 
observations and intelligible principles. It will be so more because 
Smith himself used interchangeably the two terms,philosophy and 
science, without distinction. Therefore, in the next section we 
shall first devote ourselves to a task of noticing recent achievements 
in the philosophy of science which have been made possible by the 
reactions of the Popperian school against logical positivis~ It is 
claimed that metaphysical speculations are influential in scientific 
projects in a way that is methodologically suggestive. Metaphysics 
may have moral or political suggestiveness as well. In the final 
section we shall proceed to identify Smith's metaphysical doctrines, 
which I believe to have a regUlative influence on his scientific 
researches. 
2.2. Metaphysics and Science 
At present it seems to be a common-place among contemporary 
philosophers and historians of science that metaphysical speculations 
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are significant in science. More concretely, it is agreed that 
science and its advancement are guided by metaphysical ideas which are 
formulated in such a way that it can not be checked by the ordinary 
criteria of scientific appraisal. B ) But it is important to note that 
this kind of recognition was scarcely popular before the 1960s when 
logical positivism came under increasing attack. To begin with, we 
briefly need to mention some features of logical positivis~ for the 
purpose at hand and because logical positivism as a movement has been 
greatly influential for over half the twentieth century. 
It is said that logical positivism9 ) emerged in the 1920s, and that 
its most active part was played by the members of the Vienna Circle. 
Afterwards, it was developed by a number of philosophers and 
scientists. Even though logical positivism is a product of the early 
twentieth century, it has close link with positivism which has found a 
place in the history of philosophy. The main characteristic of 
logical positivism is that scientific knowledge is derived only from 
the facts of experience or observation. Observation and induction 
lead to the formulation of scientific theories. Those theories must 
be put in a form which is verifiable by observation and experiment, in 
order to gain the status of science, as distinguished from non-
science. And they can be justified as scientific and meaningful only 
to the extent to which they are verified by appeal to empirical 
observation and experimentation. In this connection we can observe 
two central propositions of logical positivis~ firstly, a scientific 
statement must fulfil the criterion of verifiability, and secondly, it 
should be tested by the process of verification. As a consequence 
metaphysical statements which deal with the world as a whole and its 
essence are thought to be neither true nor false, but a collection of 
meaningless statements, since they do not meet the requirement of 
verifiability and can not be checked by empirical method. 10) The 
same goes for value judgments and normative statements. 11 ) Because 
saying that something is good is almost equivalent to saying that it 
is desirable, and it is thus not translatable into any empirical 
statements at all, value judgments are not verifiable and do not 
belong to the domain of all rational enquiries. It is therefore not 
strange to find an anti-metaphysical attitude of logical positivis~ 
On that ground we can understand the reason that logical positivists, 
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like nominalists, absolutely rejected metaphysical speculation. In 
fact, it is admitted that positivism, although it was wrong in 
presuming that it fought metaphYSiCS as a whole, for it was 
metaphysics as well and actually fought bad metaphYSiCS, has been 
useful in that it urged scientists to exclude irrational or pseudo-
scientific practices in scientific explanations,i.a, not to seek to 
account for reality in terms of abstract metaphysical entities which 
do not allow for empirical specification. Moreover, it is important 
to note that logical positivism was partly proposed as a means of 
social reforms, of helping ordinary people to remove irrational 
prejudice and ideological fanaticism in public affairs by way of 
offering a scientific approach. 12) 
At all events the main theses of logical positivism have been 
considerably weakened by a number of criticisms put forward by two 
groups of the science of philosophers; the Popperian School,and others 
who adopt so-called Weltanschauungen approach such as RPolany, 
N. R. Hansen, T. S. Kuhn and P. K. Feyerabend. Now, among many themes 
arrived at by those criticisms there is one thing which is of 
particular importance for our purpose. That is related to the 
restricted language of logical positivism which renders implausible 
the appreciation as to the vital part that metaphysical doctrines 
play in conjunction with scientific investigation. As mentioned 
earlier, logical positivists maintain that experience or observation 
is the only way of acquiring knowledge about the real world. Behind 
this argument is one of the main assumptions of logical positivism; an 
assumption in which there are no such things as synthetic a priori 
propositions, namely, propositions that are valid independently of 
experience while at the same time telling us something about the real 
world. They make a strict distinction between analytic and synthetic 
propositions. For them 'analytic' statements mean statements which 
are tautological or necessarily true. Those analytic statements are 
therefore ones which can be validated independently of observation or 
experiment. They have nothing to do with the discovery of the real as 
distinct from the linguistic world. 'Synthetic' statements are 
statements which are not analyt ic. 
propositions, as above pointed out, 
meaningless. This conclusion 
On this assumption metaphYSical 
remain neither true nor false, but 
is inevi table, given the 
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'analytic/empirical' dichotomy. Yet, there was a reaction against 
this assumption. Certainly. there exists a synthetic a priori 
proposition which describes the factual world despite its truth or 
falsity being logically independent of observation. It is claimed 
that 'All-some' statements, such as 'Every event has a cause', belong 
to it, and must be considered as true-or-false despite their 
unverifiability-cum-unfalsifiability. Many normal metaphysical 
doctrines can be typified by a special sort of 'all-some' statement. 
On this basis it is pOinted out that metaphysical ideas are 
indeterminately confirmable yet irrefutable. 13) 
Given the logical structure of metaphysical propositions which 
logical positivists failed to precisely apprehend, a related concern 
is to see what role metaphysics performs in connection with scientific 
enquiry. Metaphysical doctrines are usually regarded as doctrines 
which make claims about the fundamental nature of reality in the arena 
under investigation. and yet provide speculative world pictures that 
are not ordinarily as criticizable as scientific hypotheses. As 
pointed out before, it is noteworthy that these metaphysical doctrines 
are methodologically an significant source of scientific 
invest igat ion. In this light Popper suggested: 'not a few doctrines 
which are metaphysical could be interpreted as typical 
hypostatization of methodological rules'. 14) In a place where Popper 
makes criticism about posi t i vism, he points out that scient ific 
advancement and discovery must have been impossible without recourse 
to metaphysical ideas: 
The fact that value judgments influence my proposals does not 
mean that I am making the mistake of which I have accused the 
positivists--that of trying to kill metaphysics by calling it 
names. I do not even go so far as to assert that metaphysics has 
no value for empirical science. For it cannot be denied that 
along with metaphysical ideas which have obstructed the advance 
of science there have been others - such as speculative atomism -
which have aided it. And looking at the matter from the 
psychological angle. I am inclined to think that scientific 
discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a 
purely speculative kind ...• a faith which is completely 
unwarranted from the point of view of science, and which, to 
that extent, is metaphysical. 15) 
Hence, it is evident that Popper recognizes sufficiently a very 
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considerable effect of metaphysical ideas on scientific problems in 
the context of discovery as distinct from that of justification. 
Meanwhile, it is also worth noting in a similar vein that in a 
historical perspective J.Agassi presented a close link between 
science and metaphysics. According to hi~ scientific problems which 
were in intimate association with metaphysical problems of a given 
period were frequently chosen as scientific research projects, and 
scientific outcomes were sought in order to implement topical 
metaphysical issues. Viewed historically, investigators who are 
conceived to be important in the history of science, Agassi claimed, 
have very often responded in this way, although it is also true that 
there are many scientific researches which are not directly tied to 
metaphysics. 16 ) As Agassi concluded: 
I do not know why the significant events in the history of 
science should be metaphysically significant, but I have so far 
found it almost always to be the case. I suggest the theory that 
significance with respect to (pure) science is usually 
significance with respect to science's metaphysical frameworks. 
It is understandable that if metaphysical frameworks are research 
projects they should be taken very seriously Yet those 
projects viewed later as significant show a capacity to throw 
light on current metaphysical issue. I can see no other 
explanation of the situation but that is essentially metaphysical 
interest which gives (purely scientific) significance to this 
part of science rather than to that; hence, most (pure) 
scientists are more interested in metaphysics than they seem to 
be. 17) 
Metaphysics should therefore be given a much more significant role 
within scientific inquiry than is generally expected. Logical 
positivism has had a bad effect on this sort of perception and brought 
about a gap between the philosophy and the history of science. 
In what follows we shall clearly need to take note of the main 
features of metaphysical doctrines in association with science. 18) 
Firstly, as noted, metaphysical doctrines are views about the 
intrinsic nature of things in the universe. Secondly, they are 
inconclusively confirmable,and yet unverifiable and unfalsifiable. 
Hence there exists no way of testing them empirically by virtue of 
experiment or observation. Thirdly, they are methodologically 
- 23-
CHAPTER 2 
suggestive. They do have a regulative influence on first-order 
scient i fic theories. As Watkins claimed: • they do not so much convey 
information as outline a programme of research. They express ways of 
seeing the world which in turn suggest ways of exploring it. They do 
not compete with scientific theories but suggest the shape of 
scient i fic theories to come they are second-order doctrines about 
the kinds of first-order theories which ought eventually to 
triumph' .19) In other words, metaphysics underlying a programme of 
research will exert a regulative role in theory construction in terms 
both of proposing a certain range of theoretical feasibilities, and of 
ruling out a certain range of other theoretical feasibilities. Since 
in this way the specific metaphysical ideas underlying a programme of 
research function as methodological prescriptions, they forbid the 
formation of empirical hypotheses which are incompatible with them: 
'Although haunted-universe doctrines [metaphysical statements] are 
unempirical in the sense that they are compatible with every 
conceivable finite set of observation statements, they are not 
analytic or vacuous, but synthetic or factual, because' there are 
empirical theories with which they will not be compatible'.20) 
Finally, metaphysical doctrines may have moral or political 
suggestiveness, although they do not entail a particular moral or 
political view. The moral and political attitudes of investigators 
may thus be affected by them. It can be concluded that in this way 
metaphysics plays a multilateral part in scientific inquiry by virtue 
of shaping and binding together into one system various types of 
belief. 21 ) 
What has been so far observed in conjunction with the influential 
role which metaphysical ideas have played in the formation of 
scientific theories and the advancement of science is the claim made 
by philosophers and historians of science of this century who 
disagree with logical pOSitivists about the place of metaphysics 
within science. However, it is interesting to find that a 
contemporary of Smith, Dugald Stewart, presented a theme which lends 
support to current philosophers and historians of science already 
named. Stewart was convinced that the metaphysical principles may be 
of great use in gUiding scientific researches. 22) In order to 
elucidate his argument, Stewart took 
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Harvey's discovery of a circulation of the blood. In Stewart's view, 
Harvey held a metaphysical doctrine that Nature does nothing in vain, 
and such a metaphysical doctrine played a decisive role in the 
discovery of the circulation of the blood. Stewart's quotation from 
Robert Boyle, a great pioneer chemist, shows this clearly: 
I remember, that when I asked our famous Harvey ... what were the 
things which induced him to think of a circulation of the blood ? 
He answered me, that when he took notice that the valves in the 
veins of so many parts of the body were so placed, that they gave 
free passage of the blood towards the heart, but opposed the 
passage of the venal blood the contrary way, he was invited to 
think, that so provident a cause as Nature had not placed so many 
valves without design; and no design seemed more probable than 
that, since the blood could not well, because of the interposing 
valves, be sent by the veins to the limbs, it should be sent 
through the arteries, and return through the veins, whose valves 
did not oppose its course that way.23> 
This statement is remarkable, I suppose, in the sense that it 
illustrates the thesis above mentioned; the thesis that metaphysics is 
methodologically suggestive, and influences the choice and the results 
of scientific research projects. Indeed, it provides us a good case 
where scientific inquiries which are conventionally deemed to be 
significant 
speculations 
are cognitively bound up with the metaphysical 
of a particular time. In addition, it is of great 
importance to note that Stewart's discussion plainly reveals that such 
a view of metaphysics as a coordinating agent in scientific inquiry is 
not a product of this century, even though it is true that more 
apparent perception and more rational examinations concerning the 
relationship between metaphysics and science 
they were. 
are sought now than 
Smith was likewise aware, I believe, that metaphYSiCS is intimately 
related to the field of scientific research, thoug~ he made it less 
obvious. Smith's perception about it may be found in his essays on 
the ancient physics and metaphysics. In his essay on the ancient 
logics and metaphysics Smith says that metaphysics was 'apprehended to 
go before it [physicsl, in the order in which the knowledge of Nature 
ought to communicated'.24> And he later adds: 'many of the doctrines 
of that system [system of the ancient physicsl, which seem to us, who 
have been long accustomed to another, the most incomprehensible, 
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necessarily flow from this metaphysical notion'. 26) A similar 
statement appears in his discussion of Aristotle's view of physics in 
the essay on the ancient physics. Smith talks about 'the Metaphysics 
upon which it (Aristotle's opinion of physics) is grounded'.26) 
In the system of the ancient physics, everything in the sublunary 
region is comprised of the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth, 
whereas the heavenly bodies consisted of a fifth element. It was 
believed that all the qualities and laws of succession of everything 
surrounding the Earth could be deduced out of the four elements. By 
the way, it was impressed on Aristotle that from the moon upward 
things are never subject to generation and decay, whilst things below 
the moon are subject to generation, alteration, and corruption. The 
heavenly bodies are eternal and incorruptible, but the terrestrial 
things are on the contrary generated and destructible. And it was 
thought that the motion of the celestial spheres whose movement is 
circular brought about the generation of all the forms and species by 
virtue of the' mixtures of those four elements which otherwise would 
have remained in the state of eternal rest, and caused their 
corrupt ion and decay as well. 
Aristot Ie's view: 
With this in mind Smith summarizes 
he seems to express himself plainly enough: that the First 
Heaven, that of the Fixed Stars, from which are derived the 
motions of all the rest, is revolved by an eternal, immoveable, 
unchangeable, unextended being. whose essence consists in 
intelligence ... that the inferior Planetary Spheres derived 
each of them its peculiar revolution from an inferior being of 
the same kind; eternal, immoveable, unextended, and necessarily 
intelligent ... ; and that therefore whatever was below the Moon 
was abandoned by the gods to the direction of Nature, and Chance, 
and Necessity. For though those celestial beings were, by the 
revolutions of their several Spheres, the original causes of the 
generation and corruption of all sublunary forms, they were 
causes who neither kner:.7 nor intended the effects which they 
produced. 27) 
In Smith's est imat e, this kind of account emerged from 'prej udices 
which ... are not very philosophical'. Nonetheless, it was 'extremely 
natural',28) in the sense that Aristotle's theology closely connected 
with his metaphysics was thought to lead to such arguments in his 
system of physics. Aristotle's metaphysical doctrine29 ) is that 
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everything in the universe is constantly developing towards something 
better than before, or has more form and actuality after the change 
than before. For him God consists of pure form and pure actuality, 
and exists eternally without any change. God is thus perfect and 
thinks only about what is perfect, for otherwise it would be 
derogation of His perfection. On the ot her hand, the world of 
sensible things is imperfect despite its continual evolution towards 
more form and actuality, because there matter, which is regarded as a 
potentiality of form, can not entirely removed. As a result it is 
supposed that God has no idea of the sublunary world. In this 
connection Aristotle, Smith maintains, found that 'The revolutions of 
the Heavens,· by their grandeur and constancy, excited his admiration, 
and seemed to be effects not unworthy a Divine Intelligence. 
Whereas the meanness of many things, the disorder and confusion of all 
things below, exciting no such agreeable emotion, seemed to have no 
marks of being directed by that Supreme Understanding'. 30) Now it 
should be evident that Smith takes note of a relationship between 
metaphysics and science in terms of an instance of Aristotle's view of 
physics. 
It is of course to be recognized that Smith seems to object to 
excessive concentration on metaphysics. It is seen in the Wealth of 
Nations where he talks about the content of contemporary European 
university education. In Smith's outlook metaphysics is the 'subject 
in which, after a few very simple and almost obvious truths, the most 
careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, 
and can consequently produce nothing but subtleties and sophisms'.3l) 
In fact this statement implies that Smith was well aware that 
metaphysicS is a discipline which is untestable and thus 
unempirical. 32 ) On the contrary, physics is a 'subject of experiment 
and observation'; one 'in which a careful attention is capable of 
making so many useful discoveries'. But, a problem is that in the 
university curriculum metaphysics relative to physics was 'cultivated 
not only as the more sublime, but, for the purposes of a particular 
profession, as the more useful science of the two'. 33) In this light 
Smith is critical of current university education. However it is 
important to realize that beyond his criticism of undue concentration 
on metaphysics Smith does not think the discipline to be an useless 
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subject. He believes that there are 'a few very simple and almost 
obvious truths' in metaphysical discussions. More interestingly, 
Smith's apparent statement of a requirement of metaphysical 
discussions appears in a letter to Thomas Cadell, a publisher, where 
he recommends a book of his friend, John Bruce, and very briefly 
comments on that book: I It is as free of Metaphysics as is possible 
for any work upon that subject to be. Its fault, in my opinion, is 
that it is too free of them. But what is a fault to me, may very 
probably, be a recommendation to the Public'.~A) It can be concluded 
that metaphysics seems to be considered by Smith as a discipline which 
is acceptable and not useless if its treatment is confined to a 
certain degree, for the discipline does not merely help us to perceive 
• a few very simple and almost obvious truths', but also has an 
influence on scientific activities. Looked at in this way it is 
unlikely that Smith lends support to the assertion that for him 
'metaphysics is an unimportant pre-scientific activity of significance 
only to those who have an interest in theology'.3S) 
Now, given our observation concerning a link between metaphysics 
and sCience, and Smith's perception about it, it seems that a matter 
which has to be treated before going further is to examine the present 
commentaries put forward in this connection. I find that there have 
so far been, broadly speaking, two lines of argument as to Smith's 
metaphysics (mainly related to his theological outlook and natural 
law) and its effects on his ethical and economic doctrines. In the 
first group of commentators are those who were primarily historians of 
economic thought and who largely found a 'logical' connection between 
Smith's metaphysics, and his scientific theories and practical 
thought. 36) These commentators tended to see that from a priori 
assumption concerning a harmonious and beneficial order in nature 
Smith deductively drew his system of ethics and economics. For 
example, Leslie Stephen argued for a logical connection between 
Smith's theology and moral theory. 
of Shaftesbury's school including 
In Stephen's outlook, the members 
Adam Smith maintain that 'The 
morality most naturally connects itself with that philosophical Deism 
These doctrines [of morality) are a logical result from their 
fundamental conception. God is to them the informing and sustaining 
Spirit, manifested through the universe and recognised by the human 
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soul' .37) It is interesting to observe that a similar argument is 
made for Smith's economic doctrines. As J.K.Ingram put it: 
there is another vicious species of deduction ... in which the 
premises are not facts ascertained by observation, but the same a 
priori assumptions, half theological half metaphysical, 
respecting a supposed harmonious and beneficent natural order of 
things '" In his view, Nature has made provision for social 
wellbeing by the principle of the human constitution which 
prompts every man to better his condition; the individual aims 
only at his private gain, but in doing so is "led by an invisible 
hand" to promote the public good, which was no part of his 
intention; human institutions, by interfering with the action of 
this principle in the name of public interest, defeat their own 
endi but, when all syst ems of preference or rest raint are taken 
away, "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty 
established i tsel f of its own accord." This theory is, of 
course, not explicitly presented by Smith as a foundation of his 
economic doctrines, but it is really the secret substratum on 
which they rest. 80S) 
This type of commentaries informs us that Smith's scientific theories 
and practical programme are logically entailed by his metaphysics 
which talks about a natural order in the universe. 
On the other hand, commentators in the second group were inclined 
to be averse to such a linkage between Smith's metaphysics and 
science. 80S) They, like the former group of interpreters, were ready 
to accept fully that Smith assumed a doctrine of a harmonious order 
in nature. But they rejected the view that Smith drew on his 
metaphysics for his study of society. It was claimed that his 
metaphysics was not not an essential part or a major premiss of his 
science. As H.J.Bittermann put it.: 
Viewed synthetically, his metaphysics and theology were part of 
this view. Likewise was his normative economics. Analytically, 
each part was built up on its own assumptions and evidence. The 
technique was empirical, the faith underlying it was the belief 
that the study of man would provide the answer to fundamental 
questions. He did not look to Providence for direct aid in 
the economic and moral improvement of mankind. Man had to act 
in his own behalf with the powers and sentiments that were part 
of his nature. 40) 
On this sort of interpretation Smith himself proceeded to the study of 
society on the basis of the empirical method. Smith consistently 
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social phenomena in terms of the natural 
Granted that Smith is an empiricist, there 
that his scientific theories are corollaries 
I suppose that there is a certain truth in the contention of the 
second group of scholars. Indeed Smith makes it clear that scientific 
explanat ions must be grounded on efficient causes. In the Theory of 
MOral Sentiments he stresses a distinction between the discovery of a 
general order which might be reached by contemplative observations of 
the world, and the exposition of the structure and order of the world. 
In Smith's day such a distinction was popular in the natural 
sciences. Therefore, when we try to explain, for instance, the 
phenomena of bodies such as the digestion of the food and the 
circulation of the blood, we 'distinguish the efficient from the final 
cause of their several motions and organizations' and 'never endeavour 
to account for them from those purposes as from their efficient 
causes, nor imagine that the blood circulates, or that the food 
digests of its own accord, and with a view or intention to the 
purposes of circulat ion or digest ion' . In Smith's opinion this was 
not usually the case in the moral sciences; 'though, in accounting for 
the operations of bodies, we never fail to distinguish in this manner 
the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those of the 
mind we are very apt to confound these two different things with one 
another'.41) And it is now commonly agreed that in line with this 
methodological discussion Smith always makes the natural principles 
of human mind known through empirical observation the basis for the 
explanation of social facts. In so far as Smith is concerned with 
efficient causes, his method can be seen as empirical. In this way 
his empiricism and scientific activity can be properly isolated from 
any other matter like his metaphysics. It is thus unfortunate to see 
that Smith's metaphysics is a presupposition of his scientific 
analysis, and that his ethical and economic doctrines depend on the 
former. As I find, this appears to be the logic of the reasoning of 
the second type of commentators. 42) 
In my view, the latter type of comment plainly enough has a merit 
from whi ch we benef it. Smith's approach to scientific problems is 
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what can be called empirical. He does not start from metaphysics or a 
priori assumptions when he indulges himself in the explanations of 
social phenomena. His science is based on efficient causes or the 
principles of human nature. This is absolutely genuine and what we 
accept without question. Seen in this way the former type of comment 
which claims a 'logical' connect ion between Smith's metaphysics and 
science has no ground. However, I do not think that the second sort 
of commentary is entirely correct. Such interpretations have been 
made, I believe, in the main from the positivist perspective. By the 
critique of the view which found the logical linkage between 
metaphysics and science they have made us suppose that for Smith the 
former can be completely separated from the latter. An evident 
implication of such comments is that for Smith there is no way in 
which his metaphysics may have an influence on his scientific study. 
On account of this I do not wish to subscribe to the 'perspective' of 
such interpretations. I object to such a standpoint generally on the 
ground above noted, i.e., since the history of science has been 
inextricably bound up with metaphysics, in a way that metaphysics as 
• extra-scientific' doctrines is methodologically suggestive. And I 
disagree with such a perspective specifically, because it provides a 
basis for a view in which Smith's work finds expression in a duality 
of his philosophical and historical vision. 43 ) This is a ground on 
which an examination of a relationship 
science is likely to be helpful. 
2.3. Metaphysical Doctrines 
between metaphysics and 
It is evident that Smith never talks about what are his 
metaphysical doctrines. But I suppose that they can be inferred from 
the examination of the background which coloured concepts such as 
'nat ure' and the 'nat ural order of things' or ' nat ural law' which 
frequently appear in his work. Before going further it is noteworthy 
that for those who wished to primarily stress Smith as a 'SCientist', 
the meaning of the term of 'nature' and its related idea of 'natural 
law' tended to be confined to what is observed and empirical law drawn 
from it. As T.D. Campbell made it clear: 'The term is certainly 
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grossly over-used and this leads to many ambiguities and 
obscurities, but a study of its multiple uses shows that Smith, 
following in the Aristotelian tradition, is able to give it an 
empirical cash value. What is natural, for Smith, is either what 
normally happens, or, more typically, that which normally take place, 
or would take place, in the absence of some distinctively human 
factor', and 'It is almost always possible to render Smith's use of 
'natural' by the word 'actual' provided it is realized that he means 
what is normally the case'.44) There is a good deal of truth in this 
remark. Indeed, it is necessary to isolate this factor from others in 
order to appreciate Smith as scientist. However, this is too 
narrow a view, which seems to reflect a modern perspective. That 
view prevents us, I think, from making out what Smith meant by such 
concepts, which is likely to be inevitable not just for precise 
evaluation, but also for criticis~ For example, this view appears to 
lead to a mistaken account in explaining the reason why Smith simply 
equates description with prescription. 
In any case, we seem to be able to identify three types of 
tradition in connection with the concept of 'nature' and its related 
idea of 'natural law' which Smith uses. In his writings the ideas 
based on those traditions are indeed at the outset blended, and 
interdependent of each other. 
be isolated for examination. 
But it does not mean that they can not 
2.3.1. The Doctrine of Mechanistic Determinism 
Firstly, what can be pOinted out as a metaphysical proposition 
which lies in the background of Smith's scientific thought is his 
doct rine of mechanist ic det erminis~ 45) In the natural sciences the 
doctrine of mechanistic determinism means that every event in the 
whole universe is subject to strict natural laws which would account 
for it on the basis of mechanical causation. Similarly, the doctrine 
enables Smith to believe that for every social fact there exists 
natural laws which would explain it in the same manner as the 
operations of a machine are explained. This doctrine urges 
invest igators to discover the laws which precisely determine each of 
the separate events while at the same time prohibiting them from, say. 
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proposing a probabilistic hypothesis or making a statistical 
assertion. 
This type of view can originally be traced back to classical Greek 
civilization, and played an important part in regulat ing the 
scientific projects of many prominent thinkers in Europe. As Al fred 
Whitehead stated it: 'there can be no living science unless there is a 
widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an Order of 
Things, and, in particular, of an Order of Nature'. 46) There may be 
no doubt that Smith exactly shared Whitehead's opinion of the kind. 
Smith's perception as to the requirement in science of the assumption 
of strict necessitation finds expression in his essay on the history 
of ancient physics. According to him, for the ancient philosophers 
the natural phenomena around the Earth were too various and 
complicated to allow them to discover with ease natural laws which 
connect them together. 
," 
the variety of meteors in the air, of clouds, rainbows, thunder, 
lightning, winds, rain, hail, snow, is vastly greater; and the 
order of their succession seems to be still more irregular and 
unconstant. The species of fossils, minerals, plants, animals, 
which are found in the Waters, and near the surface of the Earth, 
are still more intricately diversified; and if we regard the 
different manners of their production, their mutual influence in 
altering, destroying, supporting one another, the orders of their 
succession seem to admit of an almost infinite variety. If the 
imagination, therefore, when it considered the appearances in the 
Heavens, was often perplexed, and driven out of its natural 
career, it would be much more exposed to the same embarrassment, 
when it directed its attention to the objects which the Earth 
presented to it, and when it endeavoured to trace their progress 
and successive revolutions. 47) 
Hence, what was most reqUired under these circumstances is to assume 
that there exist strict laws of causality in which a few causes 
explain those diversified natural phenomena. And this is what the 
ancient philosophers did actually do before they constructed a system 
of their physiCS. As Smith put it: 
To introduce order and coherence into the mind's conception of 
this seeming chaos of dissimilar and disj ointed appearances, it 
was necessary to deduce all their qualities, operations, and laws 
of succession, from those of some part icular things ... But ... 
it was impossible to deduce the qualities and laws of succession, 
observed in the more uncommon appearances of Nature, from those 
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of such as were more familiar, if those customary objects were 
not supposed, however disguised in their appearance, to enter 
into the composition of those rarer and more singular phaenomena. 
To render, therefore, this lower part of the great theatre of 
nature a coherent spectacle to the imagination, it became 
necessary to suppose, first, That all the strange objects of 
which it consisted were made up out of a few ... : and secondly, 
That all their qualities, operations, and rules of succession, 
were no more than different diversifications of those to which it 
had long been accustomed, in these primary and elementary 
objects. 48) 
This statement clearly shows that Smith was well aware that 
scientific researches were impossible without at least such a 
presupposit ion as st rict nat ural laws. This type of belief was given 
a new prominence in the seventeenth century. As is well-known, Isaac 
Newton played an enormous role in legitimatizing the search for 
natural laws and in confirming that doctrine in the mind of later 
generations. Newton's view about the business of natural sciences is 
as follows: 'Natural philosophy consists in discovering the frame and 
operation of nature, and reducing them, as far as may be, to general 
rules or laws establishing these rules by observations and 
experiments, and thence deducing the causes and effects of things'.49) 
It is important to note that in the same vein50 ) Newton declared the 
so-called principle of parsimony, i.e., that because Nature is marked 
by simplicity, or works by means of a few causes, scientific 
explanations in terms of a small number of principles have a supremacy 
over the contrary cases. The classic argument emerges in Newton's 
statement with regard to the 'first rule of reasoning in philosophy'. 
We are to adndt no more causes of natural things than such as are 
both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. To this 
purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, 
and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased 
with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous 
causes. 51) 
And this assumption was combined with machanistic cosmology; the idea 
in which the universe consists of particles permanently moving and 
impinging on each other through empty space, and which consequently 
expresses that every physical change arises from the motions of 
invisible particles. Accordingly, the universe was deemed, by 
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analogy, to be almost a machine, and natural laws were considered as 
laws with regard to the motions of matter. 
It is evident that Smith holds this proposition of mechanistic 
determinism as a premiss of his scientific analysis. Firstly, it can 
be noticed that where he discusses the sense of touching, Smith speaks 
approvingly of it: 
This doctrine, which is as old as Leucippus, Democri tus, and 
Epicurus, was in the last century revived by Gassendi, and since 
been adopted by Newton and the far greater part of his followers. 
It may at present be considered as the established system, or as 
the system that is most in fashion, and most approved of by the 
greater part of the philosophers in Europe. Though it has been 
opposed by several puzzling arguments, drawn from that species of 
metaphysics which confounds every thing and explain nothing, it 
seems upon the whole to be the most simple, the most distinct, 
and the most comprehensible account that has yet been given of 
the phaenomena which are meant to be explained by it. 52) 
Secondly. he plainly. declares in the Theory of Moral Sentiments that 
there is 'the necessary connection which Nature has established 
between causes and their effects'. 53) By this argument he assumes 
that for every social phenomenon there exists natural laws which would 
explain it. &4) Thirdly, like many ancient and modern SCientists, he 
claims that a few general principles reign throughout the various and 
diversified phenomena and lead to a large number of effects. As Smith 
put it: • Nature ... acts, as in all other cases, with the strictest 
oeconomy, and produces a mul tit ude of effect s from one and t he same 
cause'. 55> In a similar context Smith envisages society, by analogy, 
as a great machine: • Human society. when we contemplate it in a 
certain abstract and philosophical light, appears like a great, an 
immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce a 
thousand agreeable effects'.5G) Put in this way there can be no doubt 
that Smith accepted the doctrine of mechanistic determinism which had 
been diffused since the early seventeenth century by Newton and his 
followers. In this regard it is natural that many commentators have 
found the link between Smith's scientific researches and Newtonian 
philosophy,67> although it seems certain to me that they have failed 
to appreciate the doctrine of mechanistic determinism as a 
metaphysical proposition and its influence on his science. 
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Now we shall briefly go on to observe the inf1 uences on Smith's 
scientific activities of his presupposition of the doctrine of 
mechanistic determinism. To start with, it needs to be made clear 
that the doctrine of mechanistic determinism. which informs 
investigators that everything happens in accordance with natural laws 
which would explain it in terms of a few principles, does not tell 
them • how' to find out those natural laws. The problem of the 
discovery of natural laws may be said to depend on the methodology of 
the investigators concerned. Smith's methodology in this sense will 
be treated in the Chapter 4-. At all events there are three things 
which deserve notice in association with such doctrine's regulative 
effects on Smith's science. 
Firstly. it urged Smith to see that natural feelings of the human 
mind have a necessity. Therefore, given a certain sort of 
environment, those natural feelings are felt by all men. In this 
connection Smith asserts: <The causes which naturally excite our 
desires and aversions, our hopes and fears, our joys and sorrows, 
would no doubt produce upon each individual, according to the 
degree of his actual sensibility. their proper and necessary 
effects'.sS) Similarly, he claims that a correspondence between a 
sympathetic feeling and an original feeling brings about a 'necessary' 
approval of those who are judged of, for • it is impossible that we 
should be displeased with the tendency of a sentiment, which, when we 
bring the case home to ourselves, we feel that we cannot avoid 
adopting,.s9) As Smith states: 
When the original passions of the person principally concerned 
are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the 
spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, 
and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon 
bringing the case home to himself. he finds that they do not 
coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him 
unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite 
them. To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as 
suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that 
we entirely sympathize with them. GO) 
In this way the metaphYSical doctrine of determinism is responSible 
for the kind of psychological necessity that Smith thinks of. 
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Secondly, it had an important influence on Smith's view that a 
system of scientific theories which connects together a great variety 
of phenomena should be built up on a few principles. He thus says 
that 'the system of human nature seems to be more simple and agreeable 
when all its different operations are in this manner deduced from a 
single principle',Gl) and is led to look for it. According to him, 
sympathy is such a single principle from which moral judgments in 
everyday life can be explained: • sympathy, a power which has always 
been taken not ice of, and wi t h whi ch t he mind is mani fest 1 y endowed, 
is ... sufficient to account for all the effects'.G2> 
Finally, it played 8 constructive role in forming Smith's opinion 
as to a mode of explanat ion. Just as, if it is assumed that the 
universe is made up of atoms which are continuously moving and 
impelling each other to move, it is absurd to account for physical 
changes in terms of other factors except the motions and arrangements 
of those particles, so it is senseless, if it is assumed that certain 
natural principles of the human mind are the sources of all human 
moral act ions, to draw on teleological explanation instead of 
mechanistic explanation in order to account for the process of moral 
judgment. This is an error which confounds the efficient with the 
final causes in taking account of the operations of the mind. It is 
well-known that Smith is critical of Hume's view of justice on the 
ground that the latter found the feelings of indignation of the 
spectator which approves of the punishment of injustice in a 
perception of social utility and in the view of the general happiness 
which consequently ensues. 63 > In Smith's view, such an account of 
the approval of the punishment of injustice does not explain the 
operations of moral life. It does not tell us its causal necessity, 
given that human social life is subject to natural laws which would 
take account of it on the basis of mechanical causation. In contrast 
to Hume's outlook that the emotions in question arise out of the 
consideration of utility or social benefit, Smith claims that the 
principle of sympathy (and the approval and disapproval based on it) 
is the basis for the sense of justice: 
Though man ... be naturally endowed with a desire for the welfare 
and preservation of society, yet the Author of nature has not 
entrusted to his reason to find out that a certain application of 
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punishments is the proper means of attaining this end; 
endowed him with an immediate and instinctive approbation 
very application which is most proper to it.64) 
but has 
of that 
In this way a scientific explanation must be offered in terms of 
efficient causes. Now it will be obvious that Smith's support for the 
mode of explanation by way of efficient causes insofar as scientific 
activity is concerned is inextricably bound up with his proposition of 
mechanistic determinism. 
2.3.2. Organismic Philosophy 
The next thing to be noted in connection with Smith's metaphysical 
doctrines is another meaning of the term 'nature' and the related 
concept of natural laws, which he had in mind. As above noted, when 
the doctrine of mechanistic determinism is presupposed, Smith believes 
that nature works of necessity. and seeks to explain the social world 
in terms of efficient causes alone without introducing the notion of 
final causes. But it is important as well to note that for Smith the 
concept of nature has a teleological implication. For example, Smith 
states: 'Nature, indeed, seems to have so happily adjusted our 
sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, to the conveniency both 
of the individual and of the society, that after the strictest 
examination it will be found, I believe, that this is universally the 
case'.6S) In other words, he supposes that nature works towards final 
causes or purposes. And what is important to notice at this point is 
that in this concept of nature the nature of a thing implies what it 
is when fully developed, or the realization or actualization of the 
possibilities inherent in it. In this sense nature emerges as an 
ideal to be brought into existence. For instance, it is the nature of 
the baby to grow into the mature man with a fully unfolded personality 
in the course of time. Here we can observe that in this view of 
nature the notion of 'potentiality' is of critical importance, and is 
used as a fundamental idea. 
This kind of the point of view goes back to classical times, and 
was primarily derived from Aristotle. The concept of nature was 
suggested on the basis of the biological analogy of nature. In 
Aristotle's view, the basic pattern of explanation in the study of 
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nature should be grounded on teleology. Every phenomenon ought to be 
explained in terms of final causes. Therefore, the explanation of 
a thing becomes intelligible only when it is approached in the light 
of a purpose, for all movement of things is directed, in fixed ways in 
accordance with an internal principle of motion, towards some end. 66) 
It means that the discovery of end or the highest possi bil it ies 
inherent in things 
After all, it seems 
is significant in a scientific investigation. 
inevitable that if the scientific inquiry is 
concerned with the discovery of what is natural, and the nature of 
things is in their potentialities or the highest possibilities to be 
realized in terms of an internal principle inherent in the~ then the 
concept of natural law comes to imply at once factual generalizations 
and Obligations. This mode of thought is what may be called the 
normative form of organicis~67) The basic design of things is seen 
to proceed along organic lines towards perfection. Obviously, it is 
~-ecognized that the factual and actual features of things are not 
necessarily in the ideal for~ But since everything proceeds by its 
internal principle towards its end and acquires its own nature when 
completion is reached by virtue of its fulfilment of the highest 
pOSSibility, the ideal state constitutes the explanation of every 
phenomenon. As a result, an Is tends to be identified with an Ought. 
In any case, this doctrine of normative organicism was considerably 
influential not simply in the arena of natural philosophy, but also in 
the realm of social and political philosophy, at least until the end 
of the eighteenth century. That doctrine had in particular a 
profound effect on ethical and juristic philosophy. It can be said, 
at the outset, that organismic philosophy of this kind was common to 
the natural law tradition, even though it is true that there were 
varieties of natural law doctrine. sa) It is therefore noted that 
for the StoiCS, "following Nature" means realising, so far as 
pOSSible, the ideal of human nature'.69> The same idea was adopted by 
the Roman jurists and medieval natural law theorists. It was thought 
by them that natural law as a set of rules of morality in general and 
of justice in particular, which might be perceived by hUman cognitive 
powers, was not only a source of, but superior to, positive law. For 
natural law was believed to articulate ideal moral order 'natural' to 
or inherently possible for mankind. 70) The same spirit of this 
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tradition was inherited to the natural law philosophers in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It seems evident that Smith was 
accustomed to such a way of thinking as a result of the teaching of 
Gershom Carmichael and Francis Hutcheson. 71) And in this regard, it 
is observed that Smith's moral philosophy was, in part, a product of 
the natural law approach to individual and society. 72) 
It is likely that modern readers, who predominantly get used to the 
way of causal thinking, find an approach which regards the course of 
nature as regulated by purpose strange. In fact, it has been 
recognized that Aristotle's metaphysics had acted as a great obstacle 
to the progress of natural science. And it is well known that modern 
positivis~ which was given an impetus by 
to fight Aristotelian metaphYSiCS. It 
Francis Bacon, was intended 
is thus not surprising that 
many commentators appear to evaluate Smith's approaches in a similar 
vein. Some writers are inclined to depict Smith just as a mechanical 
materialist, while pointing out that he was unsympathetic to a 
teleological interpretation of nature. 73) For example, Vernard Foley 
argued, examining Smith's position mainly from his philosophical 
essays, that indeed he owed his 'hidden' cosmology to the ancient 
Greek philosophers such as Empedocles, Leucippus, and Democritus. On 
account of his reception of materialistic and atomistic monism Smith 
considered, Foley claimed, not only the process of human psychological 
and cultural development as directed by a mechanistic principle, but 
teleological thinking as obscure and unintelligible. 74) This is, I 
think, an extreme view concerning Smith's position. As we noted 
before, Smith held the doctrine of mechanistic determinism as a 
presupposition of scientific researches. On this ground he reminded 
readers that scientific explanation must be based not so much on 
final, but on efficient causes. But it is significant to be aware 
that such a contention does not mean that for him teleological 
thinking is an unimportant activity. On the contrary, it can be 
noticed that Smith often addressed himself to speculations about final 
causes. 7S ) Furthermore, it should be remembered that whereas by the 
early seventeenth century the mechanistic world view was about to 
replace the organismic one, the latter standpoint did not entirely 
lose its place among natural and social philosophers during the 
subsequent two centuries. It is remarked that even Newton who played 
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the most important part in defeat ing the Aristotelian We] tanschauung 
was not, in fact, free from the way of organismic thinking. It was 
not till the beginning of the nineteenth century that the 
thoroughgoing fading away of the organismic outlook was accomplished 
even from within the sphere of natural science. 76) Looked at in this 
way it is no wonder that Smith maintained both the mechanistic and the 
organismic outlooks. 
On the other hand, others who do not share this extreme view tend 
to acknowledge that for Smith teleology is part of his system. But it 
is stressed that he demanded a strict distinction between causality 
and teleology, and claimed that only explanatory approaches by virtue 
of efficient causes were justifiable for scientific purposes. In this 
View, whilst for Smith teleological interpretation of events is 
unnecessary for the sake of scientific activities, it is an appendage 
to his mechanistic explanation and thus logically sequential on the 
latter. 77) As T.n.Campbell stated: 
The theological explanation is offered, not as a substitute for 
causal explanation, but as supplementary to it. Once the causal 
pattern of events has been exhibited, the end result or state 
towards which the pattern tends is alleged to have some benefit 
which was not foreseen by any human agent and on account of which 
it is intelligible and explanatory to say that the whole process 
exhibits a plan and therefore implies a planner .... This is not 
to introduce the operation of the divine will into the causal 
process; rather it adds to the causal explanation of events a 
different type of explanation, a teleological one. The last part 
of Smith's explanatory scheme is not, therefore, independent or 
self-sufficient but is supervenient upon his prior causal 
analysis. 7B ) 
And it is added that Smith's teleological explanations are similar to 
a sort of functionalism fundamental to modern sociology whose 
explanatory scheme depends on various feed-back mechanisms designed to 
achieve homeostatic ends. Hence, an implication which ensues io that 
Smith's teleological explanation becomes, in the end, one which 'can 
be incorporated into a causal theory of human behaviour of the 
mechanistic type'. 79) 
I believe that there is a certain truth in the view just described. 
Nevertheless, if looking at problems in that way we are led to find 
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that Smith's organismic outlook can be integrated into his mechanistic 
out look, we are apt, I think, to miss two important methodological 
pOints which are suggested by his metaphysical doctrine of normative 
organicism. As already pOinted out in passing, the doctrine of 
normative organicism enables the investigators to simply 'equate' an 
'Is' with an 'Ought', more precisely, scientific explanation or 
description with normative prescription without giving any reason. eo> 
This stems from the mode of thinking in which the nature of a thing is 
regarded as the highest possibility reached in terms of an internal 
principle inherent in it, 
the determination of 
provided that scientific inquiry deals with 
what is natural. Therefore, on the 
presupposition of the organismic philosophy, scientific descriptions 
become equivalent to obligations. This point is likely to be of 
much significance, for, as we are well aware, it is logically 
impossible to pass directly from descriptive statements to normative 
judgments, on the ground that Is and Ought respectively express 
different relation. s, ) As a result, it is an error to derive a value 
from a fact; 'the naturalistic fallacy', as G.E.More named it, which 
arises out of the argument to the effect that something ought to be 
the case because it is the case. B2 ) However, it is not the case within 
the tradition of organismic philosophy. 
are not deri ved f rom, but just 
Here, normative prescriptions 
, ident i fied' with scient i fic 
explanat ions. We shall later see this implication in connection with 
Smith's normative ethics and meta-ethics. 
Next, there is a second methodological point which, if the doctrine 
of normative organicism is presupposed, deserves serious attention. 
Those who note Smith's empiricism, while at the same time admitting 
Smith's teleological interpretation of nature and the ethico-Iegal 
framework of natural law point out that the purpose of nature, or 
knowledge of moral and legal imperatives is not independent of the 
analYSis of phenomena which happen in the real world, and can be 
inferred only from factual data. In short, 'the normative natural law 
presupposes an explanatory natural law. The former is nothing but a 
particular kind of value judgment passed upon the facts and the 
relations between facts unearthed by the latter' ,83) But this type of 
contention is in some respect mistaken, since it obviously ignores the 
point that metaphysics is influential in science. And to such an 
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extent that assertion serves to keep us from making out more precisely 
what Smith's method was. The fact is that the doctrine of normative 
organicism has a regulat i ve influence on the selection and 
interpretation of factual data. Given that science aims at the 
discovery of the law of nature, the step which ensues is to find out 
what is natural. Suppose, at this stage, that an investigator 
believes that the nature of a thing lies in the realization of the 
possibilities inherent in it. In this case it is apparent that the 
investigator would not be prepared to envisage as the nature of the 
thing all which is observed about it. Rather, he would attempt to 
find that which is the most perfect among the observed facts as 
regards it, and consider that as its nature. For example, let us 
suppose again that he observes as a matter of fact that some of men 
act on the basis of perfect personality, though all men do not behave 
in such a way. He would be led, on account of his presupposition, to 
think that the nature of a man is in the perfectly unfolded 
personali ty. Here we find plainly that organismic philosophy is 
methodologically suggestive in that it affects interpretation of 
observed facts. It can thus be concluded that whereas, as many 
writers argued, explanatory natural law is derived from factual data 
and has to such a degree empirical content, its empirical content is 
suggested, via the choice and interpretation of observed facts, by the 
teleological outlook of nature. In this connection it can be noticed 
that the concept of the impartial spectator which is a key factor in 
Smith's moral theory is a typical case which reveals the 
suggestiveness of the doctrine of normative organicis~ But we do not 
here go into details, as it will be treated in the fifth chapter. 
Finally, we shall proceed to observe that organismic philosophy 
plays a part in supplying an explanatory frame for Smith's study of 
man and society. This feature appears most remarkably in Smith's 
historical treatment. S4 ) To start with, we are reminded that Smith's 
historical investigation was of a scientific character, and not the 
narrative type. SS ) If those who argue that Smith's empiricism and 
teleological outlook are entirely separable and that the latter is 
logically sequential on the former are right, we face a great 
difficulty in the face of his statement that there is a natural course 
of progress, which was actually overturned in modern European history. 
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According to Smith's 'factual observations', in the modern European 
nations, the • foreign commerce of their cities has introduced all 
their finer manufactures, or such as were fit for distant sale; and 
manufactures and foreign commerce together, have given birth to the 
principal improvements of agriculture'.BG) In his view, this was in 
the main the actual course of economic development in modern Europe. 
However, in diametrical opposition to this sort of observed facts, the 
natural course of progress for him is that • the greater part of the 
capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, 
afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce'.87) 
There may be no doubt that it is quite difficult to apprehend this 
sort of statement if we confine the concepts of science and natural 
law which it aims to establish to the sense which the modern mind 
uses. It is of critical importance to perceive a presupposition 
behind these statements in order to understand fully what Smith means 
by the~ a teleological interpretation of nature which postulates that 
there is a certain perfect or ideal state and course which a thing 
should naturally point to and follow. Of course, such a mode of 
thought concedes that the organiC design may not actually be 
fulfilled. For what happens by accident or by chance may hinder it 
from doing so. In this regard Dugald Stewart's remark is helpful as a 
correct description with respect to Smith's reasoning of that kind. 
It appears where Stewart talks about 'theoretical or conjectural 
history' . According to Stewart, 'the theoretical delineation he 
[Smith] has given of the natural progress of opulence in a country; 
and his investigation of the causes which have inverted this order in 
the different countries of modern Europe'BS) in the Wealth of Nations 
is an example of theoretical history in which Smith had much interest, 
whose type of st udy 'may be traced in all his different works, 
whether moral, political, or literary'.B9) More interestingly, this 
type of study proceeds on the assumption that: 
In most cases, it is of more importance to ascertain the progress 
that is most simple, than the progress that is most agreeable to 
fact; for, paradoxical as the proposition may appear, it is 
certainly true, that the real progress is not always the most 
natural. It may have been determined by particular accidents, 
which are not likely again to occur, and which cannot be 
considered as forming any part of that general provision which 
nature has made for the improvement of the race. 90) 
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It is of much significance to observe fr'om this passage that the 
ideal order which nature makes for the realization of certain purposes 
is distinguished from what is accidental. Obviously, this is a part of 
Aristotelian metaphysics. It is presupposed that there is • that 
general provision which nature has made for the improvement of the 
race, and it is recognized that accidents or chances may disturb its 
course. Finally, it is worth noting that a similar spirit finds 
expression in Smith's distinction between 'natural jurisprudence' and 
positive law, and his remark that natural law is the ideal foundation 
f or posit i ve law: 'Every syst em of posit i ve law may be regarded as a 
more or less imperfect attempt towards a system of natural 
jurisprudence, or towards an enumeration of the part icular rules of 
justice'. For. although positive law is 'the records of the 
sentiments of mankind in different ages and nations', the sense of 
natural justice of human beings may be warped by chancessuchasthe 
interest of government and particular classes, and the historical 
circumstances in a given period. 91 ) In fact, this provides the basis 
for Smith's criticism of legal positivism. 92) 
2.3.3. Natural Theology 
Smith's metaphysical doctrine which we are finally able to notice 
in relation to the concept of nature and its associated idea of 
natural law comes from his study of natural theology. The 
metaphysical doctrine informs us that nature and the laws of nature 
were laid down by the wise and benevolent Deity, so that everything is 
directed to fulfil its wisely planned purposes and is designed to 
maintain a harmonious order in the universe. As this statement 
indicates, it is apparent that this metaphysical proposition is 
inextricably connected with two metaphysical ideas which we already 
described earlier. In other words, that metaphysical proposition is 
not merely blended with an idea supposed by natural science that 
everything is subject to strict natural laws which are explainable in 
terms of mechanist ic principles. for it suggests that God ordained 
those natural laws. The metaphYSical doctrine is also intimately 
linked with the teleological interpretation of nature, in the sense 
that it claims that God intended everything to perform benevolent 
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purposes. This may clearly be seen in Smith's statements such as 
'that divine Being, whose benevolence and wisdom have, from all 
eternity, contrived and conducted the immense machine of the universe, 
so as at all times to produce the greatest possible quantity of 
happiness'93) and 'Universe was regarded as a complete machine, as a 
coherent system, governed by general laws, and directed to general 
ends, viz, its own preservation and prosperity, and that of all the 
species that are in it'.94) 
This might be odd to the modern mind who finds only the doctrine of 
determinism in the concept of natural laws. Nonetheless, it is true 
that this combination of ideas was popular in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. As a result, the universe, which is pictured as 
a great machine, was believed to operate in accordance with the 
principles of mechanical causation while at the same time being 
designed to reveal an ideal function to realize the benevolently 
planned purposes. It is well-known that Newton played a large part in 
supporting and spreading this type of thinking. As C.~A.Clark stated 
it: 
Newton emphasizes both the importance of the supreme being in the 
workings of the universe and the independence of scientific 
discoveries from theology and metaphysics. For Newton, and for 
the believers in Natural Theology, faith in God was as much a 
conclusion of his research as a starting pOint. Newton's theories 
dealt only with efficient causes and Newton himself claimed that 
the only possible final cause is supreme being. Yet it is clear 
that a starting point for Newton is the belief in a divine 
order the creation of a benevolent God. 9S ) 
It is evident that for this reason Newton's discoveries had great 
theological implications and acted as an encouragement to the study on 
natural theology. It is therefore no wonder that so many men of 
letters in the eighteenth century devoted a good deal of interest to 
natural theology.9G) And it is noteworthy that what is characteristic 
of those learned men is that they attempted to give natural theology a 
distinct place from revealed theology by virtue of dealing with the 
universal aspects of religion apart from the doctrines of a 
particular religion. It was a deviation from the manner of the 
theologicians since the Middle Ages, in which natural theology tended 
to be used as a foundation of revealed theology, so long as the 
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doctrines of the former is consistent with the tenets of the 
latter. 97) 
This is a background against which Smith's interest in nat ural 
theology can find its place. According to John M.illar's memory, 
Smith's lectures on moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow 
were composed of four parts, and natural theology made the first part 
of his course: 'His course of lectures on this subject was divided 
into four parts. The first contained Natural Theology; in which he 
considered the proofs of the being and attributes of God, and those 
principles of the human mind upon which religion is founded'. 9ED 
Unfortunately, we do not have Smith's writing or lecture notes 
on theology. Nevertheless, it is not completely impossible to observe 
what was the method and contents of natural theology, especially in 
connect i on wi t hits first part, 1. e., ' t he proof s of t he being and 
attributes of God'. 
There were two types of reasoning which were employed in order to 
prove the existence and nature of the Deity in Smith's day. They are 
what may be called the method a priori and a posteriori, and each of 
those two methods followed a different procedure respectively. As 
Dugald Stewart tells us: 'the former founded on certain metaphysical 
propositions which are assumed as axioms, the latter appealing to that 
systematiC order, and those combinations of means to ends which are 
everywhere conspiCUOUS in nature'.99) Hence we can suppose that the 
proofs of the being and character of God in terms of a priori method 
were strictly demonstrative like those of theorems under given axioms 
in mathematics, whereas a posteriori method led to reach by empirical 
means the conclusion that God exists and He has such-and-such 
characters. The former is the basis for the ontological argument; the 
argument which endeavours to prove the propositions of natural 
theology by deducing them from the premises that we must accept. The 
latter is the basis for the teleological argument or the argument from 
design; the argument which attempts to prove the existence and 
attributes of God by way of examining the world and showing many 
evidences of order and design. 
- 4-7 -
CHAPTER 2 
There is no doubt that Smith made use of the mode of reasoning a 
posteriori for his purposes. Firstly, it is certain from a remark of 
a contemporary of Smith, John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, concerning his 
opening prayers and his lecture on natural theology: 
that his opening prayers were always thought to "savour strongly 
of natural religion" ; that his lectures on natural theology were 
too flattering to human pride, and induced "presumptuous 
striplings to draw an unwarranted concluSion, viz. that the great 
truths of theology, together with the duties which man owes to 
God and his neighbours, may be discovered by the light of nature 
without any special revelation". 100) 
Secondly, it is actually discernible from an examination of Smith's 
writings in that he frequently devoted himself to speculation 
concerning the final causes, and ascribed its consequences 
wisdom and benevolence of the Deity. 101) 
to the 
Given that Smith adopts the a posteriori reasoning in the discourse 
of natural theology, it is apparent that the next step to be taken in 
order to prove the being and nature of God is to look at and explore 
the universe, and collect and reveal as many evidences of order and 
design as possible. In this regard it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that the evidences which Smith might show for the proofs of the 
propositions of natural theology could coincide, to a great extent, 
with those of his contemporaries such as Hutcheson, Kames, Ferguson, 
Reid, and Stewart. 102) For they likewise attempted to prove the 
existence and nature of God in terms of the argument from the final 
causes, i.e., from the confirmation of design and order found out in 
the masterly adjustments of means to ends. The following statements 
are the evidences which Smith's contemporaries made common use of. 
The structure of the different parts of the universe which fall under 
our notice has the mutual connections and dependences which cannot be 
produced by any art of men or other visible agents except the wisdom 
and intelligence of God; the bodies and instincts of animals are so 
well adapted to the circumstances such as particular climates and 
regions of the earth for their preservation and propagation of their 
species; the relations in which different species of animals stand to 
each other show a systematic order generally suitable for the 
nourishment or other conveniences of higher ranks of beings; and the 
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affections and passions, which are identical and uniform among human 
beings, are useful for individuals and society. 103) 
Similarly, we can observe, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, some 
evidences which presumably Smith would use in the context of natural 
theology. For instance, instincts of human beings are very well 
adjusted to the ends like the survival of individuals and society. 
Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original 
and immediate instincts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites 
the two sexes, the love of pleasure, and the dread of pain, 
prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and without 
any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends 
which the great Director of nature intended to produce by 
them. 104) 
Likewise, the feeling of resentment, which is usually regarded as an 
;Jnpleasant passion, is the foundation of the sense of justice which is 
necessary to society. lOS) Sympathy, which brings about the 
correspondence of opinions, and the mutual pleasure among individuals, 
is conductive to the harmony of society. 106) Even the irregularity of 
sentiments by which to judge men's behaviour not by their intentions, 
but by their consequences is useful to society. 107) Therefore it can 
be said that 'Nature ... seems, as upon all other occasions, to have 
intended the happiness and perfection of the species'. lOS) A similar 
observation can be made with reference to the physical structure of 
animals. For example, 'The digestion of the food, the circulation of 
the blood, and the secretion of the several juices which are drawn 
from it, are operations all of them necessary for the great purposes 
of animal life'. 109) On this ground it was possible to conclude that 
'In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the 
nicest artifice to the ends which they are intended to produce; and in 
the mechanism of a plant, or animal body, admire how every thing i.s 
contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature, the support 
of the individual, and the propagation of the species'. 110) 
Looked at in this way it seems clear that there are order and 
design in the universe. As a consequence, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that God exists. For just as where there is a purpose, 
there must be a purposer, so there must be a designer where there is 
- 49-
CHAPTER 2 
design. This is, I suppose, Smith's proofs of the being of God in the 
discourse of natural theology. granted that he employed the a 
posteriori mode of reasoning. and some evidences collected in the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments are correct. And it is certain that Smith 
infers the nature of the Deity on the basis of the same evidences. 
Firstly, Smith claims that wisdom and benevolence"1) are the 
character of God: 
The happiness of mankind, as well as all other rational 
creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended by 
the Author of nature. when he brought them into existence. No 
other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine 
benignity which we necessarily ascribe to him; and this opinion 
is still more confirmed by the examination of the works of 
nature. 112) 
In other words, in view of the way that the universe is arranged, or 
t he purpose to whi ch its st ruct ure is directed, it is possible to 
infer that God is wise and benevolent. For the features of the 
universe show that it was designed to advance the preservation of the 
indi vidual and the propagat ion of the species. Accordingly. Smith 
declares: 'every part of nature, when attentively surveyed, equally 
demonstrates the providential care of its Author, and we may admire 
the wisdom and goodness of God even in the weakness and folly of 
man'. 113) 
Secondly, there is another divine attribute which can be inferred 
from the investigation of nature. In Smith's view, justice, i. e .• 
reward of virt ue or punishment of vice is another aspect of God's 
purpose. 114) This argument is also drawn from the examination of 
the operations of nature. This is most obvious where Smith talks 
about the trend of the distribution of human happiness and misfortune 
in this life. As Smith pOints out: 
If we consider the general rules by which external prosperity and 
adversity are commonly distributed in this life, we shall find. 
that notWithstanding the disorder in which all things appear to 
be in this world. yet even here every virtue naturally meets with 
its proper reward, with the recompense which is most fit to 
encourage and promote it.115) 
A good man may be subject, in an unfortunate situation, to blame and 
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punishment, owing to a event which he did not intend. But it does not 
happen that he should be so as regards the general manner of his 
conduct. 
corrupt ion. 
A wicked man may avoid condemnation for a peculiar 
But it is not the case with the general manner of his 
action. It is the general rules in accordance with experiences that 
wealth and external honours are accorded as the proper reward which 
industry, prudence, and circumspection bring about, whereas the 
confidence, the reverence, and love of our fellows are accompanied by 
the practice of truth, justice, and humanity. This is the commo;} 
course of human affairs. Therefore, it is possible to say that nature 
• bestows upon every virtue, and upon every vice, that precise reward 
or punishment which is best fitted to encourage the one, or to 
restrain the other. She is directed by this sole consideration'. 116) 
If it is given that God who directed all the movements of nature 
exists, and it is observed that the natural course of things controls 
the precise reward and punishment proper for every action, it is not 
difficult to arrive at the proposition that the Deity has the 
character of justice. 
So far we have outlined the method and contents of Smith's Natural 
Theology on the basis of the available evidences, 117) while we do not 
have any writing on the subject, and consequently do not know its 
details. This was a necessary task, since Smith's metaphYSical idea 
identified in this part is grounded on the study of natural theology, 
and natural theology plays a role which links together his mechanistic 
determinism and teleology in the concept of nature and its associated 
idea of natural law. 
As noted, what is characteristic of his natural theology is that 
his belief in God and His nature is not independent of his study of 
nature. Since Smith draws on the argument from design in order to 
prove the propositions of natural theology, it is absolutely plain 
that the argument for God's existence is based upon knowledge about 
the world. In this context T.D.Campbell claimed that Smith's 
theological beliefs were a conclusion of scientific study. 
while we may admit that Smith's theology led him to expect nature 
to exhibit the signs of a creator, we should regard his faith as a 
consequence, and not a cause, of his study of nature. This is not 
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an assertion about the sources of his religious belief but about 
the arguments he uses to support it and, more importantly, the 
place it holds in his system of thought: he does not deduce facts 
from his theology but makes theological statements on the basis of 
facts independently ascertained. I1B) 
In fact, Smith points out, in his essay on the history of ancient 
physics, that natural theology in origin was a result of scient ific 
invest igat ions of nat ure: • as ignorance begot superst it ion, science 
gave birth to the first theism that arose among those nations'. 119) 
However, a problem rests on the fact that theological conclusions 
deduced from the assessment of empirical data turn into a 
presupposition in Smith' system of thought. Campbell seemed to agree 
on this matter: 'His [Smith's) belief in an all-wise Author of nature 
is certainly an important presupposition of his thought; it encourages 
him to look for systematic aspects in society and lead him to adopt 
a method of explanation similar to modern functionalist theory. 
But he does not draw on this belief for information about the 
world'. 120) In brief, Campbell's contention can be summed up as 
follows: Smith's theological belief as a presupposition helps him to 
find out beneficial consequences exhibited by the nice adjustments of 
means to ends in the universe, yet it should not be conceived as a 
presupposition of scientific study since the former obviously is just 
a consequence, and not a cause, of the latter. Put in this way there 
seems to be no room in respect of which Smith's theological beliefs 
can influence his scientific activities. 
But this is not so. It is of the highest importance to notice that 
although his belief in God's existence is primarily based on his 
empirical study of nature, that belief is quite different in status 
and nature from his scientific investigation. For whereas the latter 
is subject to empirical test, the former is irrefutable. This means 
that in the discourse of natural theology Smith, like others who were 
concerned with natural theology, accepted the being and character of 
God, not only on the basis of many empirical evidences which show 
order and deSign, but also irrespective of other facts which deny the 
patterns of order and design. A typical case of the latter is the 
problem of eVil, which has been one of major issues of debate among 
the theologicians. It is apparent that the problem of evil will 
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constitute the principal objection to the argument from design and to 
the theological propositions of those who draw upon the a posteriori 
reasoning mentioned earlier. I suppose that presumably Smith 
attempted to ascribe the existence of moral evil to man's freedom to 
do evil deviating from the natural principles of the human mind, in 
order to escape from such a difficulty. 121) In short, Smith seemed to 
explain the problem of evil away. Seen in this way Smith's 
theological faith becomes irrefutable in the face of any 
counterexample, while at the same time being confirmable. With this 
characteristic, Smith's theological view acts as a presupposition in 
scientific inquiry which has a status independent of the consequences 
of empirical stUdy. This is the reason why it must be treated as a 
metaphysical doctrine, and becomes a crucial premiss which can have a 
regulative effect on Smith's scientific study. In this connection we 
can not help pointing out the mistaken view of Lindgren, for he 
claimed, against a widely agreed outlook among Smithian commentators, 
that Smith's theological view should not be considered to be 
optimistic, on the ground that Smith obviously admitted the broad 
presence of evils: 
The popular contention today is that while he may have accepted 
no orthodox creed, he did subscribe to that Stoical optimistic 
deism, or natural religion which was popular among the 
intellectuals of his age .... Although accompanied by a number 
of citations allegedly confirming the validity of the Stoic 
optimistic deism thesis, these accounts remain unconVincing. The 
root difficulty with them is that they flatly contradict other 
features of Smith's position for which independent confirmation 
is readily available. It is not the case that Smith was 
particularly optimistic. Of the two evils which most concerned 
him - the a-moral exercise of institutional power and the unjust 
distribution of wealth - he was ... largely pessimistic. 122> 
In concluding it should be remembered once again that this 
metaphysical doctrine is not a premise from which Smith tried to 
'logically' deduce knowledge about the world. It supplies the vision 
from which the world can be examined. Therefore, it does not 
determine so much the manner of how we can obtain the materials from 
the world and by what method or rule of procedure they can be 
org-anized, but the way in which the collected data have to be 
selected, arranged, and organized. In this way it determines the 
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shape of scientific theories to come. This is the ground that 
metaphysics is methodologically suggestive. 
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3. 1. Introduction 
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that metaphysical doctrines are 
methodologically suggestive. 
in scientific researches, 
Metaphysical doctrines are influential 
in the sense that they provide the 
scientist with a perspective from which the world can be viewed. This 
way of seeing the world in turn indicates ways of examining it and the 
shape of scientific theories to come. Metaphysical doctrines do not 
provide information about the world or how to find it out, but outline 
a research programme. This is the reason that they come to limit or 
rule out a certain range of theoretical possibilities, and as a result 
exert a regulative influence on the construction of scientific 
theories. 
Given this fact, it is of great interest to see the extent to which 
Smith's natural theology affected his scientific stUdy. And this 
enterprise is of particular importance, because many commentators of 
this century are inclined to think that Smith's scientific performance 
can be completely separated from his theological view, and that it is 
possible, insofar as our purpose is purely to make out the former, 
to leave the latter out of consideration. But before t his is done, 
it is necessary to identify Smith's metatheoretical principles; 
principles which are associated with a metaphysical doctrine which is 
based on his theological view. Metatheoretical principles are those 
which, in conjunction with metaphysical doctrines, play a guiding 
role in scientific investigation by means of proposing or ruling out 
a certain range of theoretical possibilities. Against this background 
we shall attempt to identify Smith's metatheoretical principles which 
are inextricably bound up with his theological view with respect to 
God's benevolence. 
But before that, we shall address ourselves to showing that 
Christian thought had many important effects on the social philosophy 
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of the eighteenth century. Philosophers of the Enlightenment tended 
to reject superstition and enthusiasm which a particular religion 
brought, and were frequently concerned with natural religion or 
natural theology in an endeavour to arrive at universal elements of 
religion. The same is true of Smith. In this connection we shall try 
to illustrate this theme by reference to a particular example, 1. e. , 
Smith's treatment of a future state which was presumably a part of his 
natural theology. This will be offered in order to show that for 
Smith, as for his contemporary deists, Christian thought was 
influential to the doctrines of natural theology. This is the burden 
of the next section. With this premise the final section is devoted 
to the task of observing some ideas which the conception of divine 
goodness in the Christian tradition accompanied, and later bequeathed 
to European thought in its secularized for~ And in relation to this 
consideration we shall finally go on to establish Smith's 
metatheoretical principles. 
3.2. Natural Theology and Christianity 
It was observed earlier that the lectures on natural theology was 
the first part of the set which Smith delivered in his course on moral 
philosophy. There he considered the proofs of the being and nature of 
God, and dealt with some principles of the human mind on which 
religion is founded. And it was noted that he attempted to 
demonstrate theological propositions by means of the 'light of 
nature'. In other words, Smith, like many other contemporaries, made 
use of the method a posteriori, and strove to arrive at the conclusion 
at which he aimed, in terms of presenting empirical evidences of order 
and design discovered in the universe. Finally, it should be 
remembered that this type of approach to religion was thought by 
eighteenth century writers to be a philosophical or scientific 
approach, in the sense that that approach would render it possible to 
reach religious truths on the basis of the natural principles of the 
human mind. 
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Furthermore, we are reminded that the period of the Enlightenment 
is usually called the Age of Reason. In fact, a good number of the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment renounced the superstition and 
enthusiasm of medieval Christian thought, rejected all revealed and 
ecclesiastical religion,and questioned the credibility of supernatural 
phenomena. In a similar vein it is observed that this trend was 
conspicuous even in the subject of natural theology or religion. As 
they were interested in the discovery of natural laws in other 
subjects, many philosophers of the Enlightenment endeavoured to 
arrive at the doctrine of God and the universal elements in all 
religions, as distinct from the doctrines of a particular religion, by 
reference to empirical evidences and natural principles. 1) And it is 
well-known that supernatural revelation on which historical religions 
like Christianity depend finds no place in such a mode of thought. 
Given this fact, 1. e., that they not only endeavoured to found the 
doctrine of God on the known facts about the world, but also denied a 
belief with regard to the frequent intervention of a supernatural 
agent which Christianity held as absolutely true, it seems likely that 
natural theology and its doctrines to which Smith and his contemporary 
deists addressed themselves had nothing to do with, or were scarcely 
affected by, Christianity which was, in his day, a predominant 
historical religion in Europe. But this is not so. 
In his book on The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century 
Philosopher~ Carl Becker summarised some key words which may be said 
to help us to understand respectively several different centuries as 
easily as possible. 
In the thirteenth century the key words would no doubt be God, 
sin, grace, salvation, heaven, and the like; in the nineteenth 
century, matter, fact, matter-of-fact, evolution, progress; in 
the twentieth century, relativity, process, adjustment, function. 
complex. In the eighteenth century the words without which no 
enlightened person could reach a restful conclusion were nature. 
natural law, first cause, reason. sentiment, humanity. 
perfectibility. 2) 
One of the messages which Becker strongly wants to deliver is that 
whereas the aforementioned catchwords representing the period of the 
Enlightenment sounded as if they had been, in meaning, very far from 
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those of the thirteenth century, their philosophy was not entirely 
set free from medieval Christian thought, and the vision which the 
Christian thinkers had in the Middle Ages, though it was supported by 
earthly foundations, remained similar in substance. 3> And it is of 
particular interest to note that such vestiges of Christian thought 
are found even in the writings of enlightened sceptics like Voltaire. 
It can be noticed, for example, that Voltaire speaks as if he was well 
aware of God and His purposes on the one hand, and a regular and 
constant order in nature on the other4-): 'The regular and constant 
order of facts by which God rules the universe; the order which his 
wisdom presents to the sense and reason of men, to serve them as an 
equal and common rule of conduct, and to guide the~ without 
distinction of race or sect, toward perfection and happiness'.S) 
The same point can be made with regard to the subject of natural 
theology. Therefore, W.Fulton argued that the eighteenth-century 
deists' treatment of natural theology would be not possible without 
the soil and nourishment provided by Christianity, even though they 
attempted to rest their principles of natural theology on natural 
reason and scientific method. G ) Why did this happen? In the Middle 
Ages natural theology was treated as the preamble of faith as well as 
a subject which was able to treat knowledge of God by recourse to 
nat ural reason. In other words, natural theology was seen as a 
presupposition or ground which worked in support of some of the 
doctrines that the Christian faith professed, for although natural and 
revealed theology dealt respectively with distinct problems, nature 
was considered as a sphere where God's revelation or grace manifested 
itself. Of course, natural theology was not a product of the Middle 
Ages. It is well-known that its origin is found in ancient Greek 
thought. In passing we can take note that Smith was well aware of 
this. Smith, when writing of, and finding the foundation of theism 
in, Plato, in an essay on the ancient physics, states as follows: 
As soon as the Universe was regarded as a complete machine, as a 
coherent syste~ governed by general laws, and directed to 
general ends, viz. its own preservation and prosperity, and that 
of all the species that are in it; the resemblance which it 
evidently bore to those machines which are produced by human art, 
necessarily impressed those sages with a belief, that in the 
original formation of the world there must have been employed an 
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art resembling the human art, but as much superior to it, as the 
world is superior to the machines which the art produces. The 
unity of the syste~ which, according to this ancient philosophy, 
is most perfect, suggested the idea of the unity of that 
principle, by whose art it was formed; and thus, as ignorance 
begot superstition, science gave birth to the first theism that 
arose among the nations, who were not enlightened by divine 
Revelation. 7) 
In any case, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the later Platonists 
sought to draw the being and character of God from the order and 
beauty found out in the events of the universe. This philosophical 
theism gave natural theology its starting point and became the source 
of various theistic arguments in the course of time. The natural 
theology which Greek philosophy brought into existence was attached to 
the Christian system from the beginning of Christianity, and, as 
noted, the theological conclusions reached by natural reason were 
thought to be in accordance with divine revelation which revealed 
theology supported. B) But in the Reformation era natural theology was 
about to detach itself from revealed theology. Firstly, the anti-
rational tendency in the Protestant Church allowed little room for 
natural theology. Secondly, among those who suffered from the 
religious unrest and wars which were encouraged by different religious 
dogmas and creeds there was a tendency to separate natural theology 
from the Christian theological syste~ and to remove everything 
mysterious from theological discussions in terms of the exercise of 
reason. As Windelband pointed out: 
In connection with all these movements stands the tendency of the 
Enlightenment philosophy toward establishing the uni versal "true" 
Christianity by means of philosophy. True Christianity is in 
this sense identified with the religion of reason, or natural 
religion, and is to be dissolved out from the different forms of 
positive, historical Christianity.S) 
In this way intellectuals were inclined to rely on the idea of an 
universal religion which could be approached by natural reason common 
to all sensible men, and natural theology had mainly been a concern of 
the philosophers more and more independently of the old tradition of 
Christian theology. Nevertheless, as pointed out, the natural 
theology of the eighteenth century was not entirely independent of 
Christian thought, in the sense that certain basic conceptions of 
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the latter had been inextricably bound up in the doctrines of the 
former. This seems natural since a religion which coloured Western 
civilization for more than a thousand years had entered deeply into 
the thought and feeling of the European mind. In this context Dawson 
noted what fundamental conceptions traditional Christian thought left 
to the philosophers interested in a natural religion. 
When the philosophers of the 18th century attempted to substitute 
their new rationalist doctrines for the ancient faith of 
Christendom, they were in reality simply abstracting from it 
those elements which had entered so deeply into their own thought 
that they had no longer recognized their origin. Eighteenth 
century Deism was but the ghost or shadow of Christianity, a 
mental abstraction from the reality of a historical religion, 
which possessed no independent life of its own. It retained 
certain fundamental Christian conceptions - the belief in a 
beneficent Creator, the idea of an overruling Providence which 
ordered all things for the best, and the chief precepts of the 
Christian moral law, but all these were desupernaturalized. 10 ) 
This suggests that medieval Christian thought is, as a matter of 
fact, a background against which the natural theology of the 
eighteenth century can be understood. I believe that this is the case 
with Smith's theological view as well. While it goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis to examine, in detail, the extent to which Christian 
doctrines in the Middle Ages influenced the thought of the eighteenth 
century, 11) we shall later very briefly note, for my purpose of 
identifying Smith's metatheoretical principles, that some theological 
conceptions which medieval Christian philosophers introduced were 
influential to the notions which the European intellectuals during 
subsequent periods had been accustomed to use. However, before going 
further we shall finally address ourselves to Smith's treatment of a 
future state in connection with divine justice which seemed to be a 
part of his concern in the lectures on natural theology. The 
following discussion is thus offered with a view to elucidating such 
an aspect. 
It was observed earlier that justice was one of divine attributes 
which Smith attempted to prove in the course of natural theology. We 
also noted his view that an understanding of God's justice can be 
arrived at by means of the investigation of nature. In Smith's 
opinion, God is just, since He gives every virtue precise reward, and 
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every vice precise punishment. It can be said that this conviction of 
God's justice is the basis for Smith's discussion of a future state. 
In this world innocence and virt ue may be unrecognized. An 
innocent man is often, under unfortunate circumstances, blamed and 
punished owing to an act or event which he did not commit. When the 
innocent man has no hope of his innocence being proved, an appeal is 
made to God who will, in an after-life, give exact reward and 
punishment in proportion to what he has done in this life. 
put it: 
As Smith 
When we thus despair of finding any force upon earth which can 
check the triumph of injustice, we naturally appeal to heaven, 
and hope, that the great Author of our nature will himself 
execute hereafter, what all the principles which he has given us 
for the direction of our conduct, prompt us to attempt even here; 
that he will complete the plan which himself has thus taught us 
to begin; and will, in a life to come, render to everyone 
according to the works which he has performed in this world. And 
thus we are led to ,the belief of a future state, not only by the 
weakness, by the hopes and fears of human nature, but by the 
noblest and best principles which belong to it, by the love of 
virtue, and by the abhorrence of vice and injustice. 12) 
Here it can be noticed that in such cases an appeal to God is, Smith 
finds, natural or common to human beings. That is, when we suffer 
undeserved misfortunes, our natural sentiments such as hopes and 
fears, and the love of virtue and the abhorrence of vice lead us to 
believe in other world where divine justice ensures that deeds in this 
world receive exact reward or retribution. Since Smith finds that 
human nature in those circumstances necessarily brings about religious 
belief in an after-life, he speaks approvingly of it: 'That there is a 
world to come, where exact justice will be done to every man, where 
every man will be ranked with those who, in the moral and intellectual 
qualities, are really his equals is a doctrine, in every respect 
so venerable, so comfortable to the weakness, so flattering to the 
grandeur of human nature, that the virtuous man who has the misfortune 
to doubt of it, cannot possibly avoid wishing most earnestly and 
anxiously to believe it'.13) And, in Smith's opinion, this is 
confirmed by a natural history of religion. 'In every re]jgjon, and jn 
every superstition that the world has ever beheld, accordingly, there 
has been a Tartarus as well as an Elysium; a place provided for the 
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punishment of the wicked, as well as one for the reward of the 
just' . 14) 
It will be apparent, at present, that Smith advances a naturalistic 
theory of religious belief. A religious truth as to a future life is 
accounted for on the basis of human nature. The doctrine of divine 
reward and punishment in an after-life which is seen to be common to 
every religion is explained in terms of men's natural sentiment of 
hope, and the love of virtue and aversion of vice. In this sense it 
may be said that Smith's attitude, like that of many of his 
contemporary deists, reflects an effort to arrive at universal 
elements in all religions, as distinct from the doctrines of a 
particular historical religion. In this respect we can observe 
Smi th' s view concerning the Christian doctrine of atonement, the 
discussion of which was removed in the last edition of the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. There is a difference of opinion concerning the 
reason for the withdrawal of the passage of atonement. Archbishop 
Magee, who was initially satisfied with the fact that a distinguished 
philosopher like Smith supported the reasonableness of the doctrine of 
atonement, assigned its suppression, 
the unfortunate role which Hume's 
when he became aware of it, to 
infidelity played in Smith's 
attitude towards religion. 16) In contrast, Rae, while pointing out 
Magee's imprudence which led him to overlook other internal evidence, 
like Smith's account of the belief in a future state, claimed that 
'there is no reason to believe that Smith's opinion about the 
atonement was anywise different in 1790 from what it was in 1759'.16) 
Finally, Raphael's view is different from Rae's. He found that in the 
last edition of his first major book Smith in fact changed his 
position on the doctrine of divine reward and punishment in a future 
life as preached by Christians. For 'it has too often been taught in 
a form that contradicts our moral sentiments by confining divine 
salvation to the religious'. 17) According to Raphael, the point 
manifests itself in the fact that Smith, like Hume, did not agree 
with the current view of Christian clergy which stressed the 
superiority of monkish virtues over other virtues which are supported 
by the natural sentiments of the human mind, as necessary for 
salvation. 
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In order to make this clear, however, we should, first of all, 
distinguish Smith's account of the Christian doctrine of atonement 
from his account of the belief in an after-life, although these two 
doctrines are closely related to each other in Christian thought. And 
we also ought to distinguish Smith's account of the belief in a future 
life from his criticism of an address of Massillon to the effect 
that one day of penance and mortification in a monk's cell have more 
merit in the eyes of the heaven than a whole military life spent in 
the hardships and hazards of war. 18) Smith believed that every 
religion had a vision of an after-life, and regarded it as a I most 
respectable doctrine'19), on the ground that it is not simply founded 
on human nature, but also stands in support of morality. 20) On the 
other hand. Smith's criticism of the remark of Massillon stemmed, not 
from the doctrine itself, but from the fact that so mistaken an 
application was made of the respectable doctrine in opposition to our 
natural sentiments. Now, let us look at the doctrine of atonement. 
This Christian doctrine informs us that Christ is an intercessor who 
came as a sacrifice in place of sinners in this world before the Last 
Judgment, so that if we follow the two commandments to love God and 
our neighbour, we can enjoy an after-life. Looking at the problem in 
this manner, we can give more clarification to it. In the suppressed 
passage, Smith's discussion about the doctrine of atonement is as 
follows. 21 ) Granted that there is a future state which is completely 
dominated by divine justice, and that we are all sinners, then it is 
inevitable that we feel 'natural fear' due to our numberless 
breaches of duty in the face of the judgment of God who is 
characterized by infinite perfection. Under these circumstances, 
'Repentance, sorrow, humiliation, contrition' are not enough to 
appease His indignation which divine justice necessarily brings about. 
As a result, we imagine that some other atonement must be made for our 
various offences. Hence, Smith concludes that 'The doctrine of 
revelation coincides, in every aspect, with those original 
anticipations of nature'. In my view, Smith does not· argue here in 
personal support of the Christian doctrine of atonement. Instead, 
Smith attempts to explain a doctrine of a particular historical 
religion on the basis of human nature on which religion is founded. 
This precisely reflects, I believe, Smith's attitude in proposing a 
naturalistic theory of religious belief. 
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evident that the authors above mentioned all miss the point which 
Smith made. Unlike Magee, it can not be said that we can know, even 
before the final revision of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith's 
own personal attitude to a particular religion, i.e., whether or not 
Smith personally subscribes to the Christian doctrine of atonement. 
And both Rae and Raphael appear not to distinguish Smith's accounts of 
the doctrine of atonement and of the belief in an after-life from his 
criticism with regard to such a strange application of the latter 
doctrine by current Christians. At the same time they fail to see the 
naturalistic character of Smith's 
atonement. 
analysis of religious belief in 
Despite our observation about Smith's effort to make out universal 
elements in all religions, it shouldbe noted that Smith's perception 
of the doctrine of divine reward and punishment in a future state was 
a 'mental abstraction' from historical Christianity. In Christian 
religion divine justice was seen not so much to confer earthly 
prosperity on the virtuous, but to give them reward or retribution in 
another world. 22) That is, to the Christian, divine justice was 
conveyed to the kingdom of heaven where a life after death would be 
enjoyed. When the Last Judgment is performed by the Son of Man, there 
will be the reward of the righteous and the punishment of sinners. 
But this is not entirely true of other religious views. To begin 
with, it should be recognized that both visions of another world and 
divine justice existed in Greek thought. For example, Plato, who may 
be considered to be the founder of natural theology and to prefigure 
many discussions about natural theology in the eighteenth century, 
distinguished, by virtue of the separation between reality and 
appearance, between this world and the other world, and held that 
God's rule was just. However, Plato envisaged another world as the 
eternal world of ideas, or the real world in contrast to that of 
illusory appearance. He did not think that God's justice governed an 
other world, giving rewards and punishments which reflect deeds done 
in this world. Aristotle did not believe in 'personal' immortality, 
in the sense which Plato and Christianity use the ter~ Most of the 
Stoics turned down Plato's argument for immortality, since they 
supposed the soul to be material. In this connection Bertrand Russell 
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made plain the difference between the Greek and the Christian 
doctrines with reference to other-worldliness. 
Other-worldliness is a conception with Jews and Christians, in a 
sense, share with later Platonism, but it takes, with them, a 
much more concrete form than with Greek philosophers. The Greek 
doctrine ... was that the sensible world, in space and time, is 
an illusion, and that, by intellectual and moral discipline, a 
man can learn to live in an eternal world, which alone is real. 
The Jewish and Christian doctrine, on the other hand, conceived 
the Other World as not metaphysically different from this world, 
but as in the future, when the virtuous would enjoy everlasting 
bliss and the wicked would suffer everlasting torment. This 
belief embodied revenge psychology, and was intelligible to all 
and sundry, as the doctrines of Greek philosophers were not. 23) 
This clearly suggests that Christian thought provided the basis for 
the belief in divine reward and retribution in a future state. 
In a similar context, we can notice another point which 
demonstrates that Smith's conception of the belief in an after-life is 
an abstraction from Christian thought rather than from the natural 
history of religion. The point is related to a manner of Smith's 
account of religious belief; his view of religion which may be called 
'moral theology'. This characteristic is best summarized by K. 
Haakonssen: 'Men believe in God and an after-life because they are led 
to it by their moral convictions. The former is a continuation and 
completion of the latter, and religion thus becomes a strong support 
of morality, 'religion enforces the natural sense of duty'. This idea 
of religion as primarily a function and continuation of morality is so 
striking in Smith, that it seems reasonable to call his view moral 
theology, with due respect to Kant'.24) This kind of view concerning 
religious belief which is a consequence of the operation of morality 
is a remnant of Christianity. As Windelband informed us: 
The more the metaphysical factor in Deism retreated for these or 
other reasons [epistemological grounds], the more the "true 
Christianity," which Deism professed to be, became restricted to 
a moral conviction. According to this view the essence of 
religion consists in moral action, and the religious life has its 
true content, deliberation upon duty, the seriousness of a 
conduct of life determined by this. There remained an 
indefinite idea of an all-good God, who created man for 
happiness, who should be worshipped by a virtuous life, and who 
will exercise an equalising justice in an eternal life, so that 
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such virtue will receive the reward which is lacking to it 
here. 2S ) 
We can thus now conclude from what has been observed that Smith's 
natural theology, like that of other deists of the eighteenth century, 
seems to be, in many respects, affected by Christian thought, although 
such a feat ure is rendered more or less obscure by his and his 
contemporaries' attempts to deal with universal aspects of religion. 
3.3. Metatheoretical Principles 
In this section we shall concern ourselves with identifying Smith's 
metatheoretical principles which work in connection with the shape 
and construction of theories in his system of thought; principles 
associated with Smith's metaphysical doctrine which is based on his 
study of n~tural theology. To start with, we are reminded, as claimed 
in the last section, that despite their secularization Smith's 
theological notions should, in a large measure, be understood in 
relation to Christian thought. Let us proceed with this premise. Now 
it is of great importance to notice that the conception of God's 
benevolence, which Smith supposed to be a divine characteristic in the 
discourse on natural theology, is essential in recognizing his 
metatheoretical principles. For Smith's reception of the concept of 
divine goodness leads to his metaphysical doctrine that everything 
created by God is directed to accomplish wisely planned purposes, and 
designed to preserve a harmonious arrangement and order in the 
universe. This is apparent from Smith's repeated statements with 
respect to God's benevolence. According to hi~ benevolence is 'the 
supreme and governing attribute, to which the others were subservient, 
and from which the whole excellency, or the whole morality ... of the 
divine operations, was ultimately derived'26) In the same context it 
is observed that 'The wisdom of the Deity was employed in finding 
out the means for bringing about those ends which goodness 
suggested'.27) Again Smith maintains that God is 'that divine Being, 
whose benevolence and wisdom have, from all eternity, contrived and 
conducted the immense machine of the universe, so as at all times to 
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produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness'.2S) This clearly 
shows that the conception of divine goodness provides the basis for 
the perception of the universe which is actually the best possible; 
the idea that God ordered all things for the best. In this regard it 
seems inevitable to find Smith's assertion that 'In every part of the 
universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the 
ends which they are intended to produce; how every thing is 
contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature, the support 
of the individual, and the propagation of the species'.29) After all, 
it is significant to perceive that Smith's optimism comes from a 
premiss, i.e., his belief in a benevolent God, who created the 
Wliverse in a way that ordered the best arrangements for creatures. 
This belief of Smith's is, I think, the background against which his 
metatheoretical principles can be identified. Now, we shall first 
need, for our purpose, to see the influence on European thought of 
Gome Christian ideas which were produced in association with the 
conception of divine goodness, in order to discern more clearly 
Smith's metatheoretical principles. 
Christian thinkers described the events of the world as following 
the design of Providence for the attainment of a specific purpose. It 
is to be observed that the Christian doctrines which are important in 
this context are those of original sin, grace, and salvation. In 
Christian religion Ada~ the first man, committed original sin, 
because he and Eve ate the apple from the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil, which God prohibited, while on the other hand allowing 
them free will. Corruption came to the~ and was passed on to all 
their descendants, none of whom can free themselves, of their own 
power, from sin. Owing to Adam's sin, all men deserve eternal 
condemnation. Men are thus fundamentally depraved, and can be 
virtuous only through God's grace. And in a fallen world as such 
there is no way of salvation on the Day of 
to believe in Christ the Son of God. 
the Last Judgment except 
God's justice is shown by 
condemnation, and His mercy by salvation. Both reveal God's gOOdness. 
In order to find how far the Christian doctrines as briefly noted were 
influential in European social philosophy, in what follows we shall 
concentrate largely on the thought of Saint Augustine. This seems 
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useful, since the doctrine of Augustine was an authoritative source of 
the philosophy of the Christian Church through the Middle Ages. 
One of the most important effects which Christian thought brought 
about was a sense of human blindness in action. Moreover human 
blindness was considered as fundamental, and not as coming from 
incidental individual failure of insight. It was unavoidable because 
of corrupted human nature which was brought into existence by the 
original sin committed by Ada~ In this vein Collingwood wrote: 'This 
is the original sin upon which St. August ine laid such stress, and 
which he connected psychologically with the force of natural desire. 
Human action, on this view, is not designed in view of preconceived 
ends by the intellectj it is actuated B tergo by immediate and blind 
desire'.30) In this manner Saint Augustine linked the conception of 
original sin to a permanent and lifelong blindness inherent in human 
nature. And the way of thinking in which man is driven by the force 
of natural desire rather than intellect led to the assumption of 
another power that served to attain his purposes; a power which is 
supported by the conception of God's grace. 
From this it follows that the achievements of man are due not to 
his own proper forces of will and intellect, but to something 
other than himself, causing him to desire ends that are worth 
pursuing. He therefore behaves ... as if he were the wise 
architect of his own fortunes; but the wisdom displayed in his 
action is not his, it is the wisdom of God, by whose grace man's 
desires are directed to worthy ends. Thus the plans which are 
realized by human action ... come about not because men have 
conceived the~ but because men, doing from time to time what at 
the moment they wanted to do, have executed the purposes of God. 
This conception of grace is the correlative of the conception of 
original sin. 31 ) 
In a similar context we can notice another thing which the conception 
of grace brought into the mind of the Christian thinkers. It offered 
an optimistic view wi th respect to the plan and structure of the 
world. According to Saint Augustine, there is no 'essential' 
difference of the goodness of all things between the heavenly city and 
the earthly city, except one of degree. Stark says this is 
fundamental to Augustinian thought. As Stark stated: '''from the 
things of earth to the things of heaven and from those that are 
visible to those that are invisible, there are degrees of goodness," 
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for all that is is for that very reaSOIl in some sense good'. 32) At 
the root of this idea lies providentialism grounded in the conception 
of God's goodness: 'the divine hand works inside the social world and 
knows how to bring order out of chaos, good out of evil, sanctity out 
Df sinning'.33) In this respect Augustine stressed that even 
deviations from a truth were not entirely without use. He claimed, 
for· instance, that the Catholic faith was strengthened even by the 
dissensions of heretics: 'It is true that much is done by the wicked 
against God's willi but such is His wisdom and such His strength that 
all that seems to go against His will, still tends towards those ends 
and issues which He Himself has foreknown to be good and right.' 34) 
Stark duly summarized these two features of the Augustinian thought. 
His whole interpretation of history is based on the conception we 
are discussing, the conception which a later century was to call 
"the heterogony of purposes": men follow one purpose; more often 
than not it is private, and more often than not it is selfish and 
sinfuli God follows another purpose,and it is always a social and 
moral p~rpose - a loving purpose. But it does not occur. For 
God lets men have their own head; He does not attempt to thwart 
their designs - and yet He knows how to combine their strivings 
in such a way that in the end a state of things emerges which 
corresponds to his holy will. 36) 
As argued by Collingwood and Stark, this kind of thinking based on 
the Christian doctrines of original sin and grace had some effect on 
the way in which human affairs in the social world during subsequent 
ages were viewed by European intellectuals. In the first place, the 
introduction of those ideas led to the supposition that while due to a 
necessary blindness inherent in human nature men are directed only to 
their own private purposes, their activities as such are designed by 
God's purpose to carry out the benevolent consequences for the sake of 
SOCiety at large. 36) This is what is called the heterogeneity of 
purposes. In the second place, it helped to give rise to optimism or 
the belief that the world is actually (and must be) the best 
possible. 37) This belief seems inevitable, granted that God prepares 
even evil for good. Hence, in this view, disharmony or conflict in 
human affairs may come about. Yet it is declared that 'eventually' it 
is predestined to a good end. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the doctrine of progress in modern 
times is a modification of the Christian doctrine of salvation, and 
can be traced back to The City of God of Saint Augustine. 39) The 
Christian notion of a future state to be enjoyed after God's Last 
Judgment made European people conceive the life of the world to come 
as the final goal of human destiny. God's goodness did not allow 
mankind which inherit Adam's sin to live in a totally depraved 
situation. Jesus, the Son of God, was the Messiah. The death of Jesus 
was expiation for sinners, and belief in Him meant redemption and 
guaranteed eternal life in the heavenly city at the Day when the 
earthly city would be destroyed. In this way the Christian eschatology 
taught them to look forward to a Utopia where all the problems of 
human life in this world should have found their solution. On the 
basis of this idea Augustine enVisaged human history as a progressive 
change of the generations from Adam to the end of the ages; a 
progression of human life which, though men were the sole agents 
throughout history, was made possible by the government of a 
benevolent God. Accordingly, it was supposed by Augustine that: 'The 
developments of history, then, are not fortuitous. History is made 
by men, by free men even, yet in a mysterious, though probable manner 
their independent actions conspire in the end to form a scheme, a 
progression, which reflects God's will rather than theirs'. 39) But 
when the secularization of European culture which was due to the 
knowledge of classical civilization, information on remote and non-
Christ ian peoples, and more importantly a scientific movement 
accelerated by the Newtonian philosophy took place, the teleological 
conception of life inspired by the Christian eschatology were 
desupernaturalized into the prospect of indefinite progress in this 
life. As Carl Becker summed up: 
The strength of the Christian version was that, conceiving human 
history as a cosmic drama in which all men played their 
predestined part, it offered to all the hope of eternal life as a 
compensation for the frustrations of temporal existence: by 
transferring the golden age from the past to the future it 
substituted an optimistic for a disillusioned view of human 
destiny ... , It was in this time of revolt against ecclesiastical 
and secular authority that the Christian doctrine of salvation 
was gradually transformed into the modern idea of progress. 40) 
In this way the Christian philosophy based on providentialis~ 
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eschatology, and redemptionism, which replaced, in the Middle Ages, 
classical pessimism that viewed human history as a permanent series of 
successive cycles, was transferred into the prospect of progress in 
this world together with the secularization of European culture. 
So far we have briefly observed that Christian philosophy which 
connects together many different doctrines by virtue of the conception 
of divine goodness had some effect on European social philosophy which 
was secularized in modern t im~s. I believe this is the case with 
Smith as well. In this light we shall proceed to take note of Smith's 
metatheoretical principles. 
4.3.1. The Law of the Heterogeneity of Purposes 
As noted earlier, the law of the heterogeneity of purposes or dBS 
Gesetz der Heterogonie der Zwecke4 1 ) emerged as a result of the manner 
of thinking in which while man is designed to act largely for his own 
private purpose alone, depending on natural desires rather than on 
foresight by reason, God has caused such blind actions to work in a 
way which helps to realize His benevolent social purpose. Even when 
the doctrine of the heterogeneity of purposes is secularized, it tells 
us that even though individuals are actuated by their immediate and 
shortsighted desires to fulfil their personal ends, the social ends 
which ensue from those individual actions are greater than the means. 
It is quite certain that Smith regarded the heterogeneity of 
purposes as a framework of exposition. Of course, unlike the 
Christian thinkers Smith was very far from considering God to 
intervene from time to time in historical events in order to carry out 
His benevolent intention. For Smith, God just remained the author of 
nature. Given these, it is likely that Smith assumes that man acts on 
natural desires rather than the intellect for his personal ends, and 
that such actions bring socially desirable effects. Indeed, this is 
the case that Smith makes. Smith's statement as follows clearly shows 
this. 
With regard to all those ends which ... may be regarded ... as 
the favourite ends of nature, she has constantly in this manner 
not only endowed mankind with an appetite for the end which she 
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proposes, but likewise with an appetite for the means by which 
alone this end can be brought about, for their own sakes, and 
independent of their tendency to produce it. Thus self-
preservation, and the propagation of the species, are the great 
ends which Nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all 
animals. Mankind are endowed with a desire of those ends, and an 
aversion to the contrary ... But though we are in this manner 
endowed with a very strong desire of those ends, it has not been 
intrusted to the slow and uncertain determinations of our reason, 
to find out the proper means of bringing them about. Nature has 
directed us to the greater part of these by original and 
immediate inst incts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which un1 tes 
the two sexes, the love of pleasure, and the dread of pain, 
prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and without 
any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends 
which the great Director of nature intended to produce by 
them. 4-2) 
Men follow their instincts and passions without knowing what will 
come of their actions, while they are originally designed by God to 
lead to beneficent social ends. This is an apparent recognition of 
the principle of the heterogeneity of purposes. It is noteworthy that 
Smith takes it for granted. And this fact is confirmed by Smith's 
practice in using the principle in a number of places in his work.4-3) 
In fact, his moral theory as a whole is an application of the law of 
the het erogenei t y of purposes. Smi th' s moral theory is a theory of 
C moral sentiments'. He attempts to explain all moral phenomena in 
terms of natural sentiments alone, while at the same time rejecting 
the view that human actions in moral affairs are taken in view of ends 
preconceived by reason. This is plain in Smith's statement: 'When by 
natural principles we are led to advance those ends [the well-being of 
society], which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to 
us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient 
cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and 
to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the 
wisdom of God'.4-4-) This is also the ground on which Smith criticises 
the systems which sought the principle of approbation in reason.4-S ) 
A similar theme is true of the economic analysis which Smith 
offers. The most telling instance is in the passages containing the 
phrase 'invisible hand' in his two major writings. The basic idea 
which appears in those passages is that the man who pursues what he 
wants in his own self-interest, contributes to social well-being 
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wi thout intending it. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith talks 
about the distribution of the necessaries of life which happens in 
such a way. 
The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and 
agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite 
of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only 
their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose 
from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the 
gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they 
divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They 
are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution 
of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the 
earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, 
and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the 
interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication 
of the species. When Providence divided the earth among a few 
lordly masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed 
to have been left out in the partition. 46) 
Landlords, acting in their own self-interest alone, promote the 
interest of society at large. Nature is so arranged by God that the 
narrower means brings an even greater end. 
Similarly, in one of the best-known passages of the Wealth of 
Nations Smith tells us that the self-seeking motivation of capitalists 
who are not interested in public welfare contributes to the 
maximization of social production. 47) More importantly, Smith's 
purely economic analysis as a whole which draws mainly on the 
assumption that man is motivated by self-interest in economic 
transactions is likewise another application of the principle of the 
heterogeneity of purposes. As A. S. Skinner duly pointed out: 
Looked at from one point of view, the analysis taken as a whole 
provides one of the most dramatic examples of the doctrine of 
• unintended social outcomes', or the working of the • invisible 
hand'. The individual undertaker (entrepreneur), seeking the 
most efficient allocation of resources, contributes to overall 
economic efficiency; the merchant's reaction to price signals 
helps to ensure that the allocation of resources accurately 
reflects the structure of consumer preferences; the drive to 
better our condition contributes to economic growt~4S) 
What has been observed obviously reveals that Smith makes use of the 
principle of the heterogeneity of purposes as a frame of exposition. 
This illustrates the (theological) point that the conception of divine 
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goodness was influential in Smith's scientific study. 
remark is relevant in this aspect: 
H. W. Spiegel's 
Those who are familiar with the history of economic ideas will be 
aware of the fact that Smith's Invisible Hand and its related 
concept of the self-regulating market and nonpurposive social 
formations in general (which are not the result of design but of 
the interplay of the actions of individuals who pursue purposes 
of their own) are secularization of thoughts that originally and 
earlier appeared in theological context, in which the unintended 
consequence or individual actions were attributed to divine 
providence. 49) 
Finally, it is to be observed that this feature of Smith's thought 
has been called the 'doctrine of unintended consequences'. On account 
of this characteristic several commentators have conceived his 
approach of the kind to resemble a strain of modern sociological 
theories, 1. e., functionalism. 50) Whereas a comparison of Smith's 
approach with modern functionalism is not worthless as a backward-
looking attitude, it should be remembered that the idea of the 
heterogeneity of purposes originally emerged out of Christian thought 
which Saint Augustine's theology systematized and lent support to. 51) 
~.3.2. The Belief in Harmony or No Conflict in Original Arrangements 
(at the Analytic Level) 
We found earlier that the belief in divine guidance in association 
with the conception of divine goodness gave rise to optimis~ optimism 
which declares that the world is the best possible. If the world is 
the true working-out of a divine Being whose benevolence created it, 
it is easy to accept the view that the world is pervaded by harmony. 
It seems manifest that Smith shares this type of belief. In many 
places in the Theory of Moral Sentiments we can find Smith's remark to 
the effect that the benevolence of an all-wise God created and 
governed the universe in order to maintain the greatest possible 
happiness of mankind. 52) In this regard it is no wonder that Smith 
finds a harmonious order in the operations of society. 
it: 
As Smith put 
Human society, when we contemplate it in a certain abstract and 
philosophical light, appears like a great, an immense machine, 
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whose regular and harmonious 
agreeable effects. 53) 
movements produce a thousand 
This passage clearly indicates Smith's perception of social harmony. 
But there is a point which deserves serious attention. The point is 
that seen from an 'abstract and philosophical' perspective, Smith 
claims, 
illlotions. 
society resembles a vast machine which produces 'harmonious' 
In other words, it implies that only at an analytical or 
speculative level can we observe the harmony which reveals itself in 
the workings of societ y. I think that this is a very important 
message which Smith reminds us about. For he implicitly lays stress 
upon a distinction between the theoretical and the practical 
dimension. Therefore, we can point out, in so far as Smith is 
concerned, that it is one thing to say that there is no conflict on 
the analytical or theoretical level; it is another that social harmony 
reveals itself on the empirical level or in 'entire' reality. The 
former statement is what Smith has in mind in the quoted passage, and, 
as I believe, becomes a key principle in gUiding his theorizing: The 
latter statement is not true of Smith, as we shall later see. The 
truth which we can now state at this stage is that Smith observed both 
aspects of social harmony and conflict at the practical level. In any 
case, because the failure to make a precise distinction between those 
two statements which Smith had in mind seemed to give rise to certain 
misinterpretations with respect to his system of thought, in what 
follows we shall note them in order to render our theme more apparent. 
In the first place, there is a tendency to suppose that Smith found 
universal social harmony which permeates through the world while at 
the same time ignoring factual data which are found in social reality. 
Stephen is typical of this type of argument. 54) 
In the moralists [involving Adam Smi thJ whom we are about to 
consider there is generally a provoking tendency to an easy 
optimis~ They inherit the pantheistic sentiment that 'whatever 
is, is right', though they do not adopt the pantheistic logic; 
and as nature is still their God, they overlook the dark side of 
nature. 55) 
And Stephen goes on to note that Smith's work is an example of • the 
desire to obtain a comfortable and symmetrical theory at the expense 
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of facts'. (6) Two points can be made against Stephen's comment. 
Firstly, it is not true that Smith did 'overlook the dark side of 
nature'. In fact, on the practical dimension Smith did recognize the 
dark side, as well as the the cheerful side of nature, as we shall 
point out in subsequent chapters. It is of great importance to be 
aware that if Smith put forward 'a comfortable and symmetrical 
theory', it did not arise so much from his neglect of facts which 
display the dark side of nature, but from the influence of his 
metaphysics and the metatheoretical principle which rules out 
conflicting elements despite his observation of such negative features 
of society. Secondly, the point just made is reinforced by the fact 
that Smith did not subscribe to pantheism or the view which holds that 
whatever is, is right. 
with Stoic metaphysics. 
as follows. 
This seems obvious from Smithfs disagreement 
Smith describes the Stoic view of the world 
The ancient stoics were of opinion, that as the world was 
governed by the all-ruling providence of a wise, powerful, and 
good God, every single event ought to be regarded, as making a 
necessary part of the plan of the universe, and as tending to 
promote the general order and happiness of the whole: that the 
vices and follies of mankind, therefore, made as necessary a part 
of this plan as their wisdom or their virtue; and by that eternal 
art which educes good from ill, were made to tend equally to the 
prosperity and perfection of the great system of nature. (7) 
Hence, it can be noticed that while this Stoic doctrine does not claim 
that everyone lives a virtuous life, it informs us that since 
everything in the world is part of God, good could emerge out of evil. 
However, it is certain that Smith objects to this contention. For 
Smith does not admit that even the vices which men commdt are part of 
the intention of God, and that evil results, after all, in good. 
Smith believes in the natural laws which are set up by God to regulate 
the universe; and in the sphere of morality, universal moral laws 
derivable from human nature. Yet, it is noteworthy that men have, 
Smith recognizes, the freedom to follow or not to follow His moral 
laws. When we follow the moral laws, we do good, and realize the 
intention of God, whereas when we violate the~ we do evil, and become 
the enemies of God. As Smith makes it clear: 
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But by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, 
we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the 
happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, 
to cooperate with the Deity, and advance as far as in our power 
the plan of Providence. By acting otherways, on the contrary, we 
seem to obstruct, in some measure, the scheme which the Author of 
nature has established for the happiness and perfection of the 
world, and to declare ... in some measure the enemies of God. s8 ) 
This statement apparently reveals Smith's denial of the view that good 
could arise from evil since everything in the world is part of the 
plan of the universe preordained by a benevolent God. Consequent 1 y, 
it should be seen that Smith does not accept pantheism, and does 
recognize the existence of the dark side of nature which can never be 
reconciled with the positive side of nature. 
In the second place, there is another type of interpretation which 
fails to perceive that Smith supposes a harmony only at the 
speculative level. Jacob Viner's well-known paper has led the way to 
this kind of standpoint. Viner first admits that Smith finds an 
inherent harmony in the order of nature. But Viner claims that this 
harmony is imperfect and partial in the Wealth of Nation~ while it is 
universal and perfect in the Theory of Moral Sentiments As Viner put 
it: 
What is not so familiar, however, is the extent to which Smith 
acknowledged exceptions to the doctrine of a natural harmony in 
the economic order even when left to take its natural course. 
Smith, himself, never brought these together; but if this is 
done, they make a surprisingly comprehensive list and they 
demonstrate beyond dispute the existence of a wide divergence 
between the perfectly harmonious, completely beneficent natural 
order of the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the partial and 
1imi ted harmony in the economic order of the Weal th of 
Nations 59) 
It should, first of all, be pointed out that even in the Theory of 
MOral Sentiments Smith does not find a harmonious order in nature if 
his discussion rests on the empirical dimension. At all events, read 
from the quoted passage, Viner appears to think that in the Wealth of 
Nations Smith saw disharmonies at the speculative level. For he says 
that Smith there found a number of sources of social disharmony 'even 
when left to take its natural course'. This is a mistaken view. It 
is not merely opposed to Smith's declaration to the effect that he 
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observes a harmony in nature on the theoretical dimension. 
also confounds Smith's treatment of economic problems 
But it 
at the 
analytical level with his description of many negative features of 
society at the practical level. 
Before going further it is worthwhile to note that the argument of 
a basic dichotomy of the Wealth of Nations at the speculative level 
which was less explicit in Viner's writing, that is, the coexistence 
of the themes of social harmony and disharmony has, in a large 
measure, given stimulus to numerous studies with regard to the dark 
side of Smith's thought. 60> And it should be observed that the 
direction of these studies was linked to the problem of how to make 
out the dualism in Smith's system of thought. 61) But a comment of 
Robert Heilbroner's is of particular interest. 62 ) For Heilbroner was 
concerned to highlight the contrast of Smith's 'philosophic' vision, 
l.." e., optimism and pessimism. in an extension of those studies which 
focused on the dark side of Smith's work. Since I think that Smith 
supposes a social harmony at the analytical level while I do not deny 
that he finds, in many aspects, the dark side of societ y at the 
practical level, it remains difficult to accept Heilbroner's view 
which laid stress on two opposed types of 'philosophic' vision. We 
shall later have an occasion to deal in detail with this sort of view. 
4.3.3. The Belief in Progress 
There seems to be little difficulty in identifying the concept of 
progress as a metatheoretical principle which Smith used in guiding 
theorizing. To be sure, most Smi thian commentators are willing to 
recognize that the theme of progress permeates Smith's work, although 
it is not clear if they regard the concept of progress as a 
metatheoretical principle. As we have noted earlier, the modern 
concept of progress came out of the secularization of the Christian 
eschatology behind which the conception of divine goodness worked. In 
this context it seems reasonable to suppose that Smith's religious 
conviction about God's benevolence helped him to accept the prospect 
of progress in this life. In many places, Smith mentions his belief 
in progress. Phrases such as 'the natural progress which men make in 
society', 'the natural progress of things toward improvement', and 
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'the natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity'63) 
show this to be his firm convict ion. Of course, it should be 
remembered that Smith's constant theme in the context of natural 
theology is that when God brought the universe into existence He 
designed its general laws to promote preservation and prosperity of 
humankind. This is clear from Smith's expression that the universe 
is • a coherent system, governed by general laws, and directed to 
general ends, viz. its own preservation and prosperity, and that of 
all the species that are in it'.64) 
As is well-known, Smith applied the idea of progress to various 
fields. He describes the progress of scientific knowledge, of 
language, of law and government, and of economic well-being. In fact, 
much has been done in this connection. 65) Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that some writers question if the concept of progress is 
applied to morality, or consistently to the long-term evolution of an 
economy. Firstly, T.D.Campbell partially raises a doubt as to 
D.Forbes's argument to the effect that the idea of progress of society 
is the historical framework not simply of the Weal th of Nations, but 
also of the Theory of Moral Sentiments 66 ) Campbell points out that 
'this is inadequately demonstrated with respect to the MOral 
Sentiment~.67) It seems that Campbell's critique is justifiable, for 
Forbes failed to provide decisive evidence for his assertion, and just 
said that 'there will be different degrees of self-command in 
different degrees of civilization' .68) Secondly, Heilbroner's 
contention poses a more serious question as to whether or not the 
doctrine of progress is indeed a metatheoretical principle in Smith's 
work. Heilbroner finds that Smith considered the long-run evolution 
of an exchange economy to tend, in the end, towards a stationary 
state. In his view, Smith did not conceive of steady economic 
progress as the natural course of a commercial society. 69) In this 
regard he observes that Smith's vision in conjunction with evolution 
is pessimistic, and that this is one of a few things that escaped 
notice in the past. As he wrote: 'Two centuries of examination under 
a magnifying glass have left few aspects of The Weal th of Nations 
exempt from meticulous study. Yet I believe that a central issue with 
respect to Smith's philosophic and historic 'vision' has failed to 
receive the attention it merits. This is the profound peSSimism 
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concealed within Smith's economic and social scheme of evolution'.70) 
Since I consider the concept of progress to be Smith's metatheoretical 
principle, I shall need to take issue with the view just briefly 
introduced. This will be done in the later part of this work. 
50 far we have observed Smith's metatheoretical principles which 
can be identified in association with his metaphysical doctrine based 
on the study of natural theology. The principles include the law of 
the heterogeneity of purposes, the supposition of 
ruling out of conflict at the speculative level, 
harmony or the 
and the belief in 
progress. In the later chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) we shall try to 
show that the last two principles serve as the organizing factors in 
Smith's construction of his ethical and economic theories. The part 
which the principle of the heterogeneity of purposes played in Smith's 
system of thought will not be considered further, since, as we noted 
earlier. much has been done by others. Finally, it should be 
remembered that this task is performed in order to reveal that Smith's 
metaphysics, which is rooted in his religious 'conviction, was indeed 
influential with respect to his scientific activities. 
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Chapter 4: Adam Smith's Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
Metaphysics outlines a research programme in a way that limits and 
rules out a certain range of theoretical possibilities. This happens 
because metaphysics supplies vision, or a view of the world, which 
indicates the ways of exploring data in the world. In this sense 
metaphysical doctrines are seen to be 'methodologically' suggestive. 
We have suggested this kind of thing in the previous chapters. Such 
chapters were designed to offer methodological discussion in a broad 
sense. But it should be remembered that metaphysics itself does not 
tell us information about the world, and the manner in which we can 
find it out. This type of problem of how to find out information and 
knowledge about the world, whether physical or human, should also be 
handled in the context of methodological discussion. In this chapter 
we shall thus devote ourselves to understanding Smith's scientific 
method in a somewhat restrictive sense. 
The great difficulty which the students of Smith's methodology face 
is in the fact that we have nothing which Smith himself explicitly 
declares to be his own method of inquiry, 
studies of man in society. On account 
which is essential to his 
of this circumstance the 
writers on Smith's method of investigation have depended basically on 
many incidental statements which find their place in his entire 
writings. But it seems a commonplace among them that Smith's early 
works, and especially his essay on the history of astronomy are of 
particular importance for that purpose. I shall not depart from this 
practice. 
What is remarkable when we look at the present studies of Smith's 
method of inquiry is that there is a fundamental disagreement 
concerning a very significant aspect. The disagreement among 
commentators is that which relates to Smith's conception of science. 
Henry Bittermann's paper stressed how basically Smith's major 
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wri t ings, both the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Weal th of 
Nation~ are grounded on empiricism, following the lead of Newton and 
Hume. Since then, the position of many interpreters seems to have 
been in wide agreement with that of Bittermannj Smith's 
epistemological standpoint belongs to the empiricist philosophical 
tradition. 1 ) However, there have been others who claim that the 
r?mpiricist interpretation of Smith's method is misleading. According 
to these commentators, Smith's conception of science is based on what 
may be called the broadly conventionalist epistemological position. 
Human knowledge is no more than what is governed by convention, and 
has nothing to do with 'true' information about the world, whether 
physical or social. If we have to make a choice among competitive 
groups of knowledge like scient i fic theories, the standards for the 
acceptance or preference lie not in their agreement with reality, but 
in, say, the extent to which the aesthetic qualities that they possess 
satisfy us.:2) 
This chapter is designed to find another way which serves to 
develop a more precise interpretation with respect to the conception 
of science which Smith is believed to maintain, in the face of the 
disagreement of both lines of interpretation. Here it is important to 
see that the writers of both lines above mentioned seem to fail to 
realize that there are the two distinct positions within the 
empiricist philosophical tradition, that is, a positivist approach, 
and a realist approach. In fact, these two approaches were usually 
conflated under the terms, 'positivist' or 'empiricist'. In my view, 
all authors who have supported the empiricist position of Smith's 
method, as a matter of fact, have taken the 'positivist' 
interpretation. My position differs from them. While I agree that 
Smith stands mainly in line with the tradition of the empiricist 
philosophy, Smith's opinion with regard to the nature of science, I 
think, corresponds with the realist rather than the positivist 
posi tion. In a realist's view, science primarily aims to uncover the 
underlying mechanism and structure which exist objectively behind, and 
causally necessitate, observable events. The next section will be 
devoted to showing that this is indeed the case with Smith. 
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On the other hand, if it is held that Smith has a realist view of 
science, which implies that he is an empiricist, there is a point to 
which attention should necessarily be paid. If Smith demands no 
examination of the relations between theory and evidence, it can 
safely be said that he is not an empiricist, and thus not a realist. 
To be sure, Smith maintains that scientific theories must be 
objectively checked by reference to empirical evidence. Of course, 
the conventionalist interpreters deny this argument. Whilst it is not 
rejected here that Smith admits that the acceptance and preference of 
scientific theories in accordance with aesthetic standards are often 
found in the history of science, it will be claimed that his 
fundamental criterion for evaluating them consists in the 
correspondence test with the observed facts. And what is worth noting 
in relation to the matter of empirical test is that Smith is a 
verificationist. Accordingly, Smith thinks a theory to come closer to 
the truth, when it confirms more observable evidences. 
thing will be treated in the final section. 
This sort of 
4.2. The Theory of Scientific knowledge: A Realist View 
Ernest Messner once reminded us that 'Only within the small circle 
of Edinburgh intellectuals was his [Bume's} genius fully appreciated, 
though not fUlly approved, and of that intimate group only his closest 
friend Adam Smith gave the nod of whole-hearted approval'.3) While, 
of course, Mossner's remark does not imply that Smith just followed 
and fully agreed to all which Rume wrote, it certainly indicates a 
possibility that Smith may have a number of suggestions from Hume. In 
fact, Mossner's suggestion about Smith's intellectual debt to Hume has 
been recently confirmed by many writings; writings which do not, at 
the same time, fail to point out Smith's originality. It is observed 
that Hume's influence on Smith was extensive enough to cover all the 
subjects of Smith's moral philosophy such as ethics, jurisprudence, 
and political economy.4) Similarly, this is true of the subject of 
methodology and epistemology. It has been recognized that insofar as 
the arena of scientific method and epistemology is concerned, Hume was 
one of those who were most influential on Smith. G) Whereas 
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presumably this kind of assertion can not be rejected, here my aim is 
to note that insofar as 'scientific' methodology is concerned, there 
is a certain element in Smith's account of scientific knowledge which 
departs from Hurne's view of causation. This point will be very 
important, because it leads us to be conscious of the difference of 
the conception of science that Hume and Smith respectively held, and 
io see that each of them belongs to two different traditions in 
empiricist philosophy. 
The argument which finds an essential Humean character in Smith's 
account of scientific theory is a convenient place to start our 
discussion. D. D. Raphael pOinted out that Hume's theory of knowledge 
had a strong influence on Smith's account of scientific activity. 
Raphael argues in this connection: 
Smith is drawing ... on Bume's account both of causation and of 
our belief in an external world. He writes not only of constant 
conjunction but also of coherence in our experience. When he 
describes the 'interruption' of customary connections and of the 
'smooth passage' of the imagination, and when he proceeds to say 
that the imagination fills up the gap by supposing a chain of 
intermediate though invisible events, he is making use of Hume's 
doctrine in Treatise I. iv.2, the section entitled 'Of scepticism 
wi th regard to the senses'. Smith is not simply taking over 
Hume's theory ... But Smith is adapting Hume's account of the 
imagination from the one subject to the other. Smith thinks that 
philosophy or science is an enlargement of common-sense belief as 
represented by Hume .... Of course Hume himself says that systems 
of philosophy are also a product of the imagination, but his 
description of the processes of the imagination in filling up 
gaps comes into his account of our ordinary belief in an external 
world, and that is what Adam Smith uses in his account of 
scientific theory.G) 
Accordingly, in Raphael's opinion, two aspects of the positive 
achievements which Hume made in philosophy were important in Smith's 
thought. Firstly, Smith owed his view of scientific method to Hume's 
account of causation. In other words, Smith finds that scientific 
theory is grounded on the constant conjunction of ideas; or he 
subscribes to what is called associationis~ i.e., the doctrine that 
the baSic sources of knowledge are simple ideas derived from sense 
impressions, and our knowledge of the external world is reached in 
terms of the constant conjunction of particular ideas. Secondly, 
Smith's view of the role of the imagination in science was an 
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extension of Hume's account of common-sense belief. Thus, in this 
view, Smith's originality in connection with the account of the work 
of the imagination consists in the point that he applies to scientific 
activities what Home introduces in conjunction with our common-sense 
belief in an external world. 
a good deal of truth in this kind of argument. 
to approve of the posi t i ve side of Hume' s 
There is, I think, 
Indeed, Smith appears 
philosophy, though his intellectual debt to Hume is not declared. 
Nevertheless, it is of much importance to be aware that the argument 
is not complete as an outlook with respect to Smith's account of the 
nature of scientific theory. For Smith differs, in a fundamental 
aspect, from Hume, and it makes their views of the nature of science 
quit e dist inct. Hume's view of causation, which has provided the 
basic rationale for the positivist account of causal relations, 
suggests the 'regularity theory' of knowledge. In Hume's view which 
denies the necessary connection in 
result of the constant conjunction 
nature, human knowledge is the 
of ideas in accordance with 
observations that one of two events is regUlarly followed by another. 
Smith admits that commonsense knowledge stems from the constant 
conjunction of ideas based on temporal precedence and regular 
succession of events, and this kind of procedure is also part of 
scientific inqUiry. But Smith claims that science goes beyond the 
treatment of causal relations grounded on temporal precedence and 
regular succession of phenomena, and aims at the discovery of the 
underlying mechanism and structure that exist behind and link those 
phenomena. This is the fundamental difference of the conception of 
science which Bume and Smith hold respectively. In order to see this 
fact let us start out to take a brief look at Bume's view of 
causation. 
To begin with, Hume notices that our ordinary reasoning with 
regard to matters of fact involves the idea of necessary connection, 
or the idea that particular causes must necessarily have particular 
effects. When certain specific events follow other specific events, 
we believe that a causal nexus between them is necessary. Given this, 
Hume's question is about what type of necessity this could be. Hume 
firstly argues that there is no logical necessity and no non-logical 
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necessi t y concerni ng mat t ers of fact. It is impossible to know that 
the occurrence of one event is logically connected with the occurrence 
of another, which is taken to be the effect of the first event. And 
because there is no logical necessity in nature it is also impossible 
to expect similar occurrences of events in the future from experience 
of a constant conjunction of events in the past. 
it: 
As Hume maintains 
there appears not, throughout all nature, anyone instance of 
connexion which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely 
loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can 
observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never 
connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never 
appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary 
conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power 
at all, and these words are absolutely without meaning, when 
employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life. 7 ) 
Therefore, however accurately we observe any two events which we 
believe to be cause and effect, there is no rule which would allow us 
to infer that such specific effects must always be connected with such 
specific causes. But, while Hume denies the idea of necessary 
connection in nature, he says that there still remains another method 
to account for our common belief in cause and effect. The point is 
that experience and observation enable us to learn that one particular 
kind of event is regularly conjoined with another, or constant 
conjunction between two types of events. According to Hume, when 
there exists a constant conjunction of those two events, we have a 
conception of cause and effect. That is to say, the idea of 
necessary connection among events emerges out of our perception about 
a great number of resembling cases which show constant conjunction of 
those events. And it does not come from any single instance of 
events. The necessity in which we believe is thus the consequence of 
custom and habit which the repetition of similar events produces, and 
consists in the mind, not in the external objects. 
Bume wrote: 
In this context 
It appears ... that this idea of a necessary connexion among 
events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of 
the constant conjul'lction of these events .. , This connexion, 
therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition 
of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the 
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sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or 
necessary connexion. 8 ) 
It is worth noting, at present, that because of this account of the 
idea of necessary connection the Humean view of causation has been 
called the 'regularity theory'. Whereas there is no necessary 
connection in nature, instead there are only regularities of events 
which exist in the mind. Saying that one event is the cause of 
another is eqUivalent to saying that in the mind the former type is 
'regularly' followed by the latter. What is important in this vein is 
that, since the idea of necessary connection in nature is refuted, our 
perception concerning the regularities of external objects is 
impossible without a supposition of the continuity of an external 
world, or a belief that future resembles past. In Hume's View, the 
imagination helps believe the continued existence of material things, 
and thus plays an important role in filling up the gaps between sense 
impressions in terms of resembling ideas or perceptions. S ) H.H.Price 
seems to summari se well what Hume takes to be the main function of 
the imagination in association with the formation of commonsense 
knowledge. 
We find him [Hume] saying there that what we commonly call our 
consciousness of material objects and events - and therefore of 
their conjunctions - consists largely of imagination. It is a 
combination of two factors, acquaintance with sense-impressions, 
and imagination ... It most certainly is not sense-acquaintance 
alone, Thus in the establishing of a causal rule the imagination 
really comes in twice ove~ It is already reqUired for the so-
called observation of constant conjunctions. And then, of course, 
the expectation, which our rule gives expression to, is itself 
according to Hume a habit of the imagination. 10) 
In our ordinary life this kind of function of the imagination is of 
ext reme si gni f i cance. Such a function is, Hume says, 'the foundation 
of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human 
nature must immediately perish and go to ruin', and becomes the 
, permanent, 
imaginat ion. 
irresist i ble, and universal' principles of the 
This task of the imagination is contrasted with another 
which is based on the 'changeable, weak, and irregular' principles of 
the imagination. The latter type of function of the imagination finds 
expression in fantasy and art which are more free from any requirement 
to comply to sense impreSSions, and is 'neither unavoidable to 
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mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful in the conduct of 
life'.ll) However it is noteworthy that Hume concludes that any 
product of the imagination, whether grounded on universal and 
irresist ible, or weak and irregular principles, is eventually nothing~ 
\ 
but fict ion. 12) In this light it is not surprising to find Hume's 
statement in the conclusion of Treatis~ Book I: 'In all the incidents 
of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. I f we believe, 
that fire warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too 
much pains to think otherwise'. 13) It is doubtful if it is true that 
• fire warms, or water refreshes'. After all, we learn nothing about 
certain truths of the world from experience and observation. There is 
no such thing as rational knowledge about the world. The only reason 
why that kind of knowledge is needed is that 'it costs us too much 
pains to think otherwise', or it is absolutely necessary and 
indispensable for practical purposes like the prevention of 
suffering. In concluding we can observe that there are both elements 
of positivism and conventionalism in Hume, which seems an inevitable 
consequence of the way in which he starts with empiricism, yet ends 
with scepticism.. 14) 
Now let us proceed to examine Smith's approach to the problem of 
scientific knowledge with that Humean theory of causality in mind. As 
suggested before, our aim is to notice Smith's own conception of 
science, as distinct from Hume's. For the purpose at hand we shall 
rely on Essays on Philosophical Subjects, and largely on the 'History 
of Ast ronomy' . 
To start with, it is vital to recognize that Smith closely follows 
Hume in relation to the formation of commonsense knowledge. In our 
ordinary life, when we observe repeated events which are constantly 
conjoined in time, the association of their ideas naturally ensues, 
and we are accustomed to seeing an expected pattern between those 
events. Smith writes in this connection: 
When two objects, however unlike, have often been observed to 
follow each other, and have constantly presented themselves to 
the senses in that order, they come to be so connected together 
in the fancy, that the idea of the one seems, of its own accord, 
to call up and introduce that of the other. If the objects are 
still observed to succeed each other as before, this connection, 
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or, as it has been called, this association of their ideas, 
becomes stricter and stricter, and the habit of imagination to 
pass from the conception of the one to that of the other, grows 
more and more rivetted and confirmed. When objects succeed 
each other in the same train in which the ideas of imagination 
have thus been accustomed to move, and in which, though not 
conducted by that chain of events presented to the senses, they 
have acquired a tendency to go on of their own accord, such 
objects appear all closely connected with one another, and the 
thought glides easily along them., without effort and without 
interruption. They fall in with the natural career of the 
imagination 15) 
It does not seem to be difficult to find, in this passage, the 
doctrine which recalls what Hume tells us about the acquisition of 
knowledge; the point that knowledge arises from the constant 
conjunction of ideas which the imagination makes possible in terms of 
filling up the gap between sense impressions. Indeed Smith observes 
that in this way we gain commonsense knowledge. There are some cases 
which show this. Though at its first sight we are surprised by the 
motion of iron along a plain table as a result of the motion of a 
loadstone, it becomes 'in itself no extraordinary object' when we have 
long observed it. 16) The artisans feel themselves no wonder when they 
observe many appearances in their work-house, for custom has made them 
so familiar with the consequences of their work that the imagination 
can pass without any interval. The same is true of our knowledge that 
bread supplies nourishment to the human body. 17) Finally, we feel 
wonder when for the first time we see a good looking-glass which 
represents external objects before it more precisely and vividly. But 
repetition makes our knowledge concerning its effects so natural: 'It 
[the looking-glass] may excite the wonder of ignorance After a 
little use and experience, all looking-glasses cease to be wonders 
altogether; and even the ignorant become so familiar with them, as not 
to think that their effects reqUire any explication'. 18) There is no 
doubt that these cases which Smith mentions in Essays on Philosophical 
Subjects reveal his view that commonsense knowledge is arrived at by 
means of custom and habit which make the constant conjunction of ideas 
'stricter' and 'more rivetted'. 
Now let us turn to Smith's account of scientific knowledge. It 
should be painted out that the way in which scientific knowledge is 
reached, Smith finds, presupposes the way in which commonsense 
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knowledge is formed. In other words, scientific investigation 
requires the discovery of regular relations between external objects, 
whose knowledge is gained, Smith thinks, in terms of the constant 
conjunction of ideas which a number of resembling events bring into 
the mind. In order to inform us about how much of scientific 
knowledge is reached, and differs fundamentally from commonsense 
knmolledge, Smith starts by supposing the case where new appearances 
give rise to wonder by disturbing the smooth course of the imagination 
which the perception of the mind concerning the regular relat ions 
between events renders possible. When the customary connection of 
ideas is interrupted and the easy passage of the imagination is 
disturbed, the work of the imagination on a scientist's part is, 
according to Smith, to attempt to 'find out something which may fill 
up the gap, which, like a bridge, may so far at least unite those 
seemingly distant objects, as to render the passage of the thought 
betwixt them smooth, and natural, and easy.' 19) However what is 
important is that so as to fill up the gap which arises from an 
unusual sequence of events the scientist proceeds to seek an 
'intervening mechanism' whereby that kind of sequence may become part 
of a system. As Smith put it: 
The supposition of a chain of intermediate, though invisible, 
events, which succeed each other in a train similar to that in 
which the imagination has been accustomed to move, and which link 
together those disjointed appearances, is the only means by which 
the imagination can fill up this interval, is the only bridge 
which can smooth its passage from the one object to the 
other. 20) 
Now in order to suppose 'a chain of intermediate, though invisible, 
events', the scientist does not draw on the constant conjunction of 
ideas. Instead he conjectures as to the intervening mechanism through 
the imagination. To make his argument more apparent Smith takes an 
example of how Descartes endeavoured to explain the motion of the iron 
which occurs as a result of proximity to the loadstone. 
when we observe the motion of the iron, in consequence of that of 
the loadstone, we gaze and hesitate, and feel a want of 
connection betwixt two events which follow one another in so 
unusual a train. But when, with Des Cartes, we imagine certain 
invisible effluvia to circulate round one of the~ and by their 
repeated impulses to impel the other, both to move towards it, 
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and to follow its motion, we fill up the interval betwixt the~ 
we join them together by a sort of bridge, and thus take off that 
hesitation and difficulty which the imagination felt in passing 
the one to the other. That the iron should move after the 
loadstone seems, upon this hypothesis, in some measure according 
to the ordinary course of things. 21 ) 
In brief, to account for such phenomenon Descartes supposed as an 
intervening mechanism the presence of certain small invisible 
particles of matter called effluvia which circulates round the 
loadstone, impels one another through the impulses that its motion 
gives, and finally makes the iron move in accordance with the motion 
of the former. This passage thus indicates that scientific theory is, 
in Smith's view, grounded on the hypothesis which discloses the 
underlying mechanism and structure which are present behind succeeding 
events. It is also worth noting that for this reason Smith contrasts 
the scientist who is interested in a connecting chain of intermediate 
events at sight of many appearances in the work-houses of the artisans 
with common people like the latter who, if an explanation is required 
for those succeeding events, can just say that 'It is their nature ... 
to follow one another and accordingly they always do so'. The same is 
the case with Smith's statement about a relationship between bread and 
the nourishment of the human body. This contrast between common 
people and scientists is telling, in that it clearly shows Smith's 
view that scientists primarily try to find out the underlying 
mechanism and structure which operate behind phenomena rather than 
observed connection of events. As Smith expressed it: 
bread has, since the world began, been the common nourishment of 
the human body, and men have so long seen it, every day, 
converted into flesh and bones, substances in all respects so 
unlike it, that they have seldom had the curiosity to inquire by 
what process of intermediate events this change is brought about. 
Because the passage of the thought from the one object to the 
other is by custom become qUite smooth and easy, almost without 
the supposition of any such process. Philosophers, indeed, who 
often look for a chain of invisible objects to join together two 
events that occur in an order familiar to all the world, have 
endeavoured to find out a chain of this kind betwixt the two 
events I have just now mentioned; in the same manner as they have 
endeavoured, by a like intermediate chain, to connect the 
gravity, the elasticity, and even the cohesion of natural bodies, 
with some of their other qualities. 22) 
In the same vein it is of much interest to observe the manner which 
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Hume and Smith respectively consider to be an explanation of the same 
phenomena. In an Enquiry Concerning Human Understandin~ Hume 
states: 'we say, for instance, that the vibration of this string is 
the cause of this particular sound. But what do we mean by that 
affirmation ? we either mean that this vibration is followed by this 
sound, and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar 
sounds: Or, that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that 
upon the appearance of one the mind anticipates the senses, and forms 
immediately an idea of the other'. 23) Therefore, according to the 
basic rationale that this Humean view of causation provides, 
scientific knowledge is nothing but the compilation of observed 
connect ions bet ween event s. In contrast, Smith maintains in an essay 
on the external senses that, provided a fact that there is a 
connection between the vibrations of the sounding body and the sound 
we hear, the intermediate causes or the underlying mechanism which 
links the one to the other is what the scientist is interested in, and 
attempts to explain. 
The vibrations of the sounding body ... are supposed to produce 
certain correspondent vibrations and pulses in the surrounding 
atmosphere, which being propagated in all directions, reach our 
organ of Hearing, and produce there the Sensation of Sound. 
There are not many philosophical doctrines, perhaps, established 
upon a more probable foundation, than that of the propagation of 
Sound by means of the pulses or vibrations of the air .... Such 
are the intermediate causes by which philosophers have 
endeavoured to connect the Sensations in our organs, with the 
distant bodies which excite the~24) 
Seen in this way it is obvious that insofar as scientific 
explanation and knowledge are concerned, Smith does not conceive them 
to be grounded on the constant conjunction of ideas to which Hume's 
account of causation points. This once again finds itself in what 
Smi th considers to be the work of philosophy or science24): 
• Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of nature. 
Nature, after the largest experience that common observation can 
acquire, seems to abound with events which appear solitary and 
incoherent with all that go before them Philosophy, by 
representing the invisible chains which bind together all these 
disjointed objects, endeavours to introduce order into this chaos of 
jarring and discordant appearances'.2S) 
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In what has so far been seen we can notice that Smith places great 
emphasis on the hypothesis in scientific inquiry; the product of 
conjecture in terms of the imagination. In this point Smith seems to 
be close not so much to Hume as to John Locke. Locke admits that our 
'(,:y}wledge about an external world is not certain. This is inevitable, 
since we can not know the primary qualities on the basis of the 
s2p.sation of the secondary qualities. 26) Under this circumstance our 
knowledge of the physical world is very limited if we depend on 
experience and observation only: 'This way of getting and improving 
out knowledge in substances only by experience and history makes 
me suspect that natural philosophy is not capable of being made a 
science'.27) In this context Locke appreciates the part of the 
hypotheses in science. Furthermore he pOints out that the application 
of the hypotheses may usher us to the discovery of truth if they are 
checked carefully in terms of experiment and observation. 28) 
This sort of probability, which is the best conduct of rational 
experiments, and the rise of hypothesis, has also its use and 
influence; and a wary reasoning from analogy leads us often in 
the discovery of truths and useful productions which would 
otherwise lie concealed. 29) 
Accordingly, Locke lends support both to the formulation of the 
hypotheses by conjecture, and to scientists' attempt to find out the 
underlying mechanism and structure which exist behind observable 
phenomena. It is of great importance to realize that because of this 
fact Locke has been treated as standing in the realist tradition of 
science. 30) 
Given our discussion offered so far, we are in a position to give 
clarification to Smith's conception of science. We shall first need 
to make a distinction between two peculiar approaches within a broadly 
empiricist philosophical tradition, namely. a positivist position and 
a realist position. This seems necessary, because those two distinct 
traditions of positivism and realism have tended to be incorporated 
into the terms, positivism or empiricism, or be confused by several 
Smi thian commentators. 31 ) For the purpose at hand let us confine 
attention to a brief outline of the basic features of those two 
positions. 32) The positivist conception of science received a great 
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stimulus from the work of Hume. Hume's view of causation, with the 
rejection of the necessary connection in nature, provided the central 
rationale for the positivist philosophy. For the positivist general 
laws are essentially ones expressing the regular relationships that 
are found to exist in the world of appearances. They are thus purely 
empirical statements which are arrived at from the Humean view of the 
'regularity theory'. As a result, in this view, it is not the 
objective of science to make an endeavour to discover general laws 
beyond or behind experience and observation. Meanwhile, the origin of 
the realist tradition goes back to Aristotle who was interested in the 
discovery of essences in things, and Locke, as mentioned before, 
supported this approach. The realist admits that the existence of 
regular relations between events is a necessary condition for 
scientific investigation. But, whereas the positivist considers any 
attempt to go beyond experience to be nothing but the unveri Hable 
claims, the realist maintains that what is additionally required for 
scientific explanation is the description of the underlying mechanism 
and structure involved in the regular relations between the observable 
phenomena, although it contains unobservable entities. In this light 
it is also worth noting that the role of model and analogy, which are 
often drawn from a known and familiar source, is highly appreCiated by 
the realist. This is inevitable in that the discovery of the 
underlying mechanism and structure which work behind phenomena can not 
usually be made through experience and observation. Finally, given 
this, it is important not to confound realism and essentialis~ 
According to Popper, essentialism in science makes two claims. 
Firstly, scientists can eventually establish the truth of a scientific 
theory 'beyond all reasonable doubt'. Secondly, scientists are able 
to describe the essence or the essential nature of things in terms of 
the scientific theory.sS) 
Many Smithian commentators are inclined to consider Smith's view of 
science to be in line with positivism. SA) D.A.Reisman made it clearer 
in dealing with Smith's epistemology. According to him, 'Adam Smith 
believed that sense perception is the only dependable means of 
acquiring knowledge about external phenomena', 35) and 'Smith, like 
many other Positivists, was an anti-philosopher: he advises us to 
include in our Weltbild only those observations which actual 
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experience compels us to include (following Ockham's Razor, the well-
known nominalist principle that entities are not to be multiplied 
unnecessarily). '36) On the positivist interpretation, therefore, 
Smith's view of science shows that sense perception alone can be the 
source of human knowledge, and inductive procedures from ideas 
concerning a common sequence of events which are produced by the 
association of sense experience provides the basis for causal 
explanation. This type of interpretation, as we have already noted, 
is not incorrect. Indeed, Smith finds that much of human knowledge 
comes from repeated observation of similar events. But that is not 
the whole story. In Smith's opinion, this kind of knowledge is part 
of, and more importantly, is presupposed by, scientific practice. 
Science offers more than mere statements of general laws which are 
drawn from observable regular relations between phenomena. The 
discovery of regular relations does not tell us why something happens. 
The scientists try to seek answers to why-questions. Hence they are 
concerned with providing knowledge of the underlying mechanism and 
structure which, although usually invisible, exist behind, and link, 
observable events. On the realist conception of science, the 
formulation of hypotheses by conjecture, or by model or analogy thus 
plays an extremely essential role in supplying and advancing 
scientific knowledge. It is no wonder, seen in this light, that Smith 
describes philosophy as • the science of the connecting principle of 
nature', or its business as 'representing the invisible chains which 
bind together all these disjointed objects'. Seen from this 
perspective it should be obvious that Smith's view as to the nature of 
science is grounded not so much on the positivist, but as on the 
realist tradition of empiricist philosophy. 
It has been observed that Smith's outlook about the nature of 
scientific inquiry, as it exclusively appears in Essays on 
Philosophical Subject~ and especially in the essay on the history of 
astronomy, is based on a realist conception of science. In order to 
elucidate that Smith was consistent in respect both of his account of 
the nature of scientific inquiry and his practice, we shall finally 
address ourselves to a task of showing that Smith's scientific 
analysis of morals indeed discloses an applicat ion of the realist 
position. 
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Suppose that we take a positivist position in dealing with the 
problem of morality. Under this circumstance it is necessary to find 
out regularities which are observed to exist between observable 
phenomena. That is, we require many observations with respect to the 
consequences of moral judgments which ordinary people make in response 
to certain types of action. Therefore we observe that people approve 
of some kinds of action, and disapprove of other kinds. For example, 
we find that a number of particular cases which are characterized by 
benevolence receive the approbatior. of people, and a number of 
particular cases which make up crime incur the disapprobation of the~ 
In this case we can proceed to formulate a generalization; benevolence 
accompanies gratitude with social approval, whereas crime brings 
punishment with social disapproval. We as a positivist are not 
concerned with the underlying mechanism whereby people make moral 
judgments in the face of those actions, or the way in which benevolent 
behaviour or criminal offences generate the consequences of approval 
or disapproval. Rather, we as a positivist reject any endeavour to 
discover the underlying mechanis~ because it is not of a nature that 
can be observed from experience. We are content with the 
generalizations of morality which is available from the accumulation 
of many observations with regard to a repeated pattern of people's 
moral judgments in response to certain sorts of action. Given those 
generalizations, we can predict the result which a certain action will 
bring. This description is, at the basic level, the view of 
scientific explanation which should be taken if we hold the positivist 
concept ion of science. 
when we stick to the 
provides. 
This is the account of the nature of science 
rationale which Hume's view of causation 
But this is not the case with Smith's explanation of morality. 
Smith clearly recognizes that experience and induction lead us to form 
the general rules of morality: 'The general maxims of morality are 
formed, like all other general maxims, from experience and 
induction. '37) Where Smith talks about the division and 
characteristic of the ancient philosophy, he notes that many ancient 
moral philosophers tended to make this kind of thing the aim of their 
inquiry. 
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In every age and country of the world men must have attended to 
the characters, designs, and actions of another, and many 
respectable rules and maxims for the conduct of human life, must 
have been laid down and approved of by common consent. They 
might continue in this manner for a long time merely to multiply 
t he number of t hose maxi ms of prudence and moral i t y, wi t hout 
attempting to arrange them in any very distinct or methodical 
order, much less to connect them together by one or more general 
rules, from which they were all deducible, like effects from 
their natural causes. 38> 
A higher level of abstraction and generalization in this matter is to 
move from the multiplication of the general maxims of morality to 
classification, relating all of them to something that is similar in 
character, in terms of inductive procedures. This process of 
generalization and classification following inductive logic is that 
which is duly described in the essay on the history of astronomy. 
It is evident that the mind takes pleasure in observing the 
resemblances that are discoverable betwixt different objects. It 
is by means of such observations that it endeavours to arrange 
and methodise all its ideas, and to reduce them into proper 
classes and assortments. Where it can observe but one single 
quality, that is common to a great variety of otherwise widely 
different objects, that single circumstance will be sufficient 
for it to connect them all together, to reduce them to one common 
class, and to call them by one general name. 39) 
And, as we are aware, Smith finds in the history of language the same 
process along a line from particularity to generality, and from 
concreteness to abstraction. 40 ) Likewise, Smith thinks that in moral 
philosophy generalization and classification at the higher level 
beyond the formation of a great number of maxims of morality were 
achieved by other ancient moralists. 4.1 ) Such are the theories of 
virtue, or accounts of 'wherein does virtue consist'. These theories 
of virtue inform us that certain types of action (which are called 
virtuous) are the object of approval and reward, whilst other types 
(which are called vicious) are the object of blame and punishment. 
That is, those theories of virtue are no more than generalization of 
regular relations between certain types of human action (causes) and 
subsequent moral judgments (effects), both of which are observable. In 
this respect it is possible to say that those theories of virtue, 
which Smith reviewed in Part 7, Section 2, of the Theory of Moral 
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Sentiments, are grounded on the positivist conception of science, 
whether or not the moralists concerned were conscious of it. 
However, the major concern of Smith's moral theory does not lie in 
handling the question of the nature of virtue, or 'wherein does virtue 
consist?' . He is largely interested in another question of moral 
phHosophy, 'by what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this 
character [of virtuel, whatever it be, is recommended to US?'42) Yet, 
Smith's starting point in treating the latter problem is firstly to 
recognize the observed facts in our moral life as those theories of 
virtue pointed out, or that there are the regular relations between 
human behaviour and the effects which moral judgments produce outside. 
Provided this fact, Smith's agenda of the science of morals is to give 
a description of the 'underlying mechanism in the mind' whereby human 
beings make moral jUdgments responding to various sorts of action or 
Circumstance, or in Smith's words, to 'examine from what contri vance 
or mechanism within, those different notions or sentiments [notions of 
right and wrong in many particular cases) arise'. 43) Smi th' s aim in 
the science of morals is to find out the underlying mechanism which 
links those regular relations in our moral life. The theory of 
sympathy and the impartial spectator, whose details we here do not go 
into, is Smith's account of the underlying mechanism which is present 
behind, and links together, any two events which is observable, action 
and people's response, in moral life. This clearly demonstrates that 
Smith based his account of moral judgment on the realist conception of 
science, in line with his view of the nature of scientific inqUiry. 
4.3. Scientific Method 
It is scarcely possible to expect that we can be successful in a 
scientific enterprise without relying on scientific method. And it is 
unlikely that we can be consistent in it without constantly putting 
the same method to use. If Smith is believed to arrive at consistent 
resul ts in the science of SOCiety, its ground is thus likely to be 
ascribed to his constant application of the same method. In the 
previous section we have partly observed this fact. And presumably in 
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a similar perspective a good number of commentators are inclined to 
start with Smith's methodology. In other words, it seems a commonplace 
to assume that Smith's view with regard to scientific method is 
intimately bound up with his practice as appeared in the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, and the Weal th of Nations, so that a correct 
understanding of the former is basic to a proper interpretation of the 
latter. In this context much attention has been concentrated on 
Smith's early work, and especially on his essay on the history of 
astronomy. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to find that the existing 
interpretative hypotheses which are mainly drawn from Smith's essays 
on philosophical subjects do not at times fit in well with his 
practice in those two major work. Since I suppose, as others do, that 
Smith was consistent in applying his view about the scientific method 
discussed in the essays on philosophical subjects to the study of 
society, I shall here attempt to propose a more accurate 
interpretative hypothesis, in the extension of the preceding section. 
For this reason the purpose of this sect ion will be more limited in 
scope. 
It was recorded that at an early period of his life Smith's 
interest lay in the natural sciences and mathematics. And Smith's 
article in the Edinburgh Review for 1756 is said to disclose how far 
his knowledge of scientific literature is wide. AA ) If these 
circumstances are considered, it may be supposed that Smith was 
familiar with, at least, scientific method and practice alongside the 
history of science. It seems that Smith's essays on philosophical 
subjects and particularly his essay on the history of astronomy 
explicitly reveal this fact. There seems to be thus an element of 
truth in Schumpeter's claim that 'Nobody, I venture to say, can have 
an adequate idea of Smith's intellectual stature who does not know 
these essays'.AS) Given this, for our purpose let us start with what 
Smith finds to be the motive and purpose of scientific study, as shown 
in the essay on the history of astronomy. 
It is well-known that Smith's intention in writing the 'History of 
Ast ronomy' di d not rest so much on t he hi st ory of ast ronomy it sel f, 
but on an illustration of some principles of human nature, which were 
considered to be the universal motives of stimulating philosophical or 
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scientific researches, in terms of the history of astronomy. This 
fact manifests itself in the full title of the essay, 'The principles 
which lead and direct philosophical enquiries; illustrated by the 
hi st ory of ast ronomy' . The peculiar principles of the human mind 
which Smith notes in connection with the origin and purpose of 
scientific inquiry are 'Surprise', 'Wonder', and 'Admiration'. Smith 
seems to regard as a natural state of the human mind the situation 
where the imagination resumes an easy passage in terms of the 
association of ideas. 46) But the sentiment of surprise occurs 
immediately once the easy movement of the imagination is disturbed by 
the new appearance, which does not fall into the customary order or 
pattern of events. 47) 
But if this customary connection be interrupted, if one or more 
objects appear in an order quite different from that to which the 
imagination has been accustomed, and for which it is prepared, 
the contrary of all this happens. We are at first surprised by 
the unexpectedness of the new appearance, and when that momentary 
emotion is over, we still wonder how it came to occur in that 
place . .a.S) 
As this passage indicates, the feeling of surprise is instantaneous, 
and fades away promptly, being followed by the sentiment of wonder. 
Wonder thus stems from a gap which an unfamiliar succession of things 
brings into the mind; a gap which must be removed in order to recover 
the repose and tranquillity of the imagination. 49 ) For this reason 
the sense of wonder becomes the very principle of the mind which lends 
stimulus to scientific inquiry: 'Wonder, therefore, and not any 
expectation of advantage from its discoveries, is the first principle 
which prompts mankind to the study of Philosophy, of that science 
which pretends to lay open the concealed connections that unite the 
various appearances of nature'. 60) Hence it follows that the 
scientific mind will try to take account of the irregular appearances 
of events in question so as to get rid of the sentiment of wonder. 
Consequently, science is, Smith maintains, a branch of knowledge which 
'endeavours to introduce order into this chaos of jarring and 
discordant appearances, to allay this tumult of the imagination, and 
to restore it ... to that tone of tranquillity and composure', and in 
this sense becomes 'one of those arts which address themselves to the 
imagination,.sl) Seen in this way the purpose of science is to 
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assuage the imagination: 'the repose and tranquillity of the 
imagination is the ultimate end of philosophy' .52) 
This brief observation concerning Smith's account of the motive and 
purpose of science leads us to expect how far he would rely for an 
explanation of scientific inquiry and product on psychological factors 
and aesthetics. In fact, in the latter part of the 'History of 
Astronomy' where Smith reviews four main theoretical systems of 
astronomy, it is very easy to pick up a number of evidences which 
shows Smith's view that a good scientific theory ought to satisfy 
several aesthetical criteria such as familiarity, coherence, and 
simplicity. For example, the lack of simplicity and coherence in an 
old theoretical syste~ which makes the alleviation of the imagination 
difficult, is the cause of its replacement by a new theoretical 
syste~ Therefore, the system of Concentric Spheres, the first system 
0f astronomy, had to give way to the system of Eccentric Spheres, 
because of being unable to meet the aesthetic criteria: the one 'had 
now become as intricate and complex as those appearances themselves, 
which it had been invented to render uniform and coherent. The 
imagination, therefore, found i tsel f but Ii tt Ie relieved from that 
embarrassment by so perplexed an account of things. Another 
system for this reason ... was invented by Apollonius '" the more 
artificial system of Eccentric Spheres and Epicycles'. 53) 
Another instance, one of the most telling evidences in support of 
the view that appeal to the imagination is the eventual criterion in 
evaluating scientific systems, appears in Smith's account of the 
astronomers' abandonment of Ptolemy's system in favour of a competing 
system of Copernicus. 
The superior degree of coherence, which it bestowed upon the 
celestial appearances, the simplicity and uniformity which it 
introduced into the real directions and velocities of the 
planets, soon disposed many astronomers, first to favour, and at 
last to embrace a syste~ which thus connected together so 
happily, the most disjointed of those objects that chiefly 
occupied their thoughts. Nor can any thing more evidently 
demonstrate, how easily the learned give up the evidence of their 
senses to preserve the coherence of the ideas of their 
imagination, than readiness with which this, the most violent 
paradox in all philosophy, was adopted by many ingenious 
astronomers ... 54) 
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The system of ptolemy had a capability to comply to the same 
observations, and to provide the result of the same calculations. 
Hence, both systems must have been favoured. Moreover, Copernicus's 
system was diametrically opposite to the presentation of the 
senses. S5 ) Nevertheless, since the one lacked coherence and 
simplicity, the astronomers abandoned it in favour of the other. 
Meanwhile, the criterion of familiarity is likewise an important 
measure by which to evaluate a scientific syste~ According to Smith, 
'no system, how well soever in other respects supported, has ever been 
able to gain any general credit on the world, whose connecting 
principles were not such as were familiar to all mankind'. 56) The 
contemporary reception of Kepler's astronomical system makes a typical 
case which presents how far the aesthetic principle of familiarity is 
essential to the needs of the imagination. Kepler's system was 
capable of providing more accurate calculations and predictions with 
respect to the motions of the Planets, and 'was better supported by 
observations than any system had ever been before'. 57) But 
philosophers and astronomers generally neglected Kepler's syste~ 
because it was drawn from an unfamiliar analogy; 'an analogy too 
difficult to be followed, or comprehended', since they were familiar 
with the motions of all the heavenly bodies in a perfect circle and 
wi th equal velocity, rather than in an ellipse and with changing 
velocity.sS) 
Given that for Smith the aesthetic principles just mentioned are 
the criteria for the evaluation of scientific theories, it is quite 
natural to meet Smith's most favourable description with regard to the 
Newtonian system. For all aesthetical criteria like coherence, 
simplicity, and familiarity were satisfied by the Newtonian syste~ 
In Smith's words, Newton's scientific theories are • a system whose 
parts are all more strictly connected together, than those of any 
other philosophical hypothesis. Allow his principle, the universality 
of gravity, and that it decreases as the squares of the distance 
increase, and all the appearances, which he joins together by it, 
necessarily follow. Neither are tbe principles of union ... such 
as the imagination can find any difficulty in going along with. The 
gravity of matter is, of all its qualities, after its inertness, that 
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which is most familiar to US'.59) The Newtonian system most 
completely linked together the diverse phenomena in nature in terms of 
a single, familiar principle, gravity, and gave a capacity to predict 
thenl with more precision. Mankind approved of the Newtonian system, 
since in that way it 'has introduced such coherence into the motions 
of all the Heavenly Bodies, [and) has served not a little to recommend 
it to the imagination of mankind'.GO) 
Finally, there is a plainly paradoxical statement about the 
Newtonian system to note in a similar connection, which undoubtedly is 
part 1 Y grounded on Smi t h' s argument s so far observed. As noted, in 
the History of Astronomy Smith concentrated attention on psychological 
factors which were supposed to account for the origin and purpose of 
scientific inqUiry. Wonder gives stimulus to scientific activity, and 
its products, 1. e., scientific systems, are designed to 'soothe the 
imagination', and preserve the composure and order of the mind. After 
all, all scientific constructions are the products of the imagination, 
and are preferred to the extent to which they appeal to the 
imagination, and meet the aesthetical criteria rather than other 
obj ect i ve st andards. Looked at in this way it seems inevitable to 
conclude that even the Newtonian principles, which 'have a degree of 
firmness and solidity that we should in vain look for in any other 
system' are no more than the conventional kind of knowledge, which has 
nothing to do with objective truths that actually exist in nature. In 
this vein Smith writes: 
even we, while we have been endeavouring to represent all 
philosophical systems as mere inventions of the imagination, to 
connect together the otherwise disjointed and discordant 
phaenomena of nature, have insensibly been drawn in, to make use 
of language expressing the connecting principles of this one, as 
if they were the real chains which Nature makes use of to bind 
together her several operations. Can we wonder then, that it 
should have gained the general and complete approbation of 
mankind, and that it should now be considered, not as an attempt 
to connect in the imagination the phaenomena of the Heavens, but 
as the greatest discovery that ever was made by man, the 
discovery of an immense chain of the most important and SUblime 
truths, all closely connected together, by one capital fact, of 
the reality of which we have daily experience. 61 ) 
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Appeal to the imagination which the Newtonian system makes leads us 
first to approve of it, and next to believe that it is the discovery 
of truth, or 'the real chains' in nature. But, however well it may be 
supported in practice, it, like any other scientific system, is a 
'mere invention of the imagination', which has eventually found its 
place in the mind, not in nature. Accordingly, it seems that the 
pursuit of scientific knowledge has nothing to do with the discovery 
of truth. 
It is in the way so far discussed that a number of Smi thian 
commentators who have been concerned with Smith's method of inquiry 
are inclined to approach the proble~ It is. to be sure, a mistake to 
reject that there is a good deal of truth in this line of 
interpretat ion. A complete denial of that type of outlook is opposite 
to the apparent evidences which, as a matter of fact, find themselves 
in the 'History of Astronomy'. Yet, a reason why further attention is 
required rests on the extreme position that many authors in support of 
the sort of opinion take with respect to Smith's view of science. 
Before going further let us clarify that type of interpretation. 
It is evident that those who try to understand Smith's scientific 
method in the way above described propose the interpretative 
hypothesis according to which, in his view, scientific theories are 
accepted because they fulfil the aesthetic criteria like simplicity, 
coherence, and familiarity, and to such an extent they can be regarded 
as 'mere inventions of the imagination'. They may be called 
'conventionalist interpreters'. Kolakowski's statement with respect 
to a standard feature of conventionalism is likely to be helpful in 
this vein. 
The fundamental idea of conventionalism may be stated as follows: 
certain scientific propositions, erroneously taken for 
descriptions of the world based on the recording and 
generalization of experiments, are in fact artificial creations, 
and we regard them as true not because we are compelled to do so 
for empirical reasons, but because they are convenient, useful, 
or even because they have aesthetic appeal. Conventionalists 
agree with empiricists on the origin of knowledge, but reject 
emplrlclsm as a norm that allow us to justify all accepted 
judgements by appealing to experience, conceived as a sufficient 
criterion of their truth. 52) 
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In brief, for the convent ionalist science does not aim at providing 
true description or explanation concerning the world with the aid of 
scientific theories. Scientific theories, which are nothing but the 
artificial inventions of the scientists, are simply preferred either 
for aesthetic reasons, or on account of being convenient instruments 
for practical use. 
As observed, the • History of Astronomy' clearly indicates that 
Smi th' s view of science does retain an element of conventionalism. 
But, what seems erroneous is to lay exclusive (or larger> stress on 
the conventionalist side of Smith's conception of science. Two pOints 
may be observed in this connection. Firstly, it is claimed that Smith 
scarcely considers the empirical test of correspondence with 
observable facts to be the criteria for the judgment of scientific 
theories. 63) This is apparent in the following sentences: 'Adam Smith 
came very close to identifying truth with beauty, and scientific 
method with aesthetics', 64) or 'Since it is the primary purpose of 
philosophy to satisfy man's need for coherence, philosophical systems 
need not be judged principally with respect to their truth or 
falsity.6S) Secondly, it is asserted that in Smith's estimate 
scientific knowledge is fiction, and is therefore far from the 
understanding of the 'real chain' that binds the phenomena in nature. 
For Smith finds that a scientific system is a product of the 
imagination, and its acceptance depends nearly exclusively on the 
extra-scientific reasons which are relating to aesthetics. 66 ) 
This kind of interpretation which exclusively finds Smith to be a 
conventionalist in his method of inquiry, I believe, is misleading, 
looked at both from the 'History of Astronomy', and from his practice 
in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Weal th of Nations. From now 
on we shall proceed to examine this aspect. To begin with, it should 
be observed that Smith explicitly states his narrower purpose in 
writ ing the 'History of Astronomy~ His aim there is to see that the 
sentiments of surprise, wonder, and admiration playa greater part in 
the scientific inquiry than often supposed. or in his words, to 
demonstrate that the role of those sentiments 'is of far wider extent 
than we should be apt upon a careless view to imagine'.67) Later on, 
before he goes on to review four main astronomical systems from his 
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peculiar standpoint, i.e., with a view to illustrating a greater 
influence on scientific activity of the needs of the imagination than 
expected, Smith once again reminds readers that he would not address 
himself to another face of science, the rational aspects of science. 
As Smith states: 
and, without regarding their absurdity or probability, their 
agreement or inconsistency wi th truth and reali ty, let us 
consider them only in that particular point of view which belongs 
to our subject; and content ourselves with inquiring how far each 
of them was fitted to sooth the imagination, and to render the 
theatre of nature a more coherent, and therefore a more 
magnificent spectacle, than otherwise it would have appeared to 
be. be) 
The statements of qualification seem to disclose clearly that Smith 
is qUite well aware that science has various faces. One of t he most 
essential faces of science is the presentation of reasons in respect 
of the formal relations between hypothesis and evidence. This is true 
of even the scholars in antiquity and the Middle Ages in spite of a 
difference of degree. We should be reminded that especially from the 
seventeenth century the decisive role of observation and experiment in 
science was stressed by many scientists. It is well-known that Newton 
and his followers gave great stimulus to experimental researches which 
required the relations between hypothesis and evidence. 69) Given that 
Smith was familiar with natural SCience, and that he was also a 
Newtonian, it would appear difficult to believe that he considers the 
scientific criteria to be equivalent to aesthetic criteria alone. It 
has been recognized by historians of science that extra-scientific 
reasons have frequently come into the history of science. For 
scientific theories are scarcely in agreement with all the facts, and 
there does not generally exist only one scientific theory which 
corresponds to all observable facts. Smith's essay on the history of 
astronomy should, I believe, be viewed in this light. That is to say, 
by means of using the fact that the extra-scientific reasons had an 
actual, though partial, influence on the acceptance or rejection of 
scientific systems, in the 'History of Astronomy' Smith tries to show 
the connection of the principles of human nature with the field of 
science; the stimulus given to both scientific inquiry and advance by 
a broadly psychological needs. Accordingly, it is of great importance 
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to be aware that the 'History of Astronomy' was not originally 
designed to represent his whole view of science. Rather, the 
restricted aim of the essay reveals that it was written, not as the 
description of his complete view of scientific method, but as an 
exemplication of his opinion70 ), following Hume's position, 71) that 
the study of human nature provides a basis for various forms of 
scientific inquiry: 
'Tis is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater 
or less, to human nature; and that, however wide any of them may 
seem to run from it, they st i 11 ret urn back by one passage or 
another. Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural 
Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; 
since they lie under the cognizance of men, are judged of by 
their powers and faculties. 72) 
Now, given the point just described, it is our task to give some 
evidence. Let us first examine the proposition that Smith believes 
scientific knowledge to be no more than fiction, and that the 
discovery of the 'real chain' in nature is categorically impossible. 
As we noted in the previous section, Smith's view concerning the 
conception of science belongs to the realist tradition within the 
broadly empiricist philosophy. Smith does not think that scientists 
are concerned just with the discovery of regular relations between 
observable phenomena. The business of science, according to Smith, is 
to uncover the underlying mechanism and structure which are 
objectively present behind the observable events, or the 'invisible 
real chain' that binds operations in nature. This is suggested once 
again when Smith compares the connecting chain in nature with 'the 
machinery of the opera-house ... behind the scenes. 73) Since science 
deals largely with the problem of giving causal explanations of 
observable events, and of the regular relations between them in terms 
of the 'invisible' chain, undoubtedly there is a very great difficulty 
in making it clear. In fact, this is the reason that scientific 
theories have, as a rule, some reference to analogy or model which 
links them to other sorts of phenomena, or other areas of scientific 
and commonsense knowledge. It is likely that Smith was well aware of 
this fact. 74) At any rate, it is evident that the consciousness of 
the difficulty involved in the formulation of hypotheses which aim at 
the description of the 'invisible real chain' makes Smith tell us that 
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'In the Wonders of nature ... it rarely happens that we can discover 
so clearly this connecting chain'.7S) Smith appears to propose here 
the sceptical view, which would seem to find an echo in his concluding 
comment on Newton's system already quoted, with regard to whether 
truth in the branch of science is attainable, or not. Nonetheless, it 
is remarkable that the discovery of the invisible real chain, Smith 
claims, has been possible in a small number of cases, which, after 
all, leads to a denial of the view that scientific knowledge is, at 
all events, no more than fiction. As Smith maintains: 
With regard to a few even of the~ indeed, we seem to have been 
really admitted behind the scenes, and our Wonder accordingly is 
entirely at an end. Thus the eclipses of the sun and moon, which 
once, more than all the other appearances in the heavens, excited 
the terror and amazement of mankind, seem now no longer to be 
wonderful, since the connecting chain has been found out which 
jOins them to the ordinary course of things. 76) 
Hence, Smith's view concerning the truth of scientific knowledge seems 
to be that it is very difficult to find out the real chains which 
connect together phenomena in nature, yet not impossible. If this is 
correct, then the conventionalist position which says that Smith, for 
example like H.ume, shares the view that the discovery of truth in 
science is impossible, is unlikely to be able to receive support from 
Smith. 
Whereas in the 'History of Astronomy' Smith's limited objective 
rests on showing how far appeal to the imagination is important, and 
how far such aesthetic criteria as coherence, simplicity, and 
familiarity are influential in preferring a scientific system to 
another, there is yet evidence in the 'History of Astronomy' and his 
other writings in support of my interpretative hypothesis; the view 
that Smith takes a realist position in science, which implies that he 
stands within the empiricist philosophical tradition, and that he, 
like many of his contemporaries, considers the primary or • more' 
fundamental criterion for the evaluation of scientific systems to lie 
in an objective standard, i.e., their agreement with observable facts. 
We shall turn to this task. 
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When Smith examined the first astronomical syste~ that of 
concentric spheres, he asserts that its theories explained a number of 
facts which were observed at that time, fairly exact ly enough to 
satisfy early philosophers. 
The 
The motions of the most remarkable objects in the celestial 
regions, the Sun, the Moon, and the Fixed Stars, are sufficiently 
connected with one another by this hypothesis. The eclipses of 
these two great luminaries are, though not so easily calculated, 
as easily explained, upon this ancient, as upon the modern 
system. ... The obliquity of the ecliptic, the consequent changes 
of the seasons, the vicissitudes of day and night, and the 
different length of both days and nights, in the different 
seasons, correspond too, pretty exactly, with this ancient 
doctrine. 77) 
system of concentric spheres initially 'gained the belief of 
mankind by its plausibility' , and thereafter the sentiments such as 
wonder and admiration ' still more confirmed their belief, by the 
novelty and beauty of that view of nature which it presented to the 
imagination'.7B) Theref ore, Smi t h says that 'i f t here had been no 
other bodies discoverable in the heavens besides the Sun, the Moon, 
and the Fixed Stars, this old hypothesis might have stood the 
examination of all ages, and have gone down triumphant to the remotest 
posterity. '79) However, since more accurate observations gradually 
diminished the correctness of its theories, the early form of the 
system of concentric spheres had to be modified and abandoned. BO) 
This clearly shows how far Smith finds the test of correspondence with 
the observed facts to be in the first instance essential for the 
acceptance of a scientific system. 
In the same vein Smith notes that among the ancient systems of 
astronomy the system of eccentric spheres was adopted by most 
ast ronomers. For 'Of all of them, the system of Eccentric Spheres was 
that which corresponded most exactly with the appearances of the 
heavens'.Bl) The system of eccentric spheres was established after it 
accommodated itself to much more, and more accurate observations which 
a much longer course of time brought. Its better agreement with the 
observed phenomena led the astronomers to accept it, while the other 
two ancient systems, concentric spheres and Stoics, were abandoned on 
account of their loose correspondence with them. As Smith put it: 
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It was not invented till after those appearances had been 
observed, with some accuracy, for more than a cent ury together; 
and it was not completely digested by ptolemy till the reign of 
Antoninus, after a much longer course of observations. We cannot 
wonder, therefore, that it was adapted to a much greater number 
of the phaenomena, than either of the other two systems, which 
had been formed before those phaenomena were observed with any 
degree of attention, which, therefore, could connect them 
together only while they were thus regarded in the gross, but 
which, it could not be expected, should apply to them when they 
came to be considered in the detail. From the time of Hipparchus, 
this system seems to have been pretty generally received by all 
those who attended particularly to the study of the heavens. 82) 
Similarly, the astronomers' discontent with the system of eccentric 
system as time passed did not arise only from its complexity. It also 
happened as a result of its failure to accommodate itself precisely to 
more accurate observations. Smi th mentions that 'neither was the 
complexness of this system the sole cause of the dissatisfaction, 
which the world in general began ... The tables of Ptolemy having '" 
become altogether wide of the real situation of the heavenly bodies, 
those of Almamon, in the ninth cent ury, were, upon the same 
hypothesis, composed to correct their deviations'. In this way, until 
the fifteenth century the requirement of the agreement with more 
correct observations had made some astronomers continue to modify the 
system of ptolemy: 'It appeared evident, therefore, that, though the 
system of ptolemy might, in the main, be true, certain corrections 
were necessary to be made in it before it could be brought to 
correspond with exact precision of the phaenomena. '83) 
The system of Copernicus had more coherence and simplicity than 
that of ptolemy. But the one also accounted for the observed motions 
of the five planets much better, and was able to provide the result of 
calculations more correctly, than the other. 84) However, there is 
little more telling in the 'History of Astronomy' than Smith's 
account of the Cartesian philosophy, in order to see his • complete' 
view about the scientific criteria for the acceptance of a theory. 
Smith notes that Descartes originally intended to give a plausible 
explanation for the Copernican system, of which the merit of 
simplicity and coherence was reduced by the unfamiliarity that is 
connected with its failure to explain the rapid motions and the 
natural inertness of the planets. Descartes's theory of vortices, 
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Smith acknowledges, made it possible for the imagination to resume an 
easy movement, by virtue of the familiar principle of motion after 
impulse: 'When the fancy had thus been taught to conceive them as 
floating in an immense ocean of ether, it was quite agreeable to its 
usual habits to conceive, that they [the planets) should follow the 
stream of this ocean, how rapid soever'SS) This explanation of 
Descartes had made rendered the motions of the heavenly bodies so 
coherent by the familiar principle that it in the first instance 
received the high regard from the learned men. As Smith states: 'when 
the world beheld that complete, and almost perfect coherence, which 
the philosophy of Des Cartes bestowed upon the system of Copernicus, 
the imaginations of mankind could no longer refuse themselves the 
pleasure of going along with so harmonious an account of things. The 
system of Tycho Brahe was every day less and less talked of, till at 
last it was forgotten altogether'.9G) 
But Smith immediately goes on to point out that 'The Cartesian 
,. 
philosophy begins now to be almost universally rejected, While the 
Copernican system continues to be universally received'.S7) 
Descartes's theory of vortices is described by Smith as 'that exploded 
hypothesis'. The reason is naturally that the hypothesis of Descartes 
did not fit in well with detailed observations, not that it failed to 
give the imaginative satisfaction. Smith writes: 
The system of Des Cartes, however, though it connected together 
the real motions of the heavenly bodies according to the system 
of Copernicus, more happily than had been done before, did so 
only when they were considered in the gross; but did not apply to 
the~ when they were regarded in the detail. Des Cartes ... had 
never himself observed the Heavens with any particular 
application. Though he was not ignorant, therefore, of any of the 
observations which had been made before his time, he seems to 
have paid no great degree of attention '" So far, therefore, 
from accommodating his system to all the irregularities, which 
Kepler had ascertained in the movements of the Planets; or from 
shewing, particularly, how these irregularities, and no other, 
should arise from it, he contended himself with observing, that 
perfect uniformity could not be expected in their motions, from 
the nature of the causes which produced the~8S) 
After all, owing to its failure to stand the test of correspondence 
with observable facts, the Cartesian system came to be replaced by the 
Newtonian syste~ 
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Newton's system, Smith observes, 'has advanced to the acquisition 
of the most universal empire that was ever established in philosophy'. 
As we noted before, Smith's stated aim is to stress that the 
acceptance and preference of the Newtonian system has some connection 
t.Jith its capability to render the movements of the heavenly bodies 
coherent and simple. Smi th says that Newton did so, by means of 
discovering 'an immense chain of the most important and sublime 
truths, all connected together, by one capital fact'. 89) However, 
Smith's account in conjunction with the Newtonian system is rather 
generally devoted to showing that it accommodated itself to many other 
irregulari ties which the previous astronomical systems failed to do, 
and was thus able to explain the motions of the heavenly bodies with 
the most remarkable rigour. 90 ) In this vein Smith concludes: 
His principles, it must be acknowledged, have a degree of 
firmness and solidity that we should in vain look for in any 
other syste~ The most sceptical cannot avoid feeling this. They 
not only connect together most perfectly all the phaenomena of 
the Heavens, which had been observed before his time, but those 
also which the preserving industry and most perfect instruments 
of later Astronomers have made known to us; have been easily and 
immediately explained by the application of his principles, or 
have been explained in consequence of more laborious and accurate 
calculations from these principles, than had been instituted 
before. 91 ) 
Seen together from all we so far observed it would be safe to hold 
that Smith conceives the test of the correspondence of a scientific 
theory with observed phenomena to be the 'primary and fundamental' 
criterion by which we actually judge of it. But the agreement of 
scientific systems with the observed facts is not the only criterion 
of their acceptance and preference. Smith appears to find that the 
principal standard for the evaluation of scientific theories, at the 
same time, is usually complemented by the aesthetic criteria such as 
coherence, simplicity, and familiarity. If Smith talks in the 'History 
of Astronomy' as if the aesthetic reasons played a nearly exclusive 
role in the acceptance and preference of the astronomical systems, it 
is because of his specific purpose in writing the essay; the aim of 
illustrating how far some principles of human nature or psychological 
factors are basic to human activity like science. 92) Now we shall 
turn to what Smith believes to be the method of presentation best 
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relevant to philosophy and science. This is necessary, not merely 
because we can be aware of Smith's approach to individual and society, 
but especially in that we can have another confirming evidence which 
discloses his view that the primary scient ific criterion for the 
judgement of a theory consists in its agreement with observed 
phenomena. 
In Lectures on Rhetoric and Helles Lettres Smith notes that there 
are two possible types of method in terms of which a didactic or 
scientific discourse can be delivered. According to the first form 
that Smith calls the Aristotelian method, we start with collecting 
facts concerning different subjects, and proceed to find out separate 
principles by virtue of examining them. Using the second form of 
presentation called the Newtonian method we set out a very few general 
principles, and proceed to link together all the phenomena in 
different subjects by them. As Smith put it: 
in natural philosophy or any other science of that sort we may 
either like Aristotle go over the different branches in the order 
they happen to cast up to us, giving a principle commonly a new 
one for every phaenomenon; or in the manner of Sir Isaac Newton 
we may lay down certain principles known or proved in the 
beginning, from whence we account for the several I phenomena, 
connecting all together by the same chain.-- This latter which we 
may call the Newtonian is undoubtedly the most philosophical, and 
in every science whether of moralls or naturall philosophy etc., 
is vastly more ingenious and for that reason more engaging than 
the other. 93> 
Smith adds that the Newtonian method 'gives us a pleasure to see the 
phaenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable all deduced from 
some principle (commonly a well-known one) and all united in one 
chain, far superior to what we feel from the unconnected method where 
everything is accounted for by itself without any reference to the 
others. '94) Here it can thus be noticed that Smith considers a method 
of argument to be a source of pleasure, which perhaps arises from its 
aesthetic qualities, and claims that the Newtonian method was 'more 
engaging' than the Aristotelian method because of its aesthetic 
features. 
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It is important that Smith pOints out, in the same context, that 
Descartes was the first who attempted to use 'the most philosophical 
method', and for that reason the Cartesian philosophy had been 
accepted by nearly all philosophers in Europe. Accordingly, Smith 
implies that the Cartesian philosophy was universally received 
likewise due to the psychological satisfaction which is brought by it 
in.t 0 t he mind. This is therefore consistent with Smith's argument in 
the • History of Astronomy'. Descartes's account of the movements of 
the heavenly bodies • was connected with a vast, an immense system, 
which joined together a greater number of the most discordant 
phaenomena of nature, than had been united by any other 
hypothesis'.95) So the aesthetic qualities like coherence and 
simplicity which the Cartesian system possessed made contemporary 
philosophers and astronomers approve of and accept it. Looked at in 
this way Smith seems to support an extreme argument that is made by 
the convent ionalist view before observed, to the effect that Smith 
identified truth with beauty, and scientific method with aesthetics. 
But there is a great difficulty which ensues when we adopt such an 
interpretative position. As noted, the Cartesian philosophy satisfied 
all the aesthetic criteria, i.e., familiarity, simplicity, and 
coherence, which Smith in the 'History of Astronomy' deems to be 
essential to the acceptance and preference of a scientific syste~ It 
should thus be observed that in respect of this standard the Cartesian 
philosophy was exactly upon a level with the Newtonian philosophy. 
Both systems endeavoured to connect together a great number of diverse 
phenomena in different areas by reference to one general principle, 
with which ~eople were familiar. If so, and if we take the 
conventionalist interpretation, how can we take due account of Smith's 
point that up to his day the system of Descartes was 'exploded'. while 
the Newtonian system was generally accepted. Smith's further remark 
is telling in this respect. In Smith's opinion, the philosophy of 
Descartes 'does not perhaps contain a word of truth', and his work was 
no more than 'one of the most entertaining romances that has ever been 
wrote'.9G) These sentences make a good contrast with Smith's argument 
that Newton's system • should now be considered .. , as the greatest 
discovery that ever was made by man'. 97) Similarly, it is worth 
noting Smith's warning elsewhere that in France the scientists' 
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continuing attachment to , that illusive philosophy' , namely, 
Descartes's theory of vortices, 'seems among them to have retarded and 
incumbered the real advancement of the science of nature'.96> These 
make up cases which plainly indicate the extent to which Smith 
attaches much more importance to the relations between hypothesis and 
evidence in SCience, than to the aesthetic qualities that a scientific 
system has. 
It is likely that, inferred from Smith's statements just noted, 
though he nowhere deals with it, he is aware of the difference between 
the methods of Descartes and Newton. In fact, the Newtonian method of 
science differed in many respects from that of Descartes. Descartes 
began with metaphysiCS or self-evident principles, and proceeded to 
derive from them general laws, which, he claimed, were impossible to 
establish by an inductive method. Moreover, he did not considered 
experimental confirmation to be the criterion of adequacy of 
explanation. 99) By contrast, Newton stressed that scientific 
procedure should contain both an inductive stage and a deductive 
stage, or the method of analysis and synthesis, and that the 
consequences established through using the deductive procedure should 
be tested in terms of experiment and observation .. 100) As he claimed 
it in one of his Queries, appended to the Opticks. 
As in mathematicks, so in natural philosophy, the investigation 
of difficult things by the method of analYSiS, ought ever to 
precede the method of composition. This analysis consists in 
making experiments and observations, and in drawing general 
conclusions from them by induction ... And although the argUing 
from experiments and observations by induction be no 
demonstration of general conclUSions; yet it is the best way of 
arguing which the nature of things admits of And if no 
exception occurs from phaenomena, the conclusion may be 
pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any 
exception shall occur from experiments, it may then begin to be 
pronounced with such exceptions as occur. By this way of 
analysis we may proceed from compounds to ingredients, and from 
motions to the forces producing them ; and in general, from 
effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more 
general ones, till the argument ends in the most general. This 
is the method of analysis: and the synthesis consists in assuming 
the causes discover'd and establish'd as principles, and by them 
explaining the phaenomena proceeding from the~ and proving the 
explanations. 101) 
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This argument of Newton with respect to scientific method clearly 
shows that experiment and observation should be the starting-point and 
the end-point of science. In fact, Newton's famous statement, 
'hypotheses non fingd <I do not make up hypotheses), was the 
reflection of his view about scientific method, which objected to the 
view, such as Descartes's, in which general laws are directly deduced 
from metaphysical or self-evident principles. Relying on the 
scientific method he supported, Newton linked his theory of mechanics 
to phenomena in the physical world, and the conclusions drawn from it 
were in extensive agreement with the motions of celestial and 
terrestrial bodies. As historians of science have noted, Newton's 
system was mainly accepted because of the technical excellence that 
arose from its agreement with observable facts. This is also in line 
with Smith's account concerning the Newtonian system in his essay on 
astronomy that we noted earlier. Furthermore, in this connection, if 
we are reminded that the experimental method of Newton manifests 
itself in Smith's studies on man in society, 102) then what is Smith's 
actual view of science is likely to become more apparent. 
So far we have tried to show that it is misleading to claim that 
Smith's position about scientific inquiry is far from the empiricist 
philosophy. As observed before, those who exclusively take the 
conventionalist interpretation have maintained that Smith does not 
believe the attainability of truth through SCience, and he simply 
equates scientific method with aesthetics. But it has been observed 
that though Smith sees the great difficulty involved in an endeavour 
of the scientists to find out the real chain established by nature, he 
does plainly recognize that objective scientific knowledge is 
attainable. Yet, given that, as Smith asserts it, scientific 
knowledge is the product of 'mere inventions of the imagination', how 
is it possible? Smith would be contradictory to himself, if he indeed 
identified scientific criterion with aesthetic standards. As we have 
seen, Smith is a consistent thinker, in so far as his view concerning 
scientific method is concerned. Smith finds the primary criterion for 
the judgment of a scientific theory to be its correspondence with the 
observed facts. Of course, like those who are well aware of the 
history of SCience, Smith admits,at the same time, the 'complementary' 
role of extra-scientific reasons in the acceptance and preference of a 
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scientific system. This is Smith's view about natural science, which 
largely appears in his essay on the Astronomy. I f so, what about 
moral sc i ence? It is not a contradiction that a thinker may have a 
different view with regard to the natural and moral sciences. In the 
case of Smith, a number of commentators who deal with his methodology 
tend to assume that he has the same view about the method of both 
sciences. This assumption seems, as a matter of fact, valid, in that 
Smi th himself, while his essay on astronomy was the product of his 
youthful interests before 1758, takes it seriously even in his later 
years, long after he published the Theory of Moral Sentiment~ 103> and 
it would be difficult to imagine that despite a change of his view of 
science he thinks the essay to deserve publication. 104> Since I 
suppose Smith is consistent in association with methodological 
discussion, I need to demonstrate this aspect. In what follows we 
shall address ourselves to exploring this problem. Here Smith's 
review of the systems of moral philosophy will be considered since it 
gives us the clearest idea of his view of science, as compared with 
the review of the astronomical systems. 
There is a passage in the Theory of Moral Sentiments that is very 
often observed in connection with methodological discussion. It 
appears where Smith comments on Mandeville's moral philosophy. 
intense criticism Smith states: 
After 
But however destructive soever this system may appear, it could 
never have imposed upon so great a number of persons, ... had it 
not in some respects bordered upon the truth. A system of 
natural philosophy may appear very plausible, and be for a long 
time very generally received in the world, and yet have no 
foundation in nature, nor any sort of resemblance to the truth. 
The vortices of Des Cartes were regarded by a very ingenious 
nation, for near a century together, as a most satisfactory 
account of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. Yet it has 
been demonstrated, to the conviction of all mankind, that these 
pretended causes of those wonderful effects, nor only do not 
actually exist, but are utterly impossible, and if they did 
exist, could produce no such effects as are ascribed to them. 
But it is otherwise with systems of moral philosophy, and an 
author who pretends to account for the origin of our moral 
sentiments, cannot deceive us so grossly, nor depart so very far 
from resemblance to the truth. lOS) 
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There are two pOints which merit the greatest attention in this 
passage. In the first place, it is important to observe that Smith 
here does not say that theories in natural science do 'have no 
foundation in nature, nor any sort of resemblance to the truth'. 
Descartes's theory of vortices has no foundation in nature, and no 
resemblance to the t ruth. But Smith seems to imply that it is 
possible for other theories in natural science to have a foundation in 
nature and resemble the truth. This is, to be sure, in harmony with 
Smi th' s statement in the 'History of Astronomy' that with regard to 
some of the 'real chains' that are present in nature, 'we seem to have 
been really admitted behind the scenes', and 'the connecting chain has 
been found out which joins them to the ordinary course of things'. 
In the second place, it should be noted here that Mandeville's 
moral phi 1 osophy, Smith claims, 'in some respect s bordered upon the 
truth' . This point fits in with the first point just noted. The 
systems of philosophy and science can have a foundation in nature, and 
resemble the truth. From this standpoint Smith says that there is 
some truth in Mandeville's moral theory, though his system did, in 
many aspects, deceive people. Smith's comment on the Physiocratic 
system of political economy can be understood in a similar vein. 
According to Smith, 'This syste~ however, with all its imperfections 
is, perhaps, the nearest approximation to the truth that has yet been 
published upon the subject of political oeconomy'. 106) But these are 
the words which itis not easy to understand from the conventionalist 
perspective already mentioned. Since it stresses that for Smith 
scientific systems are no more than 'mere inventions of the 
imagination', or fictions, or systems of conventional signs, so that 
they are not intended to deal properly with the problem of truth, or 
have nothing to do with the discovery of truth. 
It thus appears evident that Smith acknowledges science, whether 
natural or moral, to be a discipline which relates to the pursuit of 
obj ect i ve knowledge. Yet Smith is not naive in this matter. He is 
ready to admit a great difficulty in confirming scientific knowledge. 
The reason for it, as we noted, lies in the nature of the business of 
science which Smith maintains, namely, the fact that science aims to 
uncover the underlying mechanism and structure that exist behind 
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observable facts. At any rate, in connect ion with the extent of the 
difficulty with which scientific truth may be confirmed, Smith 
compares an author on nat ural philosophy with a traveller who talks 
about a distant country, and an author on moral philosophy with those 
who are familiar with events in our own parish. Accordingly, in 
Smith's opinion, it is easier to prove the truth of theories of moral 
philosophy, while there is more difficulty in confirming theories of 
natural philosophy. It is worth quoting Smith's statement: 
When a traveller gives an account of some distant country, he may 
have impose upon our credulity the most groundless and absurd 
fictions as the most certain matters of fact. But when a person 
pretends to inform us of what passes in our neighbourhood, and of 
the affairs of the very parish which we live in, though here too, 
if we are so careless as not to examine things with our own eyes, 
he may deceive us in many aspects, yet the greatest falsehoods 
which he imposes upon us must bear some resemblance to the truth, 
and must even have a considerable mixture of truth in them. 107) 
Perhaps this statement is not one which present-day people think of. 
But if we consider the circumstances of Smith's day under which 
controlled experiments in the field of natural science were much less 
available than of today, the comparison seems acceptable. In any 
case, it is important to note Smith's following remark about by what 
standard a moral theory put forward is evaluated. 
when he proposes to explain the or~g~n of our desires and 
affections, of our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, 
he pretends to give an account, not only of the affairs of the 
very parish that we live in, but of our own domestic concerns. 
yet we are incapable of passing any account which does not 
preserve some little regard to the truth. The author who 
should assign, as a cause of any natural sentiment, some 
principle which neither had any connection with it, nor resembled 
any other principle which had some such connection, would appear 
absurd and ridiculous to the most injudicious and unexperienced 
reader. 108) 
This argument apparently indicates that we judge of a moral theory in 
terms of its consonance with the facts which we are well aware of 
through experience and observation. We are reminded that Smith does 
not say that we approve of, or disapprove of it for any extra-
scientific reason. 
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In fact, it is worthwhile to be conscious that this methodological 
discussion developed in the context of criticism of Mandeville's moral 
theory occurs in Part 7 of the Theory of MOral Sentiment~ where Smith 
handles the history of moral philosophy. Indeed, it then comes as no 
surprise to discover that Smith's practice in conjunction with the 
assessment of the previous systems of moral philosophy is in line with 
that methodological discussion. That is, Smith attempts there to 
demonstrate both the limited relevance of other systems of moral 
philosophy, and the superiority of his system over the~ by reference 
to the criterion of how far they can explain the actual moral 
behaviour of persons. 
aspect. 
Finally, we shall take a brief look at this 
Before reviewing the former systems of moral philosophy, Smith 
informs us that there are the two main questions which are to be 
considered in the subject of moral philosophy: • First, wherein does 
vi rt ue consist? ... And, secondl y, by what power or f acul t y in the 
mind is it, that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to 
us?' 109) Smith's intention here is to examine those earlier system of 
ethics which had dealt with these two questions. Smi th' s main 
argument in reviewing those moral theories is that whilst they are not 
wrong in all aspects, they are, in fact, defective in the sense that 
they can only explain some of the moral rules which are actually 
observed in SOCiety. In relation to the question of the nature of 
virtue, Smith claims that all previous systems of moral philosophy 
fall into three main groups; those which find virtue to consist in 
propriety, prudence, and benevolence. The moral theories which find 
virtue to consist in propriety cannot explain the moral rule that 
benevolence is good. or the fact that benevolent actions are actually 
approved of, and are considered to deserve reward. As Smith states: 
There is no virtue without propriety, and wherever there is 
propriety some degree of approbation is due. But this 
description is imperfect. For though propriety is an essential 
ingredient in every virtuous action, it is not always the sole 
ingredient. Beneficent actions have in them another quality by 
which they appear not only to deserve approbation but recompense. 
None of those systems account either easily or sufficiently for 
that superior degree of esteem which seems due to such actions, 
or for that diversity of sentiment which they naturally 
excite. 110) 
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Similarly, the moral theories which find virtue in prudence fail to 
account for the fact that 'to be amiable, to be respectable, to be 
proper object of esteem, is by every well-disposed mind more valued 
than all the ease and security which love, respect, and esteem can 
procure us'. 111) The system of ethics in which virtue is confined to 
benevolence, while it is 'supported by many appearances in human 
nature',112) is likewise flawed in that it cannot explain the social 
approval with regard to actions which arise from prudence and 
propriety. 113) 
In a similar manner, when Smith examines the moral theories which 
discussed the nature of virtue, he criticizes the ethical theories 
that explored the principles of moral approval. The moral theories 
which regard self-love as the origin of moral approbation cannot 
account for the fact that we approve of, or disapprove of the actions 
of the past which have no relation to our present self-interest, 114) 
just as the ethical theory based on rationalism cannot explain the 
fact that we can make a moral judgment concerning an event which we 
for the first time experience. 116> The theory of moral sense fails 
because it cannot explain the fact that we judge even of whether our 
fellows' approbation or disapprobation which is already made with 
regard to an action is proper or not. 11G ) The moral theory in which 
sympathy with utility is the origin of moral approval fails to account 
for the fact that we feel respectively different sentiments with 
respect to the breaches of the laws of justice, and 'police'. 117) 
After all, it is eVident that while all previous moral theories 
possess certain elements of the truth, each of them is, in the event, 
a partial view in the sense that it can only explain some part of the 
moral rules in society, and of their origin. In this respect, it is 
worth quoting Smith's conclusion, as stated in the introductory 
section of Part 7 of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
If we examine the most celebrated and remarkable of the different 
theories which have been given concerning the nature and origin 
of our moral sentiments, we shall find that almost all of them 
coincide with some part or other of that which I have been 
endeavouring to give an account of; '" From some one or other of 
those principles which I have been endeavouring to unfold, every 
system of morality that ever had any reputation in the world has, 
perhaps, ultimately been derived. As they are all of them, in 
this respect, founded upon natural principles, they are all of 
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them in some measure in the right. But as many of them are 
derived from a partial and imperfect view of nature, there are 
many of them too in some respects in the wrong. 118) 
As this passage indicates, Smith seems to imply that his moral 
theory is 'right', and comes closer to the truth, because his own is 
based on a whole view of human nature, and can account for, and 
confirm moral rules and behaviour more accurately and effectively than 
any previous syst.em of morality. This obviously confirms that Smith 
judges a most fundamental test for the acceptability of a theory to 
lie in the process of its 'confirmation' by reference to the facts. 
In concluding we can say that Smith's criterion of appraisal in 
examining the earlier systems of moral philosophy rests on how much 
better they can explain observable moral behaviour. This practice is 
certainly in line both with the suggestive kind of methodological 
discussion which comes about in the context of criticism of 
Mandeville's moral theory, and with Smith's argument i.n the • History 
of Astronomy' which was observed before from our point of view. 
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Reference to Smith's Metaphysical or Metatheoretical 
Principles 
5~ L Introduction 
I have already stated the major theme which is to be manifested 
throughout this thesis: a metaphysical proposition that is not capable 
of being tested and so never belongs to the realm of science has a 
significant regulative effect on scientific research. The 
metaphysical proposition plays that role by outlining a programme of 
research and providing a source from which scientific theories can be 
drawn. This becomes possible, since it articulates a specific way of 
observing the world, and limits or rules out a certain range of 
theoretical possibilities. 
In this perspective we have noted, in the last chapter, some 
metatheoretical principles, with which Smith's religious conviction in 
a benevolent God has an intimate link, such as the principle of the 
heterogeneity of purposes, the proposition of ruling out conflict on 
the theoretical dimension, and the idea of progress. And it has also 
been indicated in Chapter 2 that on account of the inheritance from 
the natural law approach, Smith's theorizing was also affected by the 
organismic outlook, (as well as the mechanistic point of view). This 
chapter will be addressed to shedding light on the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments by reference to such metaphysical or metatheoretical 
doctrines. 
In this chapter we shall indulge ourselves in the clarification of 
the characteristics of Smith's ethical theory in the light of his 
methodological and metatheoretical principles. The second sect ion 
will be devoted to an enterprise of showing that Smith's moral theory 
which is based upon the key principles of sympathy and the impartial 
spectator is marked by the ruling out of the theoretical possibility 
of conflict in moral discourse. In the third section we shall deal 
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with the fact that in the Theory of Moral Sentiments Smdth informs us 
of the progress of moral values, just as he talks about the progress 
of legal codes and of wealth through time in other writings. These 
tasks are designed to demonstrate what we called Smith's 
ruetatheoretical propositions, 1. e., that at the theoretical level he 
rules out the theme of conflict and believes in the progress of 
things. It was noted before that organismic philosophy belongs to one 
of Smith's metaphysical doctrines. It may be seen that the doctrine 
provides a frame of explanat ion. In this regard we shall shed light 
on his theory of conscience, which I suppose can be best understood in 
connection with normative organicism. This will be treated in the 
fourth section. In a similar light the fifth section will concern a 
problem related to Smith's normative ethics and its philosophical 
just i fication. It is claimed that, provided that he simply equates 
analytic exposition of moral judgments with moral obligation, its 
ground rests not on utilitarianism or a theological argument, but on 
organismic outlook which is basic to the philosophy of natural law. 
Finally, the sixth section is intended to show that an opposition 
between Smith's metaphysics and Mandeville's brings about a contrast 
between their analytic accounts of morality. It is pointed out that 
if this fact is neglected, an agreement between them with regard to 
many real features of society may lead us to contend mdstakenly that 
despite his severe denouncement as a 'licentious system' Smith in 
fact appears to commit himself to Mandeville's paradox of 'private 
vices, public benefits'. 
5.2. The Metatheoretical Principle of Ruling Out Conflict and 
the Nature of Moral Theory 
In the seventh part of the Theory of Moral Sentiments before going 
on to review various systems of moral philosophy and draw an evident 
line between those systems and his ethical theory, Smith puts forward 
two questions to be considered in handling the principles of morality; 
one concerns the character of virtue; and another is about what 
faculty of mind causes man to denominate one conduct right and another 
wrong. 1) Now we shall need to look at the second major question 
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onl y for our present purpose. To begin with, SmHh objects to a 
system of which the representative is Hobbes and in which the basis 
for man's moral judgments is deduced from psychological egois~ on the 
ground that the moral sentiments which man feels about the historical 
facts are never able to be accounted for by self-love, but by an 
indirect sympathy with the agents who in the past experienced a kind 
of benefit or damage. 2 ) And Smith also rejects the idea that reason 
remains the principle of moral approbation or the basis for evaluation 
of right and wrong as if it distinguishes between truth and falsehood, 
say, in mathematics. For, even if reason may be a source of moral 
approbation in that it serves to form the general rules of morality, 
the first perceptions of right or wrong are founded on immediate sense 
and feeling, 3) as Hutcheson first made clear. Finally, a peculiar 
power of perception called a moral sense which is thought to resemble 
the external senses may likewise not be regarded as the basis for the 
principle of approbation in the sense that the moral judgments which 
are made by reference to man's moral sentiments can be denominated 
morally good or bad, whilst it is absurd and unintelligible to ascribe 
to the external sense some qualities of the objects which they 
perceive. A) Smith thus concludes: 
in order to account for the principle of approbation, there is no 
occasion for supposing any new power of perception which had 
never been heard of before: Nature ... acts here, as in all other 
cases, with the strictest oeconomy, and produces a multitude of 
effects from one and the same cause; and sympathy, a power which 
has always been taken notice of, and with which mind is 
manifestly endowed, is sufficient to account for all the 
effects ascribed to this peculiar faculty [moral sense).S) 
This is the ground on which Smith comes to unfold his own science of 
morals. Smith opens the first passage by stressing that sympathy is 
a universal faculty of mind which every human being holds: 'How 
selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently principles in 
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render 
their happiness necessary to hi~ though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it. The greatest ruffian, the most 
hardened violator of the laws of society. is not altogether without 
But in taking account of the concept of sympathy Smith 
strives to make two things quite apparent. Firstly, sympathy 
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involves a wider meaning than pity or compassion which signi fies a 
certain fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. For Smith sympathy 
'may now... be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any 
passion whatever'. 7) Secondly, sympathy does not come from a 
certain immediate experience of the emotions of others, but from the 
idea of what every attentive spectator8 ) feels in the like situation. 
Smith thus writes: 'sympathy ... does not arise so much from the view 
of the passion, as from that of the sit uat ion which exci tes j t' .9) 
Put in this way the expression of sympathy presupposes that in order 
to understand the passions of others man experiences the same type of 
passions through an act of imagination with regard to the situation of 
others. Yet, Smith extends the concept of sympathy. Sympathy is 
claimed to arise out of a comparison between the original sentiments 
of the agent and the reaction of the spectator with respect to the 
same cause. When the original and the sympathetiC emotions concord 
with each other, the former becomes just and suitable to the object. 
And Smith goes on to state: 
To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as suitable to 
their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely 
sympathize with the~ and not to approve of them as such, is the 
same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with 
them. 10) 
lience sympathy also comes to denote the fact that, if, when the 
spectator compares his sympathetic feelings with the original ones of 
the agent, the former is completely in agreement with the latter, the 
spectator approves of the behaviour of the agents. 11) 
When man is going to evaluate the behaviours of others, two 
fundamental sources of moral judgment, Smith maintains, consist in 
propriety (impropriety) and merit (demerit). These moral concepts are 
immediately derived from two different features or relations of every 
action which Smith thinks proceeds from the sentiments or affections 
of the human mind; firstly the cause or motive which gives rise to 
them, and secondly the end or effect which they tend to bring 
about. 12) Both these aspects of the action are the fundamental fact 
in everyday life, even if moralists have, as a rule, been concerned 
solely with the second respect. As Smith puts it: 
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Philosophers have, of late years, considered chiefly the tendency 
of affections, and have given little attention to the relation 
which they stand in to the cause which excites the~ In common 
life, however, when we judge of any person's conduct, and of the 
sentiments which directed it, we constantly consider them under 
both these aspects. 13) 
Propriety or impropriety is a concept relating to a manner of judgment 
wt th regard to whether or not the affect ion has a fitness to its 
cause. Smith thus says that propriety or impropriety lies in 'the 
suitableness or unsuitableness ... [or] the proportion or disproportion 
which the affection seems to bear to the cause or object which excites 
it'.14) Merit or demerit finds itself in connection with the purpose 
of the action resulting from the affection, or, as Smith states, 'the 
beneficial or hurtful nature of the effects which the affection aims 
at, or tends to produce'.IS) On Smith's argument the judgment of 
propriety or impropriety is made in two different situations; first on 
non-moral conduct or the general subjects of science and taste for 
which the coincidence of the affections is not required, and secondly 
on moral conduct. 1 G) In the second case, Smith says, it is more 
difficult to make a certain concord of the opinions between the agent 
and the spectator, although it is much more essential. This happens 
since the agent is much more interested in a state of affairs related 
to himself, whereas the sympathetic emotions of the spectator arise 
merely from the imaginary change of situation. 
Smith holds, emerge under this circumstance. 
Two types of virt ues, 
The respectable virtue 
of self-command is founded upon an endeavour of the agent to moderate 
his sentiments in order for the spectator to enter into them. And 
the amiable virtue of humanity is based upon the spectator's effort to 
bring home to himself every minute situation which may happen to the 
agent. 17) 
Finally, Smith tries to make it qUite explicit that the 'mediocrity 
.... , in which the point of propriety consists, is different in 
different passions', IE<) in other words, that the spectator's 
disposit ion to sympathize with the emotions of the agent is dependent 
upon the origins or sources of the passions of the latter. Smith in 
detail deals with this theme in Part 1, Section 2 of the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments Yet later he summarises it concisely: 
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The point of propriety, the degree of any passion which the 
impartial spectator approves of, is differently situated in 
di ff erent passi ons. I t may be 1 ai d down as a general rul e, 
that the passions which the spectator is most disposed to 
sympathize wi th, and in which, upon that account, the point of 
propriety may be said to stand high, are those of which the 
immediate feeling or sensation is more or less agreeable to the 
person principally concerned: and that, on the contrary, the 
passions which the spectator is least disposed to sympathize 
with, and in which, upon that account, the point of propriety may 
be said to stand low, are those of which the immediate feeling or 
sensation is more or less disagreeable, or even painful , to the 
person principally concerned. This general rule ... admits not 
of a single exception. 19) 
Meanwhile, the evaluation of merit or demerit occurs in case an 
action of the agent accompanies a certain impact on the person who is 
acted upon. The sentiments which become the foundation for judgments 
of merit and demerit are gratitude and resentment that immediately and 
directly lead to r'eward and punishment respectively, as distinct from 
love and hatred. The spectator approves of the gratitude of the 
person who is acted upon if the spectator finds the original ~ction of 
the agent to be the proper object for gratitude. In this case the 
spectator judges the agent's conduct to deserve reward or to have 
meri t. On the contrary it is said that the original behaviour of the 
agent deserves punishment or has demerit if the spectator judges it to 
be the proper object for resentment and approves of the resentment of 
the third person. 20) In this respect Smith calls the sense of merit 
of demerit 'a compounded sentiment'. For the analysis of the sense 
of merit or demerit involves two distinct stages of sympathy; first a 
direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent by means of which the 
propriety of the agent's action is examined, and secondly an indirect 
sympathy with the gratitude or the resentment of the third person who 
receives the benefit or the harm that arises from the original 
action. 21 ) However, what is worthy of notice is that basically a 
judgment of the merit of demerit of the agent's action, Smith 
suggests, draws upon a judgment of the propriety of it. 22) Before 
proceeding to see the influence of fortune upon the moral sentiments 
Smith again makes it clear: 
To the intention or affection of 
propriety or impropriety, to the 
the design, all praise or 
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disapprobation, of any kind, which can just 1 y be bestowed upon 
any action, must ultimately belong. 23) 
And Smith goes on to point out that 'Its self-evident justice is 
acknowledged by all the world, and there is not a dissenting voice 
among all mankind. '24) Nonetheless, Smith acknowledges that when man 
comes to particular cases in which the influence of fortune works, the 
actual consequences of an action have a very great effect upon the 
sentiment of mankind with regard to merit or demerit. The influence 
of fortune contributes firstly to diminishing the merit or demerit of 
an action which arose from a good or bad motive when it fails reach 
its intended effects, and secondly to increasing the merit or demerit 
of the action when by accident it brings about an extraordinary 
effect. 2S ) In this way Smith recognises that the judgment of merit 
or demerit is, in fact, dependent upon both the intention and the 
actual outcome of an action. 26) 
So far we have observed Smith's theory of moral judgment concerning 
the conduct of others. Yet Smith also stresses that his account of 
moral judgments on the deed of others is a general theory of morality 
which in the same way allows an application for moral judgments 
concerning our own action. 
We either approved or disapprove of the conduct of another man 
according as we feel that, when we bring his case home to 
ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the 
sentiments and motives which directed it. And, in the same 
manner, we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, 
according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the 
situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes 
and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into 
and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced 
it. :27) 
Hence, when man at tempts to make judgments on his deed he comes to 
divide himself into two persons: the spectator and the agent. The 
reason why this is so is that, in so far as we live in a society, and 
seek to gain approbation and to avoid disapprobation, our moral 
judgments must have a social reference to the sentiments of others. 
In this respect Smith points out the part that the desire to be 
praised pi ays, since it lets us give great attention to the 
favourableness or unfavourableness of the moral opinion of others. 28 ) 
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Nevertheless, Smith finds that the love of praise may not be the 
sufficient condition for the impartial, just and proper jUdgment of 
our own behaviour. since mistaken and groundless praise or blame may 
be given concerning it when the actual spectator lacks relevant 
information (as it is often the case). 29) But according to Smith. the 
constitution of human nature also contains another crucial principle, 
a desire to become praiseworthy, at least in part to counteract that 
un fit j udgmen t. 
Nature, accordingly, has endowed hi~ not only with a desire of 
being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be 
approved of; or of being what he himsel f approves of in other 
men. The first desire could only have made him wish to appear 
to be fit for society. The second was necessary in order to 
render him anxious to be really fit.30) 
This desire of praiseworthiness, which renders ourselves the proper 
objects of the favourable judgment of others, thus becomes the very 
source of the exercise of our own conscience. 31 ) Owing to our selfish 
passions 'the loss or gain of a very small interest of our own, 
appears to be of vastly more importance, excites a much more 
passionate joy or sorrow, a much more ardent desire or aversion, than 
the greatest concern of another with whom we have no particular 
connexion' . 32) However, due to the opinion of conscience which is 
founded in the desire of praiseworthiness, we are able to correct the 
strongest drive of self-love. As Smith claims: 
When we are always so much more deeply affected by whatever 
concerns ourselves, than by whatever concerns other men; what is 
it which prompts the generous, upon all occasions, and the mean 
upon many, to sacrifice their own interests to the greater 
interests of others? It is not the soft power of humanity, it is 
not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up 
in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the 
strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more 
forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is 
reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the 
man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct. 33) 
Yet at this stage Smith recognizes at the same time that there are 
occasions where we may fail to judge ourselves in line with what we 
conceive to be the opinion of the impartial spectator: 'In order to 
pervert the rectitude of our own judgments concerning the propriety of 
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our own conduct, it is not always necessary that the real and 
impart ial spectator should be at a great distance. When he is at 
hand, when he is present, the violence and injustice of our own 
selfish passions are sometimes sufficient to induce the man within the 
breast to make a report very di fferent from what the real 
circumstances of the case are capable of authorising'. 34) It is 
because of violent emotions of selfishness that on two occasions, 
namely, at the moment when we are about to act and later when the 
action is over, we are likely to be partial and subordinate to self-
delusion. Since in the fir'st case the • eagerness of passion' will 
prevent us from forming an impartial judgment with regard to our own 
actions, and since in the second whereas we are capable of judging 
candidly and correctly, It is so disagreeable to think ill of 
ourselves, that we often purposely turn away our view from those 
circumstances which might render that judgment unfavourable'.3S) 
However, Smith shortly goes on to add that Nature provided for us a 
way to avoid these self-deceptions: 
Nature, however, has not left this weakness, which is of so much 
importance, altogether without a remedy; nor has she abandoned us 
entirely to the delusions of self-love. Our continual 
observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to 
form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit 
and proper either to be done or to be avoided. 3G ) 
Hence, self-deceit is likely to be avoided, because we have the 
ability to form general rules of morality by means of observing what 
is approved or disapproved of in particular instances. Those general 
rules become 'the standards of judgment' because they are universally 
recognized forms of rules which find their origin in a large number of 
particular judgments endorsed by the sentiments of mankind. On 
account of this feature of those general rules of conduct and since 
they can not be modified by the state of mind which may be liable to 
deviation from the reqUired level of impartiality according to the 
particular situations, they are, Smith finds, of great value 'in 
correcting the misrepresentations of self-love concerning what is fit 
and proper to be done in our particular situation'. 37) The general 
rules of morality tend to be observed, because 'Without this sacred 
regard to general rules, there is no man whose conduct can be much 
depended upon'. 38) and we naturally want to avoid a great degree of 
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blame. In addition, the observance of the general rules of behavjour 
occurs because consc i ence gi ves us a sanct i on when t hose general 
rules are obeyed or violated. As Smith put it, they 'are attended too 
with the sanction of rewards and punishments. Those vicegerents of God 
~thin us, never fail to punish the violation of them, by the torments 
of inward shame, and sel f-condemnat ion; and on the contrary, always 
,eward obedience with tranquillity of mind, with contentment, and 
self-satisfaction'.39> In short, our natural egoism is restrained by 
the voice of the impartial spectator and the general rules of 
morality. 
This is an outline which shows the basic structure of the theory of 
moral judgment that Smith conceives to be a science of morals. Now, 
it is important, viewed from this outline, to be aware that Smith's 
moral theory, which stands on the key principles of sympathy and the 
impartial spectator, rules out of the 'theoretical' plausibility of 
conflict in moral discourse. Two observations require notice in this 
respect. 
In the first place, Smith accepts what the Stoics considered to be 
the first motive of human action. Man is by nature disposed to 
prefer his own happiness to that of others: 'Every man ... is first 
and principally recommended to his own care; and every man is 
certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler to take care of himself 
than of any other person. Every man feels his own pleasures and his 
own pains more sensibly than those of other people'.40) Smith finds 
nothing wrong in this principle. Smith says that 'Before we can feel 
much for others, we must in some measure be at ease ourselves'.41) But 
t~at concerns him is the situations in which the pursuit of self-love 
leads us to ignore the rights of others and to create the state of 
conflict among men, i.e., 'mutual resentment and animosity',42) for in 
such situations • the great, the immense fabric of human society ... 
must in a moment crumble into atoms'. 4.:3) What is at present to be 
recalled is that Smith's moral theory above outlined does not allow 
room for that state of conflict. 
Even if man is by nature directed to self-interest, he has also a 
natural capacity to imagine what he would feel if he were in the 
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circumstances of other people, namely, to sympathize with them. 44) 
On account of this sympathy we can compare our sympathetic feelings 
with the original ones of other people and approve of their degree of 
emotions and their actions. 4S ) Because man naturally desires 
agreement with the sympathetic passions of the spectator and because 
the spectator can not feel the same sentiments in the same degree as 
the agent, man will try to moderate his passions and accommodate his 
level of emotions to that of others. Smith makes this clear where he 
takes ~ote of how momentary and weak the sympathetic affections are 
generally relative to the original ones: 
the emotions of the spectator will still be very apt to fall 
short of the violence of what is felt by the sufferer. Mankind, 
though naturally sympathetic, never conceive, for what has 
befallen another, that degree of passion which naturally animates 
the person principally concerned. That imaginary change of 
situation, upon which their sympathy is founded, is but 
momentary. The person principally concerned is sensible of 
this, and at the same time paSSionately desires a more complete 
sympathy. He longs for that relief which nothing can afford him 
but the entire concord of the affections of the spectators with 
his own .... But he can only hope to obtain this by lowering his 
passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of 
going along with him. He must flatten, if I may be allowed to 
say so, the sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce it 
to harmony and concord with the emotions of those who are about 
him. 46) 
In other words, because of our desire for the sympathy of others and 
social approva1 47 ) we are inclined to view our situation with the 
eyes of others who have less interest in it, and to judge and act with 
the standard of what is called the impartial spectator. In this way 
man's natural preference for his own happiness above the interests of 
others is in part restrained by his tendency to temper the selfish 
passions through the judgment of the impartial spectator, or, in 
Smith's words, to 'humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it 
down to something which other men can go along with'.4S) According 
to Smith, this provides a sufficient basis for • the harmony of 
society'. 49) And as already discussed, when there may be cases where 
the violence of selfish passions would lead us to ignore the judgment 
of the impartial spectator and bring about partiality in favour of our 
own interests, the general rules of morality which are formed by 
virtue of our capacity to draw judgments from particular instances 
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through the process of induction playa decisive part in correcting 
it. On account of this influence of the general rules Smith states as 
follows: 
Many men behave very decently, and through the whole lives avoid 
any consi derabl e degree of bl ame, who yet, perhaps, never f el t 
the sentiment upon the propriety of which we found our 
approbation of their conduct, but acted merely from a regard to 
what they saw were the established rules of behaviour. None 
but those of the happiest mould are capable of suiting, with 
exact just ice, their sent iments and behaviour to the smallest 
difference of situation, and of acting upon all occasions with 
the most delicate and accurate propriety. The coarse clay of 
which the bulk of mankind are formed, cannot be wrought up to 
such perfection. There is scarce any man, however, who by 
discipline, education, and example, may not be so impressed with 
a regard to general rules, as to act upon almost every occasion 
with tolerable decency, and through the whole of his life to 
avoid any considerable degree of blame. 50) 
In brief, it can be said that Smith's moral theory is designed to 
account for how man imposes on himself control over his passions, 
granted that he has a natural preference for his own interests above 
those of others. Smith finds that man's inclination to take the 
standpoint of the impartial spectator tied to his natural desire for 
the fellow-feeling of others, and his regard to the general rules of 
conduct counteract his natural egoism. Looked at in this way it 
should be evident that at the analytical or theoretical level Smith 
rules out the possibility of conflict or 'mutual resentment and 
animosity' among men in moral discourse. 
Before proceeding there is a significant point which requires 
notice. The point is that although on the level of moral theory Smith 
sees the social harmony which is made possible by the restraint and 
control of self-interest through the operations of moral faculties, he 
is not so naive as to argue that his moral theory covers all the 
aspects of reality. As a matter of fact he is never blind to another 
feature of SOCiety which is produced by the pursuit of selfish 
passions without limit. He acknowledges that disorder, injustice, and 
corruption actually come about in society. The possibility of such 
social turbulence springs from the compelling impulse of the selfish 
affections which leads us to neglect the interest of other people: 
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Men, though naturally sympathetic, feel so little for another, 
wi th whom they have no particular connexion, in comparison of 
what they feel for themselves; the misery of one, who is merely 
their fellow--creature, is of so little importance to them in 
comparison even of a small conveniency of their own; they have it 
so much in their power to hurt him, and may have so many 
temptation to do so ... 51) 
In the same context Smith points out that self-deception, yet more 
eventually the seeking of self-interest without bound, is 'the source 
of hal f t he disorders of human Ii fe' . 52) And the disposition to 
pursue wealth and greatness without propriety, which emerges from the 
disposition to sympathize more with joy than with sorrow, brings about 
the corruption of moral sentiments and induces acts of violence in the 
course of avaricious and hostile competition. 53) In this regard, to 
the extent to which Smith devotes himself to the description of the 
corruption and injustice of human affairs, he can by no mean be said 
to stand at the expense of facts. 54) 
as an honest observer of human life. 
In contrast, he should be seen 
Given this, another question that may arise is why Smith does rule 
out, at the theoretical level, the dark side of human affairs 
despite his observations of it, focussing instead solely on the 
mechanism by which social harmony is reached. I am convinced that the 
explanation is to be found in what may be called his world vie .. or 
vision. Smith believed, as a result of his study on natural theology, 
that the original array in nature is designed to reveal a profound 
harmony. Because of this kind of metaphysical idea he seems not to 
suppose the dark feature of human affairs to be the appropriate data 
for analytical purposes. Accordingly, he finds neither that human 
nature is in itself corrupted, nor that self-love and certain 
dispositions are in themselves detrimental and destructive to both 
good morals and society. 55) Instead, he seeks the source of the 
disorder and corruption of social life from men's tendency to view in 
the unfair and partial light the situation in which they are 
themselves involved. As Smith presents the point; 
The propriety of our moral sentiments is never so apt to be 
corrupted, as when the indulgent and partial spectator is at 
hand, While the indifferent and impartial one is at a great 
distance. s6 ) 
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In this way Smith's empirical observation that man takes the viewpoint 
of the impartial spectator in moral judgments becomes a fundamental 
assumption in his moral theory in spite of the admitted fact that man 
does not in a number of instances follow the direction of the 
impart ial spectator. Smi th appears to envisage the one rather than 
the other as human nat ure in design. If someone conceives the latter 
to be a more central fact of human affairs, such a view is likely to 
arise because he sees the world from a different kind of vision which 
a different metaphysical outlook brings. This is, I believe, the case 
with Bernard Mandeville. In this connection a contrast between Smith 
and Mandeville will be observed in the final section of this chapter. 
In the second plac~ another point to be not iced in associat ion 
with Smith's metatheoretical principle which serves to discard the 
consideration of conflict at the analytical level is that Smith's 
moral theory does not allow room for the possibility of substantial 
dissension and conflict in moral discourse57 ) or what is called the 
problem of moral conflict or dilemma5S ). A moral dilemma, according to 
Sinnott-Armstrong, arises where con-currently an agent ought to follow 
each of two alternative imperatives individually but cannot choose 
both together. 59) Since under those circumstances the appropriate 
considerations with respect to the course of actions conflict with 
each other, it is indeed difficult to determine which course of action 
should be endorsed as the proper and right one. 
duly states it; 
As Sinnott-Armstrong 
If moral conflicts were not pOSSible, there would always be one 
choice that an agent could make without worrying about remorse or 
compensation afterwards. However, since moral conflicts are 
pOSSible, it is not enough for an agent just to determine which 
action is the best one. 50) 
It should be supposed that to recognize the moral worlrl where moral 
conflicts or dilemmas are prevalent is unlikely to be a favourable 
stance for Smith. For, if men, however impartial and well-informed 
they are, can not afford to evaluate the righteousness of certain 
actions from the view of a particular situation, it will not be 
compatible with his metaphysical doctrine which assumes the goodness 
of God51 ) and the best working universe in design. 52) 
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It is notewor"thy that the notion of the impartial spectator in 
Smith's ethical theory plays an important part in ruling out the 
theoretical possibility of moral conflict. Smi t h looks upon the 
perspective of the impartial spectator as arising out of the 'divine 
extraction'.G3) The standpoint of the impartial spectator, Smith 
believes, is arrived at just through the gradual and repeated process 
of learning, consciousness and reflection towards 'the idea of exact 
propriety and perfection'. £.4) For this reason it seems qUite relevant 
that the conception of the impartial spectator for Smith embodies the 
socially objective attitude for moral judgments,GS) to which the 
members of society constantly and generally attempt to adjust 
themselves, and by virtue of which the just and right evaluation of 
moral problems are made and the conflicts of interests or arguments 
among them can be resolved. GG) In short, the standpOint of the 
impartial spectator in Smith's moral theory represents the dominant 
force which is contributory to reaching a universal agreement of 
opinions among people. In this sense, I am convinced, we can afford to 
<" 
confirm a part of Smith's metatheoretical strategy which leaves out of 
consideration all likelihood of any conflict on the theoretical 
dimension. 
Given that Smith's 'analytiC' treatment of moral judgment rules out 
the possibility of conflict in moral discourse, a final word should be 
said in connection with Smith's clear-cut recognition of certain 
variations in approved moral standards in society at large. Smith, for 
example, obviously talks about the existence of two different sets of 
moralities in a society: 
In every civilized society, in every SOCiety where the 
distinction of ranks has once been completely established, there 
have been al ways two di f f erent schemes or syst ems of moral i t Y 
current at the same time; of which the one may be called the 
strict or austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the 
loose system. The former is generally admired and revered by the 
common people: the latter is commonly more esteemed and adopted 
by what are called people of fashion. G7 ) 
The two different groups of people, the lower and the higher strata of 
society, develop their own standards of behaviour, and form a 
different style of moral norms. In addition, Smith notes the role of 
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'subal tern societj es' to which people typically belong, and describes 
the loyalties which they create. As Smith writes: 
Every independent state is divided into many different orders and 
societ ies, each of which has its own particular powers, 
privileges, and immunities. Every individual is naturally more 
attached to his own particular order or society, than to any 
other. His own interest, his own vanity, the interest and vanity 
of many of his friends and companions, are commonly a good deal 
connected with it. He is ambitious to extend its privileges and 
immunit ies. He is zealous to defend them against the 
encroachments of every other order or society.GB) 
Seen from this kind of facts it is evident that there may be agreement 
wi thin a group, but disagreement between groups. Accordingly, there 
may be a question: is the argument that Smith's ethical theory rules 
out the possibility of moral conflict indeed consistent with the 
descriptions just noted? We may seem to be able to give a positive 
answer. The reason for it is that while Smith's analysis of the 
process of moral judgments is established on the dimension that a 
person as 'individual' visualizes the act ions of himself or others, 
Smith also assumes that the agents and the spectators who are involved 
in the process of moral jUdgments act and respond within a particular 
social and economic circumstance. 69 ) In Smith's view, the mechanism 
of sympathy and the impartial spectator whereby individuals make moral 
judgments is uniform irrespective of any given circumstance. However, 
the agents and the spectators are treated by Smith, not as those who 
behave in an abstract and ideal situation, but as those whose moral 
standards are affected by a particular environment. Variations in the 
accepted social and moral norms of different societies and ages which 
Smi th obviously recognizes can thus be explained by reference to 
variations in environmental elements that are available to the 
different societies and ages. It should be clear that this argument 
is not incompatible with the point made above that the perspective of 
the impartial spectator serves to rule out the possibility of 
dissension and conflict in moral discourse. 70) 
5.3. The Metatheoretical Principle of Progress and the Development 
of Moral Values 
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The concept of progress, as we noted earlier, is a metatheoretical 
principle. I t is thus not surprising that many commentators have 
pOinted out that Smith is largely concerned to illuminate the theme of 
the progress of society.?l) It is also well-known that in dealing 
with the progress of social institutions Smith makes reference to four 
types of socio-economic organization, which may be seen to be a 
heurist ic device that represents a general condition necessary to 
consider histor'ical change. This implies that the four stages theory 
was used to offer an account of the change of social institutions. 
Much attention has been drawn to Smith's account of the advance of 
wealth in modern Europe in the Weal th of Nations, and the progress of 
legal codes in the Lectures on Jurisprudence by reference to the 
stages theory. 73) 
Unfortunately, it cannot be said that the same kind of explanation 
has been given with respect to the progress of moral values in the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
that: 
It is true that Forbes once observed 
The progress of society may also be said to be the historical 
framework of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, in so far as moral 
judgments are shown to have a social origin, and to be relative 
to the state of society, so that, for instance, there will be 
different degrees of self-command in different degrees of 
civilization. 74) 
It is obvious that, even though the general outline offered by Forbes 
was correct, his judgment was insufficient to demonstrate the thesis 
of the progress of moral codes. For the fact that Smith points out 
, different degrees of self-command in different degrees of 
civilization' is not an evidence which shows his conviction that moral 
rules advance through time. In this connect ion I shall proceed to 
elucidate the point that Smith has a clear idea of the development of 
moral codes through time. 
In treating the question of where dose virtue consist in Part 7 of 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith attempts to reduce all former 
systems to three different classifications: propriety, prudence and 
benevolence. 75) But Smith's decisive objection to those three 
systems is that the exponents of each system draw their conclusions 
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about the nat ure of virtue from part ial aspects of human nat ure, so 
that even if each system in part contains truth, it is never perfectly 
in concord with reali ty. 76) On this g-round Smith is emphat ic in 
allowing the character of virtue to involve all the qualities of 
propriety, prudence and benevolence. However, it is now noteworthy 
that though all three qualities above mentioned, Smith insists, 
constitute part of virtue from the whole viewpoint of human nature, he 
does not think them all to be upon a level with one another. It seems 
that Smith draws u hierarchical picture of virtue. Now let us proceed 
to observe the hierarchy of virtues that he describes. 
Firstly, the virtue of prudence is aroused by a self-interested 
motive. Smi th thus notes that I The care of the health, of the 
fortune, of the rank and reputation of the individual, the objects 
upon which his comfort and happiness in this life are supposed 
principally to depend, is considered as the proper business of that 
virtue which is commonly called Prudence'. 77) Since the prudential 
acts which arise out of the selfish affections accompany the benefit 
of only the person concerned and thus excite no sympathetic gratitude, 
prudence is referred to as an inferior virtue. According to Smith, 
'though it is regarded as a most respectable and even, in some degree, 
as an amiable and agreeable quality, yet it never is considered as 
one, either of the most endearing, or of the most ennobling of the 
virtues' . 
esteem, 
Therefore prudence, Smith says, 'commands a certain cold 
but seems not entitled to any very ardent love or 
admiration'.78) 
Secondly, the virtue of propriety is determined by reference to the 
sentiments of the supposed impartial spectator. As Smi t h ment ions, 
propriety thus becomes a virtue 'which, upon most occasions, overawes 
all those mutinous and turbulent passions into that tone and temper 
which the impartial spectator can enter into and sympathize with'.79) 
Smith continued: 
Those passions which are restrained by the sense of propriety, 
are all in some degree moderated and subdued by it. But those 
which are restrained only by prudential considerations of any 
kind, on the contrary, frequently inflamed by the restraint, and 
sometimes Clong after the provocation given, and when nobody is 
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thinking about it) burst out absurdly and unexpectedly, and with 
tenfold fury and violence. aO ) 
Meanwhile, j t is of part icular importance to observe that, when Smi th 
talks about the amiable and respectable virtues, he takes note of the 
i ID.port ant dist inct ion between these virtues and propriety. Smith 
describes the attainment of the amiable and respectable virtues as 
approaching to • the perfection of human nature' B1 ), whilst he finds 
that 'pr'oper' act ions are more common: 
The amiable virtue of humanity requires, surely, a sensibility, 
much beyond what is possessed by the rude vulgar of mankind. 
The great and exalted virt ue of magnanimit y undoubtedly demands 
much more than that degree of self-command, which the weakest 
mortals is capahle of exerting .... There is, in this respect, a 
considerable difference between virtue and mere propriet y; 
between those qualities and actions which deserve to be admired 
and celebrated, and those which simply deserve to be approved of. 
Upon many occasions, to act with the most perfect propriety, 
requires more than that common and ordinary degree of sensibility 
or self-command which the most worthless of mankind are possest 
of, and sometimes even that degree is not necessary.aZ) 
Thirdly, as Smith's aforementioned remark with regard to the 
amiable virtue of humanity implicitly suggests,8S) the virtue of 
benevolence is designated as divine virtue,S4) given that its 
achievement requires a considerable exertion in order to be able to 
surmount the most unyielding passions of self-interest. Even if 
benevolence is called divine virtue, it is yet an observable 
phenomenon that individuals exercise the benevolent affections: 'That 
virtue consists in benevolence is a notion supported by many 
appearances in human nature'. as) And Smith observes that the effect 
of benevolence rests on the fact that the agent, the recipient and the 
spectators are made comfortable and happy due to a harmony of minds. 
As he puts it: 
It sooths and composes the breast, seems to favour the vital 
motions, and to promote the healthful state of the human 
consti tution; and it is rendered still more delightful by the 
consciousness of the grat i tude and satisfaction which it must 
exci te in him who is the object of it. Their mutual regard 
renders them happy in one another, and sympathy, with this mutual 
regard, makes them agreeable to every other person. 8G ) 
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Hence, Smi t h pI aces t he vi rt ue of benevol ence hi ghest 87) amongst the 
virt ues, in that a benevolent act is not merely a sui table object of 
gratitude and reward, but brings the effect of a double sympathy, so 
that more pleasure between persons is created. 
Seen in this way, it is certain that Smith supposes a hierarchical 
structure of virtues. Prudence occupies an inferior realm in that 
hier-archical picture, since it brings in the main an advantage on 
behalf of the person concerned. Benevolence represents the highest 
realm in human life because it can be exercised only with the greatest 
exertion and plays an extremely important part in making social life 
agreeable. On the basis of this fact we may proceed to examine 
Smith's view of the development of the form and content of moral 
codes. 
As we are aware, Smith deals with historical change in the form and 
content of the wealth and law against four stages. This is also the 
case when he came to discuss changes in moral val ues. Smi th appears 
to find that the form and content of the moral codes are subject to 
variation in accordance with historical circumstances. In this 
connection Smith's following statement is telling: 'The propriety of 
a person's behaviour, depends not upon its suitableness to anyone 
circumstance of his situation, but to all the circumstances, which, 
when we bring his case home to ourselves, we feel, should naturally 
call upon his attention'.BB) This suggests that the moral evaluation 
which the spectators make concerning the behaviour of others and thus 
the content of the moral rules which are obtained through such moral 
evaluation on individual occasions89 ) ought to be accounted for 
relative to a specific historical stage. 
vein: 
Smith writes in the same 
The different situation of different ages and countries are apt 
to give different characters to the generality of those who 
live in them, and their sentiments concerning the particular 
degree of each quality, that is either blamable or praise-worthy, 
vary, according to that degree which is usual in their own 
country, and in their own times. Every age and country look 
on that degree of each quality, which is commonly to be met with 
in those who are esteemed among themselves, as the golden mean of 
that particular talent or virtue. And as this varies, according 
as their different circumstances render different qualities more 
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or less habitual to them, their sentiments concerning the exact 
propriety of character and behaviour vary accordingly. 90) 
Yet, this statement sounds as if Smith only spoke of variation of 
moral values rather than the progress of them in accordance with the 
changes in historical situations. 91) However, it is of cri tical 
significance to note that when he goes on to offer a contrast between 
the morality of barbarous and civilized societies, of which the 
characteristic is primarily a socia-economic type. 92) he implicitly 
indicates that moral codes progress according to the stages of 
economic development. 
To begin with, Smith notes the difference between barbaric and 
civilized morals : 'Among civilized nat ions, the virtues which are 
founded upon humanity, are more cultivated than those which are 
founded upon self-denial and the command of the passions. Among rude 
and barbarous nations, it is quite otherwise, the virtues of self-
denial are more cultivated than those of humanity'.93) Because ~mith 
does not assume the difference in human nature, the external situation 
which each of those two contrasted societies faces is likely to playa 
vital role in producing differences of morality between the~ For the 
purpose at hand it is proper to note what Smith tells us about the 
external situations and the response of human mind to th~ 
In the first place, the external situation to which every savage in 
the barbarous society is liable may be characterised by many miseries, 
continual danger and extreme hunger. It is natural that under these 
circumstances the savage is necessarily inured to every hardship, and 
is also forced to restrain his emotions, since he can expect no 
sympathy from his fellows for even the least weakness. The fact that 
self-command of passions among savages and barbarians is more fostered 
than other- moralities, is explained by the fact that the savage must 
mainly indulge in the pursuit of self-regarding propensities because 
of the necessity of his situation. As Smi t h not ed: 
Before we can feel much for others, we must in some measure be at 
ease ourselves. If our own misery pinches us very severely, we 
have no leisure to attend to that of our neighbour: and all 
savages are too much occupied with their own wants and neces-
sities, to give much attention to those of another person. 94) 
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In br'ief, the hard situation and men's reaction to it in the barbarous 
ages render the level or pitch or sympathy, with which the spectators 
can enter into the passions of the agent, much lower and, as a result, 
lead them to be more habituated to self-denial. Smith finally adds 
that this feature of the rude and barbarous ages brings about another 
essential point: 'Barbarians, ... being obliged to smother and conceal 
the appearance of every paSSion, necessarily acquire the habit of 
falsehood and dissimulation' ,95) 
In the second place, the external circumstances become largely 
changed through the economic development from the barbarous to the 
civilized society. In the ages of civility men can enjoy the general 
security and happiness so much that they are scarcely subject to 
hardship, pain and hunger. 
to escape poverty with ease. 
They are also in a situation to be able 
It is quite natural that under these 
circumstances 'the mind is more at liberty to unbend itself, and to 
indulge its natural inclination in all those particular respects'.9G) 
," 
This is the ground on which in the civilized ages the moral codes 
based on humanity are more cultivated than others. On this basis 
Smi th tells us that 'A humane and polished people, who have more 
senSibility to the passions of others, can more readily enter into an 
animated and paSSionate behaviour, can more easily pardon some little 
excuse'S7) and, 'being accustomed to give way, in some measure, to the 
movements of nature, become frank, open, and sincere'.9B) 
This argument suggests that the less the external situations 
disturb the expression of natural sentiments through the realisation 
of the higher stage of society, the nearer the moral rules come to an 
ideal state. This will again be clear, as we recall Smith's remark 
with respect to the evolution of jurisprudence in the civilized 
nations in comparison with the barbaric ones: 
the rudeness and barbarism of the people hinder the natural 
sentiments of justice from arriving at that accuracy and 
precision which, in more civilized nations, they naturally attain 
to. Their laws are, like their manner, gross and rude and 
undistinguishing. 99 ) 
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Now we shall proceed to take a close look at the virtue of humanity 
in an effort to show the fact that men's capacity to have more 
sensibility to feelings of others implies the progress of moral 
values. On Smith's argument, the perfection of human nature, which 
may be conceived to be a moral ideal. is 'to feel much for others ...• 
and to indulge our benevolent affections'. 100) Smith calls this the 
amiable virtue of humanity and defines it as consisting in 'the 
exquisite fellow-feeling which the spectator entertains with the 
sentiments of the persons principally concerned, so as to grieve for 
their sufferings, to resent their injuries, and to rejoice at their 
good fortune'. 101) On account of this respect of humanity he 
contends that it belongs to 'the social and benevolent affections' and 
is the essential basis which affords a harmony of sentiments and minds 
by inducing a redoubled sympathy. 102) That is, the affection of 
human it y is of particular importance. since it serves to promote 
social harmony by virtue of enhancing the level of the sympathetic 
passions and increasing the mutual pleasure103 ) that they produce. As 
Smith pOints out: 
The great pleasure of conversation and society ... arises from a 
certain correspondence of sentiments and opinions, from a certain 
harmony of minds, which like so many musical instruments coincide 
and keep time with one another. But this most delightful 
harmony cannot be obtained unless there is a free communication 
of sentiments and opinions. We all desire, upon this account, 
to feel how each other is affected, to penetrate into each 
other's bosoms, and to observe the sentiments and affections 
which really subsist there. The man who indulges us in this 
natural paSSion, who invites us into his heart, who, as it were, 
sets open the gates of his breast to us, seems to exercise a 
species of hospitality more delightful than any other. 104) 
Now it can be concluded that the perfection of the human mind to 
which the benevolent affections including humanity will lead, and the 
happiness of society which they will bring, are closely bound up with 
Smith's acknowledgment that benevolence occupies the highest sphere of 
virtue. Looked at in this way it should be apparent that when Smith 
pointed out general variations in moralities by contrasting the 
barbaric with the civilized moral values, he had in mind the idea of 
progress in moral codes which accompanies socio-economic development. 
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5.4. Normative Organicism and the Theory of Conscience 
It has been noted that Smith has his own theory concerning the 
development of conscience of the indi vidual and that it resembles 
some types of theories in social psychology which were developed in 
the twentieth century. 106) To be sure Smith's developmental theory 
of conscience has something in common with those present-day 
psychological theories. However, what is entirely missed in this 
kind of discussion is, I think, the issue as to whence Smith's idea of 
the developmental aspect of conscience arises. 1 t seems to me that 
such an idea comes out of the teleological conception of nature along 
with the ethico-juristic tradition of natural law, as we already 
noted. Now, we shall focus attention on Smith's view with respect to 
the developmental process of conscience not just to emphasize its 
close association with his organismic philosophy, but also to clarify 
the similarity and the difference between his own theory of conscience 
and some psychological theories which are counted as bearing some 
resemblance to it. 
To begin with, we shall need to distinguish between positive and 
normative organicis~ Apart from the positive form of organicism in 
which the actual and factual features of things are alleged as 
coherence and unity manifested in a normal living organism, the 
normative form of organicism is characterised in the following way. 
Firstly, the distinction is made between ideal and reality. In other 
words, even if the original scheme of things is organic in design and 
it may, to some extent, be actualised, it is never meant that such 
genuine order entirely reveals itself in fact and in reality. 
Secondly, despite this it is implied that reality is a process of 
natural realisation towards the original scheme of things. The actual 
and factual features of things may therefore be located somewhere 
along the lines directed towards the designed perfection. Finally, 
reality of things is thus conceived to be never static, but dynamic 
due to a tendency towards their own ideal and perfection. 106) 
Smith's account of the mature process of conscience can in this 
light be referred to as presenting a normative type of organicis~ as 
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it is the case with Aristotle's theory of state. 107) And it may be 
said that Smith's regard to the normative organicism plays a 
significant part in indicating the basic frame of exposition for the 
growth of conscience, although surely Smith attempts, as elsewhere, to 
account for the evolutionary process of conscience by means of 
efficient causes. Let us take a look at this feature of Smith's 
theory of conscience while bearing in mind the characteristic of the 
normative type of organicism above mentioned. 
The supposed impartial spectator is deSignated by Smith as the 
'demigod within the breast'. Therefore man, when his moral judgments 
are apparently directed by the point of view of the impartial 
spectator, Smith says, 'seems to act suitably to his divine 
extraction'. 108) The ground of this remark consists in the fact 
that the man within seeks to act on the principle of praiseworthiness 
more than of actual praise given by the man without, and moreover the 
former may have more precise information on his motive than the 
lat ter. 109) In fact, this is the reason why the impartial spectator 
theoretically is rendered the normative criterion of moral judgments 
in Smith's moral theory. 110) Yet what is to be observed further on 
this premiss is that Smith never claims that the impartial spectator 
is the universal character which all human beings naturally come to 
attain. Rather, for Smith the impartial spectator can be seen to 
imply 'potentiality' that a young child has as a human being, or the 
perfect personality which he is designed to attain through lifetime. 
Accordingly, the supposed impartial spectator is the 'normative ideal' 
which conscience comes to adopt in the fullness of time. 
Smith endeavours to clarify this point when he talks about two 
different standards by which moral judgments are made concerning 
ourselves: the ideal and the common standards. 
The one is the idea of exact propriety and perfection '" The 
other is that degree of approximation to this idea which is 
commonly attained in the world, and which the greater part of our 
friends and companions, of our rivals and competitors, may have 
actually arrived at. 111) 
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However, Smith is quick to acknowledge that the judgment of the 
impartial spectator is not the standard which everybody actually 
always makes use of in moral judgments: 'the attention of different 
men, and even of the same Dian at different times, is often very 
unequally divided between the~ and is sometimes principally directed 
towards the one,and sometimes towards the other'. 112) Nonetheless, it 
is stressed that the first standard is the normative ideal which every 
man holds by observing the posi ti ve behaViour of people (although the 
wise and virtuous man is much more likely to make actual judgments by 
using the ideal standard than other people) and which may be reached 
as a result of the gradual advance of the human mind in the course of 
time. In Smith's own words: 
There exists in the minds of every man, an idea of this kind, 
gradually formed from his observations upon the character and 
conduc·t both of himself and of other people. It is the slow, 
gradual, and progreSSive work of the great demigod within the 
breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct. 113) 
This is evidence in which Smith's organismic view of things is 
somewhat plainly disclosed. And looked at from the organismic 
standpoint those statement about two different standards of moral 
evaluation concerning ourselves also serve to make out not just the 
reason why for Smith the judgment of the impartial spectator should be 
the frame of reference by which people make moral evaluation. They 
also help us to grasp the basic structure of exposition, in his theory 
of conSCience, with regard to its evolution in the sense both that it 
provides the crucial conception by which the distinction is drawn 
between the ideal and the actual features being mixed in reality, and 
that it lUCidly indicates the direction of the development of things 
which are to be accounted for. 
Now in what follows we shall be concerned with Smith's causal 
explanation of the development of conscience against this background. 
The essential premiss that Smith emphasizes at the outset is that man 
is originally social man, not a solitary individual. In Smith's view 
the social presence of man it sel f is t he sol e source in which he 
first learns the patterns of approval and disapproval about the 
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behaviour of others, Which an isolated man from societ y can never 
expect to observe. As he states: 
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood 
in some solitary place, he could no more think of his own 
character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and 
conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the 
beauty or deformity of his own face. Bring him into society, 
and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted 
before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those 
he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when 
they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first 
views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the 
beauty and deformity of his own mind. he will observe that 
mankind approve of some of the~ and are disgusted by others. 114> 
Smi th begins to trace the origin of conscience under this basic 
post ulate. Man, according to Smith, has an inborn desire to gain 
approbation (praise) and to avoid disapprobation (blame): 'Nature, when 
she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to 
please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught 
him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their 
unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering 
and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation 
most mortifying and most offensive'. 115) This desire is a force 
which requires people to regard their behaviour through the looking 
glass of others. This process thus becomes a first important step 
in the development of conscience, for it gives rise to dividing the 
self into agent and spectator respectively. In Smith's expression, 
When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to 
pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is 
evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, 
into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a 
different character from that other, I, the person whose conduct 
is examined into and judged of. The first is the spectator ... 
The second is the agent ... 116> 
At this stage man therefore attempt to control his own violent 
emotions through the eyes of actual spectators because of his natural 
love of praise. Smith illustrates this case by taking an example of 
a very young child. In the first instances the young child is, Smith 
says, not accustomed to constrain its own passions. At this time it 
is often reqUired to abate them only by an outside compulsion. 
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A very young child has no self-command; but, whatever are its 
emotions, whether fear, or grief, or anger, it endeavours always, 
by the violence of its outcries, to alar~ as much as it can, the 
at tent ion of its nurse, or of its parents. While it remains 
under the custody of such partial protectors, its anger is the 
first and, perhaps, the only passion which it is taught to 
moderate. By noise and threatening they are, for their own 
ease, often obliged to frighten it into good temper; and the 
passion which incites it to attack, is restrained by that which 
teaches it to attend to its own safety. 117) 
But the moment the child goes to school, the first step in the 
development of conscience is taken: 
When it is old enough to go to school, or to mix with its equals, 
it soon finds that they have no such indulgent partiality. It 
naturally wishes to gain their favour, and to avoid their hatred 
or contempt. Regard even to its own safety teaches it to do so; 
and it soon finds that it can do so in no other way than by 
moderating, not only its anger, but all its other passions, to 
the degree which its play-fellows and companions are likely to be 
pleased with. 116) 
This passage suggests that the schoolchild, as the socialisation 
process begins, comes to have the mirror whereby it can view its 
character, and is so anxious to gain the approval of others that he 
imagines himself in the eyes of real spectators. And it also serves 
to suggest the fact that the genesis of conscience comes from a 
reflection of social opinions which are derived from the actual 
byst anders. 
Now it is yet of great importance to note that further evolution of 
conscience in the mature individual, Smith insists, is not necessarily 
dependent upon the opinions of real bystanders. To this extent 
conscience may be looked upon as becoming autonomous from the judgment 
of actual spectators. It seems that when he makes this point Smith 
does so on the supposition that the actual spectators do not, in many 
cases, have the information needed to give an impartial evaluation of 
our actions. 119) The lack of full information available is 
decisively likely to lead to a partial and false judgment. This is 
the ground on which Smith comes to indicate the autonomy of conscience 
in the individual of mental maturity. 
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In making some attempt to account for the phenomenon of the 
autonomy of conSCience, Smith ascribes to the original desire of 
praiseworthiness the efficient cause by which the mature individual is 
encouraged to share the perspective of the supposed impartial 
spectator. 120) Praiseworthiness leads man to be very interested in 
'that thing which is the nat ural and proper object of love' 121) and 
thus serves 'to inspire him with the real love of virtue, and with the 
real abhorrence of vice'. 1~2) The principle of praiseworthiness 
accordingly brings man to think and act in the light of 'what 
naturally ought to be the sentiments of other people', 123) given that 
they share the proper knowledge of the actual circumstances of his 
behaviour. For this reason man who gives more significance to the 
desire of praiseworthiness is able to be more indifferent with 
respect to the applause and censure of the real spectators; the 
internal approval of the supposed impartial spectator is more highly 
valued than the other, in that the man within is not just better 
informed, but also pursues what is honourable and noble. Smith 
describes the attitude of the mature individual whose principle of 
behaviour is based upon the desire to be praiseworthy: 
though mankind should never be acquainted with what he has done, 
he regards himself, not so much according to the light in which 
they actually regard him, as according to that in which they 
would regard him if they were better informed. He antiCipates 
the applause and admiration which in this case would be bestowed 
upon him, and he applauds and admires himself by sympathy with 
sentiments, which do not indeed actually take place, but the 
ignorance of the public alone hinders from taking place, which he 
knows are the natural and ordinary effects of such conduct, 
and which he has acqUired a habit of conceiving as something that 
naturally and in propriety ought to follow from it. 124) 
Since conscience in the mature man develops under the circumstances 
just mentioned, the voice of conscience for him becomes a higher 
tribunal '2S ) than the outlook of the actual bystanders who very often 
are ill-informed and thus can be partial and mistaken. On this 
ground Smith is convinced that where the authority of conscience is 
highly and firmly established through a continuous and uninterrupted 
regard to the supposed and well-informed impartial spectator, 
conscience comes to play a very eminent part in enhancing the 
propriety of actions which arise from the most vigorous motive of 
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'the practice of those divine virtues'. As he not es it: 
It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the 
breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our 
conduct. It is he who, whenever we are about to act so as to 
affect the happiness of others, call to us, with a voice capable 
of astonishing the most presumptuous of our passions, that we are 
but one of the multitude, in no respect better than any other in 
it; and that when we prefer ourselves so shamefully and so 
blindly to others, we become the proper objects of resentment, 
abhorrence, and execration. It is he who shows us the 
propriety of generosity and the deformity of injustice. 126) 
Hence, the individual whose conscience is always built up upon the 
judgment of the supposed impartial spectator is the man who Smith 
portrays as the most perfect and virtuous. The man is so because 'He 
has never dared to forget for one moment the jUdgment which the 
impartial spectator would pass upon his sentiments and conduct', 127) 
so that he 'joins, to the most perfect command of his own original and 
selfish feelings, the most exquisite sensibility both to the original 
and sympathetic feelings of others'. 129) This man is therefore the 
final point from the organismic viewpoint which conscience is able to 
reach, and at which the voice of conscience represents that of God. 
Here another thing which deserves notice is that the stage at which 
the standard of the impartial spectator that is identified with 'the 
idea of exact propriety and perfection' is so embodied into conscience 
that its voice stands for that of God, is achieved through a gradual 
and dynamic process. This appears where Smith pOints out an 
continuous effort of the mature individual to reach such a normative 
ideal. In the mind of the mature individual: 
they[observations on the conducts of people) have been made with 
the most acute and delicate sensibility, and the utmost care and 
attention have been employed in making them. Every day some 
feature is improved; every day some blemish is corrected. 
He endeavours as well as he can, to assimilate his own character 
to this archetype of perfection. H.e feels the imperfect 
success of all his best endeavours,and sees, with grief and 
affliction, in how many different features the mortal copy falls 
short of the immortal original. He remembers, with concern and 
humiliation, how often, from want of attention, from want of 
judgment, from want of temper, he has, both in words and actions, 
both in conduct and conversation, violated the exact rules of 
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perfect propriety; and has so far departed from that model, 
according to which he wished to fashion his own character and 
conduct. 129) 
Theroefore, this mature individual is not the man who follows simply 
what his neighbours actually do. On reflect ion he does not merely 
evaluate the actions of others and his own in accordance with the 
'archetype of perfection'. He is also anxious to adjust his 
behaviour to it. In this way, since he, in so far as his concern is 
mainly with praiseworthiness, makes a continuous attempt to improve 
his behaviour after learning and reflection, his attitude always comes 
to be in the direction of dynamic movement towards the normative 
ideal. 
So far we have observed Smith's theory of conscience in the 
perspective of normative organicis~ On this basis, we shall finally 
make a brief comment on the major characteristics of Smith's theory of 
conscience in comparison with the modern psychological accounts of 
conscience which some commentators above mentioned have taken to be 
similar to it. This task is likely to be profitable because it 
serves to clarify the difference as well as the similarity between 
Smith on the one hand,and others like Freud and Allport on the other. 
Firstly, it is true that like Freud who saw the origin of super-ego 
as a second self replacing the function of other persons including 
parents130 ) by identification process, Smith in the first instance 
takes conscience to be the supposed man within which is formed as a 
result of the observation of the attitude of other persons. 131) 
Secondly, it is difficult for the Freudian psychoanalytic theory to 
account for the autonomy of conscience, in particular when the man 
within conflicts with the opinion of actual spectators. This is due 
to the fact that the theory has a tendency to draw attention, in the 
main, to the experiences in childhood. As Brandt's statement suggests: 
Psychoanalytic theory certainly does not provide the complete 
answer for the psychology of ethical values, for it contains no 
theory of the extinction. It has nothing to say about changes in 
ethical standards during adult years, as a result of information 
and reflection. It provides us with no tools for understanding 
the modification in ethical values in a social group. 132) 
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ln contrast, Smith's theory of conscience, it has been suggested, 
allows for the possibility of conscience's standing against a pattern 
of childhood response or the attitude of the real bystanders. 
Thirdly, Smith's theory concerns the developmental transformat ion 
of conscience. As we have already noted, for Smith the growth of 
conscience is procured by individuals' desire to be praiseworthy or to 
arrive at the state of 'exact propriety and perfection' on the basis 
of learning and reflection. In this respect Smith's theory of 
conscience may be said to anticipate in its general outline Gordon 
Allport's psychological theory which goes beyond both a behavioural 
theory of learning and the Freudian psychoanalytic theory, since 
Allport argues first that internal sanctions are substituted for 
external ones, and yet secondly that the shift from the experiences of 
'prohibition, fear, and "must"' to those of 'preference, self-respect, 
and "ought'" is accomplished 'in proportion as the self-image and 
value-systems of the individual develop'. 133) In this way both Smith 
and Allport insist that the desire of praiseworthiness and 'generic 
self-guidance' by virtue of the growing ideal self-image, give rise to 
the dynamic pictures of conscience which the behavioural and the 
Freudian theories find difficulty in accounting for. 
Fourthly, it is important to note that in Smith's theory of 
conscience the driving forces which lead to the growth of conscience 
and thus the mature personality are regarded as a primitive set of the 
principles of human nature. Smith therefore speaks of the desires of 
praise and praiseworthiness as the 'original' ones, with which nature 
has endowed mankind. 134) In this respect Smith differs from Allport 
who claims the functional autonomy of motives, or the transformation 
of motives, happens in the course of time where conscience and 
personali ty make advances from childhood to adulthood. Briefly 
speaking, whereas Smith depends on the static features of human 
nature, Allport lays pivotal stress upon the emergent property of 
motives that play a role in promoting the growth of conscience 
throughout one's lifetime. 135) 
Finally and most significantly, what makes a fundamental difference 
between Smith's theory of conscience and some modern psychological 
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theories so far mentioned is that since the one is being formulated 
along the idea of organicis~ it indicates not simply that there is an 
ideal end-point that conscience ought, by nature, to arrive at in 
time,136) but also that such an ideal is to some extent being 
actualised among normal adults. This point will become apparent if we 
are again reminded of Smith's remark that there is 'in the mind of 
every man, an idea of this kind [of exact propriety and 
perfectionJ'137), and that 'habit and experience have taught us to do 
this [to take the perspective of the impartial spectator) so easily 
and so readily, that we are scarce sensible that we do it'. 138) 
5.5. Organismic Philosophy, and the Science of Morals, Normative 
Ethics, and Meta-ethics 
W. K. Frankena describes the traditional view with regard to the 
division of moral philosophy in the following way: 
1. There is descriptive empirical inquiry, historical or 
scientific Here, the goal is the describe or explain the 
phenomena of morality or to work out a theory of human nature 
which bears on ethical questions. 2. There is normative thinking 
of the sort '" that anyone does who asks what is right, good, or 
obligatory. 3. There is also "analytical", "critical", or 
"meta-ethical" thinking.... It asks and tries to answer logical, 
epistemological, or semantic questions like the following: What 
is the meaning or use of the expression II (morally) right" or 
"good"? How ethical and value judgments be established or 
justi fied?139) 
Briefly stated the science of morals, normative ethics and meta-ethics 
comprise the branch of moral philosophy in a modern sense. Viewed 
according to this tripartite division of ethics Smith's intention 
rested primarily on a science of morals or a scientific study of moral 
psychology that is concerned to elucidate the manner in which we come 
to make judgments as to what is fit to be done or to be avoided. 140) 
However, it must not be missed that at the same time Smith also 
concerned himsel f with the problem of normative judgment and 
itsjustification. As Campbell commented: 
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what is less often remarked upon is Smith's conviction that his 
causal explanat ions of the origin and development of moral 
opinions make a positive contribution both to the defence and to 
the refinement of those opinions. Certainly he sees no 
incongruity in adding prescription to description or in following 
an explanation of a moral attitude with a hortatory aside. Yet 
his characteristic method is not to pass from causal explanation 
to moral justification but rather to combine the two enterprises, 
working the assumption that scientific explanation constitutes 
the core of any adequate justification of moral attitudes. 141 ) 
In Smith's normative ethics, the impartial spectator is of critical 
signi ficance. For the judgments of the impartial spectator are 
conceived, in normative ethics, to be the criteria to which men ought 
to conform in order to determine whether or not an action or character 
is morally fit. In other words, the impartial spectator plays a 
twofold part in Smith's moral theory; firstly the scientific notion 
Which is drawn from empirical fact or the average reactions of persons 
on the one hand, and secondly general obligation which ought to be 
fulfilled for moral jUdgments on the other. 142) Put in this way, the 
descriptive and the normative phenomena are inextricably bound up with 
each other. In this regard Haakonssen stated: • All Smith's ideas of 
how a social morality is formed and how an ideal morality develops out 
of it[ the impartial spectator] are given in purely descriptive terms. 
And yet I venture to suggest that it is of clear normative import as 
well'. 143) This attitude of Smith is also reflected in his 
treatment of natural jurisprudence. 
the language of Smith's jurisprudence lectures is permeated by 
the expressions from the spectator theory. Thus, instead of 
hearing how things were at a given time, we are told how they 
were conceived or looked upon. Actions have a seemdng or apparent 
propriety or impropriety, and people can or cannot go along with 
them or enter into their motives. However, it is not just the 
actual spectator, but also the impartial spectator Who is present 
in Smith's discussion of law. 144) 
This observation might be thought odd when we are reminded that 
Smith's primary aim in the Theory of Moral Sentiments consists in the 
science of morals or the scientific study of the actual mode of moral 
judgments, which, in his words, is 'a mere matter of philosophical 
curiosity', yet 'of none in practice'. 145) Smi th also seems to be 
aware of the warning which Hume gave to the effect that an 'Is' and an 
'Ought' respectively articulate a certain different relation, and one 
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can not directly get the latter from the former. )46) At any rate, it 
is yet true that Smith's normative ethics is firmly bound up with the 
science of morals. On account of this character of his science of 
morals Smith was able to go beyond the dimension of science and create 
a critical weapon by which to evaluate whether or not an action or 
character is morally right. In fact, that is a reason why the 
discipline of jurisprudence, Smith informs us, is normative in 
character: 'Jurisprudence is the science which inquires into the 
general principles which ought to be the foundation of the laws of all 
nations'. )47) Systems of positive law, although they are important 
as • the records of the sentiments of mankind in different ages and 
nations', 'can never be regarded as accurate systems of the rules of 
natural justice'. 148) They do not necessarily coincide with the 
natural sentiments of the impartial spectator, and to that extent can 
not be right. In this way, since the spectator principle which 
constitutes the core of Smith's science of morals was identified as 
the normative principle, it could provide the basis for the evaluation 
of posit i ve laws. This is the ground on which Smi th devotes himsel f 
to legal criticism in a number of places in the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence and the Wealth of Nations 149) 
So far we have observed that Smith's science of morals embraces 
more than the level of science and slips over into normative ethics. 
At present, granted that Smith endorses the principles of obligation 
by which to determine what action or character is right or wrong, an 
enterprise to which we should now turn is the question of his meta-
ethics or of how he gives a philosophical justification for his 
normative ethical theory. It can be pointed out that there have been 
two types of interpretation with regard to the meta-ethical problem of 
justification. 
In the first place, there is one argument according to which Smith 
strives to give moral justification for the recommendation of a 
certain sort of moral attitude on the baSis of the assumption of the 
validity of utilitarianism at a contemplative level, where Smith takes 
the view of the philosopher, as distinct from that of the scientist 
involved in explanatory enterprises, in order to assess and improve 
the mechanism of moral life of mankind. In Smith's opinion, the 
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principle of utility is not a gUide by which men originally make moral 
choices, although he does not deny that its consideration as an 
after-thought may have an influence upon moral judgments. According 
to him, 'it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is 
either the first or principle source of our approbation and 
disapprobation'. 1&0) However, the princi.ple of utility remains 
essential for Smith when he talks about the value of ends, not about 
the the way in which means fulfil these ends, i.e., when he attempts 
to take a God's-eye view of the moral world. 
T.D.Campbell insists: 
In this connection 
His accounts of the functional utility of the moral sentiments in 
general, and of conscience in particular, have the consequence of 
commending them by showing that they are essential for social 
harmony and so for the preservation and happiness of mankind . 
... But such justification do, of course, presuppose the validity 
of t.he utilitarian maxim that morally right action maximizes 
happiness and minimizes pain ... Smith does assume that utility 
is the standard by which to assess the good and bad qualities of 
a total way of life. I call this contemplative utilitarianism 
to indicate that utility is, for Smith, the standard by which to 
appreciate the qualities of an entire social system. 1&1) 
In other words, 'Utility is very much the meta-principle for 
Smith'. 1&2) It can thus be said that Smith assumes that the ethical 
term, 'right', means being conducive to the maximum happiness of 
mankind. Accordingly, if a set of behaviours is shown to promote the 
maximum possible happiness for all concerned, such actions are 
regarded as right. As a matter of fact Smith finds that following 
our natural sentiments brings those consequences: 'Nature, indeed, 
seems to have so happily adjusted our sentiments of approbation and 
disapprobation, to the conveniency both of the individual and of the 
society, that after the strictest examination it will be found, I 
believe, that this is universally the case! 1&3) This interpretation 
on Smith's meta-ethics thus implies that since Smith thinks that acts 
in accordance with the judgments of the impartial spectator will 
produce the maximum possible happiness, he deems it to be right 
conduct and exhorted us to take the attitudes of the impartial 
spectator. 
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In the second place, another interpretation is based on the idea 
that Smith, like some theologically committed philosophers of his day, 
held the theological contention that acting in agreement with our 
natural sentiments is t he commandment of God. For Smith, 
philosophical justification for ethical jUdgment in which the 
impartial spectator: ought to guide our conduct rests on the point 
that the voice of the man wi thin reflects the intent ion of God. In 
this context Campbell maintained: 'there are some elements of 
philosophical justification in the Moral Sentiments. There are a few 
appeals to the fact that the de jure authori ty of moral rules is 
'obvious', which could be interpreted as an appeal to self-evidence or 
common sense, although these are usually associated with an assertion 
of the alleged function of moral sentiment in controlling other 
sentiments which, in turn, is related to the theological argument that 
the rules of morality are the commandments of God'. 154) In fact, 
Smith says that God intends moral faculties of human beings to 
command their actions. For instance, Smith writes: 
Upon what ever we suppose t hat our moral f acul ties are found, 
it cannot be doubted, that they were given us for the direction 
of our conduct in this life. They carry along with them the 
most evident badges of this authority, which denote that they 
were set up wi thin us to be the supreme arbiters of all our 
actions, to superintend all our senses, passions, and appetites, 
and to judge how far each of them was either to be indulged or 
restrained. '" since these, therefore, were plainly intended to 
be the governing principles of human nature, the rules which they 
prescribe are to be regarded as the commands and laws of the 
Deity, promulgated by those vicegerents which he has thus set up 
within us. 155) 
This citation suggests that the impartial spectator is the voice of 
God. Therefore, if Smith postulates that right conduct means that 
• commanded by God', then it is logically derived that we ought to 
follow our natural moral sentiments and obey the man within. Put in 
this way Smith's normative moral theory is dependent on his 
theological argument. 156) 
These are two interpretations raised with regard to Smith's meta-
ethical theory. We are told that Smith seeks to justify his ethical 
judgments by appeal to either utilitarianism or theological argument. 
A clear-cut characteristic of these interpretations to be observed is 
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that they are based on the logic of ethical naturalis~ That is to 
say, they find that Smi th tries to' deri ve' an Ought from an Is on 
the basis of a premiss, or to deduce out of his science of morals his 
normati ve moral theory in terms of the post ulate that right conduct 
means 'being conducive to the maximum happiness for mankind', or that 
'commanded and approved by God'. 
But, what is of great import to remember at this stage is that 
Smith does not just take the transition from analytic description to 
prescription despite his knowledge of the significance of the 
distinction between an Is and an Ought which Hume made, but also 
tended to 'identify' positive analysis with normative prescription. 
In other words, he is inclined to equate causal with moral necessity 
with no evident premiss. As we noted earlier, Smith accepts Hume's 
assumption with regard to the constant principles of human nature. In 
this respect it is no wonder that Smith speaks of 'the natural 
sentiments of all mankind'. 157) This assumption is neatly 
," 
illustrated in his statement that: 'Every faculty in one man is the 
measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of 
your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my 
reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. 
I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about 
them'. 158) It is important to note that this type of presumption of a 
basic uniformity in human nature enables Smith to believe that natural 
sentiments are 'necessary' feelings. For example, sympathetic feelings 
are felt by all men. We can arrive at the same type of emotions of 
others by virtue of the sympathetic emotions in imagining the 
situation of others. This is also the case with the standpoint of the 
impartial spectator on the baSis of which Smith says that men make 
moral judgments. 'To approve of another man's opinions is to adopt 
those opinions, and to adopt them is to approve of them'. 159) Hence, 
when our feelings concord with the sympathetic feelings of others, we 
are given their approval and praise. And all men have a nat ural 
desire to be praised and to be praiseworthy. 160) Under these 
circumstances we adjust ourselves, as a matter of course, to the 
ordinary moral standard, for nothing shocks us more than the 
experience in which we find that the sympathetic emotions of others 
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are not in agreement with, or contrary to our emotions. 161) 
this background Smith claims: 
Against 
Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite 
interests, we must chanp;e our position. We must view them 
neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own 
eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a 
third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and 
who judges with impartiality between us. Here, too, habit and 
experience have taught us to do this so easily, that we are 
scarce sensible that we do it. 162) 
This passage shows that the viewpoint of the impartial spectator is a 
common standard which all men have in a common moral world, and they 
generally become accustomed to take such a vantage pOint. The common 
constitution of human nature urges all men to adopt that attitude 
towards one anot her. Looked at in this way men's moral evaluations 
in accordance wi t h t hei r nat ural moral sent iment s become a causal 
necessi ty. And Smith appears to think that, provided that the 
sympathetic affections tied to the standard of the impartial spectator 
necessarily occur in the process of moral judgments, for all men who 
follow natural moral faculties, and provide, in consequence, the basis 
of social harmony, it is reasonable and unavoidable that such 
attitudes are Obligatory for the~ In this vein Smith asserts: 
Whatever gratifies the taste is sweet, whatever pleases the eye 
is beaut iful, whatever soothes the ear is harmonious. the very 
essence of each of those qualities consists in its being fitted 
to please the sense to which it is addressed. It belongs to our 
moral faculties, in the same manner to determine when the ear 
ought to be soothed, when the eye ought to be indulged, when the 
taste ought to be gratified, when and how far every other 
principle of our nature ought either to be indulged or 
restrained. What is agreeable to our moral faculties, is fit, and 
right, and proper to be done; the contrary wrong, unfit, and 
improper. The sentiments which they approve of, are graceful and 
becoming: the contrary, ungraceful and unbecoming. The very 
words, right, wrong, fit, improper, graceful, unbecoming, mean 
only what pleases or displeases those faculties. 163) 
In this way, Smith simply seems, I suppose, to equate causal 
necessity with moral obligation, yet without employing any postulate 
or definition in a similar fashion which present-day ethical 
naturalists use. 164) 
attempt to , derive' 
Accordingly, it can be said that he does not 
logically normative moral judgments from 
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scientific moral theory, but instead 'identifies' the one with the 
other. In what way are we able to understand this manner of 
reasoning? In my view, this mode of thinking can be ascribed to 
reasoning grounded on the philosophy of natural law, which earlier was 
r-eferred to as one of Smith's metaphysical propositions that were 
regarded as being methodologically suggestive. Myrdal's remark is 
very much helpful for our understanding at this stage: 
The peculiarity of the philosophy of natural law is not that it 
attempts to derive moral laws from the natural order of things, 
an 'ought' from an 'is'. If this were the essence of the 
doct rine of nat ural 1 aw, almost every type of obj ect i ve moral 
philosophy and utilitarianism in particular would be a 
natural law doctrine. Its peculiarity is rather its attempt to 
identify 'is' and 'ought', the actual and the obligatory, 
directly and without lengthy proofs; it simply equates reason and 
nature. 165) 
This kind of argument was the philosophical method which was common 
to natural law theorists, even though it appeared in many different 
forms and was employed for many different purposes. The idea enabled 
them to simply equate natural or rational with necessary or 
obligatory. And it must be stressed at present that behind that idea 
lies the organismic outlook of things which pervades the philosophy of 
nat ural law. Societ y and social order are organic in design. The 
basic design may and need not be fully achieved in reality. But, it 
is thought that reality comes into line with the design and is 
permeated by a tendency towards design and perfection. This reasoning 
is what may be called normative organicis~ This form of organicism 
provides the basis for that identification between description and 
prescri pt ion. As Werner Stark informs us: 'normative organicism 
distinguishes an Is and an Ought, yet the Ought is not really, or 
radically, at variance with the Is. Rather is it its true working out, 
its natural realisation. It is more than an idle play upon words to 
say, that the normative theory demands that society should become what 
it is--that it should become in reality what it is in design'. 166) 
Seen in this way it is evident that Smith does not logically deduce 
his normative moral theory out of his science of morals on the basis 
of a given assumption or definition, as the ethical naturalists do. 
Indeed, he seems not to presuppose the utilitarian and the theological 
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definitions in order to back up the normative judgments. That is, he 
does not presume that right conduct denotes 'the promot ion of the 
maximum happiness of mankind', or one 'commanded and approved by God'. 
Instead, without those presuppositions he simply identifies causal 
necessity with moral obligation. This manner of thinking is based 
upon organismic philosophy, which seems to lie behind the thought of 
natural law theorists. In my view, this makes up the background of 
Smi th' s meta-ethical theory. Smi th is disposed to consider that if 
the constitution of human neture leads men to make moral judgments on 
the basis of the sympathetic emotions from the perspective of the 
impartial spectator, all men are obliged to do so. He would make 
claim that because human nature is so constituted that each of us does 
adopt such moral attitudes towards each other, it is morall y 
inevitable to do so. To be sure Smith endeavours to justify his 
normative moral theory by appeal to the nature of things. Yet, his 
philosophical justification for moral attitudes which he endorses is 
different from ethical naturalism mentioned above. Such a met hod of 
vindication is what is called ethical justification in a non-logical 
sense, as distinct from that in a logical sense such as the 
utilitarian and the theological definitions. 167) It does not seek to 
draw logically an Ought from an Is working on those assumptions. It 
is not dependent on them for Justification. Rather, it finds its 
reasonableness in correctness of scientific explanation. If causal 
explanation is inadequate, then we can discard that justification. 
Before concluding there is a point which deserves notice. The 
philosophy of natural law has been in fact intertwined with 
theological speculations. As a result, a natural law theorist tended 
to believe that • natural' is eqUivalent to 'divine'. Furthermore, 
natural theology was a subject which Smith taught, and on which he 
attempted to demonstrate the character of the Deity such as goodness, 
wisdo~ and justice. In that study he was certainly concerned to show 
that there are nice adjustments of means to ends in this world; for 
instance, how well human nature is directed to the realisation of the 
perfection and happiness of mankind. Under these circumstances it is 
likely to be natural to see that several diverse ideas are so 
combined in Smith's writings that it is not easy to clarify which idea 
is the key to the problem of his meta-ethics. Nevertheless, provided 
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that Smith does not so much derive the normative aspect from the 
positive analysis of his moral theory, but identify those two 
sides, 169) we can isolate and rule out other elements such as 
utilitarianism at the contemplative level and a theological argument. 
If so, the interpretation established on the same proposition as 
ethical naturalists appears less convincing, for reasons that we have 
already clarifie~ 
In brief, it can be concluded that since Smith works on the basis 
of organismic philosophy connected with the teleological conception of 
nature, one of whose main characteristics is a mere equation between 
an Is and an Ought despite a clear-cut distinction between them, he 
not simply combines causal explanation of morality and its obligation, 
but also provides a philosophical justification for the theory of 
obligation in the non-logical sense. Given that Smith does not pass 
from analytic description to prescription, and instead does identifies 
them, those views in which he seeks moral justification for his theory 
of obligation in terms either of utilitarianism, or of the argument of 
the commandment of God cannot be accepted. 
5.6. Metaphysics and Moral Theory: A Contrast Between Smith and 
Mandeville 
Smith's criticism of Mandeville's moral theory appears in Part VII 
of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, which is concerned with a review of 
various systems of moral philosophy. While, as noted above (Chapter 
4-), Smith informs readers of the restricted relevance of the former 
systems of moral philosophy which were concerned with the question of 
wherein virtue consists, he does not place strictures on the~ Though 
they have a defect in explaining the nature of virtue, they, Smith 
claims, perform a function of 'Ethics', namely, serve to 'inflame our 
natural love and increase our abhorrence of vice'. 169) Mandeville's 
system is an exception. Smith calls it a licentious system. The 
reason why Mandeville'S account of morality is criticized is that it, 
unlike others, tends to remove the distinction between virtue and 
vice, so that it is perniCious to morals and society. 170) 
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According to Smith, Mandeville conceives all actions to arise from 
vicious passions. He reduces all the motives which human beings have 
on particular occasions to the same selfish motives, and especially to 
vanity among them., which is considered as a foundation of vice. 171) 
Even virtuous actions which are approved as an object of esteem and 
honour are considered eventually to be the consequences of vanity. As 
Smith states: 
Dr. Mandeville considers whatever is done from a sense of 
propriety, from a regard to what is commendable and praise-
worthy, as being done from a love of praise and commendation, or 
he calls it from vanity. Man, he observes, is naturally much more 
interested in his own happiness than in that of others, and it is 
impossible that in his heart he can ever really prefer their 
prosperity to his own. Whenever he appears to do so, we may be 
assured that he imposes upon us, and that he is then acting from 
the same selfish motives as at all other times. Among his other 
selfish passions, vanity is one of the strongest 172~ 
In criticism of Mandeville's system Smith firstly points out that 
vanity has to be duly distinguished from the 'love of virtue' and the 
'love of true glory', which can be, in no sense, included in the 
meaning of vani t y. Secondly, it is claimed that Mandeville's account 
supports itself by using ascetic doctrines which make virtue consist 
in the extirpation or complete self-denial of the passions. 173~ 
Thirdly, and more importantly, Smith disapproves of Mandeville's moral 
theory on the ground that 'self-love may frequently be a virtuous 
motive of action'. 174~ Elsewhere Smith argues that 'Regard to our own 
private happiness and interest, too, appears upon many occasions very 
laudable principles of action'. 17S~ Self-interest brings us to the 
virt ue of prudence. Smith does not, of course, claim that all forms 
of self-love are approved as proper. Only where the pursuit of self-
interest has reference to the interests and opinions of our fellows, 
actions which arise from the self-interested motives are sympathized 
wi t h and approved of. This kind of argument is neatly summarized in 
the conclusion of Part VI of the Theory of Moral Sentiment~ 
Concern for our own happiness recommends to us the virtue of 
prudence: concern for that of other people, the virtues of 
justice and benevolence; of which, the one restrains us from 
hurting, the other prompts us to promotes that happiness. 
Independent of any regard either to what are, or to what ought to 
be, or to what upon a certain condition would be, the sentiments 
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of other people, the first of those three virtues is originally 
recommended 1.0 us by our selfish, the other two by our benevolent 
affections. Regard to the sentiments of other people, however, 
comes afterwar-ds both to enforce and to direct the practice of 
all those virt ues; and no man during, either the whole of his 
life, or that of any considerable part of it, ever trod steadily 
and uniformly in the paths of prudence, of justice, or of proper 
beneficence, whose conduct was not principally directed by a 
regard 1.0 the sentiments of the supposed impartial spectator,- -of 
the great inmate of the breast, the great judge and arbiter of 
conduct. 176) 
Hence, these suggest, not only that self-regarding propensities are 
..... ~, those which dominate all the aspects of life, but that self-
interest itself cannot be identified with vice, and its pursuit is not 
incompatible with propriety where it refers to the opinions of our 
fellows. In this connection Smith asserts against the position of 
Mandeville above outlined: 
It is the great fallacy of Dr. Mandeville's book to represent 
every paSSion as wholly vicious, which is so in any degree and in 
any direction. It is thus that he treats everything as vanity 
which has any reference, either to what are, or to what ought to 
be the sentiments of others: and it is by means of this 
sophistry, that he establishes his favourite conclusion, that 
private vices are public benefits. 177) 
Put in this way Smith seems to provide a reasonable reply to 
Mandeville's insistence that private vices are public benefits. 
However, there is a passage in Smith's concluding remark with 
respect to Mandeville's system of moral philosophy which deserve 
attention. Whereas, as has been noted, Smith attempts to criticize 
Mandeville's account of morality, he admits, on the other hand, that 
it contains some truth: 'how destructive soever this system may 
appear, it could never have imposed upon so great a number of persons, 
nor have occasioned so general an alarm among those who are the 
friends of better principles, had it not in some respects bordered 
upon the truth'. 176) In this part Smith does not detail the respect 
in which Mandeville's system bordered upon the truth. It seems likely 
that reference has to be made to the earlier parts of the book, in 
order to be aware of a common opinion which both Smith and Mandeville 
share with regard to some aspects of a commercial society. For 
example, this appears most obviously where Smith talks about men's 
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pursuit of wealth and place in connection with their desire for 
appr-oba t ion. 
it is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that 
we pursue r-iches and avoid povecty. For to what purpose is till 
the toil and bustle of this world? what is the end of avarice and 
ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and preheminence? 
Is it to supply the necessities of nature? The wages of the 
meanest labourer can supply them. From whence, then, arises 
that emulation which runs through all the different ranks of men, 
and what are the advantages which we propose by that great 
purpose of human life which we call bettering our condition? To 
be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with 
sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages 
which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the 
ease, or the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is always 
founded upon the belief of our- being the object of at tention and 
approbation. 179) 
As pointed out above, vanity is regarded as a vice, and a source of 
the misery and disorder of human affairs. 180) But Smith here observes 
that there is a linkage between the pursuit of wealth or- economic 
activity, and vanity. In this passage motivation which is related to 
the pursuit of wealth and place is attributed to vanity. While, if we 
are reminded that Smith rejects Mandeville's theme of 'private vices, 
public benefits', certainly this seems to present difficulties for his 
own arguruent, it clearly shows his recognition that vanity plays a 
very important role in conjunction with economic activity. Hence 
Smith, like Mandeville, appears to consider the coexistence of wealth 
and virtue in a commercial society to be, in a sense, difficult. 
Meanwhile it is noteworthy that the agreement between Smith and 
Mandeville has led some critics to claim that Smith's criticism 
against the Mandevillian paradox as a moral justification of 
commer'cial society is either • flat and feeble' 191) or 'wide of the 
mark' . 182) Thomas Horne's comment in the same vein is more serious. 
According to hi~ even though Smith intended to take a middle ground 
between Hutcheson's claim which ignore the fruitfulness of some forms 
of self-interest, and Mandeville's position which overestimates the 
inevitability of vice, Smith 'was unwilling to rescue virtue and 
commercial society by making unrealistic claims on their behalf'. 
Smi th was too honest an observer of human affairs. As the above 
quotation indicates, Smith himself, following Mandeville, in fact 
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admitted the role of vanity in economic activity. As a result, 'Smith 
seems to have committed himself to Mandeville's paradox of "private 
vices, public benefits"'. lS3~ 
The arguments of these critics may seem to remain valid to the 
extent to which Smith, like Mandeville, acknowledges the par-t which 
vanity plays in association wi.th men's pursuit of wealth and place. 
However, it is quite misleading to assert that Smith accepts the 
Mandevillian paradox. Such an interpretation arises from neglecting 
the point that while Smith introduces various features of social 
reality at the practical level, he rules out some facets of reality at 
the analytic or theoretical level. In other words, Smith apparently 
admits that vanity acts as an actual form of self-love which leads a 
number of people to the active pursuit of riches. Yet, at the same 
time, he also observes the fact that vanity is not the only form of 
self-interest which dominates all aspects of human life, and that 
there are some other forms of self-love which play a similar role in 
economic activity. A clear-cut example of the latter in Smith's eyes 
is that a number of people take 'prudent' actions in matters which are 
connected with the pursuit of wealth and place. The prudent man also 
seeks for riches and reputation, and desires the approbation which 
they bring. This end is achieved by taking the course of 'prudence', 
for the 'methods of improving our fortune, which it [prudence) 
principally recommends to us, are those which expose to no loss or 
hazard; real knowledge and skill in our trade or profession, assiduity 
and industry in the exercise of it, frugality, and even some degree of 
parsimony, in all our expences'. 1 S4) In the same connection Smith 
says that • The habits of oeconomy, industry, discretion, attentioIl, 
and application of thought, are generally supposed to be cultivated 
from self-interested motives, and at the same time are apprehended to 
be very praise-worthy qualities, which deserve the esteem and 
approbation of every body'. 185) These arguments suggest that there 
is, as Smith observes, another form of self-love which makes the 
pursuit of wealth and status compatible with that of virtue. 
What is of great importance under these circumstances is that when 
Smith is concerned with the formal analysis of morality, he focuses 
exclusively on the latter type of phenomena, while at the same time 
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ignoring the fact that vanity is, in a large number of cases, an 
actual sour-ce which leads men to seek for wealth and status. In my 
opinion, the reason is that while Smith recognizes frankly that such 
is indeed a moral problem in a commercial society. 186) he essentially 
believes that human nature in design is so constituted that the 
viewpoint of the impartial spectator dominates the process of moral 
judgments concerning both others and our'selves, and that this serves 
as a barrier against anti-social passions. In other words, Smith 
judges that the pursuit of riches and place is possible wi thout 
,-,::,lying upon the passion of vanity, because of the constitution of the 
human mind in deSign, and actually observes that there are some forms 
of self-interest which make the coexistence of wealth and virtue 
possible. In this way, on a theoretical dimension Smith rules out the 
working of the passion which is thought to be a foundation of vice. 
This is the ground on which Smith is able to criticizes Mandeville's 
account of morality. Hence, it is misleading to see that Smith 
committed himself to Mandeville's argument that private vices are 
public benefits. Such an interpretation is based on a confusion 
between the theoretical and the practical dimensions in Smith's work. 
Finally, I am convinced, as I claimed above<section 2), that Smith's 
mind-set, namely, the fact that he is interested in a particular type 
of fact to the exclusion of other facts, though they are all observed 
at the practical level, and that he performs formal analysis in a way 
that shows the harmonious moral order, is due to his metaphysics or 
theological belief in a benevolent harmony and order of the universe. 
Since I believe that a similar sort of thinking may seem to be found 
in Mandeville'S thought, yet his different world view leads himself to 
produce a contrasting syste~ which, in my opinion, is responsible for 
an eventual disagreement between Smith <and Shaftesbury's followers) 
and Mandeville, we shall proceed to examine this aspect in conjunction 
with Mandeville's outlook on nature. 
Sir Leslie Stephen once noted that for Mandeville nature is '8 dark 
power'187), and that his view of nature as such is contrasted with the 
viewpoint 
standpoint 
of Shaftesbury's school to which Smith belongs; the 
from which the profound harmony and order of things in 
nature are declared. In a similar vein a commentator informed us 
that: • When he [Mandeville] looked at nature he did not see the 
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benevolent harmony and order' which excited the admirat ion and approval 
of Shaftesbury and the Deists '" He would instead be compelled to 
believe that this universe is the scene of a huge struggle of 
organisms driven by conflicting passions'. lBB~ In this regard it is 
very interesting to observe that Mandeville himself declared a 
diametrical opposition between Shaftesbury's system and his own, and 
regar-ded the former system as a false account of morality: 
The attentive Reader, who perused the foregoing part of this 
Book, will soon perceive that two systems cannot be more opposite 
than his Lordship's and mine. His Notions I confess are generous 
and refined: They are a high Compliment to Human-kind, and 
capable by the help of a little Enthusiasm of Inspiring us with 
the most Noble Sentiments concerning the Dignity of our exalted 
Nature: What Pity it is that they are not true. le9) 
In contrast to the deists who believe in the benevolent harmony and 
order of the universe, he goes so far as to say that when examined 
carefully the elements of the earth and the constitution of the human 
mind 'make up together a frightful Chaos of Evil'190), or 'every thing 
is Evil, which Art and Experience have not taught us to turn into a 
Blessing'. 191) It seems to be no wonder that given such a view of 
nature, Mandeville thinks human beings to have in origin 'his corrupt 
and defective Nature'. 192) Mandeville's pessimistic attitude to nature 
also leads him to renounce the contention that man has some capacity 
to govern his behaviour in accordance with natural moral faculties: 
• there is no Innocence or Integrity that can protect a Man from a 
Thousand Mischiefs that surround him'. 193) In Mandeville's opinion, 
this happens because man is not a creature who has 'natural' 
sociableness, and because man is completely motivated by degraded and 
selfish passions. Mandeville states in this connection: 
But be we Savages or Politicians, it is impossible that Man, mere 
fallen Man, should act with any other View but to please himself 
while he has the Use of his Organs, and the greatest Extravagancy 
either of Love or Despair can have no other Centre. There is no 
difference between Will and Pleasure in one sense, and every 
Motion made in spite of them must be unnatural and convulsive. 
Since then Action is so confin'd and we are always forc'd to do 
what we please, and at the same time our Thoughts are free and 
uncontroul'd, it is impossible we could be sociable Creatures 
without Hypocrisy. 194) 
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This is certainly an apparent contrast with Smith's <and Shaftesbury's 
followers') view, out lined above, that man is originally social. This 
view of Mandeville also makes a contrast with Smith's account of 
morality, as it will be clear when we are r-eminded that Smith's 
analysis of self-love and its constraint shows 'the point that men are 
led as if an invisible hand to generate barriers against their 
unsocial passions by natural as distinct from artificial means'. 195) 
How can such a contrast between Mandeville and Smith be understood? 
It seems significant to notice that Mandeville, together with many of 
his contemporaries, was also influenced, whether directly or 
A modern commentator indirectly, by a sort of theological outlook. 
insists that behind Mandeville's thought which shows a deep concern in 
the dark side of nature is a French intellectual tradition dating from 
the end of the seventeenth centur-y; the tradition which was intimately 
linked to the religious thought of the Jansenists. 196 ) The theological 
stance of Jansenism197 ) is summarized as follows: 
Their pessimistic theological ideas, which stressed the depravity 
of all men after the fall, the impotence of men to effect their 
own salvation, the enormous separation between man and God, and 
the unregenerate evil of nature, expressed the unfavorable 
situation in which this group found itself. 19B) 
This kind of religious outlook seemed to act as a means whereby 
Mandeville was led to see men's corrupted nature along with a negative 
image of reality. Mandeville talks about man's 'State of Innocence', 
'his Beautiful' and 'his Divine Original' before the fall, and says 
that 'this Earth must have been alter' d since the Fall of our first 
Parents'; in this world 'All the Elements are our Enemies'199>; and 
'All untaught Animals are only solicitous of pleasing themselves, and 
naturally follow the bent of their own Inclinations, without 
considering the good or harm that from their being pleased will accrue 
to others'.200) Put in this way, it seems, therefore, that 
Mandeville's theological view, that came from the influence of 
Jansenism, and may be treated, in my opinion, as his metaphysics, 
plays a role in his perception of the negative aspects of social 
reality including his view of human nature. 
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Looked at from the perspective just noted, it is likely that an 
'ultimate' reason for the contrast of opinions between Mandeville and 
Smith can be found in the contrast of this 'world view'. Understood in 
this way the reason why they may disagree about an 'analytic' account 
of morality, 201) though they have, in some respects, a common view 
with regard to real facets of society appears clear. One might be 
tempted to ascribe the difference of their views to a definition of 
virt ue and vice. Macfie, for instance, pointed out, in support of 
Smith, that 'Mandeville's paradox holds water only if we regard 
asceticism as the standard of private virtue'.202~ There is a certain 
truth in this argument. Yet it appears to me that the disagreement 
between Mandeville and Smith somewhat goes beyond the problem of 
definition. For people may disagree about the nature of things or 
facts even though they use similar definition. We shall finally 
pr"oceed to look at this aspect in connection with Smith's criiicism of 
~~ndeville's system of moral philosophy. 
In Smith's opinion, Mandeville's error was to consider 'whatever is 
done from a sense of propriety, from a regard to what is commendable 
and praise-worthy, as being done from a love of praise and 
commendation, or as he calls it from vanity'.203~ Smith defends 
himself by pointing out that 'the desire of doing what is honourable 
and noble, of rendering ourselves the proper objects of esteem and 
approbation, cannot with any propriety be called vanity'.204) However, 
Smith's reply may remain unsatisfactory to Mandeville, if he initially 
accepts Smith's point, yet questions the eventual source of virtuous 
Cictions. The remark of one commentator seems to sum up well 
Mandeville's intention: 'The ersatz virtue is not true virtue just 
because its motive is vanity'. 206) 
comment is very suggestive: 
In the same context Kaye's 
There are several things to be borne in mind in connection with 
Mandeville's reduction of all action to open or disguised 
selfishness. The first is that he did not deny the existence of 
those impulses which are commonly called altruistic. He merely 
argued that the philosopher can go behind this apparent 
unselfishness. He was rather explaining altruism than explaining 
it away.206) 
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In other words, while recognizing that the man who acts from the love 
uf virtue alone performs what is right and proper in a disinterested 
concer"n fur" the public good, at the same time Mandeville may judge 
that his' ultimate' motive springs, in the end, from vanity and pride. 
It is worth quoting Mandeville's statement in this regard: 
But such Men, as without complying with any Weakness of their 
own, can part from what they value themselves, and, from. no other 
Motive but their Love to goodness, perform a worth Action in 
Silence: Such Men, I confess, have acquir'd more refin'd Notions 
of Virtue than those I have hitherto spoke of ; yet even in these 
(with which the world has yet never swarm'd) we may discover no 
small Symptoms of Pride, and the humblest Man alive must confess, 
that the Rewar-d of a Virtuous Action, which is the Satisfaction 
that ensues upon it, consists in a certain Pleasure he procures 
to himself by Contemplating on his own Worth ... 207) 
In concluding it is important to remember that whereas Smith's 
criticism of Mandeville's system of moral philosophy is obviously 
offered in connection with his formal analysis of morality, a contrast 
of opinions between them can eventually be understood in respect of 
the difference of the world view which both of them respectively 
believe to be true. That is, the reason for the antagonism between 
Smith and Mandeville can be sought in their contrasting metaphysics: a 
deistic outlook which finds itself in the benevolent harmony and order 
of things in the universe, and a pessimistic outlook which denies such 
a deistic view, and envisions men's degeneracy. 
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established as the principle of approval. (cL L. Stephen, op. cit., 
p.76; W.C. Swabey, Ethical Theory from Hobbes to Kant (1961), pp.182-
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give a more realistic account of the judgment of our own actions and 
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Chapter 6: Some Analyses of the Wealth of Nations With Reference to 
Smith's Metaphysical or Metatheoretical Principles 
6. 1. Introduction 
The central arguments of this thesis are based on the proposition 
that metaphysical doctrines, which can be seen to be confirmable yet 
irrefutable <therefore extra-scientific), are influential in 
scientific study or at work in the background of scientific inquiries. 
Metaphysical doctrines provide a general perspective whereby a 
coherent type of data can be arranged and organized, and rule out a 
certain range of theoretical possibilities. Looking at problems from 
this outlook we have observed several features of the Tbeory of Moral 
5entiment~ and found that there is scope which allows a more 
consistent interpretation with regard to Smith's system of thought. 
In this chapter we shall focus attention on some aspects of the 
Weal th of Nations in a similar manner as we have done in the last 
chapter. But there seems to be more difficulty in this task, in the 
sense that many commentators found two different perspectives in 
Smith's thought in association with the fact that the Wealth of 
Nations discloses a great number of cases of the social flaws. In 
this connection it is noteworthy that Smith's 'philosophic and 
historical vision' was declared to show two contrasting convictions of 
optimism and pessimis~ Therefore, before we proceed to demonstrate a 
regulative influence of Smith's religious belief grounded on natural 
theology on his 'theoretical' analysis of an exchange economy, we 
shall need to elucidate a point in connection with the gloomy features 
of human affairs which the Wealth of Nations uncovers in many places. 
I shall first review the present line of interpretation which finds an 
'intrinsic dichotomy' between theoretical and practical domains in the 
Wealth of Nations in order to explain the coexistence of the themes of 
social harmony and disharmony. I shall argue for both the fact that 
Smith was a well-balanced observer, and the requirement that we draw 
an explicit line between theoretical and practical dimension in 
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Smith's work, and yet we ought not to seek a complete separation 
between his methods of inquiry, abstract and empirical, or ideal and 
real. This is the burden of the next section. And we shall proceed 
to devote ourselves to exploring Smith's view of economic growth, the 
division of labour, and value and distribution; the tasks to be 
performed so as to prove my theme that his natural theology had a 
regulative effect on his scientific study. Accordingly, in the second 
section, I shall endeavour to show that Smith's view of long-term 
economic evolution is characterized by an unlimited growth because he 
is bound to the notion of progress as a metatheoretical principle. 
Next, I shall proceed to reveal that Smith's theoretical treatment of 
distribution is bound up with his metatheoretical principle of ruling 
out conflict. This fourth section is also partly intended to take 
issue with the writers who perceived Smith's analysis of value and 
distribution in the Weal th of Nations as bringing out the theme of 
social conflict and exploitation. Meanwhile, the metatheoretical 
principle of progress is also interesting in relation to Smith's 
treatment of the division of labour. Whereas the division of labour 
acts as one of the basic determinants of social progress in Smithian 
theoretical economics, at the same time it appears as a barrier which 
is responsible for a harmful effect on the labourersf intelligence, 
morality, and martial spirit. On account of this fact a number of 
commentators found Smithfs statements concerning the deleterious 
consequences of the division of labour as a significant source of 
inspiration for Marxf s critique of capitalism. While I do not deny 
this contentionf I would claim that there is an irreconcilable gap 
between Smith's and Marx's approaches to the division of labour, 
ascribing it to the difference of the world view which Smith and Marx 
respectively presupposed as true. This will be performed with a view 
to an illustration of the theme that metaphysics is methodologically 
suggestive in such a way that limits or rules out a certain range of 
theoretical possibilities. This is the task of the final section. 
6.2. The Duality of Smith's Method of Inquiry?: A Conventional 
Outlook Reviewed 
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In a well-known passage of the Wealth of Nations Smith reminded 
readers that the self-seeking motivation of capitalists who were never 
concerned with social interest unintentionally brought about socially 
beneficent consequences: 'Every individual is continually exerting 
himself to find out the most favourable employment for whatever 
capi tal he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not 
that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own 
advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that 
employment which is most advantageous to the society', 1) An instance 
which Smith introduced in order to underpin the theme of unintended 
results in human affairs was that capitalists, since they want the 
highest return on capital, naturally prefer investment in domestic 
industry to that in foreign trade, so that social produce, without 
anyone's intention or as if led by an invisible hand, becomes 
maximized. As Smi t h wrot e: 
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both 
to employ his capital in the support of domestick industry, and 
so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the 
greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render 
the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He 
generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick 
interest, nor know how much he is promoting it. By preferring 
the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends 
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led 
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention.:2) 
This is a case to which Smith applied the principle of the 
het erogenei t y of purposes; the thesis which states that while man 
acts for the sake of his perLJnal purposes alone, the social outcomes 
produced by such individual actions are often greater. 3) But more 
importantly, the passage has been popular in that it summarises the 
central argument which Smith's formal economic analysis as a whole 
involves; the message that since everyone who acts on his own self-
interest is the best judge with regard to the way which makes the use 
of his capital and labour most profitable, the wealth of a nation will 
be maximized if he is left free to carryon his business in accordance 
with his judgment. In this vein it is not surprising that many 
Smithian students found the doctrine of social harmony in the Wealth 
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of Nations. Gunnar Myrdal is typical of this trend, when he states: 
'A sunny optimism radiates from Smith's writings. He had no keen sense 
for social disharmonies, for interest conflicts. On the whole, it 
is true to say that he was blind to social conflicts. The world is for 
him harmoni ous. Enlightened self-interest ultimately increases social 
happiness'. 4) 
However, on the other hand, we have become familiar with the fact 
that the Wealth of Nations reveals another side of society as 
contrasted with that of social harmony. That is, whereas the book 
endorses the doctrine of social harmony on the side of production, it 
also uncovers a good number of instances of social conflict on the 
side of distribution, and the dark features of a commercial society. 
This type of perception is due to the authors like E.Halevy, Gide and 
Rist, and Viner. 
Giving qualification against Smith's dominant image as such, 
namely, a patron of the thesis of social harmony, Gide and Rist, the 
coauthor of one of the earliest books that treated the history of 
economic thought as a separate subject, stated: 
This idea of a harmony between private interest and the general 
well-being of a society was not put forward as a rigidly 
demonstrable a priori theory, open to no exceptions. It was a 
general view of the whole position - the conclusion drawn from 
repeated observations ... Smith would have been the first to 
oppose the incorporation of his belief in any dogma. He was 
also the first to point out instances - in the case of merchants 
and manufacturers, for example - where the particular and the 
general interest came into conflict. We might cite many 
characteristic passages in which he takes pains to qualify his 
opt imism. S) 
In a similar vein Jacob Viner compiled collections of numerous 
examples of disharmony that can be found in the Weal th of Nations. G' 
A partial list of the social flaws whose instances Viner collected is 
roughly as follows. Masters and workmen have conflicting interests 
over wages, because the former wants to give less and the latter to 
receive more, and owing to this fact both parties tend to come to a 
combination: 'The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give 
as little as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order 
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to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labour'. 7> 
Moreover, the masters usually have the superior bargaining power over 
the workmen. e> In addi t ion, the interest of merchants and 
manufacturers is opposed to the interest of the public in that the 
former always attempts to raise prices of goods by way of imposing 
restrictions on competition. 9> There is also divergent interests 
between the manufacturers in town, and the farmers and landlords in 
count ry10), between the master and the apprentice, and the public. 11) 
The division of labour is detrimental to the labourers' intelligence, 
morals, and martial spirit. 12) Indeed, Smith made a number of 
individual statements13 ) throughout the work with regard to the flaws 
in the social order, which were mainly associated with the problem 
that took place among individuals or classes due to economic gain. 
These are unequivocally the statement of social disharmony which Smith 
did not fail to confess. It was thought that even this partial list 
Df social conflict would provide ammunition for socialist orations. 14> 
On the basis of this fact Viner compares the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments with the Wealth of Nations. In Viner's view the former 
work is a book of a speculative philosopher which draws a set of self-
evident propositions from a doctrine of a harmonious order in nature. 
In contrast, Smith in his later writing was, Viner observes, keen not 
to neglect factual material and preferred observational data to 
generalization which proclaims the natural harmony of economic order. 
Out of this new attitude which Smith shows in the latter book the 
intense collision between generalization and facts thus arose, and 
came to comprise its inconsistency. As Viner put it: 
He still, it is true, retained his flair for resounding 
generalizations of heroic range. There is a long standing feud 
between sweeping generalization and run-of-the-mill factual data, 
and when Smith brought them together he did not always succeed in 
inducing altogether harmonious relations. But Smith's strength 
lay in other directions than exactly logical thinking, and he 
displayed a fine tolerance for a generous measure of 
inconsistency. It is to his credit that when there was sharp 
conflict between his generalization and his data, he usually 
abandoned his generalization. 16> 
Here we can notice that Viner talks as if Smith sought • sweeping 
generalization' on the basis of the assumption of the natural harmony 
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of economic order and irrespective of ordinary facts. But it will be 
shown below that this contention which Viner makes is, in some 
respects, misleading. 
At all events, Viner's discussion about the 'flaws in the natural 
order' which are found in the Weal th of Nations seems to have become 
an influential source for many later Smithian commentators. 16) It 
has, in a large measure, given stimulus to numerous studies with 
respect to the dark side of Smith's thought. And Viner's contrast of 
'sweeping generalization' with 'run-of-the-mill factual data' has 
brought an interest in Smith's method of inquiry. Firstly, much 
attention was paid to the problem of so-called alienation in 
connect ion with Smith's explicit statement concerning some damaging 
effects on the labourers of the division of labour in a commercial 
society. And this line of study was so closely related to the problem 
of how to comprehend methodologically Smith's statements as to two 
contrasting effects of specialization. 17) Secondly, it was asserted 
that Smith's scheme of evolution (and his philosophic vision) was 
eventually pessimistic. 18) This argument received support both from 
those studies which dealt with the theme of so-called alienation, and 
from Smith's description of a stationary state in relation to economic 
evolution. Thirdly, the Marxian interpretation of Smith's value 
theory which had existed prior to Viner's observation of social 
disharmony found refreshing evidences in support of the themes of 
social conflict and exploitation which such interpretation 
accompanied. 19) Finally. the coexistence of the bright and dark sides 
which are disclosed in Smith's work enabled several commentators to 
point out the duality of Smith's method of inquiry, i.e., his manner 
of making 'parallel' use of two distinctive methods, a priori and 
inductive, or abstract and empirical, or ideal and real. 20) These are 
four strands of interpretation which may be seen to be affected, in 
some degree, by Viner's early stUdy. Since I suppose that a more 
correct methodological approach becomes the basis for resolving some 
misapprehensions which happen around this issue, I shall first address 
myself to methodological discussion in relation to the coexistence of 
the themes of social harmony and conflict. 
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A conventional point of view from which two opposed features that 
Viner noted are approached is simply to introduce the two Smiths. 
According to Guy Routh's expression, • we observe in Adam Smith a 
curious conflict in beliefs. 
must fait h full Y t ransmi t ; 
There is the received gospel that he 
then he changes roles and becomes 
intermittently an apostate denying what he has preached'. 21) 
commentators made a similar point in this connection. 22) 
Many 
Jerry 
Evensky's writing is noteworthy since recently it was concerned to 
detail this type of argument. The duality of Smith's thought results 
from his distinction between the ideal and the real world. As Evensky 
put it: 
The voices [of Smith] express the two points of view from which 
Smith views the world. One of them is that of Smith as moral 
philosopher. From this point of view Smith sees the world as 
the Design of the Deity, a perfectly harmonious system reflecting 
the perfection of its designer. Smith's second viewpoint is 
that of historian, contemporary observer, and social critic, and 
from it he sees that the real world is not the Design of his 
ideal vision. He recognizes that human frailty leads to 
distortions in the Deity's Design. 23) 
According to Evensky, the former analysis was built up on the socio-
psychological premiss of 'perfect' individual virtue, whereas the 
latter analysis is based on the socio-psychological premiss of 'human 
frailty'.24) Obviously, this account implies that Smith's perspective 
was divided because of two different sets of method of inquiry, 
abstract and empirical, and the two Smiths, i. e., Smith the moral 
philosopher and Smith the social critic respectively emerged from an 
exercise of those different methods. Since this type of interpre-
tation not only finds the duality of Smith's methodology or his manner 
of making 'parallel' use of two different methods, but also supports 
implicitly the view that draws the inherent dichotomy in Smith's 
philosophic and historical vision from what he told us about the flaws 
of the social order throughout the Weal th of Nations2S ) , it is 
important to observe what Smith's own method of inquiry actually is. 
To start with, we need to note that Smith's recognition of bright 
and dark features in a commercial society is intimately connected with 
the psychological assumption in the Wealth of Nations that man acts in 
a self-interested manner in economic transactions; the assumption that 
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Smith expressed in one of the best-known passages: 'It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but their self-love, and 
never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages'. 26) 
From this premiss Smith did not merely draw a pict ure of increasing 
well-being and prosperity which are seen to be reached as a result of 
the division of labour and capital accumulation. On the same 
assumption he also found a number of instances of conflict of 
interests among individuals or groups. For example, the clash of 
interests between workers and employers, as this is shown by the 
combination of each group to raise wages or to keep wages low beyond 
what free competition would allow in the labour market, came from an 
effort of each group to seek its self-interest. Now it is noteworthy 
that this kind of social conflict among people was familiar to Smith. 
This point reveals itself in the Theory of Moral Sentiments; Smith's 
earlier book which provides, as it is now commonplace since the 
bicentennial literature,27) richer and more comprehensive treatment of 
the psychology of self-love2S ) on whose assumption the Wealth of 
Nations is built up. 
Smith made it clear in the earlier writing that self-interest was 
not simply a natural principle of the human mind, but a prime one of 
passions which motivated human action: 'Every man is, no doubt, by 
nature, first and principally recommended to his own care .... Every 
man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in whatever 
immediately concerns himself than in what concerns any other man'.29) 
Obviously, under these circumstances it would be not difficult to 
expect that some forms of self-interest are likely to bring about 
discord and disorder among individuals or groups or nations. Indeed, 
Smith, although he mentioned only a general rather than a detailed 
state of affairs of disorder, noted, in many places,30) hostile 
opposition, violence and crime, and ascribed such anti-social 
phenomena to excessive selfishness. In Smith's eyes, self-deception or 
what is described by Smith as 'the delusions of self-love' in moral 
judgments, 'this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the 
disorders of human life'.31) This undoubtedly reflects Smith's 
realistic sense. Because of the possibilities of unconstrained self-
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interest Smith judged that justice was the minimum condition for the 
existence of society. In this regard, the enforcement of the rules of 
justice was considered as a duty of government. 32) It should be seen 
that if Smith had been blind to the fact of social disruption and 
unrest, the discussion of justice would never have been thought of. 
On the other hand, however, it is likewise important to be aware that 
Smith discovered that abuse of self-interest was not invariably the 
case. That 1.s, Smith found that there had been social agreement among 
people, and man as a social being was involved in an uninterrupted 
communication process, affected by social opinion and conscience. At 
the practical level Smith observed the fact that extreme pursuit of 
self-love was voluntarily restrained by ceriain elements, so that 
society was able to survive and continue. 33) 
Looked at in this way it is evident that Smith as an observer was a 
level-headed person and well aware of various facets of reality in 
which agreement, cooperation and friendship on the one side, and 
antipathy, antagonism and resentment on the other abounded. Yet, what 
is of critical consequence is that Smith as a theorist was led to deem 
the facts connected with social concord rather than antipathy to be an 
appropriate substance for theoretical construction. As we have seen 
in the previous chapter, therefore, on the level of moral theory, it 
is shown that all the checks and controls of self-interest are 
achieved in terms of man's moral faculties. In other words, Smith's 
theory of moral judgment points explicitly to the restraint from and 
the reconciliation of the probable abuse and clash of self-interest 
between individuals by virtue both of the impartial spectator 
mechanis~ and of man's regard to the moral rules of behaviour. 34) 
If it is agreed that Smith apply the same methodological 
perspective in both of his major writings, it is possible to view the 
Weal th or Nations in the same vein. Therefore, we would expect to 
find a number of instances of social flaws scattered throughout the 
Wealth or Nations chiefly revolving around economic gain. It is 
highly likely that so long as Smith finds man's predominant motive of 
action to consist in self-love, he will be ready to reiterate that the 
collision of interests between individual and individual or between 
individual and society everywhere would occur. 
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for our purpose is that as in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, so in 
the Wealth of Nations Smith, on the formal or theoretical dimension, 
focuses on socially positive facts alone among various features which 
he actually observes that man's self-interest brings in the economic 
world. Smith observes negative facts which obtain in society, yet 
leaves them as empirical data alone. In this way, at the level of 
formal economic analysis Smith provides a vision of steady economic 
progress, concentrates on the beneficial effects of the division of 
labour, and allows little room for social conflict even on the side of 
distribution of social product, as we shall see in the succeeding 
sections. In my opinion, the ground on which Smith focuses attention 
on the positive rather than the negative side of social reality should 
be found in his 'conceptual' outlook of the motions of society which 
regards social progress and harmony as the 'original' arrangements of 
nature. 
It should be seen, in concluding, that it is indeed difficult to 
accept the conventional view noted above which finds the duality of 
Smith's method of inquiry in the discovery of social flaws that are 
disclosed in the Wealth of Nations Those who hold that point of view 
are inclined to separate completely methods, a priori and inductive, 
or abstract and empirical, or ideal and real, in Smith's work. On 
account of this fact the conventional outlook seems to be able to lend 
support to a certain view which suggests a duality of Smith's 
philosophic vision. The truth is that Smith's method of social 
inquiry which is related to his theoretical analysis is at once a 
priori and inductive, or abstract and empirical, or ideal and real. 
This is a fundamental foundation on which we shall proceed. 
6.3. The Metatheoretical Principle of Progress and 
the Theory of Growth 
A large number of commentators36 > have already observed that for 
Smith the idea of the progress of society plays a key part in his 
account of the history of civil society; a form of account which has 
been duly called 'philosophical history' in the sense that it seeks to 
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give a historical analysis in a fashion which employs a scientific 
method (such as Newton's) whereby 
known or proved in the beginning, 
several 1 Phenomena, connecting all 
we 'lay down certain principles 
from whence we account for the 
together by the same Chain'. 36) 
It is now known, on the authority of W.R. Scott that Smith's endeavour 
to demonstrate the theme of the progress of society is traceable back 
to his late twenties between 1748 and 1751 when he lectured in 
Edinburgh. 37) 
Smith states explicitly in the Wealth of Nations that there is a 
'natural progress of things toward improvement'. 39) And it has been 
shown in detai139 ) that in the later work Smith provides an account of 
social progress from the rise and fall of the feudal society to the 
emergence of modern European states by reference to the self-interest 
of individuals and the stadial thesis which envisages society as 
passing through four distinct modes of socio-economic organisation. 
Indeed Dugald Stewart indicated that in the Wealth of Nations 'the 
great and leading object of his speculations is ... to illustrate the 
provision made by nature in the principles of the human mind, and in 
the circumstances of man's external situation, for a gradual and 
progressive augumentation in the means of national wealth'.40) It may 
therefore be said that Smith's prevalent objective in the type of 
historical investigation enVisaged lay in an ideal or a highly formal 
and theoretical delineation of economic progress through time. 41 ) 
Smith's scheme of economic development as purely economic analysis 
as distinct from the philosophical history has also been touched upon 
by a large number of historians of economic thought. A larger number 
of commentators found that Smith presented a very optimistic picture 
of the future prospects of a commercial society.42) However, others, 
whilst focussing on Sudth's explicit remark with reference to a 
stationary state, tended to see that his view about the nature of 
social evolution had to be eventually found out in a gloominess of the 
final stage. 43) While commentaries of the former kind may have a 
validity in that they try to reconstruct what Smith has in mind as to 
economic growth, here my concern is to clarify on what ground 
conclusions which the latter type of commentaries reach concerning the 
inevitablity of the stationary state are misleading. 
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to be recalled that this task will be performed in order to illustrate 
my theme that at the analytic or theoretical level Smith consistently 
applies his metatheoretical principles in exploring society. 
In this section I shall therefore address myself to the exercise of 
showing that Smith's theoret ical interest lay indeed in an ever-
progressive economy, and of suggesting the manner in which his 
optimistic account of economic evolution can be understood in spite of 
his expressed reference to the stationary state. Before going further 
it yet appears necessary to mention what Smith assumed for the sake of 
an analytic treatment with regard to a commercial economy. This is 
important, since it helps not only to see a close linkage between the 
analysis of economic growth and other areas within his theoretical 
economics, but also to gain a more precise understanding of his 
theoretical doctrine, as dist inct from empirical descriptions, 
concerning economic evolution. 
The concern of science lies, Smith maintains, in finding the 
connecting principles of nature in terms of which a complex of 
disjointed and discordant phenomena are inter-related. 44) As a 
result, it has became the dominant view that on the same basis, 
namely, on the conviction of the interdependent nature of diverse 
economic phenomena, Smith addressed himself to economic analysis. In 
this connection Jacob Viner noted that Smith made 'detailed and 
elaborate application to the wilderness of economic phenomena of the 
unifying concept of a co-ordinated and mutually dependent system of 
cause and effect relationships which philosophers and theologicians 
had already applied to the world in general', thus prOViding 'a 
definite trend toward logically consistent synthesis of economic 
relationships, toward "system-building"'.4S) 
From a similar viewpoint it has been demonstrated that the 
treatment of the division of labour, the analysis of price and 
distribution, the discussion of reproduction, of capital accumulation, 
and of growth are all inseparably linked with one another in such a 
way as to constitute an economic machine which ensures the efficient 
working of a type of economy where the goods one requires are attained 
through exchange. 46) As A.S. Skinner has pointed out it: 
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It may now be apparent that the concept of the philosophical 
(analytical) system as a kind of 'imaginary machine' is 
particularly apt as a description of Smith's contribution to 
theoretical economics .... Smith's argument makes it possible to 
proceed from one area of analysis to another in a fairly clear 
and logical orderj from the analysis of price to that of 
distribution, from the analysis of distribution to the treatment 
of the 'circular flow' and thus to the explanation of growth. 
Moreover, it is apparent that Smith advances through the work by 
dealing with distinct logical problems in a particular sequence, 
and in a form which successfully demonstrates the interdependence 
of economic phenomena. 47) 
On this ground Smith's science of economics has often been called a 
'theoretical system'4S) or 'conceptual system',49) although it is true 
that some economic analyses in detail have been declared to be 
inconsistent or irrelevant from the perspective of modern 
commentators. SO) It seems of great importance, in some respects, to 
understand properly the Smithian theoretical or conceptual system 
which conceptualizes a commercial economy in terms of the 
interdependence of its components. Firstly, based on the notion of a 
reciprocal causation, Smith envisaged as endogenous the variables 
which act as the major forces of the dynamic process. Allyn Young's 
following statement, which sounds like mere tautology, suggests very 
well such a characteristic: 'Adam Smith's dictum amounts to the 
theorem that the division of labour depends in large part upon the 
division of labour,.sl) Secondly. in so far as 'theoretical 
economics' is concerned, Smith postulated certain factors as given. 52) 
In other words, in order to derive the type of theoretical 
propositions through his formal economic analysis Smith first presumed 
that the competent institutional arrangements due to perfect justice 
and liberty are properly establishedS3 'j and secondly adopted, as A. 
Lowe duly noted, 'the assumption of constant returns on natural 
resources, that is, an optimistic view of nature's bounty which, for 
all practical purposes, permits the output of agriculture and of the 
extractive industries to adjust itself to rising demand without any 
check on real output and income,.s4) As a matter of fact, Smith was 
inclined to think that an improper institutional structure6S ) and a 
certain sort of physical conditions would act, in fact, as barriers 
which prevented theoretical propositions in his formal analysiS from 
being precisely reached. For example, his theory of natural price in 
which the market price of commodities always tends to gravitate 
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towards the natural price may be stated to obtain where a condition of 
justice and liberty is satisfied5G ); further economic advance cannotbe 
made in areas where some natural conditions such as fertility of the 
soil are not fulfilled. 57) After all, this discussion implies that 
when Smith is concerned with his formal economic analysis he makes 
effective use of the 'ceteris paribus' postulate, meaning other things 
being equal, as a methodological rule. In this respect it is of 
vital significance to remember that if Smith's theoretical doctrines 
interest us, they need to be duly distinguished from his merely 
empirical or historical statements. S9 ) 
Now, we shall devote ourselves for a moment to show how Smith draws 
an optimistic picture of the mechanism whereby social progress is 
assured. To start with, let us turn our attention to identifying the 
maj or forces upon whi ch Smi t h count ed for economi c growt h. That 
Smith's principal concern within economic analysis was with economic 
growth59 ) may be supposed from the full title of the Wealth of Nations 
and from the fact that much of the work is permeated by his attention 
to the issue of economic development. In addition, we are reminded 
that Smith stated clearly that the objective of political economy was 
'to enrich both the people and the sovereign'.GO) Given the objective 
of political economy, Smith considered two conditions to be of 
fundamental importance: 
The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be 
increased in its value by no other means, but by increasing 
either the number of its productive labourers, or the productive 
powers of those labourers who had before been employed. G1 ) 
That is to say, the level of the annual output (or economic growth) is 
governed by two sets of requirement; firstly, the proportion in which 
labour is employed in productive purposes; secondly, the productivity 
of labour, whose degree is enlarged by the division of labour. Yet, 
the even more fundamental precondition of economic development in a 
commercial society depends, Smith finds, upon capital accumulation. 
For capital accumulation helps to increase the amount of the 
employment of productive relative to unproductive labour and to widen 
scope of the sub-division of labour. As Smith pointed out: 
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The proportion between capital and revenue, therefore, seems 
everywhere to regulate the proportion between industry and 
idleness. Wherever capital predominates, industry prevails: 
wherever revenue, idleness. Every increase or diminution of 
capital, therefore, naturally tends to increase or diminish the 
real quantity of industry, the number of productive hands, and 
consequently, the exchangeable value of annual produce of the 
land and labour of the country, the real wealth and revenue of 
all its inhabitants. s2 ) 
As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be 
previous to the division of labour, so labour can be more and 
more subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more 
and more accumulated. As the division of labour advances, 
therefore, in order to give constant employment to an equal 
number of workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater 
stock of materials and tools than what would have been necessary 
in a ruder state of things, must be accumulated beforehand. s3 ) 
These suggest that Smith assigned a central role for economic growth 
to the division of labour and capital accumulation. Moreover it is 
noticed that in the Smithian model of economic growth such major 
determinants of economic development are intimately inter-related with 
one another in a way that constitutes, once established, a reCiprocal 
causation or a linking chain acting as both dependent and independent 
variables. SA.) Given this knowledge, we shall now give a brief 
description of the mechanism whereby Smith presents the process of 
economic change through the interaction of those principal factors 
above descri bed. 
In Smith's account, capital accumulation immediately brings about 
an increase in the amount of employment: an additional capital which 
is rendered available by parsimony or net saving, 'by increasing the 
fund which is destined for the maintenance of productive hands, tends 
to increase the number of those hands whose labour adds to the value 
of the subject upon which it is bestowed'.sS) On the one hand, this 
fact leads to the growth of physical output and wealth by virtue not 
just of a growing proportion of productive to unproductive labour,SS) 
but also of technical advance and increasing productivity which are 
due to the division of labour which has a positive relation to 
employment. s7 ) On the other, an increase of capital also contributes 
to the increase in wages and population, because it is directly 
responsible for the addition to the wages fund. sS ) The former causes 
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the price of manufactured goods to fall in the long run. 69) The latter 
also serves to give stimulus to the market for products by way of 
making possible an enlarged demand for goods, which will in turn, 
through widening the size of the market, provide further scope to the 
division of labour. 70) After all, a sequence of the flow turns out 
to be further capital accumulation; a new departure point from which 
economic growth on an extended scale can be carried further forward. 
It may thus be stated that Smith had in mind, to be sure, a process of 
economic evolution, wherein an economy in the commercial stage will 
move forward towards indefinite progress by the aid of the interaction 
of increased productivity and widened markets, both of which rely on 
capital accumulation. In this respect it seems correct to say that 
Smith's theoretical interest in the problem of economic change rested 
solely upon a type of economy marked by increasing returns to 
scale71 ). As such, the Smithian model shows a very pleasant prospect 
for the future. 
This is a brief sketch of Smith's theory of economic evolution, to 
which the greatest priority is given throughout the Wealth of Nations 
Meanwhile, if this line of argument is accepted as correct, the 
question of how to understand Smith's two contrasting statements with 
regard to the evolutionary trend is likely to be raised. For the 
textual presence of the opposed parts in connection with the future 
prospects of economic evolution has enabled many writers to see two 
different aspects concerning the core of Smith's theory of economic 
growth. 
In the chapters on wages and the profits Smith made 'empirical' 
observations with regard to thriving, stationary, and declining 
states. Firstly, Smith states that there is a progressive state, one 
which is in reality the cheerful and the hearty state to all the 
different orders of the society'; a situation where 'while the society 
is advancing to the further acquisition, the condition of the 
labouring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be the 
happiest and the most comfortable'. 72) It is depicted as the best 
circumstance for all, because it is apparently marked by the 
continuous incr-ease of wealth and opulence, which implies an increase 
of r-evenue and capital respectively for landlords and entrepreneurs on 
-211-
CHAPTER 6 
the one hand, and rising real wages for labourers on the other. In 
the light of our line of argument Smith's empirical observation of 
this kind corresponds to the nature of the whole path of economic 
development which he envisages at the theoretical level. Secondly, 
Smith speaks of the 'stationary state', as found in: 
a country which had acquired that full complement of riches which 
the nature of its soil and climate, and its situation with 
respect to other countries allowed it to acquirej which could, 
therefore, advance no further, and which was not going backwards, 
both the wages of labour and the profits of stock would probably 
be very low. 73) 
In a society which is in the stationary state the competition among 
labourers reduces wages to the level of subsistencej most capitalists, 
who carryon a business with a moderate level of stock sink into the 
status of self-employerj only a fairly limited number of the wealthy 
continue to live on their money interest. 74 > Finally, Smith alluded 
to a declining state in which, as a result of the falling-off of the 
capital stock of society, wages are reduced even below • the most 
miserable and scanty sUbsistence of the labourer', 76:> whereas the 
profit rate is becoming so high as to encroach on the entire rent of 
the landlord. 76> And it is also mentioned that in this condition 
population decreases due to starvation up to the level at which the 
capital stock of the society is easily capable of sustaining it.77> 
Now, if the declining state is left out of consideration since, 
despite its «textual' presence, few tend to think it to be a final 
stage that Smith expected the growing society to reach, two 
contrasting situations remain to be explained. On account of the very 
coexistence of two yet apparently opposed passages which were 
connected with the prognosis of the long-term economic process many 
writers have been able to claim either an insuperable dichotomy 
between Smith's twofold assertions, or an eventually pessimistic 
nature of his vision, which must prompt us to find in his work a type 
of • dismal science' that suggests a Ricardian prospect. 79:> It is 
important that some parts among various statements offered by Smith 
ought not to be favoured to the exclusion of others. However, in so 
far as Smith's Wealth of Nations, which contains diverse factors such 
as theoretical arguments, empirical statements, historical discourse, 
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and policy recommendations, is concerned, it is also important to 
distinguish such elements and dimensions properly. In particular, 
where our interest lies in Smith's theoretical arguments, it is likely 
that the validity of any exegesis does not rely so much upon citation 
from a peculiar part, as upon the totality of an author's work. In 
this regard, it is worth quoting what George Stigler proposes in 
conjunction with textual exegesis: 
A success~ul hypothesis accounts for the important relationships 
in - the appropriate data, but it need not account for random 
variation. Similarly, the textual interpretation must uncover 
the main concepts in the man's work, and the major functional 
relationships among them. The interpretation need not account 
for careless writing or unintegrated knowledge. The test of 
an interpretation is its consistency with the main analytical 
conclusions of the system of thought under consideration. 79) 
I believe this remark is a moderately helpful guide for the purpose of 
exegesis, if a requirement is added that commentators should not rule 
out giving the reason for 'random variation' which the author 
examined, if he is at least a systematic writer, offers in his 
writings. 
In the light of this perspective we shall now mainly concentrate on 
Robert Heilbroner's view, because he was particularly interested in 
the paradox of progress which was deemed to arise from the duality of 
Smith's own philosophical and historical vision. Robert Hei 1 broner 
begins with a Smithian model of economic growth originally constructed 
by A. LoweeO ); a model which shows 'hitchless' growth. with an economy 
moving forward in dynamic equilibrium without outside disturbances. 
Yet he maintains that somewhere the upward trend must turn into a 
process which moves on towards a stationary state, an end of the 
historical sequence apparently characterized by general poverty. 
What deserves to be noted is that before proceeding to explain the 
way leading to the Malthusian-Ricardian prospect Smith is believed to 
propose, Heilbroner concedes very clearly that 'Nowhere does Smith 
actually explain the mechanism that leads him to the conclusions so 
unequivocally spelled out'.Sl) Presumably it would be a highly 
curious thing to think that, given that it is usually recognized that 
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his originality rests upon system-building, Smith himself fails to 
make quite plain the procedure by which the course of continuous 
economic development is so reversed as to run towards the gloomy final 
stage. At any rate, Heilbroner believes that wi thin the statements 
apparently made by Smith just one behavioural source, which leads to 
the consequence, remains to be inferred: 'a rate of population growth 
that continues to be positive throughout the various stages of real 
per capita well-being implied in the long trajectory of economic 
growth and decline'.B2) 
Heilbroner's reasoning on Smith's behalf may be summarized as 
follows. On the one hand, rising wages ensuing from the increasing 
demand for labour, that is in turn caused by capital accumulation, 
make a positive contribution to a continuous increase in population by 
means of producing a greater ability of labourers to support a larger 
number of children. On the other hand, as capital accumulates, the 
profits that are responsible for further accumulation are likely to 
decline on account of the supposed inverse relationship between wages 
and profi t, B3) or because • High wages of labour and high profits of 
stock, however, are things, perhaps, which scarce ever go together, 
except in the peculiar circumstances of new colonies'.B4) In this way 
Heilbroner came to a conclusion that 'Hence we must assume that the 
increase of population proceeds relentlessly until it reaches a point 
at which the increase in productivity stemming from the continuing 
division of labour is finally overwhelmed by the decreasing 
productivity of the land and resources available to the nation'. B6) 
This is a summary of the anatomy of the 'concealed' mechanism that is 
responsible for the grim dynamics in the Wealth of Nations to which 
Robert Heilbroner once addressed himself. It is notable that in fact 
Heilbroner's view concerning Smith's prognosis of the long-run trend 
of an economy coincides precisely with the logic of David Ricardo's 
reasoning. BS ) 
Three assumptions which 
clarification in questioning 
Firstly, Heilbroner postulated 
growth the profit rate was 
were made by 
the validity of 
that in Smith's 
Heilbroner require 
his interpretation. 
model of economic 
the ultimate source which enabled 
manufacturers to accumulate capital. B7 ) 
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that the profit rate would fall in the course of social progress, 
Heilbr-oneT- noted that iiiai1Urac:tuf'er-s' inability tu ae:e:Ulilulate e:apital 
stock as a result of the falling rate of profit would act as a hitch 
which prevented the growth process from proceeding. Secondly. he 
presumed that in Smith's view the (Malthusian) population mechanism 
took control of population so effectively that its size in the end 
would multiply to fit in with the level which could be sustained at 
the subsistence wage. BS) Finally, he believed that Smith expected 
diminishing returns in agricultureS9 )j a phenomenon which occurs due 
to the assumption of non-homogeneity of land in Ricardo's corn model. 
Combined together, to be sure, all these elements are likely to act as 
the decisive variables that are sufficient to portray the evolutionary 
process of a commercial economy which, via a progressive state, 
descends to a stationary state. Hence, what becomes of much 
significance for our purpose is to examine whether or not Smith ever 
subscribed to those propositions. 
It remains true that Smith acknowledged that the rate of profit has 
a tendency to fall with the continuing accumUlation of capital stock, 
attributing the falling rate of profit to the intensity of competition 
among capitalists. 
The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower profit. 
When the stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the same 
trade, their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its 
profi ts; and when there is a like increase of stock in all the 
different trades carried on in the same society, the same 
competition must produce the same effect in them all. 90) 
However, what is of great importance is that Smith clearly 
associated capital accumUlation during a given period not so much with 
the rate of profit but with the magnitude of profit. 91' In other 
words, in so far as Smith's view of capital accumulation was 
concerned, the capital-supplying power rested upon the amount of 
aggregate profits rather than upon the profit rate itself. Only in 
this way we can properly understand Smith's assert ion that as social 
progress proceeds the bulk of capital stock expands in spite of the 
decline of the profit rate: 
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As riches, improvement, and population have increased, interest 
has declined. The wages of labour do not sink with the profits 
of stock. The demand for labour increases with the increase of 
stock whatever be its profits; and after these [the profit rate] 
are diminished, stock may not only continue to increase, but to 
increase much faster than before. It is with industrious nations 
who are advancing in the acquisition of riches, as with 
industrious individuals. A great stock, though with small 
profits, generally increases faster than a small stock with great 
profits. 9:2) 
This argument clearly indicates that the low rate of profit93 ) was not 
seen by Smith as a marked barrier to economic progress. 94) 
Next, it has to be recognized that Smith seems to offer a 
Malthusian type of argument to the effect that population would 
respond in proportion to the demand for labour: 'the demand for men, 
like that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates the 
production of men; quickens it when it goes on too slowly, and stops 
it when it advances too fast'.9S) This passage is interesting in that 
it obviously indicates, like the writings of later classical 
economists, a certain kind of interaction between capital 
accumulation, employment, wage level and population. 9G ) Yet it is of 
great consequence to be aware that Smith did not expect the mechanism 
just stated to entail the Malthusian conclusion that the demand for 
labour (employment) and population would expand as fast as the rate of 
growth of capital accumulation, so that wages are always sustained at 
the level of subsistence. For Smith explicitly or implicitly sets 
out some premises which serve to check the growth of capital stock and 
wages respectively. 
Firstly, Smith presumes insatiableness of desire except that of 
food. He thus sees no boundary to the extent to which one may crave 
for other goods or fancies such as the ornaments of bUilding, dress, 
equipage, and household furniture. As Smith writes: 
Those ... who have the command of more food than they themselves 
can consume, are always willing to exchange the surplus ... for 
gratifications of this other kind. What is over and above 
satisfying the limited desire, is given for the amusement of 
those desires which cannot be satisfied, but seem to be 
altogether endless. 97) 
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Once the means of subsistence therefore is sufficiently supplied, as 
it is the case in a progressive state, it is possible that the desire 
for articles of luxury may help to curb the population multiplication 
in strict proportion to the growing wages. 9S ) For there exists a 
trade-off relationship, given the amount of income, between the growth 
of expense for luxurious goods and the up-bringing of children. The 
increase in the demand for those manufactured goods, as real wages 
rise, will thus act as an impediment to population growth in exact 
proportion to the rising income. In addition, it is noted by Smith 
that luxury plays a role unfavourable to procreation • Luxury in the 
fair sex, while it enflames perhaps the passion for enjoyment, seems 
always to weaken, and frequently to destroy altogether, the powers of 
generation. • .99) As a consequence there seems to be little scope 
that the supply of labour either matches or exceeds the demand for it, 
as an economy progresses. In this regard it will be of particular 
interest to notice Smith's comment on Great Britain (and most European 
countries> to the effect that the real wages had constantly been 
growing since the middle of the sixteenth century, and even the lowest 
ranks of people enjoyed luxury, whereas population in Great Britain 
(and most European countries) had expanded so much more steadily that 
it needed at least five hundred years to double. 100) 
Secondly. Smith believed that fixed capital, and raw material 
(without which the working of economy as a whole would be 
impossible 1 0 1 ) in Smith's model of macro-economics) increases, as a 
commercial economy advances: 
The quantity of materials which the same number of people can 
work up, increases in a great proportion as labour comes to be 
more and more subdivided; and as the operations of each workman 
are gradually reduced to a greater degree of simplicity, a 
variety of new machines comes to be invented for facilitating ad 
abridging those operations. As the division of labour advances, 
therefore, in order to give constant employment to an equal 
number of workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater 
stock of materials and tools than what would have been necessary 
in a ruder state of things, must be accumulated beforehand. 102) 
This requirement of fixed capital and raw material which must be 
fulfilled as capital stock increases serves, as a result, to work as a 
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type of shackle which comes to render the expansion of employment and 
population less speedy than that of capital accumulation. 103) 
Thirdly, there is a point which was made by W. A. Eltis: • if wages 
also rise as capital accumulates, there will be a further 'leakage' of 
circulating capital to the payment of higher wages per worker - which 
would reduce the rate of growth of employment still further in 
relation to the rate of growth of capital'. lOA) Seen in the light of 
these remarks it can be concluded that a faster rate of population 
growth than of capital stock was not looked on by Smith as an 
anticipated phenomena in the course of economic development, and hence 
cannot be counted as an important hitch in the Smithian model of 
econolllic growth. 
Finally, we shall turn to the principle of diminishing returns in 
agricul t ure which Smith was deemed to hold. The exploration of the 
presence of diminishing returns in Smith's model appeared to be made 
mainly with a view to giving a due account of the secular decline of 
profits along with economic growth. 105> It is true that some 
sentences in the Wealth of Nations look as if Smith explicitly 
introduced the assumption of diminishing returns. A passage which 
alludes to diminishing returns in agriculture appears in the chapter 
on profits: 
A new colony must always for some time be more under-stocked in 
proportion to the extent of its territory, and more under-peopled 
in proportion the extent of its stock, than the greater part of 
other countries. As the colony increases, the profits of 
stock gradually diminish. When the most fertile and best 
situated lands have been all occupied, less profit can be made by 
the cultivation of what is inferior both in soil and situation, 
and less interest can be afforded for the stock which is so 
employed. As riches, improvement, and population have 
increased, interest has declined. The wages of labour do not 
sink with the profits of stock. 106> 
Looked at in isolation this might be conceived to correspond to what 
Ricardo had in mind as he presented a corn model; a model in which a 
secular decline in the rate of profit was explained by virtue of the 
rising costs of the out put (wheat) from land, since land was non-
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homogenous and, as population expanded, less fertile land formerly 
uncultivated had to be brought into cultivation. 
However, the passage does not occur in a context which shows that 
as economic development proceeds, the declining profit rate is brought 
about by diminishing ret urns to land. Rather, it emerges in a place 
that is designed to elucidate his repeated theme with regard to 
competition between capitals which is seen to generate the downward 
movement of the profit rate, as its first two sentences hint <and his 
discussion immediately subsequent on it clarifies); the theme in which 
the rate of profit depends upon the amount of capital stock in 
proportion to the business that is conducted, in modern terms, the 
capital-output ratio. 107) Accordingly, it can be said that the 
passage above cited was not meant to represent the assumption of 
diminishing returns which arise from an increasingly unfavourable 
proportion between land on the one hand and labour and capital on the 
other hand. lOS) 
A general suggestion about returns to scale may be found, instead, 
in the first chapter on the division of labour. which has became 
somewhat familiar since Allyn Young elaborated Smith's account of the 
division of labour by reference to increasing returns. It comes out 
when Smith discusses the nature of manufacture and agriculture in 
relation to the possibility of a further subdivision of labour; the 
most important force which, in his model, comes to be contributory to 
increasing returns owing to its capacity to give rise to technical 
progress and rising productivity. As he writes: 
The labour too which is necessary to produce anyone complete 
manufacture, is almost always divided among a great number of 
hands. How many different trades are employed in each branch of 
the linen and woolen manufactures, from the growers of the flax 
and the wool, to the bleachers and smoot hers of the linen, or to 
the dyers and dressers of the cloth! The nature of agriculture, 
indeed, does not admit of so many subdivisions of labour, nor of 
so compete a separation of one business from another, as 
manufactures. It is impossible to separate so entirely, the 
business of the grazier from that of the corn-farmer, as the 
trade of the carpenter is commonly separated from that of the 
Smith. 109) 
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Accordingly, whilst increasing returns may be expected in manufacture, 
it is difficult to see the same consequence in agriculture. In 
addition, Smith insisted that the real price of manufactures would 
fall mainly because of the effects on the costs of the technical 
progress stemming from the division of labour as improvement proceeds: 
It is the natural effects of improvement, however, to diminish 
gradually the real price of almost all manufactures. In 
consequence of better machinery, of greater dexterity, and of a 
more proper division and distribution of work, all of which are 
the natural effects of improvement, a much smaller quantity of 
labour becomes requiSite for executing any particular piece of 
work ... 110) 
Even though real wages rise in this process, the cost-reducing effect 
of the enhanced and improved productivity will more than counter-
balance the effect of the increased wages, in that less labour than 
before is required. 
Meanwhile, Smith expected, as economic progress goes on, that. much 
of the produce in agriculture and mining, where the scope for further 
division of labour is extremely limited, will rise in price: 
If you except corn and such other vegetables as are raised 
altogether by human industry, that all other sorts of rude 
produce, cattle, pOUltry, game of all kinds, the useful fossils 
and minerals of the earth, &c. naturally grow dearer as the 
society advances in wealth and improvement, I have endeavoured to 
show already. 111) 
It will be so with the exception of cornl12\ whose price will be 
roughly constant due to a counterbalance between the effect of 
improved cultivation and the rising price of cattle, and of other 
vegetable foods l13 >, which will face a reduction of price simply as a 
result of technical progress in agriculture. 
Hence, it follows from these utterances that Smith assumed 
increasing returns in manufactures, constant costs in corn production 
and rising costs in most other agricultural produce except vegetable 
foods. Viewed in this way it remains important to find out Smith's 
view with regard to which sector (among manufactures and agriculture) 
will have greater effects on further development of a commercial 
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economy where social pr-ogress is already under way. It seems that 
indeed Smith considered manufacturing industry to playa more crucial 
role in fut ure progress. It must be seen that this remark is not 
inconsistent with Smith's well-known argument that agriculture is the 
major source for capital accumulation since the same bulk of capitals 
brings the greatest surplus in agriculture among various economic 
sectors. The reason for it is that agriculture, Smith saw, is most 
favourable to the rate of capital accumulation, in nations where 
little or no accumulation is attained,l14) or where there is no 
capital which is sufficient for all economic sectors11S ). However, as 
accumulation is sufficient to put all sectors into motion, its effect 
is to favour manufacturing industry. 116) 
This proposition just described can be seen to be grounded on 
Smith's two theses, formally in relation to the demand side. 
Firstly, there is a limit to the consumption of food 11 ?); secondly, 
the desire of manufactured goods, where the basic need of nourishment 
is fulfilled, is unlikely to be satiable. 118) As Smith put it: 'The 
desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the 
human stomach; but the desire of the conveniences and ornaments of 
building, dress, equipage, and household furniture, seems to have no 
limi t or certain boundary'. 119) This remark is, as a matter fact, 
supported by another empirical argument which was made in association 
with a feature of manufacturing and agricultural production: 
This impossibility of making so complete and entire a separation 
of all the different branches of labour employed in agriculture, 
is perhaps the reason why the improvement of the productive 
powers of labour in this art, does not always keep pace with 
their improvement in manufactures. The most opulent nations, 
indeed, generally excel all their neighbours in agriculture as 
well as in manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished 
by their superiority in the latter than in the former. 120) 
This passages clearly implies that economic development is more 
manufacture-attracting. 121) Hence, as capital accumulates, and 
employment and real wages rise, the demand for manufactured goods 
expands exceedingly fast relative to agricultural sector. It leads 
to further division of labour and increasing productivity in 
manufactures, which serve to generate the general prevalence of 
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increasing returns in the whole economy while overwhelming the effect 
of diminishing returns in agriculture. This sequence will evidently 
sustain the progress of opulence and subsequently enhance the rate of 
capital accumulation, providing another opportunity of expansion. 
This reasoning is, I believe, behind the passage just quoted. 
As we have observed, Smith offered his analysis of economic 
evolution on the basis of a relationship of mutual dependence between 
capital accumulation and the division of labour, and considered such a 
n:::lationship to be reinforced by increasing returns. In add it ion, 
Smith judged that the trend of economic progress came to secure more 
manufact ures-at tract ing form of development. Given this fact, it 
seems misleading to seek an understanding with respect to Smith's 
scheme of economic growth on the assumption of broad diminishing 
ret urns, or somehow t he predominance of diminishing ret urns. After 
all, Smith did not treat diminishing returns to scale as another 
important hitch which prevented growth from continuing. 
Finally, this examination of Heilbroner's view enables us to 
conclude that Smith did not apparently have any concealed mechanism 
whereby an improving economy was expected to move forward, through the 
cheerful progressive state, towards the final gloomy stage of the 
stationary state. Instead, the Smithian model of growth provided an 
optimistic picture with respect to future evolution of a commercial 
economy. If, as Stigler argued, the test of an interpretation is seen 
to rely upon 'its consistency with the main analytical conclusions of 
the system of thought under consideration', this conclusion can be 
supported by A. S. Skinner's remark. 
in the Wealth of Nations: 
On Skinner's close examination, 
Nor in dealing with the 'flow' did Smith suggest that the level 
of output attained d~ring any given period would be exactly 
sufficient to replace the goods used up in it. On the contrary, 
he argued that output levels attained in anyone year would be 
likely to exceed previous levels: an important reminder that 
Smith's predOminant concern was with economic growth. 122) 
After all, it can be said that Heilbroner's reconstruction of the 
mechanism of economic evolution 'concealed' in the Wealth of Nations 
with reference to the Ricardian model is misleading. Before proceeding 
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there is, however, another point which is worth noting in this 
connection. The point is that in spite of a pessimistic outlook which 
is derived from Ricardo's theory of economic growth, Smith and Ricardo 
shared a same practical purpose in relation to its theoretical 
analysis. In other words, Ricardo's ultimate aim in presenting his 
formal analysis of the process of economic evolution is not so much in 
a mere presentation of the gloomy circumstances which a progressive 
economy would be expected to reach naturally, but in reinforcing the 
view that economic prosperity could be sustained if free trade would 
be allowed, for example, by way of the abolition of Corn Laws. 123) 
Hence, given that the whole point of the Ricardian model was 
definitely to demonstrate the need for the repeal of the Corn Laws in 
respect of economic prosperity, it seems that Heilbroner was doubly 
mistaken. 
Now, what remains to be spoken of (since we declared that Smith did 
not see the stationary state as that which was due to treatment, 
beyond simply empirical observation, in his model of economic growth) 
is one thing related to the stationary state (' random variation' in 
Stigler's term). The question is about the reason why Smith had no 
need to provide a theoretical explication of the steps leading to the 
stationary state despite his detailed description of it. Two possible 
types of argument may be put forward. A probable account is a weak 
type of onein the sense that although it is in part defensible, 
ultimately it cannot explain the nature of Smith's growth theory in 
comparison with other economists. According to such an account, the 
fact that Smith lived in an epoch when there was the rapid growth in 
the rate of economic development is responsible for his exclusive 
concern with a progressive state at the formal level. As one 
commentator maintained: 
He spelt out the details of the stationary state no more than 
Keynes bothered to provide a detailed description of the ultimate 
destination of a Keynesian economy with the rentier 'euthanised', 
and the rate of profit reduced to negligible proportions. Such 
propositions were not relevant to the main work of Smith and 
Keynes, which was to provide an account of the working of the 
economies that they lived in. 124) 
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Certainly, it must be accepted, as many historians of economic 
thought have pOinted out, that the social and economic circumstances 
of a par-ticular era have a very great effect upon economists (and 
social philosophers), so that a mutual relationship between their 
theories and the history of their time may be noticed. 126) Smith 
undoubtedly wrote the Weal th of Nations in an epoch which showed the 
features of a remarkable economic development, even though some 
different opinions126 ) have been advanced with regard to whether or 
not he was utterly familiar with the movement known as the Industrial 
Revolution. In this regard it does not seem wrong to claim that it 
is possible to appreciate, from the economic circumstances of Smith's 
day, the entire lack of the theoretical, as distinct from the 
observational, concern with the stationary state. Nonetheless it is 
likely that such an approach is not sufficient to help us understand 
the optimistic nature of Smith's growth theory. For David Ricardo 
whose prognosis of the future prospects for the long-run trend of a 
cODlDlercial society is contrasted with that of Smith (though both of 
them had a same practical purpose) surely lived in the epoch of the 
Industrial Revolution. In the midst of dramatic economic growth he 
presented a pessimistic outlook which was responsible for the 
designation of economics as 'dismal science'. 
Now it appears that a more sufficient account concerning the 
optimistic implication of Smith's formulation of social evolution can 
be sought in what I have put forward. In dealing with the problem of 
economic evolution, the concept of progress, one of Smith's 
metatheoretical principles which are inextricably connected with, and 
supported by his theological belief, plays a clear-cut role in 
proposing and constructing the central theme of the Wealth of 
Nations 127) Smith was so keen an observer as to be not blind to the 
reality of his day. Nevertherless Smith's exclusive analytic concern 
as to social evolution was with the thriving or progressive state. 
This seems to be the reason that those who attempted to find out the 
concealed assumptions and logic in the Weal th of Nations whereby the 
evolutionary route to the stationary phase can be accounted for fail 
to receive sufficient support from his text, and come to rely on some 
assumptions of Smith's successors instead of his own. 
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G. 4. The Metatheoretical Principle of Ruling Out Conflict 
and thf= Theory of Value and Distribut ion 
In connection with a popular view which talks about the • two 
Smi lhs', or' the inconsistency of belief and vision in Smith, I have 
poiuted out the fact that Smith was well aware of various features of 
reality. In the same context I have also noted the requirement that 
we distinguish the formal or theoretical from the practical dimension, 
if we are interested in his belief and vision. It is my view that 
though Smith observes both the positive and the dark sides at the 
practical level, his wor-ld view or vision, supplied by his theological 
outlook with reference to God's benevolence, leads him to consider the 
former aspects to be the nat ure of things in original arrangenments, 
and the latter to be a deviation from such a state. Accordingly, 
Smith obviously describes the clashes of individual or group interests 
which happen in association with economic gain, yet has no interest in 
such issues at the analytic level <which should be distinguished from 
his practical prescription for its remedy). Instead, he is concerned 
wi th another side of reality at the formal level. At this stage 
Smith's metatheoretical doctrine of ruling out conflict plays an 
active par-t in shaping his theories. This section will therefore be 
devoted to showing that Smith's formal analysis as to distribution and 
value128 ) endorses my view. 
Let us begin by examining the lines of interpretation which find 
the theme of social conflict in Smith's discussion of distribution. 
For example, Elie Halevy129) claimed that Smith's argument of social 
conflict appeared primarily in the area of income distribution. At 
the time of the publication of the Wealth of Nations Smith had failed 
to integrate the earlier theory of production and exchange as 
formulated in his Glasgow lectures on jurisprudence with the theory of 
distribution later introduced probably under the influence of the 
Physiocratic system130 ). This was the reason why, even if the thesis 
of the natural identity of interests prevailed, the fact of the 
natural divergence of interests likewise appeared. On the other hand, 
there is another- interpretation which finds that Smith foreshadowed 
the theory of exploi tat ion of Marx1 31), in the sense that first ly 
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Smilh, identifying laboul as the only source of value,18:::n suggested a 
deduction theory of profit and rent; secondly he was emphatic in 
unmasking the diSharmony between three classes in a capitalist society 
which arose from the problem of relative shares. As D. A. Reisman 
concisely expressed it; mutual dependence among members or classes in 
a capitalist society, • which does not preclude exploitation, might be 
ulll:ible to prevent conflict over l'elative shares. Central to Smith' 5 
views on the objective existence of exploitation is the labour theory 
of value. It is also possible, however, that the theory identi fies 
labour as the unique creator of value, with the ilIlpllcallull that the 
pl-ofit of the capitalIst and the rent of the landowner" reflect not 
compensation for value added but position in lhe power--structure'. 133) 
In so far as Halevy's opillion questions the systematic char"aeier" of 
Smith's formal analysis, it can be discarded as irr·elevant. 184) 
Meanwhile, it is evident, as Marxian interpretation informed us, thai 
Smith considered profit and rent to be deductions from the produce of 
labour' to be a type of surplus in an economic sense. 136' Yet, it is 
also worth noting that he did not regard the distribution of the 
social surplus among capitalists and landlords as a form of 
exploitation, while Marx considered surplus-value to be exploitation. 
Smith made it plain that capital and land had become property at an 
advanced stage of society. 
this cont.ext is that in the 
What is of considerable importance in 
Weal th of Nations he presupposed an 
institutional system of justice and consequently a theory of property 
rights of which a full treatment was given in the Lectures OIl 
Jurisprudence. 136) Accordingly. it is to be admitted that Smith 
judged it to be reasonable that remuneration ought to be made for the 
use of those forms of property. 137) 
Now we shall turn to the examination of Smith's theory of 
distribution and value to see whether or not his discussion of them 
generates the implication of social conflict revolving around 
distributive shares. Therefore, for the purpose at hand, we have to 
consider whether or not Smith has a theory of distribution, as Ricardo 
and Marx do, \<,'hich establishes a precise inverse relationship between 
distributive var-iables. Fot' a theoretical identification of the 
inverse relationship between such variables apparent ly indicates a 
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conflict between social classes in the problem of the distribution of 
social pr-uduct in the sense that given a constant size of pie an 
increasing pl-oportionate share by one class directly implies a 
decreasing share by 1:l.Ilothel', and thus provides scope for class 
struggle in the determination of distr'ibutive shares. 13e~ Befor-e 
guing un, it seems worth noticing that the labour theor'y of value has 
recently been recognized as a purely analytical device for the 
measurement of the value of the social product in terms of the 
quantities of embodied labour; a device which can be utilized, with a 
,dew to avoiding circular reasoning, to der-i ve, as in the case of 
Ricardo and Marx, the rate of profit prior to illld independently of the 
determination of its price. 139) The impUcation to be realized is 
that the argument that Smith held, whether consistently or 
inconsistently, a labour-embodied theory of value, cannot be used in 
demonstrating the point that he envisaged conflict between social 
classes at the theoretical level. 140) 
To begin with, it should be admitted that Smith speaks as if profit 
varied inversely with wages: 'High wages of labour and high profits of 
stock, however, are things, perhaps, which scarce ever go together, 
except in the peculiar circumstances of new colonies'. 141 ) This 
statement was made when he talked about the state of distribution in 
countries which were advancing or progressive. At the beginning of 
the same chapter Sci th explained the reason that high wages were not 
compatible with high profit. According to Smith, the reason rests on 
the intensity of competition among capitalists which the accumulation 
of capital brought about: 
The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower profit. 
When the stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the same 
trade, their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its 
profit; and when there is a like increase of stock in all the 
different trades carried on in the same society, the same 
competition must produce the same effect in them all. 142) 
Furthermore, Smith offered a more detailed account of how the 
accumulation of capital involved a declining rate of profit. This 
occur-red in iwo ways; firstly by reducing prices in commodity markei, 
and secondly by raising wages in the labour market. As Smith put it: 
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As capitals increase in any country, the profits which can be 
made by employing them necessarily diminish. It becomes 
gradually more and more difficult to find within the country a 
profitable method of employing any new capital. There arises in 
consequence a competition between different capitals, the owner 
of one endeavouring to get possession of that employment which is 
occupied by another. He must not only sell what he deals in 
somewhat cheaper, but in order to get it to sell, he must 
sometimes too buy it dearer. The demand for productive labour, 
by the increase of the funds which are destined for maintaining 
it, grows every day greater and greater. Their competition 
raises the wages of labour, and sinks the profits of stock. 143) 
And it is noteworthy that a similar line of reasoning was employed in 
explaining the phenomena of low wages and high profits in a decaying 
economy where the reduction of capital stock is under way. 144) 
Viewed in these passages Smith's remark about the effect of 
accumulation on the rate of profit might be seen to anticipate 
Ricardo's theory of profit. 145) F or wages seem to be descri bed as 
the decisive variable which affects the rate of profit in the course 
of economic development. 
However, if we take a closer look at Smith's discussion of value 
and distribution,146) it will become evident that he never related 
wages to the rate of profit in such a way as to suggest that the 
latter varied inversely with the former. 147) Two observations need 
to be made by way of clarification. In the first place, it is to be 
noticed that in Smith's view wages and profit are determined by two 
distinct mechanisms and, in particular, the rate of profit is treated 
as being unrelated to the ratio of aggregate profits to aggregate 
capi tal advanced. In other words, Smith argued that wages would be 
determined partly by the supply of labour in relation to the amount of 
capital stock seeking its employment,148) and partly by the price of 
the necessaries. 149) The latter factor which regulates wages led 
Smith to point out that the lowest limit of wages is the subsistence 
level. 150) But Smith also claimed with the former factor just 
described in mind that the long-run price of labour could go beyond 
the subsistence level. 151) As observed above,152) if the condition 
under which an economy stands accords, for example, with an advancing 
state, on which Smith concentrated his formal analysis, the long-run 
price of labour may well be established and sustained at a level above 
that of subsistence. 
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Meanwhile, low or high profit, according to Smith, depends on the 
quantity uf capital stock directed to investment in conjunction with 
the timouni of business which it has to deal in'68)j 'The ordinary rate 
of profit ... is every wher-e regulated Ly the quantity of stock to be 
employed in pr-oportion to the quantity of the employment, or of the 
business which must be done by it'. 15.4) As this statement makes clear', 
Smith did not consider the determination of the rate of profit to rely 
on Lhe relat lOll of wages to the rate of pr'ori t (or the rat io of 
aggregate profits tn aggregate capital advanced, in which wages vary 
LHversely wlLh the pr-oflt ['ate). Instead, he arg'ues that the pr'ofit 
rate is associated with the amount of capital stock in proportion to 
the business that is conducted, in modern terms, the capital-output 
ratlo. 155 ) 
As this shows, Smith found no analytical relationship between wages 
amI profit. He proceeded as if those different forces which have no 
connection with each other had determined respectively the rate of 
wages and profit. In this regard, Smith's assertion that, for 
instance in a Uu-i ving economy, • High wages of labour and high profits 
of stock are things, perhaps, which scarce ever go together' 156) 
must not be envisioned so much as an expression of the inverse 
r'elationship between wages and profit, but as the kind of a contrast 
of the long-term trend of two distributive variables of which the 
magnit ude is deter-mined independently of each other according to the 
forces above ment i oned. We are reminded that for Smi t h the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall in the course of economic growth is 
bl~ought about directly by the increasing capital stock in conjunction 
wi th the amount of business available rather than, as in Ricardo, 
rising wages or the rising cost of the labourers' subsistence. On 
this reasoning it is thus possible that (although the technical 
conditions of production are unchanged,) high profit is compatible 
with high wages wherever the amount of business is sufficient in 
connection with the increasing capital stock. As Smith stated: 'The 
acquisition of new ten'iiory, or new branches of trade, may sometimes 
raise the profits of stock, and with them the interest of money, even 
in a country which is fast advancing in the acquisit ion of 
r'iches'.157) Iii short, it is important to perceive that Smith finds 
no constraint to bind changes in wages to changes in profit, since in 
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his dccount of distr-ibutiofl both of them are consider'ed to be 
regulated independently of each other. 
In the second place, it deserves notice that an examination of 
Smith's theor-y of pri ce again CalIri rms that he does not ident ify any 
constraint by which the economic antagonism between social classes 
mani fests lisel f. Smith defined the natural price as the sum of 
wages, profits and rent which must be paid as costs incurred by those 
who were involved in the production of commodities. 1SE') This sort of 
3 cost-of-production explanation of price1S9 ) leads to indicate that 
the natur-al price changes, given the dominant technological conditions 
of production, if one of its component parts changes. As Smith put 
it: 'The naturdl price itself varies with the natural rate of each of 
its components parts of wages, profit, and rent'. 160) In this sense, 
Smith's theory of value was described by Sr'affa as that in which 'the 
pr'ice of commodities is arrived by a process of adding up the wages, 
profit and rent'. 161) And this characteristic of Smith's theory of 
value and distribution, which may be thought to reflect, in a sense, 
his view of the nature of social mechanism, may well be observed by 
means of turning to his discussion as to the effect of changes in the 
r-ales of r-eturn on price. 162) Let us look, for instance, at Smith's 
account concerning the effect of changes in wages on the price of 
commodi ties. 
If wages rise for any reason, it follows that 'The increase in the 
wages of labour necessarily increases the price of any commodities, by 
increasing that part of it which resolves itself into wages'. 163) 
Accordingly, in Smith's estimate, a rise in the price of corn, for 
instance due to lhe corn export bounty, will be passed all by way of an 
increase in wage costs to all commodities in the form of higher price. 
Smith wrote in the chapter on bounties i;). Book IV of the Weal th of 
Nations. 
the money price of corn regulates that of all other home-made 
commodities. It regulates the money price of labour, which must 
always be such as to enable the labourer to purchase a quantity 
of corn sufficient to maintain him and his family It 
regulates the money price of all the other pal-ts of the rude 
produce of land, which ... must bear a certain proportion to that 
of corn ... By regulating the money price of all the other parts 
-230-
CHAPTER 6 
of the rude produce of land, it regulates that of the materials 
of almost all manufactures. By regulating the money price of 
labour, it regulates that of llitlflufticLuring art tind industry. 
And by legul crllng both, it regulates thtlt of the compleat 
manufacture. The money pl~ice of labour-, and of every thing LhCit 
is the pr'oduce either of laud VI' ldDour, must necessarily either-
ribe or fall in proportion to the money price of corn. 164) 
This passage obviously reveal~ t.hat Smith applies his theory of value 
and distr-ibutlon Ciuove outlined. Smi th judges undert akers, whenever 
there is an increase in the wage rate, to be capable of raising the 
pr'ices of corumodi ties in order to cover the rising cosL of production, 
giving a clear impr'ession thCit this process of price adjustment has IIO 
distributive implications. After all, it ought to be seen that in 
Smi Lh' s opihion chang'es in wages were not inextricably linked to 
changes in pr'of it.' 65) 
We can finally conclude, through a brief consideration of Slllith's 
theory of value and distribution, that Smith saw no constraint or 
inverse relationship in which one class cannot be better off without 
another class being worse off. For Smith argued that wages and 
profit could be determined autonomously and independent ly of each 
ot.her; the adding up of three sources of costs of production 
constitutes the price of commodities. The sociological implication 
of Smith's treatment of value and distribution is therefore that 
viewed at the theoretical level a commercial economy manifests no 
class antagonism in the division of social produce. Even t.hough 
Smith was well aware of clashes of individual interests and social 
conflict in the problem of income distribution, he did not provide any 
analytical treatment which could support the implication of social 
conflict. Illstead, concentrating exclusively on the facts which show 
the harmonious features of the commercial society, Smith proceeded to 
give a formal analysis of distribution around its positive aspects. 
And I believe that this conclusion concerning the sociological nature, 
observed in relation to the distribution of wealth, of Smith's 
theoretical economics which was uuil t up on the assumption of some 
institutional factors such as justice and competition being maintained 
maYt in a large measure, be confirmed by his statement as follows: 
'The establishment of perfect justice, or perfect liberty, and of 
perfect qualitYt is the very simple secret which most effectually 
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secures the highest degree of prosperi t y to all the three 
classes'. 166) A final word which should be said is that this feature 
of social harmony which Smith's account of value and distribution in 
the Weal th of Nations suggests can be well understood in conjunction 
wi th his theological outlook and metatheoretical principle of ruling 
out conflict in the original arrangements of things in nature. 
6.5. Metaphysics and the Treatment of the Division of Labour: 
A Contrast between Smith and Marx 
It was noted above that in Smithian theoretical economics the 
division of labour plays a very important part as one of the basic 
determinants upon which social progress depends. That is, Smith 
envisaged specialization in an exchange economy as helping bring a 
considerable improvement in wealth and in the standard of living by 
virtue of its capability to advance the productive powers of 
labour. 167) In Smith's words, the gains of the division of labour 
'are mutual and reciprocal, and the division of labour is ... , as in 
all other cases, advantageous to all the different persons employed in 
the various occupations into which it is subdivided', 166) since 'It is 
the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, 
in consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-
governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the 
lowest ranks of the people'. 169) 
On the other hand, quite interestingly Smith acknowledged that the 
division of labour has some damaging effects on the labourers because 
of a simple routine arising out of repeated factory work. 
st3.tes: 
As Smith 
In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the 
far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the 
great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very 
simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the 
understandings of the greater part of man are necessarily formed 
by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is 
spent in performing a few simple operation, of which the effects 
too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has 
no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his 
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invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties 
which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of 
such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it 
is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his 
mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a 
part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any 
generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming 
any just judgment concerning many, even, of the ordinary duties 
of private life. 170> 
In fact, Smith's Glasgow lectures on jurisprudence also reveal that he 
was fully aware of the same kind of inconveniences which accompanied 
specialization in commercial society. 171> 
These two contrasting views of the effects of the division of 
labour have given rise to much concern, whether direct or indirect, 
among Smithian students. Attention was drawn by one group of 
commentators to the fact that Smith's remark concerning the 
deleterious effects of the division of labour acted as a main source 
of inspiration for the Marxist-socialist critique of capitalist 
institutions. 172> Another, while beginning from the same premiss and 
looking in more detail at Smith's treatment of the negative aspect of 
the division of labour from the viewpoint of Marx' s term, 
, alienation', was also concerned with how those opposed views as to 
the division of labour may be 'methodologically' grasped in Smith's 
economics. 173> Whereas at the outset it is of course to be recognized 
that Smith surely affected Marx's view of alienation in capitalist 
society174> although the former did not employ the term alienation 
when speaking of the disadvantageous outcomes stemming from 
specialization in the commercial society, there seems to be room for 
further discussion pertaining to this issue. It is undeniably true 
that Smith and Marx agreed, in some measure, as to the unhappy aspects 
of the division of labour. Yet, it seems to me of fundamental 
significance that they envisioned and organized the phenomena 
revolving around the division of labour through their own peculiar 
looking glass; a world view which but tressed and oriented their own 
peculiar reading of history and SOCiety. It is my purpose in this 
section to clarify this idea with reference to Smith's view of the 
division of labour. Marx's treatment of the division of labour will 
also be considered, for that purpose, i. e., in order to see the 
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contrast of the t heoret i cal approach which a difference of 
metaphysical dimension between them brings. 
Let us begin by examining several interpretations17S ) which were 
introduced with a view to explaining the reason why Smith was 
consistently insistent on some bad consequences of the division of 
labour in a commercial society, whereas the division of labour 
received a great weight of emphasis in respect of social progress. 
Firstly, some commentators176 ) proposed that Smith's duality about the 
treatment of the division of labour came from the different point of 
view between disciplines or economics and sociology. E.G.West argued: 
'It is possible that in Book V he worked back from this "fact" to make 
his social diagnosis. By contrast, however, his analysis of the 
productive advantages of the division of labour in Book I carried him 
forward buoyantly to reach conclusions about the incidental social 
effects which were positively favourable and optimistic. Proceeding 
from two different starting points, the sociological and economic 
methods thus yielded different results'. 177) That is to say, Smith's 
economic approach to the division of labour led him to stress its 
positive effects whereas his sociological approach brought its 
negative effects into relief. According to West, Smith's economics of 
the division of labour is characterized by 'a balanced combination of 
empirical illustration and a priori analysis',179) whilst his 
sociological analysis is built up on observations of social 
reality. 179) Hence it seems evident that by economic and sociological 
approaches in Smith's treatment of the division of labour West means a 
priori and inductive methods. While it cannot be denied that it is 
possible to look at Smith's writings from a sociological point of 
view,190) I find that West's attempt to perceive 'contradictions in 
The Wealth of Nations in Adam Smith's treatment of the division of 
labour' in terms of the economic-sociological distinction, or the 
contrast of methods, a priori and inductive, is incorrect. As noted 
before, it is not Smith's method of inquiry. In fact, West's view 
about this seems similar to R.Lamb's described belo~ In any case it 
is noteworthy that West insisted, with the economic-sociological 
distinction within the Wealth of Nations in mind, that Smith's 
sociological argument about the so-called alienation of labour was in 
part, although not wholly, similar to Marx's theory of alienation. 191) 
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Secondly, it was claimed that the dichotomy of Smith's statements 
with regard to the division of labour arose from two contrasting 
methods that Smith made matching use of. In other words, the 
inconsistency in his treatment of the division of labour was due to 
the fact that on the one hand Smith drew optimistic conclusions on the 
basis of an abstract theory of relations in the capitalist society 
which was not based on the actual situations associated with the 
division of labour, while on the other its harmful effects were 
reached in terms of Smith's use of inductive method which led him to 
observe and descri be the phenomena of alienation which was really 
occurring among factory workers. As Lamb insisted: 
Smith's statements about the socializing effects of the division 
of labour are based on his abstract model of society built up 
from conjectured individual propensities origination in man's 
innate tendency to truck, barter, and exchange. On the other 
hand his critique of the division of labour's effect on detail 
factory labourers is drawn from observations of the real social 
effects of such institutions upon individuals. 1B2 ) 
Lamb's outlook of this sort in association with Smith's method of 
inquiry is to be rejected. 183) The inadequacy which this kind of 
interpretation faces does not simply lie in the alleged opposition 
between theory and observation. 184) Rather, such an interpretation 
errs in not being conscious that Smith's statement concerning the 
positive effects of the division of labour is likewise based upon 
empirical observation. For example, Smith's claim about the improved 
product i ve power resul t ing from the division of labour was made by 
focussing on the factual observation of the pin manufacture. It is 
apparently true that when Smith was concerned with theoretical work, 
he ascribed the origin of the 'observed empirical facts' to a certain 
propensi t Y of human beings. Yet it does not imply that one of 
Smith's two contrasting methods serves to propose 'an abstract theory 
of capitalism' at the formal or ar.alytical level which is scarcely 
associated with empirical observation, whereas another lets him make 
'socialist criticism of existing society'18S) at the empirical level. 
Since Smith postulated that human beings act according to their own 
nature, he made an endeavour to seek the origin of observed facts in 
terms of tracing the basic principles of human nature. To be sure, 
Smith's method of inquiry belongs to the empiricist tradition, and may 
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be seen to reflect a peculiar characteristic of the realist conception 
of science, as I tried to describe it above. 19G) This ought to be 
distinguished from the positivist conception of science consisting of 
another pillar of the empiricist tradition. 
Thirdly, Maurice Brown contended that Smith's contradictory 
statements with regard to the effects on the division of labour 
resulted from the logical implications of his 'dialectical materialist 
model'187), as distinct from the empiricist conception of science that 
was usual 1 y assumed to be Smi t h' sown. On this interpretation, the 
distinctive feature of Smith's method of inquiry consists 'both in the 
stress that it places on the interaction of economic organisation and 
socially generated individual consciousness, and in its emphasis on 
the dynamic, historical, nature of that interaction'. 188) Its aim is 
to offer an adequate account of the self-propelling processes of the 
social world where objects actually change by way of the dynamic 
movement of 'qualitative' transition. 189) Therefore, in this view: 
The central division of labour model is a highly complex 
construct designed to explain- to reflect, or make comprehensible 
- the actual course of development (as perceived by Smith) or 
commercial society. It is a crucial feature of such constructs, 
that in so far as there are considered to be contradictory 
tendencies in the actual social world, they should be mirrored 
with the model, which should in turn provide a theoretical 
explanation for the~ 
In this frame of interpretation Brown went on to say that 'That such a 
theoretical resolution exists in Smith's model, becomes clear if we 
consider its overall structure. For it is one of its central 
features that there is, in the interaction between individual and 
society, a process of 'creative destruction' during which socio-
economic institutions can evolve in response to the needs of a 
progressively developing society.' 190) In this way Brown claimed 
that Smith's proposal of education initiated by government was a kind 
of theoretical construct which his dialectical materialist model held 
with a view to resolving the existing contradictory modes as to the 
effects of the division of labour or reversing such a process of 
'creative destruction'. Two points may be made in criticism of this 
interpretat ion. Firstly, we are reminded that Smith has a realist 
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view of science, which implies that he stands in the 'empiricist' 
tradition. Secondly, this dialectical materialist approach tends to 
completely ignore the distinctive status of 'the science of a 
legislator', which has been successfully established by recent 
studies. For Brown's interpretative model finds the source of all 
events in the 'interaction of economic organization and socially 
generated individual consciousness'. Hence, there is in fact no room 
for the free and independent decision of political agency. 
In my opinion, it is important to know initially that Smith was a 
honest observer of human life, as pointed out before. In other words, 
he saw at the empirical level that the division of labour in 
commercial society had both effects, the positive and the negative. 
On the one hand, Smith envisaged that the division of labour enabled 
the workers to heighten their capacity to improve the efficiency of 
the work and to invent a good deal of machinery which was not of great 
complexity. The improvements in the productive powers of labour and 
invention, which Smith thought played a very important part in the 
determination of the volume of wealth and the course of social 
evolution, were rendered possible by the fact that the workers 
concentrated on a narrow range of operations as a result of the 
division of labour. This description comes from Smith's observation 
of the real features of society. On the other, at the practical level 
Smith' keen eyes did not allow him to neglect the point that the 
workers became depraved in the moral,social, and intellectual capacity 
when society advanced with such an extensive division of labour. 
This description of two contrasting features of an existing 
phenomenon cannot be regarded as odd, for a man, at least, of common 
sense is fully aware that a great number of social phenomena never 
have just one effect. What is now worth noticing is that Smith 
looked upon the former aspect of the division of labour as a set of 
data suitable for a formal or theoretical treatment whilst leaving the 
latter as an empirical fact only, which does not deserve to be dealt 
with, in so far as Smith is concerned, at an analytical leveL 
Critical comment may be made on such an attitude of Smith's, on the 
ground that though it is worthwhile to take seriously the problem of 
alienation in modern society, Smith tended to make so light of the 
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issue that he gave no formal or theoretical analysis of it. It is yet 
important to realize that this choice does not constitute a 
theoretical mistake on his part. 191) 
A question which now arises is about why Smith regarded the 
constructive rather than the detrimental effects of the division of 
labour as a source for formal analysis. An interpretative framework 
from which I envision the problem raised is that Smith's metaphysical 
idea, a presupposition, which declares the harmonious order of things, 
is influential in this matter. That is, the metaphysical doctrine 
leads Smith to conceive the former feature as the nature or essence of 
things in the original array which merits attention for analytic 
treatment. This is the ground on which the contributory aspects of 
the division of labour appear as a core principle inextricably 
associated with social progress in Book I and II of the Weal th of 
Nations The major concern of these books rests on a formal analysis 
of the commercial economy, whereas the intellectual and social decay 
of the workers stemming from a dull routine and monotony of the work 
process that accompanies it is given a relatively small portion of 
treatment in relation to state-subsidized education in Book V of the 
same work. 192) After all, it should be apparent that to grasp in 
this way Smith's contradictory statements concerning the effects of 
the division of labour discloses an intimate relationship between his 
metaphysics and science. And this standpoint is also of great 
importance since it serves to provide a striking contrast between 
Smith's political economy and Marx's, just as it helped us to find a 
contrast between Smith's ethics and Mandeville's. 
While giving qualification to the view of those who found the 
Wealth of Nations as an important source of inspiration for Marx's 
theory of alienation, E.G. West argued that among three dimensions of 
the ter~ alienation, used by Marx, only its third aspect, i.e., self-
estrangement, could be seen to be similar to Smith's • alienation 
passage' which appeared in Book V of the work. West also pointed out 
that Smith's concept of alienation was very restrictive, not merely in 
the connotation of the term relative to Marx's use, but in that his 
notion of it was confined to the degradation of merely the workers 
whereas Marx saw universal and all-embracing alienation coming from 
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the division of labour in the capitalist society. 193) And in an 
extension of West's view it was also claimed that this strain of 
Smith's thought obviously revealed the profound pessimism of his 
philosophical vision and as a result represented a contradiction of 
his whole system.. 194) 
It cannot be denied that Smith's 'alienation passage' certainly 
affected Marx's perception of a feature of capitalism.. If confined 
only to the textual comparison, Smith's concept of alienation may be 
seen to resemble, in a certain respect, Marx's view on it. However, 
one seems liable to miss a sharp contrast between Smith's system and 
Marx's if attention is just drawn to a simple comparison of some parts 
or the sociological respect of their writings. For the deep-seated 
contrast between Smith's view of the division of labour and Marx's 
eventually arises, I believe, from the difference of metaphysics which 
they respectively presupposed implicitly as genuine. We shall take a 
brief look at Marx's metaphysics with a view to making plainly evident 
an unbridgeable gap in the respect of Smith's and Marx's perception of 
worldly phenomena. This point seems important, because it helps 
understand a contrasting nature of their formal analysis of capitalism 
despite a certain correspondence of their empirical observation of 
facts. 
Marx's metaphysics through which the social facts were observed and 
filtered out and the general framework for theory construction was 
formed may be called an anthropological ontology, in that he 
established the dialectical relationship between materialist ontology 
and anthropology. 195) In other words, unlike those who found human 
nature in a fixed a priori anthropological principles, or on the basis 
of relativistic historicis~ Marx presupposed that the essence of man 
manifests itself in the fact that man is a teleological being who is 
capable of self-development of his various powers or capacities by way 
of taking actions against nature as the source of raw material with 
which to work. Labour or productive activity plays the part, in the 
mediation between man and nature, as the very means by which man comes 
to what he is. In Marx's conceptual framework of anthropological 
ontology the transformation of man <and nature) was fulfilled by the 
interaction between them through the mediation of labour. 
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viewed by Marx as the ontologically crucial factor which was necessary 
for the historical development of man and society. 196) 
Marx's philosophical anthropology appeared for the first time in 
his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1B4.4. 197') There Marx 
summed up his position very plainly as follows: 'Only through 
developed industry ... does the ontological essence of human passion 
come into being, in its totality as well as in its humanity. 19B) And 
when he insisted on a sharp contrast between human life and that of 
other animals, the point also reveals itself: 
In creating a world of objects by his practical activity, in his 
work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious 
species-being, i.e., as a being that treats itself as a species-
being. Admittedly animals also produce .... But an animal only 
produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It 
produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It 
produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, 
whilst man produces even when he is free from physical need and 
only truly produces in freedom therefrom. 199) 
According to Marx, the whole character of man's species-being is 
marked by • free and conscious' life activity. He judges that the 
• real' at t ri but e of man rest s on his working as a result of cuI t ural 
as well as simply physical human needs. Hence, for Marx, 'free and 
conscious' productive activity is the significant point of reference 
which serves to make a decisive distinction between man and other 
animals and becomes the basis for the realisation of his species-life. 
This Marxian presupposition that man realizes his 'real' nature only 
in terms of purposive production through 'free and conscious' 
practical activity also became the fundamental idea that persisted and 
was stressed in his later writings such as Capital. It is worth 
quoting at length. 
We shall ... have to consider the labour-process independently of 
the particular form it assumes under given social conditions. 
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and 
Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, 
regulates and controls the material re-actions between himself 
and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own 
forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the 
productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting 
on the external world and changing it, he at the same time 
changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and 
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compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now 
dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that 
remind us of the mere animal. '" We pre-suppose labour in a form 
that stamps it as exclusively human. But what distinguishes 
the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the 
architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it 
in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result 
that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its 
commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the 
material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his 
own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he 
must subordinate his will. 200) 
This perspect i ve from which the development of essent ial human 
qualities is teleologically accomplished in terms of human productive 
activity in an 'unrestrained' self-expression stands firmly in the 
background of Marx's view of the alienation of labour. In this light 
Marx evaluated a number of social facts in the pre-socialist society. 
Marx's diagnosis of the alienation of labour came from the perception 
of constraints which were continuously created by the major 
institutions in such a class society; constraints which, in his vie~ 
acted as barriers to the genuine realisation of potential in human 
powers in terms of labour. In Marx's view, private property, which 
was regarded by the political economists including Adam Smith as an 
unquestionable basic social institution was a human establishment 
which played a crucial role as a source of diverse aspects of human 
alienation: alienation of labour from its product, alienation from the 
producing activity, self-estrangement and the estrangement of man from 
man. 201 ) In this vein, Marx mentioned: 'In tearing away from man the 
object of his production, therefore, estranged labour tears from him 
his species-lif~ his real objectivity as a member of the species,and 
transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his 
inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him. • 202) It is thus not 
surprising that the history of the pre-socialist (class) society which 
may be seen, in a sense, to be the history of the movement of private 
property was envisioned in Marx's eyes as that of general and 
intransigent alienation of labour. 
In this way Marx's anthropological ontology influenced his view of 
the division of labour. Marx, like the classical political 
economists, was fully aware that the division of labour, perceived as 
an aspect of private property, brought progress of productive forces 
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and the increasing prosperity of society as a whole: 'the division of 
labour raises the productive power of labour and increases the wealth 
and refinement of society'.203) Nevertheless, the division of labour 
is referred to by Marx as 'the estrange~ alienated positing of human 
activity as a real activity of the species'. 204) For, in his opinion, 
it brought about private property, and opposition between individual 
interests and communal interests which necessities of mutual inter-
dependence among individuals in society create; and it prevented human 
beings from achieving self-fulfillment in terms of voluntary activity 
because under the rule of private property it was left outside human 
control. 206) After all, the division of labour which on the one hand 
expressed the advance in man's command over nature implied, for 
instance in capitalis~ the conversion of man into 'a crippled 
monstrosity' on the other. For, far from the occasion on which the 
productive activity assisted by a proper use or control of the 
productive means leads to man's real species-life, the workman under 
wage labour is degraded to a thing which exists simply to satisfy the 
requirement of self-expansion of capital as the property of another 
and an alien power to which he is subjugated. As Marx put the point 
briefly: 
It [the division of labour in manufacture] increases the social 
productive power of labour, not only for the benefit of the 
capitalist instead of for that of the labourer, but it does this 
by crippling the individual labourers. it is a refined and 
civilised method of exploitation. 20S ) 
In brief, in Marx's view, the division of labour in the capitalist 
form of production, even though it was looked upon by Marx as a 
necessary condition for future communist society whereby humanization 
would be ensured in terms of self-conscious life-activity, was in its 
entirety one of the fundamental sources through which human 
fragmentation and deformation were accelerated on account of its 
contribution to confined human capacities. Now, it is to be noted 
that Marx's anthropological ontOlogy already mentioned acted as the 
looking glass through which his evaluation about the division of 
labour was made and its negative and pessimistic features were thrown 
into relief. 
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In contrast, Smith's conviction was that seen from an abstract and 
philosophical perspective human society looked like a coherent machine 
which by its various motions brought about a large number of 
harmonious and agreeable consequences. 207) As noted earlier, his 
conviction of this kind stemmed from his concern in natural theology 
according to which the universe was a system which was intended to 
produce the sustenance and the prosperity of all the creatures; the 
operations of the social world were therefore fulfilled in order to 
make sure the greatest possible happiness of mankind. In this light 
Smith found that the principles of human nature which were for him the 
basis for the exposition of human affairs were at the same time the 
vehicle for realizing those beneficial ends. Smith's lucid 
announcement of this perspect i ve appeared in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments: 'In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted 
with the nicest artifice to the ends which they are intended to 
produce ... the two great purposes of nature, the support of the 
individual, and the propagation of the species .... [Bly natural 
principles we are led to advance those ends ... which in reality is 
the wisdom of god'.20S) In the Wealth of Nations a similar outlook 
was expressed when Smith talked about the unplanned character of the 
progress of opulence which happened in the Western commercial 
economies: 'That order of things which necessity imposes is 
promoted by the natural inclinations of man'. 209) It is likewise the 
case with the division of labour. In Smith's view, the original 
scheme of the social world was intended to show that necessity arising 
out a certain propensity in human nature brought about the division of 
labour which in its turn secured the spontaneous and blind progress of 
society. 210): 'This division of labour, from which so many advantages 
are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdo~ which 
foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. 
It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a 
certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive 
utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for 
another'.211) It is thus likely to come as no surprise that Smith's 
world view as just described allowed his 'formal' or 'speculative' 
analysis of the operations of an economy to exclusively concern the 
favourable side of the division of labour. 
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In conclusion, it ought to be seen that in spite of a certain 
similar! ty of Smith's and Marx's observation concerning the division 
of labour, the irreconcilable breach between their theoretical 
approaches to it results above all from the distinctive character of 
the world view which both of them respectively presupposed as 
authentic. 
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especially illustr-ating his view of the different employment of 
capitals and is based in some degree on histor"ial material, on the 
other hand it stresses that the actual historical record in the modern 
states of Europe was found to indicate an unnatural progress of 
opulence (cL WN, III, 1. 8-9; and for a more detailed account of 
Smit.h's historical analysis see A. S. Skinner, A System of Social 
Science(1979) , chapter 4; idem, I Adam Smith: The Origins of the 
-246-
CHAPTER 6 
Exchange Economy', The European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought, Vol. 1 (1993), pp. 1-25. 
(2) See, for example, J.~ Low, 'An Eighteenth century Controversy 
in the Theory of Economic Progress', Manchester School of Economic and 
Social Studie~ Vol. 20(1952), pp.311-330; E. Roll, A History of 
Economic Thought(1953), p.153; A. Lowe, 'The Classical Theory of 
Economic Growth', Social Research, Vol. 21 <195() , pp. 132-U1; idem, 
'Adam Smith's System of Equilibrium Growth', in A. S. Skinner and T. 
Wilson(eds.), Essays on Adam Smith(975) , pp. (15-(25; J. Schumpeter, 
History of Economic Analysis095(), p.572; W. O. Thweatt, 'A 
Diagrammatic Presentation of Adam Smith's Growth Model', Social 
Researc~ Vol. 2(1957), in J.C.Wood(ed.), Adam Smith: Critical 
Assessments(198(), Vol. 3, pp.88-91; G.S.L. Tucker, Progress and 
Profits in British Economic Thought, 1650-1850(960), pp.72-73; H. 
Barkai, 'A Formal Outline of a Smithian Growth Model', Quarterly 
Journal of Economic~ Vol. 83(1969), pp.396-(1(; G.B. Richardson, 'Adam 
Smith on Competition and Increasing Returns', in A.S. Skinner and T. 
Wilson<eds.), op. cit., pp.350-360 ; W. A. Eltis, 'Adam Smith's Theory 
of Economic Growth', in A. S. Skinner and T. Wilson(eds.), op. cit., 
pp.(26-(54; idem, The Classical Theory of Economic Growth(1984), Ch.3; 
D. P. 0' Brien, The Classical Economists(975) , pp.206-21(; C. Venning, 
'The World of Adam Smith Revisited', Studies in Burke and His Time. 
Vol. 19 (1978), p.68; A. S. Skinner, A System of Social Science(1979) , 
pp.176-183; G.C. Reid, 'Disequilibrium and IncreaSing Returns in Adam 
Smith's Analysis of Growth and Accumulation', History of Political 
Economy, Vol. 19(987), pp.87-106. 
4-3) See, e. g., Paul H. Douglas, • Smith's Theory of Value and 
Distribution', in J.~ Clark et a1., Adam Smith, 1776-1926(928), 
pp.107-110; J.J. Spengler, 'Adam Smith's Theory Economic Growth', in 
J. C. Wood (ed. ), op. cit., pp.110-U1; R. Heilbroner, 'The Paradox of 
Progress: Decline and Decay in The Weal th of Nations, in A. S. 
Skinner and T. Wilson (eds. ), op.cit., pp.52(-539; P. Samuelson, 'The 
Canonical Classical Model of Political Economy', Journal of Economic 
Lit era t ure. VoL 16 (1978) , pp. U 15- U34; R. E. Prasch, 'The Et hi cs of 
Growth in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, History of Political 
Economy, Vol. 23(1991), pp.337-351. 
4-4-) Cf. Astronomy, II. 12. 
4-5) J. Viner, 'Adam Smith and Laissez-Faire', in J. C. Wood (ed. ), 
op.cit., Vol. 1,p. 14-3. 
46) See A. S. Skinner, op. cit., chapter 7; cf. also W. Let win, The 
Origin of Scientific Economics(1963), p.226. 
47) Op.cit., pp.181-812. 
48) Cf. A. Lowe, op.cit., p.415. 
4-9) Cf. A.S.Skinner, op.cit., p.151. 
50) No attempt is made to supply a complete list of the commentaries 
on this issue. I shall simply record some. Adam Smith's theory of 
value and distribution does not seem to deserve discussion except a 
purpose for the understanding of the labour theory of value which is 
related to Ricardo and Marx. (P.H. Douglas, op.cit., pp.77-115.) 
Smith's labour theory of value was found as much confused (whilst the 
cost-of-production theory was identified as his own.) (Schumpeter, 
op.cit., pp. 188-189; ~ Dobb, Theories of Value and Distribution since 
Adam Smith(1973), pp. (3-56 and 76.) But it was noted that Smith's 
cost-of-production theory is no value theory at all in the sense that 
it does take no account of the determination of its components. (~ 
Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect< 1978) , pp. (0-(1; D. P. 0' Brien, 
op. cit., p.79; E. K. Hunt, History of Economic Thought (1979) , Ch.3; 
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R.O'Donnel, Adam Smith's Theory of Value and Distribution(1990), 
Ch.10) One critic even declared, from the perspective of the modern 
neoclassical micro-economics, that Smith's theorizing in price 
analysis is too completely defective to deserve praise as establishing 
a foundation of 'analytic' economics. (S. Rashid, 'Adam Smith and the 
Market Mechanism', History of Political Economy, Vol. 24(992), 
pp. 129-152.) A criticism was also made of Smith's proposition of the 
investment priorities of capitals. (S. Hollander, The Economic of Adam 
Smith(1973), pp.193-199). 
51) Allyn Young, 'Increasing Returns and Economic Progress', 
Economic Journal, Vol. 38(928), p.533; cf. also A. Lowe, op. cit., 
pp.416ff and N. Kaldor, 'The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics', 
Economic Journal, Vol. 82(1972), p.1244ff.; S. Hollander, Classical 
Economics(987) , p. 319. 
52) A. Lowe, op.cit., pp.416-417. In dealing with the 'constants' 
in Smith's model Lowe in fact added to those factors(institutional and 
natural> the psychological items, say, a self-regarding propensity 
like I the desire of bettering our condition, a desire which, though 
generally calm and dispaSSionate, comes with us from the womb, and 
never leave us till we go into the grave'. (WN, II.iii.28) However, I 
do not agree that such psychological factor is of the same character 
or position as the institutional and natural ones. Firstly, the 
psychological items are the basic principles by which Smith supposes 
human beings behave and thus on which his theories are built up and as 
such postulated at the outset like Newton's principle of gravitation. 
Secondly, they are assumed to be invariable throughout time, and, 
unlike A. Lowe's view (cf. op. cit., p. 422.), do not enter, in any 
event, into a reciprocity of cause and effect. 
53) It therefore implies that, in so far as Smith's 'theory' of, say, 
economic growth is concerned, an imperfect institutional framework is 
not considered as a causal factor in affecting the course of 
development of society, even though it is admitted that in the Wealth 
of Nations as a whole there exists an interdependence between it and 
purely economic factors. 
54) A. Lowe, op. cit., p.417. This assumption means that although 
Smith did not rule out the possibility that natural resources might be 
exhausted, this is not a feature of his theoretical model of growth. 
This fact appears not to be noticed by some commentators (cf. 
J.Spengler, op.cit., p.128; R.Heilbroner, op.cit., p.530.). 
55) See, for example, Smith's reference to China as an example of a 
stationary economy which 'had probably long ago acquired that full 
complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its law 
and institutions'. (WN, I.ix.14) 
56) See WN, I. vii. 30; cf. also WN. I. vii. 6; I. x. a. 1; IV. vii. c. 44; 
IV. ix. 17. 
57) Cf. LJ, iv.62 where it is remarked that the poor soil of Tartar 
and Arab acted as a decisive barrier to further development. For 
comment see A.S. Skinner, 'A Scottish Contribution to Marxist 
Sociology?', in I. Bradley and M. Howard (eds. ), Classical and Marxian 
Political Economy(982) , pp.91-92. Cf. also Smith's suggestion that 
natural conditions can give rise to fluctuations in physical output. 
(WN, II. i. 29. ) 
58) It is well known that the Wealth of Nations is not a treatise in 
the style of the textbooks of the present-day 'positive' economics. 
Rather, it contains the mixture of theoretical doctrines, empirical 
statements, historical discourse, and policy recommendations. 
Moreover, it is important to note that in performing such different 
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purposes - especially in presenting political prescriptions - Smith 
does not employ a single form of communication style, e. g., like a 
style of didactic or scientific discourse. For comment on this issue 
see, for example, A.S. Skinner, 'Adam Smith: Rhetoric and the 
Communication of Ideas', in A. W. Coats (ed. ), Poli tical Economy and 
Public Policy(1983) , pp.71-88; A.~ Endres, 'Adam Smith's Rhetoric of 
Economics', Scottish Journal of Political Econom~ Vol. 38(1991), 
pp.76-95; cf. also A. S. Skinner, A System of Social Science(979), 
pp. 206-208. 
59) Note that Smith refers to political economy as the treatment of 
'the nature and causes of the wealth of nations'. (\lIN, IV. ix. 38. ) 
Cf. G.Bryson, Man and Society(1945) , p.208ff.; J.J. Spengler, op.cit., 
p.110ff. 
60) \lIN, intro.1; cf.also WN, II.v.31. 
61) \lIN, II. iii. 32; cf.also WN, intro. and plan. 3; IV.ix.34. 
62) \lIN, II. iii. 13. 
63) \lIN, II. intro. 3; cf. also \lIN, I.viii.57. 
64) In this regard Smith's model of economic growth has been 
described as 'self-propelling', 'self-generating' or 'self-
sustaining'. See the papers of A. Lowe, A. S. Skinner and G. B. 
Richardson in the above note 42. 
65) \lIN, II. iii. 17. 
66) See WN, intro. and plan. 6; II. iii. 13; II. iii. 17; II. iii. 32; 
IV. ix. 36. 
67) See \lIN, I. viii. 57; II. intro. 4. For comment see S. Hollander, 
op. cit., pp.210-211 and 252; .W. A. Eltis, 'Adam Smith's Theory of 
Economic Growth', op.cit., p.429. 
68) See WN, I. viii. 18,21,23,40 ad 42, together with WN, II. iii. 17 and 
32. 
69) Cf. \lIN, I. viii. 57; I. xi. o. 1; V.i.e.26. 
70) Cf. \lIN, I. iii; IV. ix. 41. 
71> See, e. g., Allyn Young, op. cit., pp.527-542; N. Kaldor, op. cit .• 
pp.1242-1246; G.B. Richardson, op.cit., pp.351-352; A.S. Skinner, 
op.cit., p.182; G.C. Reid, op.cit., pp.87-106. 
72) \lIN, I. viii. 43. 
73) \lIN, I.ix.14. 
74) See \lIN, I. viii. 24; I.ix.20. 
75) \lIN, I. viii. 26. 
76) See \lIN, I.ix.13 and 21. 
77) See \lIN, I. viii. 26. 
78) See R.Heilbroner's paper especially amongst those which treat the 
stationary economy as a final stage Smith visualized. 
79) G.J. Stigler, 'Textual Exegesis as a Scientific Problem', 
Economica, N. S., VoL 32(965), p. 448; cf. also C. B. McCullagh, 'Can 
Our Understanding of Old Texts Be Objective 7', History and Theory, 
Vol. 30(1991), p.316. 
80) Cf. the above note 42. 
81) R.Heilbroner, op.cit., p.529. 
82) Ibid. 
83) In the final section of this chapter it will be argued with that 
Smith did not find an inverse relationship between wages and profits. 
84) \lIN, I. ix. 11; cf. also \lIN, I. ix. 2; I. x. c. 26; II. iv. 8. 
85) Heilbroner, op.cit., pp.529-530. 
86) In dealing with economic relationships Ricardo supposes the whole 
economy to be marked by the corn model producing a single product in 
which it is assumed that a single production factor or a fixed factor 
proportion of labour and capital is applied to land. subject to 
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diminishing returns, and that the size of population, whose change 
draws on Malthus's population mechanism, determines the demand for 
wheat. (For accounts of the corn model see, e. g., M. Blaug, Ricardian 
EcononUcs (1958), pp.12-15j idem, EcononUc Theory in Retrospect(1978), 
pp.91-95j D.P. O'Brien, op.cit., pp.37-41j S.Hollander, The Economics 
of David Ricardo(1979) , pp.7-8 and 695f.) In addition, he assumes 
the closed economy in which the mobility of resources is possible only 
within each country (see H.Myint, 'Adam Smith's Theory of 
International Trade in the Perspective of Economic Development', in 
J.C. Wood (ed. ), op.cit., Vol. 3, pp.511 and 513) and allows no room for 
the effects of technological advance (cf. E. G. We~;t, 'Ricardo in 
Historical PerspectivE!', Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 15 (1982), 
pp.316-18 and 322j cf.also P.Samuelson, op.cit., p.1428). It can be 
pointed out that these are restrictive assumptions Smith did not share 
at all (see belowj for a contrast of Smith's and Ricardo's model and 
assumptions of economic system see H.Myint, op.cit., pp.511-514). At 
all events, under those assumptions Ricardo insists that capital 
accumulation gives rise to increasing population by way of wages above 
subsistence and consequently increasing demand for wheat, which in 
turn brings inferior land into cultivationj as a result of diminishing 
returns rising price of wheat and wages result, finally leading to a 
permanent decline of profit rate. After all, Ricardo reaches, through 
the route, a conclusion in which a final stage of a developing economy 
will become a stationary state where accumulation will cease and wages 
will be at subsistence level. 
87) Ibid., pp.526-527. For the same view see J. J. Spengler, 
op.cit., p.126; P.Sylos-Labini, 'Competition: The Product Markets', in 
A.S. Skinner ad T.Wilson(eds.), The Market and the State(1976), p.220. 
88) Heilbroner, op. cit., pp.527 ad 529; cf. also P. Samuelson, 'A 
Modern Theorist's Vindication of Adam Smith', American EcononUc 
Revie~ Vol. 67(1977), in J.C. Wood (ed. ), op.cit., Vol. 3, pp.499-500. 
89) Heilbroner, op.cit., p.530. This point was stated more clearly 
in the article under the same title which appeared in Journal of the 
History of Ideas, Vol. 34(1973), p.251. Cf. also J. J. Spengler, 
op. cit., p. 128; P. Samuelson, op. cit. , p.500j idem, 'The Canonical 
Classical Model of Political Economy', op. cit., pp.1416ff. and 1432, 
note 13. 
90) WN, I.ix.2j also WN, I.ix.11; I.ix.23; II.iv.8. 
91) See R.O'Donnel, op.cit., p.47 and passi~ In this regard it is 
of particular importance to be aware that for Smith, like many 
contemporaries in the eighteenth century, accumulation or net saving 
did not fall back so much upon the rate of profit, as upon the habits 
and outlook of society. (See M. BOWley, Studies in the History of 
EcononUc Theory before 1870(1973), pp.193-196; cf. also WN, I.iii.14-
17, where it is stated that 'capitals are increased by parsimony, and 
diminished by prodigality and misconduct'. 
92) WN, I.ix.11j cf. also IV. vii. c.59. 
93) Smi th' s account of a falling rate 
discussion of different employments of 
comment see, e. g., M. Bowley, op. ci t., pp. 
94) Cf. G.L.S. Tucker, op.cit., pp.72-73. 
95) WN, I. viii. 40. 
96) See WN, I. viii. 18-22, 40 and 42. 
of profit appears in his 
capital ( WN, II. v.). For 
220-22. 
97) WN, I.xi.c.7; cf. WN, I.xi.c.36j I.xi.g.28. 
98) This point was suggested by J.J. Spengler, op.cit., p.126. 
99) WN, I. viii. 37. 
100) Cf. WN, I.viii.23 and 35; I.ix.6. 
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a positive relationship between population and prosperity Smith noted 
that in North America where the rate of accumulation was much faster 
than in Britain and most European countries, population took 20 or 25 
years to double. But what requires emphasis is that its cause is not 
so much attributed to the r1s1ng cost of wage goods, as to a 
profitability attained by parents when more children are brought up. 
On this ground Smith said that in North America 'The value of children 
is the greatest of all encouragements to marriage'. (WN, I. viii. 23. ) 
Smith's reasoning of this kind in fact makes it clear that his opinion 
of population mechanism must be distinguished from Malthus's view of 
it which contains two forces: the desire for procreation as a 
biological impulse and available subsistence. In other words, Smith 
saw a rational evaluation of the 'value of children' as another 
important force which dominates population mechanis~ Certainly this 
force may act as another check which keeps additional population from 
augmenting accurately proportionately to the wage goods. For a 
similar yet even more loose suggestion see J.J. Spengler, 'Adam Smith 
on Population', Population Studies, Vol. 24(1970), p.388; idem, 'Adam 
Smith on Population Growth and Economic Development', Population and 
Development Review, in J.C. Wood (ed. ), op.cit., Vol. 3, p.403. 
101) Cf. WN, II. i; II. iii. 32; II. iii. 35; II. iv. 4; II. v. 11; 
IV. iii. c. 15. 
102) WN, II.intro.3j cf. WN, I.xi.c.7. 
103) See W.A. Eltis, op.cit., pp.436-437. 
104) Ibid., p.437. 
105) Cf. the articles of R. Heilbroner and P. Samuelson in the above 
note 42. And for discussion of this issue see, for instance, 
S. Hollander, 'On Professor Samuelson's Canonical Model of Political 
Economy', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 18<1980}, p.559-574; 
E.G. West, 'Development in the Literature on Adam Smith: An Evaluative 
Survey', in W.O. Thweatt (ed. ), Classical Political Economy(1988) , 
pp.21-27. It is worth noting that in fact, some of Smith's 
successors, e.g., Ricardo did not think that the secular profit falls 
in Smith's model came about owing to diminishing returns. He 
criticized Smith's failure to find its cause not in diminishing 
returns to land, but in the drying up of investment opportunity 
resulting from the intense competition between capitals. (See 
D. Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in 
Piero Sraffa(ed. >, Chapter. 21. ) 
106) WN, I. ix. li. 
107) Cf. WN, I.ix.12-14; II.iv.8; V.ii.f.3. 
108) Cf. S.Hollander, op.cit., p.560ff. 
109) WN, I. i. 4. 
110} WN, I. xi. o. 1; also 
111) WN, I.xi.i.3j also 
112) Cf. WN, I. xi. e.2B. 
more proper measure of 
IV.v.a.23.) 
I. viii. 57; V.i.e.26. 
I. xi. d. 1; I. xi. e. I. 
On this ground Smith says corn 
val ue t han any ot her good. 
113) Cf. WN, I. viii. 35; I.xi.n.l0. 
114} See W.A. Eltis, op.cit., p.452. 
115} See, for instance, WN, II.v.19-20. 
can act as a 
(WN, I. v. 15; 
116) In this sense it was noted that I There is thus a trade-off 
between agriculture which favours the rate of accumulation, and 
industry which favours the effects of accumulation'. (W. A. Eltis, 
op.cit., p.452; original italics) 
117) Cf. WN, I.xi.c.7; TMS, IV.i.l.l0; LJ(A), iii. 135. 
118) Cf. WN, I. xi. c. 7; I. xi. c. 36; I. xi. g. 28; LJ(B), 209. A more 
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detailed account of the insatiable wants of mankind appears, in the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, in relation to the desire for approval 
which is basically seen to inspire them to seek wealth (and status), 
and is closely connected with the discussion of economic growth. See 
TMS, I. iii. 2; IV. 1; VII. ii. 4.. 12. And for comment see A. S. Skinner, 
'Adam Smith: Ethics and Self-love', in P.Jones and A.S. Skinner(eds.), 
Adam Sndth Reviewed(1992) , pp. 14.9-154. and 162-163. 
119) WN, I.xi.c.7. 
120) WN, 1. i. 4.. 
12l> In this respect it deserves notice that whilst probably it is 
likely that a preindustrial conception of, say, technology was 
employed in the Weal th of Nations, it does not, in part, seem correct 
to claim that Smith failed to anticipate the Industrial Revolution. 
[Cf. R.Koebner, 'Adam Smith and the Industrial Revolution', Econondc 
History Review, Vol. 2(1959), reprinted in J. C. Wood(ed.), op. cit., 
Vol. 4., p.72ff; RBlaug, op.cit., pp.37-38.] Furthermore, it appears 
completely mistaken to find that Smith's analytical work ought to be 
understood as a type of the preindustrial economics, since basically 
his theoretical doctrines can be conceived as something 'intended to 
promulgate an egalitarian agrarian capitalism in the spirit of 
physiocracy' . [See H. Caton, • The Preindustrial Economics of Adam 
Smith', Journal of Econondc Histor~ Vol. 4.5(1985), pp.833-853.] In a 
similar vein one can be critical of D.McNally's book, Political 
Economy Bnd the Rise of Capitalism(1988), chapter 5, where he placed 
an overstress on the primacy of agricultural growth in Smith's outlook 
of evolution by overlooking Smith's confidence both in the expected 
direction of the preference of consumers and in the greatest 
competence of specialization in manufacture. 
122) A.S. Skinner, op.cit., p.176. 
123) See, for example, Leo Rogin, The Meaning and Validity of 
Econond c Theory, (1956) , pp. 11 0-117. 
124.) W. A. Eltis, op. cit., p.4.53; cf. also C. Venning, op. cit., p.68; 
A. S. Skinner, • Say's Law: Origins and Content', Econondca, 
Vol. 34(1967), p.165. 
125) See, for instance, the prefaces or the introductions of J. K. 
Ingram, A History of Political Economy(1915); E. Roll, op. cit.,; E. K. 
Hunt, op. cit. 
126) See, e.g., R.Koebner, op.cit., pp.72-83; RBlaug, op.cit., 
pp.37-38; S. Hollander, op. cit., pp.208-241; C. P. Kindleberger, 'The 
Historical Background: Adam Smith and the Industrial Revolution', in 
A.S. Skinner and T.Wilson(eds.), The Market and the State(1976), pp.1-
25. 
127) Note that somewhat curiously Schumpeter suggested that vision 
described as 'the preanalytic act' yet capable of having no effect on 
the analytic process of scientific work might play a very important 
part exceptionally in the economists' theoretical formulation relating 
to the issue of economic growth. (Schumpeter, op. cit., pp.42ff. and 
570ff. ) Meanwhile, it is also worth noting that while he places. 
emphasis on the role of vision in appreciating scenarios or theories 
of some prominent modern economists, Heilbroner recently would seem to 
go a long way from his original position already examined, in that 
he remarked: 'Smith's visionary deistic order precedes and guides the 
processes of self-ordering growth described in the Wealth of Nations'. 
See R. Heilbroner, 'Analysis and Vision in the History of Modern 
Economic Thought', Journal of Econondc Literature, Vol. 28(1990), p. 
1110. 
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128) On the point that in the classical political economy the problem 
of value was inextricably related to the problem of distribution, see, 
e.g., E. Cannan, A History of the Theories of Production and 
Distribution in the English Political Economy(1898) , p. 186ff.; R. L. 
Meek, Precursors of Adam Smith(1972), p. Xi P. Garegnani, 'Value and 
Distribution in the Classical Economists and Marx', in J.C. Wood (ed. ), 
Karl Marx's Economics: Critical Assessments(1988), Vol. 1, p. 1077ff .. 
129) See E. Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism<190U, 
translated by Mary Morris (1928), pp. 100-103. 
130) Cf. R.L. Meek, 'Adam Smith and the Classical Concept of Profit', 
in his Economics Bnd Ideology and Other Essays(1967), pp. 28-32, where 
he speculated about the impact of the Physiocratic system on Smith's 
analysis of distribution, whilst at the same time considering together 
Dugald Stewart's statement that the division of returns into wages, 
profit, and rent was first indicated by his friend, James Oswald (cf. 
Stewart, III. 2): cf. also A. S. Skinner, A System of Social 
Science(1979), pp.122-9. 
131) See P.H. Douglas, 'Smith's Theory of Value and Distribution', in 
J.M. Clark, et al., Adam Smith, 1776-1926(1928), pp.77-115; E.Roll, A 
History of Economic Thought<1954..). p. 171ff.; M. Dobb, Theories of Value 
and Distribution since Adam Smith(1973), pp.~6 and 112; R.Lamb, 'Adam 
Smith's Conception of Alienation'. in J. C. Wood(ed.). Adam Smith: 
Critical Assessments(198~), Vol. 1, pp. ~81 and ~85; D.A. Reisman, Adam 
Smith's Sociological Economics(1976) , chapter 6; R. L. Meek, Smith, 
J~rx & After (1977), pp.6-1~; P.R Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy 
For Modern Capitalism(1991) , pp.132 and 1~3. 
132) Smith stated at the beginning of WN that 'The annual labour of 
every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the 
necessaries and conveniences of life' (WN, intro.1; cr. also I.x.c. 12), 
and used as his criterion of social advantage the quantity of 
productive labour put into motion by a given capital (cf. WN, II. v). 
Note also that from the second edition Smith removed the words, ' a 
source of value', which were also applied to profit and rent in the 
first edition(WN, I.vi.6 and 8). 
133) D. A. Reisman, op. cit. t p. 16~. 
13~) Cf. A.S. Skinner, op.cit., chapters 5 and 7. 
135) See WN, I. viii. 19-20; cf. also I. vi. 7-8 and I. viii. 6-8. 
136) For detailed discussion of Smith's theory of property rights see 
K. Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator(198U, pp.96-97 and chapter 
5; P.H.Werhane, op.cit., chapter 2. 
137) It is noted that Smith considered 'just t the deduction of non-
labour forms of· income from the produce of labour (J.T. Young, 
'Natural Price and the Impartial Spectator', International Journal of 
Social Economics, Vol. 12(1985), pp.123-28; idem, 'The Impartial 
Spectator and Natural Jurisprudence: An Interpretation of Adam Smith's 
Theory of Natural Price', History of Political Economy, Vol. 18(1986), 
pp.377-81). And for a linkage of Smith's concept of natural price to 
'just price' in the scholastic tradition see Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit, 
p.60f; Raymond de Roover, 'Scholastic Economics: Survival and Lasting 
Influence from the Sixteenth Century to Adam Smith', Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 69(1955), pp.161-190; M. Bowley, Studies in the 
History of Economic Theory BeFore 1870(1973), pp.127-32; cf. also J.R. 
Lindgren, The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith(1973), pp.87 and 97-99. 
138) For a clear statement of this point see D. M. Nuti, 'Vulgar 
Economy' in the Theory of Income Distribution', De Economist, 
Vol. 118(1970), reprinted in E.K. Hunt and J.G. Schwartzeeds.), A 
Critique of Economic Theory (1972), p.226; cf. also K. Marx, Theories 
-253-
CHAPTER 6 
of Surplus Value(1969: Lawrence & Wishart London), Part II, p.166. 
139) Cf. J. Eatwell, 'Competition', in 1. Bradley and M. Howard (eds. ), 
Classical and Marxian Political Economy(1982) , p.212; P.Garegnani, 
op. cit. , pp. 1079-80; idem, • Surplus Approach to Value and 
Distribution', in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of EcononUcs(1987). 
1(0) It can be seen in this connection that an interpretative attempt 
to stress Smith's having theoretical interest in class antagonism by 
virtue of his link to a labour theory of value is unconvincing. For 
interpretation of the kind see, for instance, D.A. Reisman, op.cit., 
pp. 164--69. 
14-1) tiN, 1. ix. 11. 
14-2) WH, I.ix.2. 
14-3) WH, II.iv.8. 
14-4-) See WN, I.ix.13. 
14-5) Ricardo and his followers judged that the falling rate of profit 
would result from diminishing returns from land and rising wages (see 
D. Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy, edited by P. Sraffa (1951), 
chapter 21 and particularly p.296)' As Ricardo briefly stated: 'if, 
as is absolutely certain, wages should rise with the rise of corn ... 
profits would necessarily fall' (ibid., p.lll and passim). 
14-6) There have been many lines of interpretation on Adam Smith's 
theory of value in connection with WN. I will just state their major 
respects below. Firstly, it was claimed that Smith had a labour-
embodied theory of value for a primitive economy and yet for a 
capitalist society both the labour-embodied and labour-commanded 
theories were applied. (cf. P. H. Douglas, op. cit., pp.88-90; also 
E.F. Paul, Moral Revolution and EcononUc Science (1979), p.23). Note 
that this argument was criticized, above all, for its failure to 
distinguish between the source and the measure of value. (cf. V. W. 
Bladen, 'Command over Labour: A Study in Misinterpretation', in 
J.C.Wood(ed.), op.cit., Vol.3 pp.370-lj S.Kaushil, 'The Case of Adam 
Smith's Value Analysis', in J.C.Wood(ed.), op.cit., Vol. 3, p.278.) 
Secondly, while sharing in part the above view on the dichotomy of 
Smith's account of value, some writers argued that for the capitalist 
economy he put forward a cost-of-production theory which was meant to 
represent a kind of supply and demand theory. This view finds that 
Smith contributed to the development of both lines of tradition 
concerning the treatment of value, namely, the labour theory and the 
neoclassical theory, (cL E. Roll, op. cit., pp. 161-164- ad 171-172; R. L. 
M.eek, Studies in the Labour Theory of Value(1956) , pp.69-71; idem, 
SnUth, Marx, &- After(1977), pp.8 and 154--57; M.. Dobb, op. cit.. pp.4-5-
4-7; idem 'Ricardo and Adam Smith', in A.S. Skinner and T.Wilson(ed.), 
Essays on Adam SBdth(1975), pp.327-328; E.K. Hunt, History of EcononUc 
Tho~ht(1979), ch.2.). 
Thirdly, objecting to the view that Smith held, although partially for 
a barter economy, a labour theory of value, on the ground that in such 
situation any theor; of value would suggest the same result, i.e., the 
same eXChange rate between commodities, many found that his theory of 
value was consistently an explanation of. value in terms of cost of 
production. On this interpretation it is noted that .Smith's account 
of the determination of value corresponds to a special case of 
Marshall's theory of value in that it assumes constant costs, so that 
demand has no role in determining the long-run price. (cf. 
J. Schumpeter, History of EcononUc Analysis(1954-) , pp.188-89 and 309; 
M. Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect (1978), pp.4-0-4-2; M.. Bowley, 
Studies in the History of EcononUc Theory Before 1870(1973), pp. 122-
126; D.O. O'Brien, The Classical Economists(1975) , pp.78-80; A.S. 
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Skinner, A System of Social Science (1979), pp.157-58). 
Fourthly, Smith was seen to anticipate the neoclassical general 
equilibrium theory of value. In this view Smith's treatment of value 
is evaluated as an attempt to provide a version of long-run general 
equilibrium. rather than partial equilibrium analysis of supply and 
demand; value is determined by the interplay of both demand and supply 
which are based on utility and scarcity. (See S. Hollander, The 
Economics of Adam Smith(1973) , chapter 4, and S. Kaushil, op. cit., 
pp.280-82; cf. also J.Schumpeter, op.cit., p.189; K.E. Boulding, 
'After Samuelson, Who Needs Adam Smith 7', in J.C.Wood(ed.), op.cit., 
Vol. 3, p.250; P.A. Samuelson, IA Modern Theorist's Vindication of Adam 
Smith', in J.C.Wood(ed.), op.cit., Vol. 3, p.499.) 
Finally, there has recently been a challenge to the contemporary 
interpretation on Smith's theory of price in respect of the surplus 
(or classical) approach to value and distribution. This approach 
draws attention to the analytical structure of classical political 
economy mainly concerned with the determination of relative prices and 
the rate of profit whose problem was considered to arise from 
classical economists' primary interest in reproduction and 
distribution. On the one hand, this line of analysis disapproves of 
the general equilibrium approach according to which for Smith price is 
determined by demand and supply (cf. P.Garegnani, 'The Classical 
Theory of Wages and the Role of Demand Schedules in the Determination 
of Relative Prices', American Economic Review, vol. 73 (1983), pp.309-
313; R.O'Donnel, Adam Smith's Theory of Value and Distribution(1990), 
especially chapter 9 and passim). On the other it shows that Smith 
considered the relative prices to be determined by the methods of 
production and the manner in which the surplus is distributed (See 
P. Sylos-Labini, 'Competition: The Product Markets' I in A. S. Skinner 
and T. Wilson (eds. ), The Market and the State(1976) , pp.202-6. 
R.O'Donnel, op.cit., pp.76ff. and 89-90; cf. also P.Sraffa, Production 
of Commodities by Means of Commodities(1960) , in particular section 
20. ) 
147) The consideration of rent will be dropped, since Smith did not 
make a consistent argument about rent. Rent was spoken of as price-
determining when he talked about the component parts of natural 
price(WN, I. vi. 17j vii.4j vii. 33), whilst in contrast as price-
determined on his taking detailed account of it{WN, I.xi). Moreover, 
note that Smith did not establish a precise analytical relationship 
between the rates of wages, profit and rent (cf. P.Sylos-Labini, 
op.cit., p.204j R.O'Donnel, op.cit.,pp.l00-l02). Smith once said as 
if rent had been related to wages and profit; 'High or low wages and 
profit, are the causes of high or low price; high or low rent is the 
effect of it' (W, 1. xi. 9. 8), However, it is not of course an 
expression of an analytical relation between the distributive 
variables needed for the discussion of value. 
148) It is suggested that Smith's argument to this effect must not be 
taken to show that he produced an analysis of wage determination by 
virtue of demand and supply • theory' which is identical to modern 
economics (See P.Garegnani, op.cit., pp.310-311: J.Spengler, 'Adam 
Smith's Theory of Economic Growth', in J.C.WoodCed.), op.cit., Vol. 3, 
pp. 125-126. 
149) See WN, I.viii, and especially I. viii. 52; V.ii.I.1; V.ii.k.4. 
150) See W, I. viii. 16. It is worth noting that by SUbsistence rate 
Smith did not mean a biologically or physiologically determined level 
of wages, but wage level culturally or historically determined eCL 
WN, V. ii. k. 3), 
-255-
CHAPTER 6 
151) In this connection it must be observed that Smith's saying that 
for instance the natural rate of wages is 'regulated '" partly by the 
general circumstances of the society, their riches or poverty, their 
advancing, stationary, or declining condition; and partly by the 
particular nature of each employment' (WN, vii. 1> does not imply that 
in his opinion the rate is determined exclusively by • phYSical, 
social, and institutional factors' (Cf. R. L. Meek, op. cit., p.158; also 
C.~A. Clark, op.cit., p.834 and S.Rashid, 'Adam Smith and the Market 
Mechanism', History of Political Economy, Vol. 24(1992), p.135>. It 
seems to me that Smith introduced three general circumstances of 
society with taxonomic rather than explanatory purpose, as he utilized 
the four stages theory which was recognized as a taxonomic tool with 
the aid of which an explanation of history was attempted (cf. 
K.Haakonssen, op.cit., p.188). 
152) See above, section 2. 
153) See WN, I.ix.12-14; II.iv.8. 
154) WN, V.ii. f.3. 
155) Cf. W. A .. Eltis, 'Adam Smith's Theory of Economic Growth' in A.S. 
Skinner and T. Wilson (eds. ), Essays on Adam Smith(1975) , p.44; 
R.O'Donnel, op.clt., p.96ff. 
156) WN, I.ix.11. 
157) WN, I.ix.12. 
158) Cf. WN, I.vii.4. 
159) It is stressed that the argument that the price will be equal to 
costs of production must not be looked on as a type of the theory of 
value, for such fact is simply a statement of the state always assured 
under the condition of competition and the theory of value ought to 
show what determine the value of commodities. Furthermore, it is 
noted that costs of production cannot be calculated independently of, 
and prior to the determination of the prices of commodlties[cf. 
P.Sraffa, op.cit., section 4; J.Eatwell, 'Cost of Production', in The 
New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics(1987)]. It is declared in 
this respect that a cost-of-production • theory of value' cannot be 
applied to both classical and neoclassical theories (R.O'Donnel, 
op.cit., pp.21-22). 
160) WN. I. vii. 33. 
161> P.Sraffa. • Introduction· to Principles of Political Economy of 
David Ricardo(1951), p.xxxv. 
162) The same is in part true of Smith's analysis of taxes on wages 
and profit. See WN, V.ii.f.2; V.ii.g.3-4; V.ii.I.1-2; V.ii.k.4-5. 
163) WN, I. viii. 57. 
164) WN. IV. v. a. 11-14. 
165) It is claimed that no identification by Smith of the analytical 
relationship between the distribution variables made his theory of 
value indeterminate yet not wrong (See P.Sylos-Labini, op.cit., p.204; 
R.O'Donnel, op.cit., pp.l00-l02). 
166) WN, IV.ix.17. 
167) Smith found that the division of labour had such capacity 
because of three kinds of advantage it induced: the increase of 
dexterity of labourers, the saving of time in the process of work, and 
the invention of machinery which serves to facilitate and abridge 
labour (see WN, I. i.5-8). 
168) WN, III.i.1. 
169) WN, 1.1.10. 
170) WN, V.l.f.50. 
171) See LJ(B), 328-338. 
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172) Cf. Gide and Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines(1915) , 
p.l09; J. Viner, 'Adam Smith and Laissez-faire' in J.C.Wood(ed.), Adam 
Smi th: Crl t leal Assessments(1984-) , VoL 1, p. 154-; idem. 'Int roduction' 
to John Rae's The Life of Adam Sm1th(1965) , p.35; N.Rosenberg, 'Adam 
Smi th on the Division of Labour: Two Views or One ?', in 
J. C. Wood (ed. ), op. cit., VoL 3, p. 171; D. Forbes, in D. Young et a1, 
Edinburgh in the Age of Reason (1967) , p.47; P. A. Werhane, Adam Smith 
and His Legacy for Modern Capitali sm(1991> , p.14-5. 
173) See below, notes 137, 143, and 145. 
174) See, for instance, M. Fay, 'The Influence of Adam Smith on 
Marx's Theory of Alienation', Science and Society, Vol. 47(1983), 
r'eprint ed in J. C. Wood (ed. ), Kar 1 Marx's Economi cs: Cri tical 
Assessments(1989) , VoL 1, pp.551-556, where it is argued that Marx's 
Economic and Plli1osopllic Manuscript of 1844 shows that his elaboration 
of the concept of alienation was deriveed from his critical analysis 
of Smith's Wea1tll of Nations in terms of the Hegelian looking glass of 
the dialectical method. 
175) Here our aim is to give a critical review as to those concerned 
mainly with a • methodological' grasp of the theme of (alienation'. 
It was pointed out that Smith's social welfare function was not 
confined to economic or material satisfaction and included non-
economic welfare criteria such as moral approval of the impartial 
observer (J.M.A. Gee, 'Adam Smith's Social Welfare Function', in 
J. C. Wood (ed. ), Adam Smi th. VoL 4, pp. 84-97), It is to be kept in 
mind that similarily many commentators have approached the problem of 
• alienation' from the perspective of, .-say, socio-political welfare 
criteria. See, e. g., J. Cropsey, Polity ad Economy(1957) , p.56ff; 
idem. • Adam Smith and Political Philosophy', in A. S. Skinner and 
T.Wilson, Essays on Adam Smith(1975), pp.132-153; D.Winch, Adam 
Smith's Politics, chapter 5; A. S. Skinner, A System of Social 
Science(1979) , chapter 9; idem, 'Adam Smith and Economic Liberalism', 
in D. Mail' (ed. ); The Scottisll Contribution to Modern Economic 
Tho~ht(1990), pp.138-140. 
176) See E.G. West, 'Adam Smith's Two Views on the Division of 
Labour', in J. C. WoodCed.), op. cit., Vol. 3, pp.162-170; cf. also 
R.Heilbroner, 'The Paradox of Progress', in A.S. Skinner and 
T.Wilson(eds.), Essays of Adam Smith(1975),p.530. 
177) E.G. West, op.cit., pp.168-169. 
178) Ibid., p.162. 
179) See ibid., pp.165-69. 
180) A number of authors have shown that Adam Smith (and the member 
of the Scottish Enlightenment) was a predecessor of the modern 
sociology, and discussed his work in the perspective of sociology. 
See, for exrunple, A. W. Small, Adam Smith and Modern Sociology(1907); 
R.Pascal, 'Property and Society, Modern Quarterly, Vol. 1(1938), 
pp.167-179; G.Bryson, Man and Society(1945); A.Salomon, 'Adam Smith as 
Sociologist', Social Research. VoL 12(:945), in J. C. Wood (ed. ), 
op. cit., VoL 1, pp.236-24-9; R. L. Meek, Economics and IdeOlogy and 
Other Essays(1967), pp. 34-50; idem. Social Science and the Ignoble 
Savage(1967); A. Swingewood, (Origins of Sociology: the Case of the 
Scottish Enlightenment', British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 21 (1970), 
pp.164-180; D.A. Reisman, Adam Smith's Sociological Economics(1976). 
181> Cf. E. G. West, (The Political Economy of Alienation: Karl Marx 
and Adam Smith', in J.C.Wood(ed.), op.cH., pp.357-377; idem, 'Adam 
Smith and Al ienationt in A.S. Skinner and T.Wilson(eds.), ep.cH., 
pp.540-552 
182) R.Lamb, 'Adam Smith's Concept of Alienation', in J.C.Wood(ed.), 
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op. cit., VoL 1, p.48I. 
183) See above, section 2. 
184-) For such an argument see, e. g., M. Brown, Adam Sl1lith's 
Economics(1988) , p.l08. 
185) R.Lamb, op.cit., p.481. 
186) See above, chapter 4-. 
187) See M.Brown, op.cit., pp.l07-114. 
188) Ibid., p.19; original emphasis. 
189) Cf. ibid., pp.13-21. 
190) Ibid., p.110. 
191) Cf. Nathan Rosenberg's argument as elaborated in 'Adam Smith on 
the Division of Labour: Two Views or One? in r. C. Wood (ed. ), 
op.cit., Vol. 3, pp.171-183. 
192) That 'alienation' of the workers was treated as merely observed 
facts for the subject of political economy does not of course mean 
that Smith regarded it as something unworthy of further consideration. 
Rather, Smith found that it ought to be balanced and ameliorated in 
the perspective of politics. This point implies that the subjects of 
Smith's moral philosophy are interconnected. We shall touch this 
issue in the next chapter. Cf. D.Winch, Adam Sl1lith's Politics(1978), 
pp.80-87 and chapter 5. 
193) See E. G. West, 'The Political Economy of Alienation: Karl Marx 
and Adam Smith', op. cit. Note also that R. Lamb, accepting and 
following all three aspects of alienation which West identified as 
Marx's own, went further in arguing that Smith regarded the workers as 
facing in some ways the condition of isolation, powerlessness and 
self-estrangement in the commerciai society (R.Lamb, op.cit.). 
194) Cf. R.Heilbroner. 'The Paradox of Progress: Decline and Decay in 
The Wealth of Nations', in A. S. Skinner and T. Wllson(eds.), op. cit., 
pp.524-539. 
195) See I. Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation(1970), pp.36-48. 
196) In this regard Marx's view of the dialectics of labour as the 
foundation of humanity was appreciated as an attempt to resolve the 
philosophical opposition between idealism and materialism and between 
teleology and causality. For comment see G.Lukacs, 'The Dialectic of 
Labour: Beyond Causality and Teleology', Telos, Vol. 6(1970), pp.162-
174; L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism(1978) , Vol. I, pp.133-138; 
I. Meszaros, op.cit., pp.162-169; P.Walton and A.Gamble, From 
Alienation to Surplus Value(1972), pp.27-34; C. r. Arthur, Dialectics 
of Labour(1986), pp.5-7. 
197) Scholars such as Daniel Bell, Sidney Hook and Lewis Feuer have 
argued that there was a radical break in the development of Marx's 
ideas, i.e., between the young and the mature Marx. However, Marxian 
commentators have recently emphasized the consistent unity of Marx's 
writings, drawing attention to the ideas intensely expressed in the 
Paris Manuscripts. See, for example, L. Kolakowski, op. cit., Vol. I, 
pp.132-133 and passim; 1. Meszaros, op. cit., p.22; D. McLellan, Marx's 
Grundrisse<197D, p.12ff; P. Walton and A. Gamble, op. cit., p.25; E. K. 
Hunt, 'Marx's Concept of Human Nature and the Labour Theory of Value', 
Review of Radical Political Econom~ Vol. 14(1992), reprinted in 
r.C.Wood(ed.), Karl Marx's Econol1lics: Critical Assessments(1988) , 
Vol. I, pp.477-512; c.r. Arthur, op.cit., pp.141-145. 
198) Karl Marx, EcononUc and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844(Lawrence 
& Wishart, London, 1974), p.120. 
199) Ibid., p.68; original italics. 
200) Karl Marx, Capital (International Publisher; 1967), Vol. 1, 
pp. 177-178. 
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201) Cf. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844., 
pp.61-74-. 
202) Ibid., p.69; original italics. 
203) Ibid., p.23; cf. also K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology 
(Lawrence & Wishart; 1970), p. 4-3f., edited and introduced by C. J. 
Arthur; Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, pp.359-368. 
204-) Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844., p. 114-; 
original italics. 
205) Cf. Karl Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, p.52f. 
206) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p.364. 
207) Cf. TMS, VII. iii. 1.2. 
208) TMS, II.iii.3.5. 
209) WN, III.i.3. 
210) Recall Smith's two metatheoretical propositions: the principle 
of the heterogeneity of purposes and the belief in progress. 
211) WN, 1. i1. 1. 
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7.1. Introduction 
What we have attempted to make clear in the last two chapters is 
that metaphysical doctrines are methodologically suggestive. Smith's 
lectures on natural theology were devoted in part to proving the being 
of God and His character like goodness and wisdom. The manner in 
which Smith tried to give such pr-oofs was a type of reasoning a 
posteriori. Hence, it is evident that Smith had to collect a large 
number of cases of the nice adjustments of means to ends which are 
observed everywhere in nat or-e. The same is t rue of social phenomena. 
There is no doubt that he could not 1 end full support to his thesis 
especially when he faced diverse social facts. The problem of evi I 
comprises a typical case which rlisproves the patter-n of order and 
desi gn. TIl(~ doct r-i TIP. of the goodness and wisdom of God is thus in 
agreement with possible finite set of observations. The doctrine is 
inconclusively confirmable. Yet, it is irTefutable in the sense that 
it can not be defeated, for- the existence of moral evil is referred to 
men's free will to do evil rather than to God's intention. With this 
characteristic the doctrine becomes metaphysical, and to such an 
extent it plays a regulative role in the construction of empirical 
theories whi Ie ruling out other empirical theories which it clashes 
with. 1) After identifying such metatheoretical propositions as the 
belief in progress and the supposition of no conflict which are 
deri ved from the metaphysical doctr-ine, we have so far been concerned 
with the demonstr-ation of an evident relat ionship between 
metatheoret feal proposi t j ons and Smith's ethical and economic 
theories. In other words, we have mainly seen that at the 
I theoret ical' level Smith avoids descriptions of conflict and draws a 
picture of social progress. 
Given that this interpretation is correct, namely, if Smith just 
supposes that there is a harmonious order in society, how should we 
understand Smith's clear-cut recognition of the essential role of 
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politics? A key point is that at the empirical level Smith also found 
an incomplete world as well. As we have noted, in his work he plainly 
acknowledged the flaws in society and described the situation of his 
day even as a 'depraved state of mankind'.2) This is perhaps a reason 
that Smith was convinced that a political agency was necessary as a 
means which encourages and coordinates the concord and cooperat ion 
among men. It is evident, in this connection, that my position, which 
has primarily focused on the harmonious aspects of Smith's work, is 
not inconsistent with the point thnt for Smith politics has not just a 
validity, but a neccesity.3) 
In this chapter my aim is to explore the bearing of Smith's 
metaphysical doctrine and its associated propositions on his political 
attitude as well. We are reminded that the theme stating that 
metaphysical doctrines may have political suggestiveness although they 
do not entail particular policy proposals,d) seems to lend support to 
this enquiry. In the next section I shall first introduce recent 
studies which have stressed the centrality as well as non-triviality 
of Smith's politics. Whereas I fully accept the achievements of those 
studies, I am going to take note that for Smith the problem of the 
maintenance of social order which must be an objective of politics is 
not entrusted only to the political sovereign, and that other agencies 
like moral ond economic forces are also allowed to perform a similar 
role in preserving social or-der. In the third section I shttll be 
concerned with the main enterprise above mentioned. Smith's 
metaphysical doctrine which is bound up with his natural theology and 
the metatheor-etical proposition of progress lie behind his argument 
for economic liberalism. Before that it will be pointed out that 
Smith's enunciation of economic liberty is dependent on a formal 
analysis of the economic system based on exchange; that his laissez-
faire position is put forword just a means of maximizing wealth and 
remains what may be called a 'theory' or 'general principle' of 
economic policy; and that on insisting on the need for free enterprise 
other objectives of public policy are isolated. 
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7.2. Social Order, and Poll tical and Non'-polH ieal Agencies of Order 
As it is well-known, in the final chapter of Book IV of the Wealth 
of Nations Smith eloquently advocated 'the system of natural liberty'. 
All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, 
being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system 
of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every 
man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left 
perfect ly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to 
bring both his industry and capitol into competition with those 
of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely 
discharged from 11 duty, in the attempting to perform which he 
must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the 
proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could 
ever be sufficientj the duty of super"intending the industry of 
private people, and of directing it towards the employments most 
suitable to the interest of the society.S) 
Undoubtedly, Smith's proposed system of natural Uberty is based on 
his view that man's desire of bettering his condition leads not just 
to personal and social opulence, but to the progress of social 
envi ronment: the conviction that 'The natural effort of every 
individual to belter' his own condition, when suffered to exert itself 
with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is 
alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the 
society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred 
impert inent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often 
incumbers its operations'.6) 
It is likely that Smdth's strong argument for natural liberty, as 
found in the above quotation, has played a crucial role in 
establishing his dominant image as an advocate of laissez-fair~ and 
as an opponent of government intervention in the minds of later 
generations. Appreciating Smith's rhetorical ability on the 
centenary of the publication of the Wealth of Nation~ Walter Bagehot 
~"ote: 'Adam Smith has carried political economy far beyond the bounds 
of those who care for abstract science. He has popularised it in 
the only sense in which j t can be popularised without being spoiled; 
that is, he has put certain broad conclusions into the minds of hard-
headed man, which ar"e all which they need know, and all which they for 
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the most pad will ever care for, and he has put those conclusions 
there ineradicably'. 7) Indeed, R. D. C. Black's paper, Q) in which the 
proceedings at the Political Economy Club's dinner in 1876 to 
celebrate the centenary of the Wealth of Nations and a leading 
newspaper were surveyed, lends proper suppor·t to the fact that British 
popular wrtters and politicians were much attracted by Smith's 
argument of free trade. It was reported that they judged the most 
important proposition of Smith's teaching to consist in the doctrine 
of laissez-faire or the universal non-intervention of the state. 
Perhaps it is liD wonder' that the nineteenth century popUlar view of 
Smi th as the leading potron of 101 ssez'-faire has survived up to today. 
It is, as a matter of fact, a feature of a number of typical 
university textbooks. en This fact comes as no surprise if we are 
reminded that at the Wealth of Nations bicenennial celebrations held 
in 1976 at Glasgow University one of the leading economists, George 
Stigler, opened his after-dinner' speech to the effect that Adam Smith 
was alive and well, and living in Chicago. Moreover, it is 
worthwhile to notice, in a similar context, that among many historians 
of ideas as well there was a tendency to regard Smith as a theorist in 
the tradition of thought connected with • a non-political model of 
societ y' ; a model bui I t up upon a concept ual out look of societ y, 
which, • by virtue of being a closed system of interact ing forces, 
seemed to sustain its own exlstence wi thout the aid of an outside 
political agency'. 10) According to that line of interpretation, 
Smith believed that the free interplay of individuals who act in the 
pursuit 
pattern 
of private interest spontaneously brought about an ordered 
of social relationship, so that the intervention of the 
outside political authority was unnecessary except for the performance 
of some minimal duties. 
However, the tendency to view Smith's work as nothing but • a non-
poli tical model of sad et y' did not go unchallenged. At least four 
main strands of interpretation came out with the aim not just of 
rescuing Smith fr'om this traditional image, but of showing eventually 
that his polf t iCG has its own place in his intentions. In the first 
place, it can be observed that many historians of economic thought 11) 
including Gide and Risl'?) and Viner'~) were concerned with a 
qualification of the popular view of Smith as a doctrinaire believer 
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in the non-inter'vention of gover'nmenL They informed readers that 
Smi th assigned a much mor'e oct i ve role to the state than is generally 
discerned. They supported their position, beyond taking note of what 
Smi th expli ci tly identified as three functions of pol1 tical agency, 
namely, the odm:lnistn'ltioJl of justice, defence and the provision of 
several public works and instHutlons, by means of collecting another 
list of instances concer'ning which Smith indisputably recognized the 
legitimacy of government participation. Dut it needs to be noted 
that they found the lalter cases scat tered through the Weal th Of 
Nations to be just a number' of exceptions to a general rule of 
laissez-faire. As Vi ner put it: 
Smith made many exceptions to his general argument for laissez-
faire. But his interest as a reformer and a propagandist was 
not in these exceptions. He nowhere gathered together in orderly 
fashion the exceptions which he would have made to his general 
restriction of government activity to protection, justice, and 
the maintenance of a few types of public works and public 
institutions. When considering in general terms the proper 
functions of government, he forgot all about these exceptions. 14) 
Secondly, apart from simply enumerating examples of a wide range of 
government activities which were conceived as exceptions to a laissez-
faire policy, there was a more refined approach which attempted to 
find the 'general princi.ples' for policy prescriptions which Smith 
suggested. 11':) It is noticeable that this line of comment is emphatic 
in stating that Smith's agenda for government action may vary 
according to historical circumstances, for his policy prescriptions, 
as proposed in the Wealth of Nation~ were derived from an application 
of the 'general principles' to the circumstances of his day. This 
implies that what Smith supposed to be the functions of government in 
the eighteenth century context must not be mistaken for what he would 
pr'opose in moder'n times. In this connection A. S. Skinner identified 
a number of general principles which were applied by Smith, in order 
to justify a wide range of resposibilities of the state. Firstly, the 
presence of mar'ket failure was nn impodant ground on which Smith lent 
support to the provision of public works, one of the general duties of 
the state, such as roods, bridges, conals and harbours. Secondly, he 
called for a major reform of economic policy of his day ond admitted a 
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need for specific policies in respect of two general principles of 
personal liberty and economic efficiency. 
Thirdly, a valunble effort was made to reinstate Smith's politics 
of its own accord alongside his ethics nnd economics. Donald Winch's 
Adam Smith's Politics Is the first major contribution in this 
connection. Winch, whilst being in port in line with some earlier 
commentators who made the case that politics plays a more important 
r-ole in Smith's work than is in general recognized, was emphatic in 
pointing out that such effort • has not succeeded in shifting the 
debate outside the confines of the liberal capitalist framework'. 11!;) 
Arguing against those who characterized Smith's work as standing in 
agreement with • a non--political model of society' or the nineteenth 
century English tradition of liberal capitalism, Winch provided, by 
reference both to all insight from the civic humanist ideas '7 ) and to 
the per'speet i ve of a not ur-alistic science of pol it ies or scept icol 
Whiggism that Smith shared with Hume, 1 EI) a wide-ranging historical 
reading of Smith's statements concerning several critical political 
pr'oblems of the day to which the simple harmony through laissez-faire 
did not apply, so that the intervention of pol:l.tical agency was 
required. 
Fourthly and finally, ~lereas Winch's attempt to recover from 
mistaken inter'pretations Smith's position of homo civicus running 
parallel with homo socius and homo oeconomicus seemed to be in a large 
measure successful, it ought to be noted that shortly after its 
publicot ion there arose an opinion which doubted if in establishing 
and recapturing Smith's overall intentions Winch's work indeed 
designated Smith's pol it ics as a cr'uc1 al and independent area of 
concerns. As Teichgrneber suggested: 
the book [of Winch] is mar'ked by 0 curious, and ultimately 
unresol ved, tension bet ween ~l8t m:l ght be called the "weak" and 
the "strong" versions of its moin argument. The "weak" version 
is the observati.on that i.n r-ecover'ing the historical Smith we 
find thot his polHics wos neither "trivial nor vestigial." This 
point seems unarguable, The "strong" version is the often 
implied claim that since it 1s misleading to regard politics as 
occupying an unimportant role in Smith's thought, it then follows 
that for Smitll politics also represented an important and 
autonomous realm of value in human affairs. That point mayor 
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may not be right, but Winch simply does not make a strong enough 
case for it. 19) 
This kind of react ions seemed :1.nevi table, since, even though Winch 
reminded readers that 'The treatment of justice obviously provides an 
important clue, and it is :1.mportant to stress at the outset the 
natural jurisprudential framework of Smith's views on the study of 
politics',70) he did not properly handle the ethical and philosophical 
basis of Sm! th' s natural jurisprudence within which his political 
thinking was said to find its place. 
Haakonssen's study of Smith's jurisprudence provided another 
remarkable contribution. 21 ) Hoakonssen has shown that Smith's 
natural jurisprudence is developed from his moral theory, that it has 
ethical and philosophical foundations, and demonstrated that the 
application of theory in the face of historical circumstances is 
always behind Smith's historical account and criticism of law and 
government. This means that while seeking a clear-cut link between 
the Theory of MorBl Sent.iments, Leet ures on Jurisprudence and the 
WeBltb of NBtions, Haakonssen made it quite plain that Smith's 
pol! tics occupied 'an impor'tant and autonomous realm of value in human 
affairs', thus making a strong case for a firm vision of politics. 
In Haakonssen's words: 
If we are to apply anachronistic categories to Smith, it would be 
more accurate to say that his natural jurisprudence is a theory 
of the state in search of a supplementary view of politics. In 
order to under'stand Smith's politics we must combine this idea of 
natural jurisprudence with his strongly historicised view of 
society, indeed of morals generally, as a web of particulars in 
wh:l,ch we may retrospectively find some broad and approximate 
patterns, but which in its present and its future is inevitably 
subject to flux and uncertainty.??) 
These are four major lines of interpretation were intended to 
suggest a non--tr:lvial role and str'ess a necessary vision of politics 
in Smi th' s work. Since Skinner', Winch and Haakonssen, as a resul t, 
there seems to be much agreement, at least among serious Smith 
scholars, 2~) with regar-d to the fact that politics performs an 
essential part in his thought. 
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While I entirely agree with the studies just mentioned, there seems 
to be one point which mer! ts at tent ion before proceeding. It is 
related to a problem of the maintenance of social order, which is 
likely to form part of the concerns of a politically-minded 
philosopher. The pr'obl em of social order which I have here especially 
in mind concerns the way in which the insolent and selfish 
proclivities of the human mind would be controlled and harnessed to 
the general social good. In this connection Nathan Rosenberg24) has 
admir'ably shown that at the institutional level the Wealth of Notions 
can be gr'Bsped as a treatise putting forward an institutional 
mechanism to restrain from antisocial elements in human nature which 
ar'e inimIcal to the public interest, and to channel them towards the 
greater social benefit.2~) As Rosenberg concluded: 
Smlth' 5 Wealth of Nations provided the first systematic guide to 
the manner in which the price mechanism allocated resources in a 
free-market economy, and the book has been justly celebrated for 
thls unique achievement. At the same time, however, Smith was 
ver'y much preoccupled with establishing the conditions under 
which this mar'ket mechanism would operate most effect I vely. His 
conception of human behnvior allowed for the free operation of 
certain impulses, mot i vat ions, and behavlor pat terns which were 
calculated to thwart, rather thon to reinforce, the beneficent 
oper'olion of market forces, find Smith was therefore very much 
concerned with providing an exact, detailed speCification of an 
optimal institutlonal structure.?G) 
It is llppar'ent that Rosenberg is talking mninly about legal and 
institutional machinery whose or'ganization requires legislative action 
to control and har'ness selflshness Lo the general welfare of society. 
Thus we are told that Sm:l.th was obsessed with the 'enforcement' of a 
spontaneous identity of inlerests among individuals by virtue of 
pr'oper legal institutions. ::>.7) But 1. t is noteworthy that Rosenberg 
seems to over-Jook other forms of institutlonal order, as distinct from 
a lesal form administered by political agency, with which Smith was 
also concer'ned. Those Of'C 1 I1S t 1 t ut i onal f orms2Q ) of encouraging 
volunt.ary (as contrasted with enforced) control or adjustment of 
lnter-ests. ::;>9) Both moral forces, ::'0) and economic forces worklng 
through the ruar'ket are lypical of the voluntary control mechanisms 
that Smith had in mind as a means of leading unr'estralned sel fishness 
to a socjalJy producllve dlrectlon, 
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In the first place, as mentioned earlier, it was Smith's view that 
self-interest is the fiTst and foremost motive of human action. 
Owing to that st urdiest :l.mpulses of self-love, a great number of 
adverse effects take place. Even the impartial spectator or 
conscience, which Smith regards as fI cor-rective to the violence and 
injustice of selfish passions, often fails to prevent theuf3'): f so 
partial are the views of mankind with regard to the propriety of 
their' own conduct, both at the time of action and after' it; and so 
difficult is H for' them to view it in the light in which any 
indifferent spectator- would consider H'. 3::!) Therefore this self-
deception becomes' the sour'ce of half disorders of human life'. 23) 
Yet it :1.5 important to note that Smith found morality to be another 
instrument for the va] nntary cont.r'ol of soc:l.al conflict. The general 
rules of conduct, according to Sm! th, emerge from man's continual 
observation with respect to patterns of social approval and 
disapproval. 11le rules of mor'ality often become 'standards of 
judgment' and are I'egar'ded as f the ultimate foundations of what :l.s 
just and unjust in human conduct'. As such moral rules, f when they 
have been fixed in our' mind by habitual reflection, are of great use 
in correcting the misrepr'esentat:i ons of sel f--Iove concerning what is 
fit and proper- to be done in our particular situation'. :i>A) 
Meanwhile, it is interesting to observe Smith's statements with regard 
to internal or external sanctions in association with the voluntary 
control mechanism. As Smith wrote: 
those geneI'f~1 rules which our moral faculties observe in 
approving or condemning whatever sentiment or action is subjected 
to theIr examination, may much more justly be denominated such. 
They have a much greater resemblance to what are properly called 
laws, those general rules which the sovereign lays down to direct 
the conduct of hIs subjects. Like them they are rules to direct 
the fr'ee act ions of men: they are prescribed most surely by a 
lawful super-lor, and ar'e at tended too with the sanctions of 
rewards and punIshments. Those vicegerents of God within us, 
never fail to punish the v:l.o] at ion of them, by the torments of 
inword shame, and se] f-condemnation; and on the contr-ary. always 
reward obedience with tranquillity of mind, with contentment, and 
self-satisfnction.3~~ 
vice and virtue can be either punished or rewarded by the 
sentiments and opinions of mankinds 36) 
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On this basis mOT'als 8£1 a spontAneous institution, Smith finds, 
contribute to the creation of social order' by means of controlling 
unchecked sel f i shness. Finn] ly, it is r'emarkable that Smith seems to 
give prior'tty more to mOl'ality 06 a device of social control than to 
legal machiner'y enfOl'ced by government: 'what institution of 
gover'nment could tend so much to promote the happiness of mankind as 
the general prevalence of wisdom and virtue ? All government is but 
an imperfect remedy for' the deficiency of these. Whatever beauty, 
therefore, can belong to civil government upon account of its utility, 
must in a for superior degree belong to these'. 37) 
In the second place, It can be pointed out that in Smith's opinion 
economic forces under fr'ee competition will supply a certain desirable 
socia] order, as distinguished from aspects of static equilibrium. 
efficient allocation of resources find due economic development; a 
social or'der in which voluntary control or' adjustment of different 
interests is so rewardingly achieved by the parties concerned that 
their pursuit of Belf-interest may well be harmonized with the broader 
public interests of society. A clear example of a voluntary adjustment 
of interests appear's in relation to the actions of workers and 
employers in the labour market. As Smith tells us, it is natural that 
the workers want to raise the wages whereas employers attempt to hold 
wages down. The self-jnter'est of those two parties is so different 
and opposite that each party would prefer' to establish a combination 
in order to accomplish its purpose. 3A ) However, for instance, when 
there is a continual growth of capital accumulation and thus 
increasing demand for' labour, employers are expected to concede to 
higher wagf>s, breaking the combinn\.ion between them. As Smith put it: 
When in any coun t ry t he demand for t hose who 1:1 ve by WAges; 
labourers, Journeymen, ser-vants of every kind, is cont inually 
increasing; when every yel3r furnishes employment for a greater 
number than had been employed the year before, the workmen have 
no occasion to comblne in or'der to raise their wnges. The 
scarcity of hands occasions a competition among masters, who bid 
ngainst one another', in or-der to get workmen, and thus 
voluntarily br'eak through the natural combination of masters not 
to raise wages. 39) 
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In other words, a part icular set of economic circumstances will 
promote voluntary control or adjustment by accommodating the interests 
of employers to those of workers. As in the case of voluntary 
control by moral rules, this process of adjustment will happen because 
of an effective negative sanction which deviation from it will give 
rise to. Under these circumstances, unless an employer accepts 
higher wages, the employer must suffer a penalty in the sense that he 
may be unable to find workers at a lower level of wages than they 
demand and consequently lose business. Meanwhile, if an economy is 
in the stationary or declining state, the contrary situation will 
ensue; workers will try to adjust their interests to those of 
employers. otherwise a worker will be subject to a negative sanction 
because he will lose his employment. It seems worthwhile to note 
that behind his appeal to competition lies Smith's insight into the 
operation of economic forces in conjunction with voluntary control of 
interests in respect of social order. Smith was well aware that the 
self-interest of merchants and manufacturers was closely bound up with 
their monopolising spirit and that it was difficult for laws to hamper 
a voluntary combination between the~ In this regard it is stated 
that 'People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is 
impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either 
could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and 
justice'. 40) What is a corrective to monopoly or restrictive 
Smith shortly goes on to describe it. agreements ? 
An incorporation not only renders them necessary, but makes the 
act of the majority binding upon the whole. In a free trade an 
effectual combination cannot be established but by the unanimous 
consent of every single trader, and it cannot last longer than 
every single trader continues of the same mind. The majority of 
a corporation can enact a bye-law with proper penalties, which 
will limit the competition more effectually and more durably than 
any voluntary combination whatever. 41) 
An lmplication of his statements therefore appears to be clear. 
Provided that competition is assured or the state does not assist 
legal incorporat ion, economic forces bring about the natural 
withdrawal of monopoly and restrictive agreements. To such a extent 
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economic forces, as in the labour' market, may come to encourage 
voluntary control or adjustment of interests between merchants and 
manufacturers and the public in the commodity market, thus leading to 
a moderation of social conflict. Finally, in a similar vein, Smith's 
remark concerning how far economic stimulus under competition comes to 
control and harness unfavourable effects emerging from self-interest 
in support of the public interest is surely telling and is worth 
quoting at length: 
In every profession, the exertion of the greater part of those 
who exercise it, is always in proportion to the necessity they 
are under of making that exertion. This necessity is greatest 
with those to whom the emoluments of their profession are the 
only source from which they expect their fortune, or even their 
ordinary revenue and subsistence. In order to acquire this 
fortune, or even to get this subsistence, they must, in the 
course of a year, execute a certain quantity of work of a known 
value; and, where the competition is free, the rivalship of 
competitors, who are all endeavouring to justle one another out 
of employment, obliges every man to endeavour to execute his work 
with a certain degree of exactness. Rivalship and emulation 
render excellency, even in mean professions, an object of 
ambition, and frequently occasion the very greatest exertions. 42 ) 
Now a conclusion is in order. While it is true that in a sense 
Smith's work is characterized by an effort to channel the 
disadvantageous upshot of selfish paSSions in terms of institutional 
arrangements into a social benefit, it cannot be asserted that his 
concern about the contents of institutional order to impose social 
control is predominantly with legal institutions set up by political 
authority. As noted above, morals and economic forces are the other 
main forms of institutional framework which Smith thinks play a 
crucial role in checking selfish actions. Furthermore, he seems to 
judge morality to be more significant than legal institutions in the 
sense that the former 'promises prosperity and satisfaction, both the 
person himself and to everyone connected with him' whereas the latter 
only 'guard against the mischiefs which human wickedness give occasion 
to',43) In addition, it should also be observed that while for Smith 
legal institutions are the condition under which economic forces 
operate through the market, he makes it obvious that some types of 
legal regulations are subject to the failure to accomplish their aim 
of harneSSing selfish passions to the public interest, since they were 
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enforced without considering the operation of economic forces 
concerned. 44) 
7.3. Smith's Metaphysics and Economic Liberalism 
Some studies of Smith's intentions and achievements have shown that 
politics is not merely given an autonomous place within his system of 
moral philosophy, but acts as a bridge between ethics and economics. 
One of the fruitful points which were explicitly made by these studies 
is that Smith ought not to be looked upon simply as an economist, who 
draws economic policy directly from just economic analysis alone. 
That is to say, the point is that for Smith there is no simple one-to-
one relationship between his economic and political thinking. Winch 
is typical of those who have taken pains to bring this aspect into 
relief: 
there is ample evidence in what he did publish, and especially in 
the Wealth of Nations itself, to show that the branch of the 
science called political economy has no simple one-to-one 
relationship with the 'art of legislation', or with what we would 
call economic policy. In other words, I wish to emphasise how 
much of Smith's advice to the legislator depends on 
considerations that do not flow from economic reasoning alone. 
Moreover, when he fortified or modified his analysis of what 
would be expedient from an economic point of view, he did so in a 
systematic way that goes well beyond the ad hoc introduction of 
legal and political consideration of a more or less subjective 
kind.A.S) 
Winch demonstrated his theme through a detailed examination of such 
outstanding cases as Smith's analysis of the problem of defence 
including standing armies versus militias issue, his treatment of 
mental mutilation arising from the division of labour and its remedy 
through a programme of education and cultivation of the arts, his 
discussion of public debt &id expenditure, his consideration of 
solutions to the current difficulties caused by the American 
Revolution,A.6) and finally his view on the corn trade. 47) In addition, 
in a similar vein, it should also be borne in mind that, as pointed 
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out by Viner and Skinner, Smith allowed for a wide range of 
government's policy including legal refor~ 
Meanwhile, whilst these studies gave modern readers an opportunity 
to correct Smith's mistaken image as a notable exponent of laissez-
faire doctrine, nonetheless it is justifiably accurate to find a 
persistent theme against government intervention in economic affairs 
throughout the Wealth of Nations It is evident that the presence of 
such an insistence enables many modern economists, despite the 
criticism directed to them, to hold still that Smith's political 
attitude is to a great degree characterized by his contention against 
government intervention.4s> But what is noteworthy is that even those 
writers who have been at great pains to recover Smith as the 
politically-minded philosopher against the traditional view of him as 
a modern advocate of laissez-faire, do not hesitate to concede that 
there exists, beyond a rhetorical purpose, a 'certain' element of 
rejecting the active role of government in Smith's thought. Viner, 
for example, stated that 'There is no possible room for doubt, 
however, that Smith in general believed that there was, to say the 
least, a strong presumption against 
fundamental duties of protection 
government activity beyond its 
against its foreign foes and 
maintenance of justice'.49> After giving a variety of qualifications 
Skinner also seemed ready to admit a similar pOint. so> Winch was 
likewise prepared to grant that whereas Smith believed that the 
functions of government would expand with the development of modern 
civilized society,sl> 'he hoped its operation would not be extensive 
and detailed in the economic field'. Furthermore, Winch allowed that 
for Smith the use of the term, laissez-faire, may be valid when 
applied in some contexts: 'West has accused me of downgrading the 
stat us of laissez-faire in Smith's thinking to that of a 'myth'. I 
do not think this is so. Within the context of anti-mercantilism, as 
part of the rejection of Hobbesian or Mandevillian assumptions of non-
sociability, and as an antidote to the arrogance of the 'man of 
system', the slogan may still have its uses'.S2> 
Now, the kind of statements made by authors such as Viner, Skinner 
and Winch seem to require more clarification. For a strain may be 
seen in appearance in the sense that beyond the basic three duties of 
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the state like defence, maintenance of justice and provision of public 
works Smith is found to demand the legal reform of contemporary 
institutions and propose a large number of spe~tfi~ tasks whi~h 
government should perform in diverse areas, while at the same time it 
is recognized that his work discloses, in some respect, a general 
presumption against the interference of the state. For t he moment I 
shall engage myself in rendering this tension clearer. This task is 
needed for the purpose at hand and because, in my view, the problem of 
how that aspect should be grasped appears to allow room for further 
discussion. To begin with, we shall have to recall the place of 
political economy and formal economic analysis within Smith's scheme 
of moral philosophy. 
In his lectures at Glasgow University when he was elected to the 
Chair of Moral Philosophy Smith began with natural theology, worked on 
to ethics and then proceeded to jurisprudence and political economy. 
The second part of his lectures, 1. e., ethics was mainly covered by 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the last part, 1. e., political 
economy by the Wealth of Nations S3 ) Yet, what is significant is that 
although the lectures on political economy consisted of a distinct 
part of Smith's moral philosophy its treatment was elaborated within 
the categories of his natural jurisprudence. This point may be made 
apparent in terms of Smith's statement of intentions which appears in 
the advertisement of the sixth edition of the Theory of MOral 
Sentiments published in 1790. 
In the last paragraph of the first Edition of the present work, I 
said, that I should in another discourse endeavour to give an 
account of the general principles of law and government, and of 
the different revolutions which they had undergone in the 
different ages and periods of society; not only in what concerns 
justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and 
whatever else is the object of law. In the Enquiry concerning 
the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations, I have partly 
executed this promise; at least so far as concerns police, 
revenue, and arms. 
Natural jurisprudence was regarded by Smith as I a theory of the 
general principles which ought to run through and be the foundation of 
the laws of nations'S4) and this passage indicates that he placed his 
work on economics, and dealt with it, within the framework of natural 
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jurisprudence. This fact is of course fully confirmed by the 
students' notes from the jurisprudence lectures. Economic questions 
are dealt with under the heading of 'Police', one of the great objects 
of law, which handles 'the cheapness of commodities, public security, 
and cleanliness'. Just the first subject relating to 'the most 
proper way of procuring wealth and abundance' 55> comes to comprise a 
large part of the Weal th of Nations, as Millar reported. Since the 
great requirement of natural jurisprudence rested on the presentation 
of a theoretical model of legislation and economic questions were seen 
to occupy a place within the framework of natural jurisprudence, Smith 
called political economy 'a branch of the science of a statesman or 
legislator'.5G> Put in this way it is apparent that for Smith 
political economy is part of politics in a broad sense and is by no 
means an autonomous subject apart and separable from the latter. 
Granted that political economy is a branch of the science of the 
legislator whose great object is 'to encrease the riches and power' 57> 
of a nation the next question remains as to the place of formal 
economic analysis within the sphere of political economy, which 
becomes the subject of the first two books of the Weal th of Nations. 
In other words, what part is formal economic analysis designed to play 
in conjunction with the given object of political economy? 
The 'laws of police' are founded on the general principle of 
utility.5a> According to Smith the duty of government is to 'command 
mutual good offices' in the consideration of convenience and 
prosperity, as well as to enforce the rules of justice: 
The civil magistrate is entrusted with the power not only of 
preserving the public peace by restraining injustice, but of 
promoting the prosperity of the commonwealth, by establishing 
good discipline, and by discouraging every sort of vice and 
impropriety; he may prescribe rules, therefore, which not only 
prohibit mutual injuries among fellow-citizens, but command 
mutual good offices to a certain degree. 59> 
On the basis of that principle of public utility the legislators can 
thus enact the 'laws of police' which will organize and control a 
specific institution with the particular purpose of ensuring and 
increasing national prosperity. However, unless the legislators have 
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precise knowledge of the operation of the economic system as a whole, 
their intentions are apt to fail, or create the contrary effects. 
Without perceiving the laws of motion of system as precisely as 
possible,GO) it appears to be implausible to find the most proper way 
of achieving effectively their purpose. This is the reason that 
Smith is critical of the mercantile system and the Physiocratic 
system, which he thinks worked contrary to the very end which they 
were designed to back Up.G1) On account of this Smith says that 'Some 
general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and 
law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the 
statesman'.G2) The study of such ideas is necessary for and part of 
the science of a legislator 'whose deliberations ought to be governed 
by general principles which are always the same'. G3) If it is so, 
what is the efficient way to interest the legislators in mastering 
that form of system knowledge? Where man's love of system from which 
the means is more valued than the end is mentioned, we are told about 
what is likely to be an effective manner in which to persuade the~ 
You will be more likely to persuade, if you describe the great 
system of public police which procures these advantages, if you 
explain the connections and dependencies of its several parts, 
their mutual subordination to one another, and their general 
subserviency to the happiness of the society; if you show how 
this system might be introduced into his own country, what it is 
that hinders it from taking place there at present, how those 
obstructions might be removed, and all the several wheels of the 
machine of government by made to move with more harmony and 
smoothness, without grating upon one another, or mutually 
retarding one another's motions. G4 ) 
If the legislators are persuaded in that way, it 'frequently serves to 
recommend those institutions which tend to promote the public 
welfare' . This seems to be Smith's view concerning the ground on 
which system knowledgeG6 ) is needed and the way in which it should be 
arranged to persuade the legislator. 
Looked at in this way the role of formal analysis of the economic 
system for Smith seems plain. It was introduced, in terms of a 
systematic account of the economic world, to assist the great object 
of political economy as the science of a legislator which 'proposes to 
enrich both the people and the sovereign'.GG) Hence, at the outset, 
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his economic analysis. which dealt with a series of different yet 
inter-connected areas such price. distribution, macro-statics and 
macro-dynamics. started with a definite normative aim of serving 
legislative actions in respect of how material well-being or economic 
growth could be promoted. Even though we should not dismiss other 
aspects of Smith's economic analysis. 
economics. such as his treatment 
from the perspective of modern 
of equilibrium and resource 
allocation in a free market economy. it is of much importance to be 
convinced that as a number of commentators67 ) have pointed out, the 
main and foremost objective of economic analysis on Smith's part 
consists in the condition of economic development. That alone will 
be quite consistent with what he explicitly stated as the great object 
of political economy in the Lectures on Jurisprudence and the Wealth 
of Nations. 
As noted in the first section of the last chapter, the conclusion 
of Smith's theory of economic growth is that when natural justice and 
liberty are maintained and competition without preference or 
constraint is assured, the process of economic evolution will show 
steady progress in terms of the operation of self-enforcing forces 
subject to increasing returns. If we are allowed to apply 
anachronistic modern terms. it can be said that this conclusion helped 
Smith to formulate the 'theory' or 'general principle' of economic 
policy. That is to say, Smith's theory of economic policy is based 
upon systematic or scientific knowledge of the laws of motion derived 
from a comprehensive analysis of the economic system as a whole 
corresponding to a commercial society. The general prescriptions 
in support of free trade or economic freedom is what we would call 
the theory of economic policy. As Smith put it: 'All systems either 
of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken 
away. the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes 
itself of its own accord. Every man. as long as he does not violate 
the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest 
his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into 
competition with those of any other man or order of men'. 69) Behind 
this theory of economic policy lies of course Smith's reference to the 
economic analysis of macro-dynamics. For example, Smith states: 
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No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry 
in any society beyond what its capital can maintain. It can 
only divert a part of it into a direction into which it might not 
otherwise have gone; and it is by no means certain that this 
artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the 
society than that into which it would have gone of its own 
accord. oS) 
Rather, that artificial regulation prevents the natural order of 
things towards improvement and prosperity from taking place by virtue 
of overturning the order of investment priority.70) 
It is thus that every system which endeavours, either, by 
extraordinary encouragements, to draw towards a particular 
species of industry a greater share of the capital of the society 
than what would naturally go to it, or, by extraordinary 
restraints, to force from a particular species of industry some 
share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it; is 
in reality subversive of the great purpose which it means to 
promote. It retards, instead of accelerating, the progress of 
the society towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, 
instead of increasing, the real value of the annual produce of 
its land and labour. 71) 
As this sequence of reasoning implies, if an objective of 
macroeconomic policy of government is to maintain as a high rate of 
economic growth as possible, the general principle of economic policy 
ought to be • the system of natural liberty' . For the artificial 
direction of government in favour of a specific area of industry does 
the nation no good and creates consequences contrary to the original 
object. It is of particular interest that when Smith argued in this 
way, he advanced the general principle of economic policy on the basis 
of formal economic analysis, whilst at the same time he isolated this 
aspect from what might be other objectives of economic policy. In 
other words, in respect of economic growth, Smith was establishing an 
one-to-one relationship between economic analysis and the theory of 
economic policy. In this sense we can say that Smith's argument for 
the system of natural liberty therefore does not directly tell us 
anything about the sphere of other government activities. 
However, his argument for economic freedom or free enterprise 
becomes much more restrictive in scope than generally expected if it 
is agreed that the state may and does have a wide range of different 
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domains of public policy. Even in the economic field his 
recommendation of free trade may be subject to limitations if 
government has a number of various objectives in respect of economic 
policy. It is evident that Smith was fully aware of this. 
As Smith's system of" jurisprudence implies,72) there are various 
and differeni areas to which attention should be drawn by the state. 
And if the domains of public policy are diverse, it is natural that 
there may be cases where conflict occurs between the particular 
purposes of each sphere of public policy. This is the reason that an 
order of priority between them is required in order to avoid 
unnecessary conflict. 
Smith does not conceive that the increase in wealth and economic 
welfare ought to be given the first order, of priority in the agenda 
of the state, although he is conscious that it also accompanies good 
consequences for society in many aspects. 73) Smith's formulation of 
priority represents that first of all the considerations of defence 
and justice have to precede the objective of the progress of opulence. 
Defence is the 'first duty of the sovereign'. Without defence even 
justice may be useless in the sense that if there be no security from 
injuries from without the property of individualls can not be 
secure'.74) In this regard Smith says that 'defence '" is of much 
more importance than opulence'. Therefore, the Act of Navigation is 
justified even though it 'is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to 
the growth of that opulence which can arise from it'. 76) 
context he endorses the regulations of fishing bounty 
In the same 
and of the 
bounties on the export of British-made sail-cloth and gunpower. 76 ) 
Next, the maintenance of justice is referred to as the 'second duty 
of sovereign'. According to Smith, 'The first and chief design of 
all civil governments is to preserve justice amongst the members 
of the state and prevent all incroachments on the individualls in it, 
from others of the same society'. 77) This statement reflects the 
point that 'Justice is the main pillar that upholds the whole 
edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human 
society must in a moment crumble into atoms', for • Society 
cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready to hurt and 
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injure one another'.7B> On account of this significance of justice 
Smith found that it must take precedence over economic prosperity: 
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state 
which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in 
which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession 
of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not 
supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not 
supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of 
debts from all those who are able to pay. 79> 
It is also worth noticing in the consideration of justice and public 
utility that Smith demands legal reform of the economic laws of his 
day.Bo> Similarly he is rather willing to set up a principle which 
permits the regulations of the state in the economic field at the 
sacrifice of the principle of economic freedom for the sake of the 
progress of opulence: 'those exertions of the natural liberty of a few 
individuals, which might endanger the security of the whole society, 
are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of all governments; of 
the most free, as well as of the most despotical'.Bl> A typical case 
to which Smith refers is regardS to the regulation of the issue of the 
small bank notes, for which the reason is that the common bankruptcies 
of beggarly bankers may cause not just disturbances to social 
stability, but a great disaster for many poor people in terms of 
economic 10ss.B2> 
It is also evident that Smith offers what may be another goal of 
economic policy ; that which is to facilitate the operation of an 
exchange economy. This is another part of economic policy. This 
economic pOlicy is directed to providing and organizing certain 
'public works and institutions for facilitating the commerce of the 
society' that 'it can never be for the interest of any individual, or 
small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit 
could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of 
individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a 
great society'. B3> The cases of public works which Smith presents 
under this object of economic policy Smith presents are such things 
as roads, bridges, canals, and harbours. BA > On a similar ground and 
yet in relation to institutions other than public works Smith 
recognizes the usefulness of temporary monopolies for groups of 
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merchants who will undertake the great risks and expense entailed in 
establishing a new trade with remote foreign countries, in the same 
manner as the grants privileges to the inventors of a new machine and 
the authors of a new book.9S) 
Furthermore, it is noticeable that Smith is quite prepared to grant 
that some objectives of social policy which point to a higher public 
interest can override the consideration of individual liberty. Such 
objectives of social policy are to encourage and maintain the 
'intellectual, social, and martial virtues' of common people. The 
division of labour in a commercial society, despite its good effects 
on the economic prosperity, renders common people incapable of 
'relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation', of 
'conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently 
of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary 
duties of private life' and finally of 'exerting his strength with 
vigour and perseverance, in any other employment than that to which he 
has been bred'.9S) This decline in virtue is so inevitable a 
situation that 'some attention of government is necessary in order to 
prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body 
of the people', 97) since the encouragement and maintenance of them 
will essentially serve to lessen the possibilities both of a danger to 
liberty and of disturbances to public order which that creates. ss> 
On this ground Smith is keen to assign compulsory education to the 
state whilst making a case of allowing it to intervene at the expense 
of the principle of laissez-faire: 
The public can impose upon almost the whole body of the people 
the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of 
education, by obliging every man to undergo an examination or 
probation in them before he can obtain the freedom in any 
corporation, or be allowed to set up any trade either in a 
village or town corporate. S9 ) 
So far we have attempted to clarify a theme arising out of a 
conclusion of recent studies; one according to which on the one hand 
Smith's work demonstrates how many aSSignments he ascribes to the 
state, while on the other hand his argument for free enterprise 
undoubtedly comprises an important thesis which permeates the Weal th 
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of Nations In the course of clarification we have pointed that there 
is an evident one-to-one relationship between Smith's formal economic 
analysis and his principle of laissez-faire. And it has been 
recalled that his formal analysis of the economic system as a whole is 
devoted to an account of the laws of motions of an economr based on 
exchange. namely, of how the economy, when accompanied by appropriate 
environments, operates. The result of such exposition reveals that 
under appropriate circumstances the economy goes forward towards 
economic prosperity by means of the working of self-propelling forces. 
With the background of such economic analysis, the general 
principle of economic freedom becomes a slogan of economic policy for 
promoting economic growth. 
But, as we have observed, it is certain that the promotion of 
material well-being, however important it is, constitutes a part of 
economic policy. The latter is also a part of public policy to which 
the state should direct attention. Smith thinks that as a whole 
defence and the consideration of justice ought to take priority over 
other objectives of governmental activity, and, on account of a need 
for the attainment of a higher social good, certain issues of social 
policy should take precedence over the consideration of individual 
liberty. Therefore, even if it is true that there is a strong tone 
which finds expression in Smith's argument for laissez-faire 
throughout the Weal th of Nations, there is no reason to believe that 
the general principle of non-intervention of government must be 
regarded as a correct description of Smith's position in connection 
with the role of the state. 
Moreover, it is to be borne in mind that the principle of laissez-
faire is what can be referred to as the 'theory' of economic policy. 
Smith is anxious to warn to the effect that theory should be 
differentiated from its application. This point duly manifests itself 
in Smith's well-known criticism of the 'man of system': 
Some general, and even systematical idea of the perfection of 
policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views 
of the statesman. But to insist upon establishing, and upon 
establishing all at once, and in spite of all opposition, every 
thing which that idea may seem to require, must often the highest 
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degree of arrogance. It is to erect his own judgment into the 
supreme standard of right and wrong. 90) 
Hence, the practical application of the principle of laissez-faire 
shouYd be made very carefully. It ought to be made on the basis of 
contextual knowledge of particular events together with the 
consideration of the constraints which the legislators may face in 
executing legislation. 91 ) This aspect emerges clearly in Smith's 
remark about the man of public spirit: 
When he cannot conquer the rooted prejudices of the people by 
reason and persuasion, he will not attempt to subdue them by 
force; He will accommodate, as well as he can, his public 
arrangements to the confirmed habits and prejudices of the 
people; and will remedy as well as he can, the inconveniencies 
which may flow from the want of those regulat ions which the 
people are averse to submit to. When he cannot establish the 
right, he will not disdain to ameliorate the wrong; but like 
Solon, when he cannot establish the best system of laws, he will 
endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear. 92) 
This seems to be reflected in Smith's remark concerning how the state 
of free trade has to be restored in the face of the current British 
condition which made her extremely dependent upon a single market. 
Some moderate and gradual relaxation of the laws which give to 
Great Britain the exclusive trade to the colonies, till it is 
rendered in a great measure free, seems to be the only expedient 
which can, in all future times, deliver her from this danger ... 
To open the colony trade all at once to all nations, might not 
only occasion some transitory inconveniency, but a great 
permanent loss to the greater part of those whose industry or 
capital is at present engaged in it .... Such are the unfortunate 
effects of all the regulations of the mercantile system They 
not only introduce very dangerous disorders which it is often 
difficult to remedy, without occasioning, for a time at leas, 
still greater disorders. In what manner, therefore, the colony 
trade ought gradually to be opened; what are the restraints which 
ought first, and what are those which ought last to be taken 
away; or in what manner the natural system of perfect liberty and 
justice ought gradually to be restored, we JOust leave to the 
wisdom of future statesmen and legislators to determine. 93) 
At the same time it is noteworthy that Smith's advice to the effect 
that besides general principles, contextual knowledge and the 
consideration of constraints are required for legislative action also 
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lies behind his well-known pessimism as to the chances of realizing 
'the system of natural liberty' or implementing a policy of laissez-
faire: 'To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be 
entirely restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an 
Deena or Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the 
prejudices of the publick, but what is much more unconquerable, the 
private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it'. 94) 
Yet the status of politics and the political aspects in Smith's 
th~ught have been successfully treated in other writings already 
mentioned and here we perhaps do not need to repeat these arguments. 
Finally, the task to which we now have to turn is a question to be 
addressed with regard to Smith's argument for laissez-faire. We all 
know that Smith must not be treated as an advocate of the universal 
non-intervention of government, and that his principles, on which his 
specific policy proposals, quite suitable to the eighteenth century 
context are dependent, will produce an extensive agenda of the state 
when applied today.96) As already noted, it is nonetheless true that 
Smith believed in and advocated a policy of laissez-faire, in so far 
as one of the objectives on which politics should focus attention is 
to facilitate economic prosperity and growth. Smith did not doubt 
the intellectual soundness of the argument for free trade. Moreover, 
as Dugald Stewart informs us, the idea is one of some 'leading 
principles' whose originality Smith claimed in a paper which dates 
back at least to 1755. 
Projectors disturb nature in the course of her operations in 
human affairs; and it requires no more than to let her alone, and 
give her fair play in the pursuit of her ends, that she may 
establish her own designs. Little else is requisite to 
carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest 
barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration 
of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural 
course of things. All governments which thwart this natural 
course, which force things into another channel, or which 
endeavour to arrest the progress of society at a particular 
point, are unnatural, and to support themselves are obliged to be 
oppressive and tyrannical. 96) 
Granted that the case for free trade finds a place in Smith's 
thought, what will concern us here is a question of the source of his 
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advocacy of economic liberalism or of what makes it basically possible 
for him to believe in it. To start with, let us proceed to review the 
present opinions on it. We can identify three distinct approaches. 
Firstly, it is pointed out that Smith's reasons in support of a 
policy of laissez-faire should be found in his perception of the 
failure of government to perform competently and efficiently even in 
respect of small projects. 97) In a similar context, it is claimed 
that Smith's case for laissez-faire emerges not merely from his 
observation that the British government of his day was vastly 
inefficient and corrupt, but from his firm conviction that government 
interventionism generated further possibilities for private enrichment 
at the expense of social enrichment by way of offering some groups 
special treatment and privileges. ge ) That fact is amply disclosed in 
his polemic against the monopolizing spirit of businessmen and 
mercantilism99 ); his observation of the inefficiency of 
government 1 00); his critique of government interference in support of 
an establ-ished church,101) and of educational establishments. 102) 
As Rosenberg concludes: 'It is impossible to appreciate fully the 
thrust of Adam Smith's arguments concerning laissez-faire until he is 
regarded as very much, and very self-consciously, a social critic of 
eighteenth-century society. As we have seen, Smith subjected most of 
the basic institutions of his day - the economy, the government, the 
church, the educational system - to searching and far reaching 
criticism'. 103) 
Secondly, it is asserted that Smith's doctrine of laissez-faire is 
closely bound up with the thought that he considered the negative 
virtue of justice as one which ought to be treated as the most 
important in the political arena. For Smith, justice is the minimum 
condition for social existence and survival, without which I civil 
society would become a scene of bloodshed and disorder, every man 
revenging himself at his own hand whenever he fancied he was 
injured'. 104) In this connection Smith finds the most important 
function of government to be the enforcement of justice and not in the 
inspiration of a civic-minded virtue: I The wisdom of every state or 
commonwealth endeavours, as well as it can, to employ the force of the 
society to restrain those who are subject to its authority, from 
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hurting or disturbing the happiness of one another',106) Smith 
condemned, and demanded the removal of, many legal institutions which 
violated and sacrificed the principle of justice in terms of 
preference or restraint, consequently arguing for free trade. As 
Teichgraeber makes it clear: 
We have found in the Glasgow Lectures that the first weapons 
Smith used in arguing for free commerce were concepts drawn from 
a well-established tradition of legal humanism that dated back to 
Hugo Grot ius. And those same weapons would be brought into 
battle again in the Weal th of Nations. Smith himself 
sometimes used the phrase "the system of natural liberty" as a 
short-hand description of the entire argument of the Wealth of 
Nations. By this he meant that, it all systems of economic 
preference or restraint could be removed, "every man, as long as 
he does not violate the laws of justice", could in fact be left 
"perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way." 
Smith's argument for economic liberty, in short, were linked with 
an insistence on jurisprudence, and this for reasons any reader 
familiar with natural law jurisprudence might readily have 
understood. 106) 
Meanwhile, a similar yet additional contention tends to suggest 
that the moral primacy of the negative virtue of justice, tied with 
the lack of contextual knowledge available to the state, is the basis 
for Smith's laissez-faire economic philosophy. According to 
Haakonssen, 4 the combination of the distinction between the negative 
and the positive in morals with the distinction between the two kinds 
of knowledge which we traced above - contextual knowledge and system 
knowledge - determines the shape of Smith's theory of politics (as 
opposed to his policy proposals)'. 107) Since the state is never 
capable of the acquisition of the kind of knowledge that individuals 
have, Smith urges it to be mainly concerned to alleviate concrete 
evils, giving rise to pain and misery, and not to interfere in 
economic affairs concerning which individuals have superior knowledge. 
Haakonssen wrote: 
A piecemeal approach in politics which does not aim much higher 
than to remedy given evils will, by contrast, respect those 
individual situations to as high a degree as is possible or it 
will only be guided by those elements in the situations which are 
most 'pungency' felt and which are most 'universally' and 
4 distinctly' sympathized with, namely pain and misery. Whereas 
for the rest the individuals' own lights provide safer 
gUidance. 108) 
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Thirdly and finally, Smith's argument for economic liberalism is 
seen as a result of his belief in a natural order or harmony of human 
interests. 109) In Smith's view God made society into a system where 
a harmonious order in nat ure prevailed. The economic system was 
therefore designed to further a social good when each man was left 
free to seek his own advantage. In this regard, for example, Eric 
Roll maintains: 'The consequences of this belief in the natural order 
are simple. Government can rarely be more effective than when it is 
negative. When Smith applies these rules of the natural order to 
econoliiic matters he becomes a strong opponent of all forms of state 
interference with the ordinary business of industry and commerce'. 110) 
These are three strands of interpretation offered in association 
with the source of Smith's advocacy of laissez-faire. To start with 
it should be admitted that my position with respect to this question 
is in line with the third outlook. But I recognize this only in terms 
of general direction, and not in detail. As I see it, the third line 
of interpretation is, as a matter of fact, defective in some respects. 
Firstly, commentators in this line are inclined, as a rule, to find 
that Smith logically deduces his argument for economic liberalism from 
his a priori presupposition as regard!; a harmonious order in nature. 
The remark of T. E. Cliffe Leslie, a forerunner of this line of 
interpretation, duly reveals this feature. 
the classical conception of Nature supposed simplicity, harmony, 
order, and equality in the moral as in the physical world, in 
Adam Smith's philosophy it becomes associated with divine equity 
and equal benevolence towards all mankind, and by consequence 
with a substantially equal distribution of wealth, as the means 
of material happiness. Nothing, therefore, is needed from human 
legislation beyond the maintenance of equal justice and 
security for every man to pursue his own interest in his own 
way. 111 ) 
Secondly, to the extent to which this kind of interpretation sees 
Smith's practical thought as a logical deduction from his 
presupposi t ion, it tends to neglect the relationship between 
metaphysics and science, and between theoretical description and 
prescri pt ion. In what follows we shall first clarify this, and then 
proceed to comment on the first two lines of interpretation. 
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As we have observed, Smith believed in the harmonious order in 
nature. His lectures on natural theology focused attention on this 
theme. Smith's belief in progress is metatheoretical in the sense 
that it was presupposed prior to and guided theorizing. His 
metatheoretical principle of progress finds expression in a clear-cut 
statement with regard to opulence that self-interest is thought to 
involve: 'The unifor~ constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man 
to better his condition, the principle from which publick and 
national, as well as private opulence is originally derived, is 
frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things 
toward improvement'. 112) It is significant to be aware that despite 
his observation of such countries as China and Bengal which were in 
the stationary and decaying states, Smith believed in and lay stress 
on the possibility of progress. As pointed out in the last chapter, 
the proposition of progress played a conclusive part in shaping the 
frame of his theory of economic growth. It is worthwhile to perceive, 
in a similar vein, that in the event Smith's firm conviction of 
progress enabled him to be critical of the Physiocratic system which 
suggested that an economy 'would thrive and prosper' only tmder a 
certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty and 
perfect justice'. According to Smith the fact is that the bad 
effects of a political economy which involved errors of administration 
and extravagance can be offset. 
Such a pol i tical economy, though it no doubt ret ards more or 
less, is not always capable of stopping altogether the natural 
progress of a nat ion towards weal t h and prosperi t y. and st i 11 
less of making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper 
without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, 
there is not in the world a nation which could ever have 
prospered. In the political body, however the wisdom of nature 
has fortunately made ample provision for remedying many of the 
bad effects of the folly and injustice of man; in the same manner 
as it has done in the natural body, for remedying those of his 
sloth and intemperance. 113) 
However, the metatheoretical principle of progress only determines 
an outline of economic theory and does itself not provide information 
about the economic world. In other words, it suggests only the shape 
in accordance with which theories ought to be built up. A detailed 
analysiS depends upon observations concerning the economic world, and 
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an analytical product of the real world reached in that way provides 
the basis for a practical argument. This is the ground on which 
Smith's analytical view of economic progress finds its place in 
conjunction with his argument for economic policy. 
For Smith, natural forces when left without any constraint or 
preference determine the distribution of capital between the different 
employments in a way which suggests that agriculture is preferable to 
manufactures, and manufactures to foreign trade. As Smith contends: 
• According to the natural course of things, the great er part of 
capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture, 
afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce. 
This order of things is so very natural, that in every society that 
had any territory, it has always, I believe, been in some degree 
observed'. 11.4.> The ground of this assertion lies in the point that 
if equal profits are ensured, agriculture is more secure than 
manufactures, and the latter than foreign trade. 116) As a result of 
the 'natural course of things', if man is left free to pursue his own 
interest, capital accumulation will proceed in a way that maximizes 
economic growth. For agriculture 'adds a much greater value to the 
annual produce of the land and labour of the country, to the real 
wealth and revenue of its inhabitants' in terms of hiring 'a greater 
quantity of productive labour than any equal capital employed in 
manufactures'. 116) The same applies to the preference of 
manufactures to foreign trade. 117) These circumstances, as noted in 
the last chapter, will let society move forward towards rapid 
development by virtue of the interaction between the basic forces of 
economi c growt h. Looking at things in this way, Smith claims: 
the great object of the political oeconomy of every country, is 
to encrease the riches and power of that country. It ought, 
therefore, to give no preference nor superior encouragement to 
the foreign trade of consumption above the home-trade, nor to the 
carrying trade above either of the two. It ought neither to 
force nor to allure into either of those two channels, a greater 
share of the capital of the country than what would naturally 
flow into them of its own accord. 118> 
Hence, there is a good deal of truth in the statement that 'Smith's 
liberalism was a logical product of the theory of political economy 
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set out in the Wealth of Nations'. 119) In passing, it is of great 
importance to be aware that we fail to apprehend precisely the way in 
which Smith offers practical prescription, if we think that here 
Smith, as many modern economists actually do, does not 'derive' 
prescription from analytical description. The truth is that Smith is 
inclined to 'identify' the latter with the former. 120) As we observed 
before, this is a characteristic of the natural law tradition which is 
grounded on organismic philosophy. In any case, while Smith's formal 
analysis of economic growth acts as a basis for his enunciation in 
support of economic liberalis~ at the same time we must not overlook 
the point that Smith's theological belief leads him to proclaim that 
drives and propensities implanted in human nature by a benevolent God 
are designed to bring about social well-being or prosperity. Seen in 
this perspective it is evident that Smith's metaphysics based on 
natural theology and his belief in progress associated with it become 
a source of his argument for economic liberty. Granted that this 
point is correct, it certainly makes up a case which shows that 
metaphys~cal doctrines may have political suggestiveness. 
In what follows we shall finally be concerned to comment on the 
first two views above described. On the first line of interpretation 
Smith argued for the non-intervention of the state because he observed 
as a social critic mainly the incompetence and inefficiency of 
government, and the monopolizing spirit of businessmen to seek private 
interest at the expense of public interest. This interpretation 
tends to add that where government demonstrates its competence and 
efficiency Smith is quite prepared to approve of a wider role in 
economic affairs. 121) In my view, this sort of outlook has certainly 
a merit in that it enables us to perceive how intensive Smith's 
attempt is to denounce a bad system of incentive and instead replace 
it with a good one. Indeed Smith was eager to suggest good 
institutional means to counteract negative outcomes in human affairs. 
However, I think that as an interpretation of the inquiry into why he 
believed in and argued for economic liberalism this type of view 
mistakes a 'necessary condition' for a 'sufficient condition'. A bad 
set of institutions fails to direct 'the interest of every man to live 
as much at his ease as he can'122::> to more prudent and efficient 
activities, whereas a good one is likely to bring successful 
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consequences. One of institutional structures which Smith does have 
in mind is a competitive order in which 'the exertion of the greater 
part of those who exercise it, is always in proportion to the 
necessity they are under of making that exertion'. 123) 
But, the competitive mechanism is a condition on which man can act. 
It tells us nothing about what happens in an economy and how it works. 
As a result, granted that a laissez-fair policy is recommended for the 
increase in wealth, it would not be enough to maintain that Smith's 
observation of inefficient institutional establishments supported by 
government let him argue for economic liberalism. In other words, 
Smith recommended a laissez-faire policy, not because he found an 
inefficient institutional structure, but because he was convinced of 
the most important conclusion of his formal economic analysis that 
under a competitive mechanism surrounded by other appropriate 
institutions a commercial society would go forward while making steady 
growth tied with the process of the efficient allocation of a given 
stock of resources. 124) 
Meanwhile, a similar comment can be made with reference to the 
opinion that 'Smith's arguments for economic liberty, in short, were 
linked with an insistence on justice'. Indeed, in many places in his 
work Smith condemned legal institutions of his day. 12&> It is also 
well-known that in the Wealth of Nations he criticized the 'laws of 
police' like laws imposing restrictions on manufacturers and farmers, 
apprenticeship laws and settlement laws. 126> The normative character 
of jurisprudence which Smith introduced provided the context for legal 
criticism: 'Jurisprudence is that science which inquires into the 
general principles which ought to be the foundation of the laws of 
all nations' . 127> The 'laws of police' of the above kind were 
denounced on the ground that they violated natural justice and 
liberty. This is well illustrated by Smith's strictures on the laws 
which were enacted to prevent the exportation of British wool; those 
laws 'which the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers has 
extorted from the legislature, for the support of their own absurd and 
oppressive monopolies'. 129) Those laws certainly hurt 'the interest 
of the growers of wool, for no other purpose than to promote that of 
the manufacturers', and consequently are evident violations of natural 
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justice: 'To hurt in any degree the interest of anyone order of 
citizens, for no other purpose but to promote that of some other, is 
evidently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which the 
sovereign owes to all the different orders of his subjects', 129) The 
same spirit finds expression in Smith's demand for free mobility of 
labour: 
Let the same natural liberty of exercising what species of 
industry they please be restored to all his majesty's subjects, 
in the same manner as to soldiers and seamen; that is, break down 
the exclusive privileges of corporations, and repeal the statute 
of apprenticeship, both which are real encroachments upon 
natural liberty, and add to these the repeal of the law of 
settlements, so that a poor workman, when thrown out of 
employment either in one trade or in one place, may seek for it 
in another trade or in another place, without the fear either of 
a prosecution or of a removal, and neither the publick nor the 
individuals will suffer much more from the occasional disbanding 
some particular classes of manufacturers, than from that of 
soldiers. 130> 
In the same context Smith concludes: 'All systems either of preference 
or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the 
obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its 
own accord', 131> 
Put in this way Smith's insistence on justice linked with the moral 
primacy of the negative virtue appears to pave the way for his 
pronouncement of economic laissez-faire. At this stage it is 
important to remember that for Smith the main object of a laissez-
faire pOlicy 1s to promote economic growth. If, on account of hi s 
concern with justice, Smith demanded the repeal of the contemporary 
diverse'laws of police' and supported a laissez-faire policy, there is 
no reason to expect that such a liberal policy will serve to back up 
the economic progress of a nation, Without reference to the formal 
analysis of the economic system <which is performed on the assumption 
of perfect liberty and justice) it would be difficult to point out 
what is wrong, for the objective of economic progress, with the 
specific institutions established with specific purposes by the 
'laws of police'. In fact, this is the ground on which Smith could 
claim that every system of restraint or preference 'is in reality 
subversive of the great purpose which it means 
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main ground does not so much consist in justice, but in economic 
reasoning. As Smith goes on to say: 'It retards, instead of 
accelerating, the progress of the society towards real wealth and 
greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of 
the annual produce of its land and labour'. 132) 
On the other hand, it was also found that on Haakonssen's argument 
the lack of local information available to the state made it possible 
fC!r Siilith to advance a laissez-faire position. That is, whilst 
government should be concerned to alleviate injustice owing to the 
moral primacy of the negative virtue, it is advised not to intervene 
where individuals have better situational knowledge. For example, 
where it is stated that when a capitalist acts according to his own 
interest, by 'an invisible hand' he often 'promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote 
it',133> Smith adds that for the politicians who have inferior local 
information to interfere in economic affairs is impolitic and 
presumpt uous: 
What is the species of domestick industry which his capital can 
employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest 
value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local 
situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can 
do for hi~ The statesman, who should attempt to direct private 
people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would 
not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but 
assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to 
no single person, but to no councilor senate whatever, and which 
would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had 
folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise 
it. 134) 
It appears as if the state should not intervene because it is 
impossible to have sufficient contextual knowledge. But it is 
evident that this view also overlooks both the relationship which 
formal economic analysis has with Smith's doctrine of economic 
laissez-faire and that it is a 'theory' or 'general principle' of 
economic policy which is predicated to be real for the advance in 
wealth and welfare independent of whether or not the state has 
particular situational knowledge. Meanwhile, because his doctrine of 
laissez-faire is a general principle of economic policy Smith reminds 
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us that a peculiar circumstance and the constraints associated with it 
should be considered on its practical application, as above noted. 
A conclusion is in order. In this section I have so far attempted 
to show that Smith's political attitude in economic affairs, namely, a 
laissez-faire position. is linked with a metaphysical d~ctrine drawn 
from his study of natural theology. I initially accepted fully some 
significant conclusions of recent studies according to which Smith 
ought not to be regarded as a representative exponent who can be 
characterized by Carlyle's phrase, 'Anarchy plus the constable', and 
furthermore that not only his politics finds an autonomous place in 
his scheme of moral philosophy. but also his politics in a broad sense 
is essential to an understanding of the Weal th of Nations. 
Nonetheless. since it was recognized by nearly all commentators that 
there is a general presumption against government intervention in the 
economic field. I tried to make these clearer in connection with my 
stated ai~ It was pointed out that economic questions to be handled 
by the state just constituted only a part of the arena of public 
policy and that a laissez-faire policy was recommended for the 
specific purpose of increasing wealth or promoting economic 
development. But what is important was that his formal economic 
analysis provided a • sufficient' basis for his support of free trade, 
and that without the former it would be impossible to make a strong 
case for the latter; that his argument for economic liberty became 
what may be called a 'theory' of economic policy. Granted this view 
and since, as we have seen, for Smith the outline of economic theory 
was determined by his belief in progress.i.e., one of his 
metatheoretical doctrines, there may be little doubt that Smith's 
study of natural theology played a most important role in forming his 
political stance about economic affairs. Seen in this perspective 
other views offered to account for why Smith believed in and pleaded 
for economic liberalism remain less convincing. I suppose that they 
deal with what may be called a necessary condition for it, or that one 
of them ignores that his doctrine of the kind is a theory or general 
principle of economic policy. which is declared to be right as a guide 
of economic policy and yet can be practically applied, in his view, 
with modifications in the consideration of circumstances and 
const raint s. 
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110) E.Roll, op.cit., p.14-7. 
111> T. E. Cliffe Leslie, 'The Political Economy of Adam Smith', Essays 
in Political Economy(1888) , p.27. 
112) WN, II. iii. 31; cf. also LJ(A), iv.19. where 'natural progress 
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Profits in British Economic Thought 
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finds that the former is originally 
ethics and economics (A History of 
120) See G.Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of 
Economic Theory(1953), pp.1-22; cf. also above, chapters 2 and 5. 
121) Cf. J. Viner, op.cit., p.164-; N.Rosenberg, op.cit., p.26. 
122) WN, V.i. f.7. 
123) WN, V.i. f.4-; also V.i. b.20. 
124-) A.Lowe described this feature of Smith's conceptual system as a 
mechanism of ' stationary and dynamic feedbacks in joint operation' 
(see 'Adam Smith's System of Equilibrium Growth', in A.S. Skinner and 
T.Wilson(eds.), p.4-21). 
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IV. ix. 50. 
IV. ii. 9. 
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In modern times, few among the social scientists will agree that 
theology has to be a starting point of scientific inquiry. But it is 
very important to realize that the 'conscious' separation of science 
from theology (or philosophy) is quite modern. It is no wonder, in 
this connection, that Smith's lectures on moral philosophy began with 
natural theology. Although the linking chain between philosophy and 
science had by degrees become broken since the seventeenth century, 
until the eighteenth century scientific activities were not considered 
to be strictly independent of philosophical speculations in a narrower 
sense that we think of today. As an example I cited the statement of 
Robert Boyle, a great pioneer chemist, to the effect that Harvey's 
metaphysical speculation led him to make the scientific discovery of 
the circulation of blood (Chapter 2), It is likewise remarkable that 
for Sir Isaac Newton, who gave the Enlightenment a model to follow in 
a similar sort of activity, a starting point of science was his faith 
in a divine order established by a benevolent God. 1) 
We are reminded, of course, that to say that a starting point for 
Smith is his religious belief in a divine order does not imply that he 
'logically' deduces from that presupposition the explanation of the 
operations of the social world. Smith is a realist, which also means 
that he stands in a broadly empiricist philosophical tradition 
(Chapter 4-). Smith concentrates exclusively on efficient causes when 
he engages in accounting for the workings of man and society, just as 
Newton and his method, (as dist inguished from that of Descartes), 
demanded both to avoid the 'direct' deduction of the general laws of 
nature from phi losophical speculations, and to base scient i fie 
investigation on observation and experiment. 
Modern minds, even when they are well aware of this fact, are 
inclined to think that whilst Smith's natural theology and his belief 
in a benevolent God is a part of, and even an important presupposition 
of, his system of thought, they yet play no role in relation to his 
scientific inquiry. It is well-known that Smith offers a causal 
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explanation in his study of man in society. Accordingly it is 
scarcely believed that his theological outlook is influential in his 
science of society. Rather, Smith's theology can be regarded as a 
consequence of his study of nature and society. This is today a 
conventional view with respect to the place and role of Smith's 
natural theology and his belief in a benevolent God, which I feel to 
be not true. It is noteworthy that this popular account of Smith's 
theological view may have a difficulty in the face of an argument 
which rejects the usually accepted opinion that Smith, like many of 
his contemporaries, subscribed to deis~ on the ground that he found, 
as a matter of fact, a large number of evils which were present in 
society (Chapter 2). 
In fact, it is impossible to find a linkage between Smith's 
theological outlook and his scientific study, namely, a part which the 
former plays in the latter, using the restricted language of logical 
positivism. Since logical positivism assumes the 'analytic/empirical' 
dichotomy, there is no room for any other statement, except for both 
tautological or necessarily true, and synthetic or factual statements. 
()n that assumption Smith's theological view is meaningless in respect 
of scientific inquiry. I suppose that such a premiss was the 
background knowledge with which many commentators worked in support of 
the popular view above noted. But it is of critical importance to be 
aware that there is another statement which cannot be understood with 
the 'analytic/empirical' dichotomy, yet tells us something about the 
factual world. That is called a synthetic a priori proposition. The 
characteristic of the synthetic a priori proposition is that it 
describes the real world while at the same time its truth or falsity 
is independent of experience. M.etaphysical propositions, which make 
claims about the intrinsic nature of the universe while providing 
speculat i ve wor'ld views that are not as subj ect to cri t icism as 
scientific theories, belong to the synthetic a priori statements. 
Undoubtedly Smith's theological outlook can be considered to be a 
metaphysical proposition in this respect; his belief in a benevolent 
Deity is inconclusively confirmable and yet irrefutable. 
doctrines are influential in scientific projects. 
doctrines are said to be methodologically suggestive 
M.etaphysical 
M.etaphysical 
in that they 
provide the vision which shows ways of exploring data in the world, 
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and come to limit, or rule out a certain range of theoretical 
possibilit.ies. It is also claimed that they have moral or political 
suggestiveness as well (Chapter 2). 
Against this background, in the present study I have mainly 
attempted to provide a more coherent interpretation with regard to an 
intimate relationship between natural theology and the science of man 
in society within Smith's scheme of moral philosophy. As we are 
aware, many authors have recently shown a systematic unity between 
ethics, jurisprudence or politics, and political economy in Smith's 
plan of moral philosophy. The primary aim of the present work was to 
argue for a systematic unity between Smith's theological view and the 
scientific study of SOCiety. For that purpose I have endeavoured to 
answer two types of questions, which can be, though related, 
distinguished; firstly, a problem with regard to whether or not there 
is an inextricable relation between Smith's theological view, and his 
science of morals and theoretical economics; secondly, another problem 
concerning how the dark side of human life which finds expression in 
Smith's two major books has to be understood and resolved, granted 
that Smith presupposes his religious faith in a benevolent God for the 
scientific analysis of man and society. 
In connection with the first question, which ought to be positively 
answered if there is indeed the systematic linkage between Smith's 
theology and his science of man in the sense that we describe, I have 
identified his metatheoretical principles which are inextricably bound 
up with, and supported by, his theological view with respect to God's 
benevolence (Chapter 3), First, we have seen that Smith presupposes 
the idea of 'the law of the heterogeneity of purposes', which implies 
that while man acts largely for his private ends following natural 
deSires, such blind actions of individuals mani fest themselves in the 
way that serves to bring benevolent social purposes. This idea is 
well-known due to its conjlllction with the 'invisible hand passage', 
so that in Chapter 3 I outlined its methodological implication without 
giving further treatment in subsequent chapters. But we are reminded 
that I consider the idea to be an organizing principle for theorizing, 
rather than a teleological framework which ensues from prior causal 
analysis as some commentators have noted. 
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Secondly, the doctrine of the supposition of harmony, or the 
rUling-out of conflict at the 'analyt ical' level was regarded as one 
of Smith's metatheoretical principles (Chapter 3), We noted that the 
conception of divine goodness produced the idea of the best possible 
world which revealed harmonious movements in its 'original array'. An 
important reminder in identifying this principle was that Smith did 
not believe social harmony to prevail in society whilst at the same 
time ignoring the apparent facts of social conflict. It is to be kept 
in mind that from the 'abstract and philosophical' perspective social 
harmony was declared. In this regard we once again have to perceive a 
connection of Smith's theological idea with his organismic philosophy. 
For the form of normative organicism, a metaphysical doctrine, does 
not declare that the 'natural' state of things is entirely realized in 
actuality; and it nevertheless claims that in the course of a movement 
towards completion its partial realization can be observed. It is 
likely to be easy to make this out, if we are reminded that the 
concept of 'nature' and its related idea of 'natural law' which Smith 
uses illustrate three sorts of philosophical tradition which are 
interdependent of each other (Chapter 2). At all events, I have tried 
to demonstrate my theme in subsequent chapters (Chapters 5 and 6). It 
was shown that Smith's moral theory which works on the key principles 
of sympathy and the impartial spectator rules out the possibilities of 
conflict in moral discourse; and that in the 'analytic' treatment of 
value and distribution of an exchange economy he found no inverse 
relations in which one class cannot be better off without another 
class being worse off, 
antagonism or conflict 
social product. 
which, in the end, means that he saw no class 
in association with the distribution of the 
Thirdly, there is a metatheoretical principle which was ident ified 
in its connection with Smith's theological outlook about God's 
benevolence in the shape of the concept of progress. This has been 
one of many themes which are familiar to Smi thian commentators. The 
perception of this concept of progress as a 'metatheoretical' 
proposition was of particular interest, because there were two claims, 
which have not received a proper reply; the first was that the idea of 
progress of SOCiety might not be the historical frame of the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments; the second was that the Wealth of Nations manifests 
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the duality of Smith's historical vision, optimistic and (yet 
eventually) pessimistic. It was demonstrated that Smith in the former 
book talks about the progress of moral values, just as he has the same 
idea concerning the progress of legal codes and of wealth; Smith's 
detailed description of the stationary state is no more than an 
empirical statement, for which he does not offer an analytic or 
theoretical treatment, and his formal analysis of social evolution 
discloses that he has in mind a type of economy marked by a steady 
growth. 
As I mentioned above, the second question which I have endeavoured 
to address in the present study was about how the broad presence in 
both books of the flaws in the natural order has to be understood and 
resolved if we find that Smith sincerely believed in a harmonious 
order set up by a benevolent God. A number of authors have introduced 
the 'two Smiths' in order to account for this problem as we have seen. 
They are liable to see an irreconcilable conflict of beliefs in Smith. 
A conventional view on the duality of Smith's method of inquiry shares 
the same assumption. It was claimed by these authors that Smith's 
perspective is twofold owing to two different kinds of method of 
inquiry which he makes 'parallel' use of, namely, ideal and real, or 
abstract and empirical. Smith the theorist reaches optimistic 
conclusions on the basis of the premiss of perfect individual virtue, 
or abstract 
pessimistic 
observations 
human propensities, whilst 
pictures from the premiss 
of real social conditions. 
Smith the observer draws 
of human frailty, or from 
It is noteworthy that this 
view as to the duality of Smith's method is closely linked to, and 
lends support for, the duality of Smith's philosophic vision. 
However, if we are reminded that Newton's method of analysis and 
synthesis which Smith seems to employ reqUires both inductive and 
deductive stages, it is hard to assume why Smith entirely separates 
the two methods, abstract and empirical, and makes parallel use of 
them (Chapt er 5). 
It is agreed that Smith was a systemat ic thinker. A systemat ic 
thinker may seem to fail to be consistent in detail. However it seems 
difficult to suppose that he may also be so in the br'oad. The so-
called inconsistency of belief and vision in Smith was present from 
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the outset in the Tbeory of Moral Sentiments to his final revision of 
the same book. This is also true of the wealth of Nation~ It was my 
view that Smith's theological outlook with reference to God's 
benevolence, which is inconclusively confirmable from the empirical 
study of nature and society, now becomes a metaphysical doctrine, a 
presupposit ion, which is irrefutable or almost independent of the 
empirical study of nature, when he indulges in the science of society. 
Smith's theological opinion can be regarded as the world view for hi~ 
the vision which suggests ways of exploring data in the world. Smith 
was too honest an observer. Smith was so level-headed an observer 
that he was well aware of diverse features of society. in both its 
bright and dark sides. It may therefore be said that he was well-
balanced at the practical level. Yet what is of the highest importance 
at this stage is that his world view or vision does not allow him to 
see the negative facets of reality be appropriate material for 
theoretical analysis, since they are not believed to stem from a 
'original arrangements' of nature. Rather they are regarded as the 
deviation from the original array of nature. Here it is noted that a 
form of normative organicis~ Smith's metaphysical doctrine, 
constantly serves as a methodological principle in the background of 
his thought. As pointed out before, this is hardly surprising, 
because the concept of 'nature' and its associated notion of 'natural 
law' in Smith's thought incorporate those ideas which are grounded on 
the traditions of theology and organismic philosophy (as well as the 
doctrine of mechanistic determinism). This is the ground on which 
Smith both focusses exclusive attention on the happy side of SOCiety, 
and leaves its negat ive facets as empirical data alone. Though the 
fact that Smith leaves the negative aspects of human activities only 
as the honest description at the practical level i8 by no means 
undeserving, especially looked at in the context of politics (Chapter 
7), certainly it will be mistaken if such facts lead us to conclude 
that Smith has two contrasting types of vision which are impossible of 
reconciliation, and that he makes parallel use of two distinctive 
methods. It should be remember'ed that in a similar context I have 
attempted to shed light on the contrast between Mandeville and Smith, 
and between Smith and Marx (Chapters 5 and 6). Many commentators have 
pointed out a similarity of thought between Smith and these writers, 
on the basis of a similarity of observed facts at the practical level. 
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In those places I intended to stress that the differences of 
metaphysics between them are basically responsible for the fundamental 
differences of their perception with respect to the 'true' operations 
of the social world, or to which side among various respects of 
reality represents the essence or nature of things and is therefore 
proper for 'theoretical' analysis. Those arguments were in part 
designed to reinforce my theme that metaphysics is influential in 
'scientific' projects. 
It was noted that metaphysics may have political suggestiveness (as 
well as met hodologi cal suggest i veness), alt hough it does not entai 1 
part icular policy proposals. In the final main chapter (Chapter 7) I 
have tried to examine the bearing of Smith's theological view and its 
associated principles on his political attitude in economic affairs. 
It was init ially observed that Smith's formal analysis of economic 
growth acts as the I sufficient' basis for his argument for economic 
liberty. The reason does not rest on the fact that Smith 'derives' 
practical conclusions from his formal analysis as modern economists 
think, but on the point that he does simply 'identify' the one with 
the other, just as he equates his science of morals with normative 
ethics (Chapters 2 and 5>. It was noted that such identification of 
analyt ic descript ion with prescript ion shows the influence of 
organismic philosophy which is common to the natural law tradition. 
But since the shape of Smith's formal analysis of growth is regulated 
by the notion of progress, one of Smith's metatheoretical principles, 
there is little difficulty in being conscious that his theological 
outlook plays the important part in affecting his political attitude 
in economic affairs. 
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Note to Chapter 8 
1) Cf. R. H. Hurlbutt, III, Hume, Newton, and the Design 
Argument(965); C. M. A. Clark, I Natural Law Influences on Adam Smith', 
Quaderni di 5toria dell'Economia Politica, Vol. 6(1988), pp.59-86. 
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